throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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` Paper 9
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` Entered: March 8, 2017
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
` GOOGLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`
` IXI MOBILE (R&D) LTD.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before BRYAN F. MOORE, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`Ex. 2001 1/42
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`

`

`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
`
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Google, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) pursuant
`to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–10 of
`U.S. Patent No. 7,552,124 B2 (“the ’124 patent,” Ex. 1001). The Petition is
`supported by the Declaration of Jason Flinn, Ph.D. (Ex. 1002). IXI Mobile
`(R&D) Ltd. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (“Prelim.
`Resp.,” Paper 7). The Preliminary Response is supported by the Declaration
`of Lin Chase, Ph.D. (“Chase Declaration,” “Chase Dec.,” Ex. 2001).
`For the reasons set forth below, we institute an inter partes review of
`claims 1–5 of the ’124 patent, but we do not institute an inter partes review
`of claims 6–10 of the ’124 patent.
`A. Related Matters
`Petitioner advises us that the following District Court lawsuits may
`affect or be affected by this proceeding: IXI Mobile (R&D) Ltd. v.
`BlackBerry Limited, No. 2:15-cv-01883 (E.D. Tex.); IXI IP, LLC v. HTC
`Corp., No. 2:15-cv-1884 (E.D. Tex.); IXI IP, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`Ltd., No. 2:15-cv-01885 (E.D. Tex.); IXI IP, LLC v. ZTE Corp., No. 2:15-
`cv-01886 (E.D. Tex.); and Google Inc. v. IXI Mobile (R&D) Ltd., No. 5:16-
`cv-04173 (N.D. Cal). Pet. 1. Petitioner also identifies Microsoft Corp. et al.
`v. IXI IP, LLC, IPR2017-00898, filed February 16, 2017, as involving the
`’124 patent. Paper 8, 1.
`
`B. The ’124 Patent
`The ’124 patent, titled “Natural language for programming a
`specialized computing system,” is directed to a method and corresponding
`
`2
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`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
`
`
`system for “programming a mobile communication device based on a high-
`level code comprising operative language.” Ex. 1001, Title, Abstract. A
`user provides “[h]igh-level code 150 [which] may comprise one or more
`sentences, wherein each sentence comprises at least one operative language
`(i.e. keyword) defining an instruction for a function or an operation to be
`performed.” Id. at 4:10–21. “[I]f high-level code 150 comprises a complex
`set of instructions, then high-level code 150 is transmitted to network server
`100,” but
`if high-level code 150 comprises a less complex structure, then
`application software 1122 or a portion thereof is installed and
`executed on mobile device 120 to process high-level code 150 to
`produce executable code 160, without the need for transferring
`high-level code 150 to a more powerful processing environment
`implemented on network server 100.
`
`Id. at 4:49–51, 4:58–64.
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1 and 6 are the only independent
`claims.
`Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative.
`1. A method for programming a mobile communication device based on a
`high-level code comprising operative language, the method comprising:
`receiving a high-level code comprising one or more
`keywords, wherein the high-level code is provided by a user of a
`mobile communication device to control the operation of the
`mobile communication device without having to select from
`menu items provided by an operating system running on the
`mobile communication device;
`
`3
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`IPR2016-01669
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`parsing the high-level code for the keywords to recognize
`the operative language associated with controlling one or more
`operations of the mobile communication device;
`determining at least one operation associated with the
`operative language;
`determining whether high-level code comprises keywords
`defining one or more relationships and conditions corresponding
`to the operative language;
`producing an executable code that can be executed by a
`microcontroller of the mobile communication device to perform the
`respective operation associated with the operative language;
`determining level of complexity and implementation of the
`high-level code; and
`designating an application software to process the high level
`
`code,
`
`wherein the high-level code comprises at least one sentence
`formatted in accordance with a first context,
`wherein the high-level code is processed by a natural language
`compiler comprised of one or more modules executed on one or more
`independent computing systems, depending on the level of complexity
`and the implementation of the high-level code,
`wherein application software is executed on a distributed
`environment comprising the mobile communication device and a
`network server connected to the mobile communication device, and
`the application software performs the parsing and determining steps
`depending on implementation, and
`wherein when the high-level code comprises a complex
`structure the parsing and determining steps are performed by
`application software executed on a network server connected to the
`mobile communication device and when the high-level code
`comprises a less complex structure the parsing and determining steps
`are performed by application software executed on the mobile
`communication device.
`
`Ex. 1001, 8:59–9:38.
`
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`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
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`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`Petitioner relies upon the following prior art references:
`
`(Ex. 1005)
`Feb. 21, 20061
`Maes
`US 7,003,463 B1
`(Ex. 1006)
`Preston
`US 2003/0046061 A1
`Mar. 6, 2003
`Pazandak US 7,027,975 B1
`Apr. 11, 20062 (Ex. 1007)
`White
`US 2002/0072918 A1
`June 13, 2002
`(Ex. 1008)
`Aug. 1, 20063
`(Ex. 1009)
`Manson
`US 7,085,708 B2
`
`
`
`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 2):
`
`Challenged Claims
`
`Basis
`
`References
`
`1–10
`
`1–10
`
`§ 103 Maes and Preston
`
`§ 103
`
`Pazandak, White, and Manson
`
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
`LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under the broadest reasonable
`
`
`1 From a PCT with a 35 U.S.C. § 371(c)(1) date of June 25, 2001.
`2 Filed August 8, 2000.
`3 Filed June 18, 2001.
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`interpretation standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary
`meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the
`context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249,
`1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`1. “operative language”
`Petitioner proposes a construction for the claim term “operative
`language” (claims 1–10). Pet. 7–8. Specifically, Petitioner proposes that
`“operative language” means “language associated with one or more
`operations to be performed.” Id. at 7. Petitioner relies on the Specification’s
`disclosure that ‘“operative language’ [(i.e. keyword]) [may] . . . ‘defin[e] an
`instruction for a function or an operation to be performed.”’ Ex. 1001, 4:19–
`21 (cited at Pet. 8); Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:25–28, 9:2–4, 10:6–9; Ex.
`1002 ¶¶ 24–25).
`Patent Owner asserts “[f]or purposes of this paper, Patent Owner
`applies Petitioner’s proposed construction without prejudice, but reserves its
`rights to present evidence and arguments in this or any other proceeding as
`to the proper construction of the term ‘operative language’ within the
`meaning of the ’124 Patent.” Prelim. Resp. 6. Petitioner’s construction is
`generally consistent with the Specification. However, because, at this stage,
`there is no significant argument that the prior art does not read on this term,
`we determine it is unnecessary to provide an express construction for this
`claim term at this stage of the proceeding.
`
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`2. Means-Plus-Function Terms
`Petitioner recognizes that claims 6–104 contain limitations written in
`means-plus-function format5 and that, as such, there is a rebuttable
`presumption that they are governed by section 112, paragraph 6. Pet. 8–10;
`See Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade
`Commission, 161 F.3d 696, 703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1998). On the present record,
`we determine that section 112, paragraph 6 governs these limitations, as they
`use the word “means,” and no rebuttal evidence has been presented. Id.;
`Prelim. Resp. 7. Thus, pursuant to the statute, they are to be construed to
`cover the corresponding structure described in the specification and
`equivalents. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
`As an example, one of the limitations at issue recites “means for
`parsing the high-level code for the keywords to recognize the operative
`language associated with controlling one or more operations of the mobile
`
`
`4 Claims 7–10 depend ultimately from claim 6 and incorporate the means
`plus-function limitations of claim 6.
`5 Specifically, “means for receiving a high-level code comprising one or
`more keywords”; “means for parsing the high-level code for the keywords to
`recognize the operative language associated with controlling one or more
`operations of the mobile communication device”; “means for determining at
`least one operation associated with the operative language”; “means for
`determining whether high-level code comprises keywords defining one or
`more relationships and conditions corresponding to the operative language”;
`“means for producing an executable code”; “means for determining level of
`complexity and implementation of the high-level code”; and “means for
`designation an application software to process the high-level code.”
`
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`communication device.” Pet. 9. Petitioner contends that the structure that
`should relied upon for the recited function for this limitation—and as to all
`but one of these limitations6—is “software running on a processor
`configured to perform the identified functions or equivalents thereof.” Id.
`However, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner points to any algorithm for
`performing the functions contained in the relevant limitations of claims 6–
`10. Pet. 11–13; see also Function Media, LLC v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d
`1310, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that a computer-implemented means-
`plus-function limitation is indefinite because the specification failed to
`disclose the specific algorithm used by the computer to perform the recited
`function). In fact, Petitioner asserts that “beyond repeating some claim
`language for some identified functions, the specification for the ’124 patent
`does not disclose any algorithm that corresponds to the identified functions
`of [the means-plus-function claim elements].” Pet. 12–13.
`The Specification states “application software 1122 parses high-level
`code 150 for keywords in an attempt to recognize any operative language
`included in high-level code 150 (S220).” Ex. 1001, 5:36–39. However, the
`Specification does not explain sufficiently how the application software
`recognizes the keywords. C.f. TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 731
`F.3d 1336, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that an algorithm was shown
`
`
`6 Petitioner asserts that the corresponding structure for the term “means for
`receiving a high-level code comprising one or more keywords” is “a user
`interface, including a keypad, pointing device, touchscreen, keyboard,
`microphone, or equivalents thereof.” Pet. 9
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`despite the specification’s reference to generic software because the
`specification explains how the generic software works.). Such “black box”
`disclosures of software can be too generic to provide corresponding structure
`for computer-implemented means-plus-function limitations. Blackboard,
`Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir.2009) (“The ACM
`is essentially a black box that performs a recited function. But how it does
`so is left undisclosed.”); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509,
`518 (Fed. Cir.2012) (holding that “black box” labeled “Purchase Orders”
`was insufficient structure to perform the “generate purchase orders”
`function); Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir.
`2012) (“the disclosure must identify the method for performing the function,
`whether or not a skilled artisan might otherwise be able to glean such a
`method from other sources or from his own understanding.”). That is the
`case here. Thus, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Specification
`discloses an algorithm for the function of parsing a keyword or any other
`structure to enable us to determine if the asserted prior art teaches such
`structure.
`Thus, Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
`prevailing in its challenge to claims 6–10, and the Petition as to those claims
`is denied. See Blackberry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, IPR2013-
`00036, Paper No. 65 (Mar. 7, 2014) (terminating inter partes review
`proceeding because specification did not disclose specific algorithm to
`perform recited function of a computer-implemented means-plus-function
`term).
`
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`For purposes of this Decision and based on the record before us, we
`determine it is unnecessary to provide express constructions for any other
`claim terms at this stage of the proceeding.
`B. Principles of Law
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise
`teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
`a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also
`Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1259, 1262 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
`The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of
`record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
`In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich,
`579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).
`
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`C. Obviousness of Claims over Maes and Preston
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–5 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103(a) as obvious over Maes and Preston. Pet. 14. To support its
`contentions, Petitioner provides explanations as to how the prior art
`allegedly teaches each claim limitation. Id. at 14–46.
`1. Maes
`Maes (Ex. 1005), entitled “System and Method for Providing Network
`Coordinated Conversational Services,” is generally directed to a “system and
`method for providing automatic and coordinated sharing of conversational
`resources, e.g., functions and arguments, between network-connected
`servers and devices and their corresponding applications.” Ex. 1005,
`Abstract. Maes provides third party applications access to conversational
`services that are, in general, complex, resource-intensive, and expensive to
`operate (e.g., speech recognition, natural language understanding, text-to-
`speech generation, natural language generation, and speaker identification).
`See, e.g., id. at 1:49–60, 4:24–29, 4:57–62, 8:13–16. Maes describes a
`system in which networked devices are made “conversationally aware” of
`each other by using conversational network protocols to transmit messages,
`processed by dialog managers, to automatically share conversational
`resources and functions among the networked devices, and the method of
`operating such a system. Id. at 2:35–48, 5:19–25.
`2. Preston
`Preston (Ex. 1006), entitled “Apparatus for Automatically Generating
`Source Code,” provides “[a] method of automatically generating software
`
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`from one or more predefined functions in accordance with an input
`statement entered in natural language.” Ex. 1006, Abstract. Preston further
`“relates to apparatus for automatically generating source code, and is
`particularly, but not exclusively, suitable for generating source code for
`communication services.” Id. ¶ 1.
`Preston explains that a non-programmer should be able to program a
`system without the need to learn a particular programming language and
`identifies that there are “many situations where it is desirable for a non-
`programmer to be able to program a system so that it can subsequently act
`on his or her behalf without further interaction.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.
`Preston describes a method to allow a user (e.g., a non-programmer)
`to input a natural language instruction and have it analyzed to generate
`source code customized for carrying out the user’s wishes. Id. ¶ 49. Preston
`provides that certain natural language descriptions are associated with
`predefined functions and their relationships are stored in data storage. Id.
`¶ 57. After a user inputs natural language, it is determined whether the input
`natural language is associated with any of the pre-defined functions in the
`data storage. Id. ¶ 61. If the user’s input is associated with a function
`contained in the data storage, a code generator generates source code
`corresponding to the pre-defined function. Id.
`
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`3. Analysis
`
`a. Claim 1
`i. “receiving a high-level code . . .”
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`Maes teaches “receiving a high-level code comprising one or more
`keywords, wherein the high-level code is provided by a user of a mobile
`communication device to control the operation of the mobile communication
`device without having to select from menu items provided by an operating
`system running on the mobile communication device.” Pet. 17–18; Ex.
`1005, 10:59–62, 15:46–61; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64.
`ii. “parsing the high-level code for the keywords . . .”
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`the combination of Maes and Preston teaches “parsing the high-level code
`for the keywords to recognize the operative language associated with
`controlling one or more operations of the mobile communication device.”
`Pet. 18–21; Ex. 1005, 2:6–10, 4:24–29, 4:57–62, 8:34–35, 11:23–33, FIG. 2;
`Ex. 1002 ¶ 64. For example, Petitioner asserts that “Maes describes
`‘recognition/understanding’ of the word ‘dial’ in a command to dial a phone
`number.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 15:49–61; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64).
`iii. “determining at least one operation . . .”
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`Maes teaches “determining at least one operation associated with the
`operative language.” Pet. 21–22; Ex. 1005, 4:24–29, 57–62, 11:46–47, 62–
`63, 15:49–61; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64.
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`iv. “determining whether high-level code comprises
`keywords . . .”
`
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`the combination of Maes and Preston teaches “determining whether high-
`level code comprises keywords defining one or more relationships and
`conditions corresponding to the operative language.” Pet. 22–25; Ex. 1005,
`2:6-10, 4:24–29, 4:57–62, 8:34–35, 11:23–33, FIG. 2, Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 49, 92,
`99–102, 123; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 41–44, 64. For example, Petitioner relies on
`Preston to show keywords defining relationships and conditions. Pet. 23;
`Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 49, 92, 99–102, 123. Preston discloses “input statements, which
`are entered in natural language, . . . may comprise condition/action
`information.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 99. On the present record, Petitioner articulates
`sufficient reasons for combining Maes and Preston including at least that the
`combination uses known method to obtain predictable results. Pet. 24–25.
`For example, Petitioner asserts:
`A POSA would have recognized the benefits of modifying the
`system and processes of Maes to use and process high-level code
`including keywords defining relationships and conditions,
`similar to that disclosed by Preston, and thus would have been
`motivated to modify the system and processes of Maes in this
`way. Such a modification would have enabled a user of the
`system and processes of Maes to accomplish a wider variety of
`tasks through commands uttered to a mobile communication
`device, e.g., because the commands could include details
`regarding relationships and conditions pertinent to the user’s
`desires. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, ¶¶ [0099]-[0102]; Ex. 1002, ¶64.
`This modification would have been a straightforward
`change for a POSA to make, given that both Maes’s system and
`Preston’s system operate in a similar manner, e.g., by accepting
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`a natural language input from a user, processing the input, and
`controlling a mobile communication device to perform a task
`based on the processed input. See Ex. 1005, 15:49-55, 11:23-33,
`FIG. 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract; Ex. 1002, ¶64. Modifying Maes to
`determine whether high-level code comprises keywords defining
`relationships and conditions corresponding to operative language
`would have required minimal change to downstream processing
`related to controlling the mobile communication device that
`would have been within the skill of an ordinary artisan. Ex. 1005,
`15:49-55, 11:23-33, FIG. 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract; Ex. 1002, ¶64.
`Indeed, adding to Maes the capability to determine
`whether high-level code comprises keywords defining
`relationships and conditions corresponding to operative language
`would have involved a combination of prior art elements (e.g.,
`Maes’s speech recognition, conversational engines, and control
`of a device such as a phone, and Preston’s keywords defining
`relationships and conditions) according to known methods (e.g.,
`including Preston’s processing regarding relationships and
`conditions to Maes’s conversational engines, which already
`included parsing capabilities to recognize operative language) to
`yield predictable results (e.g., Maes’s conversational system and
`natural language understanding engines being augmented to be
`able to process additional natural language statements pertaining
`to additional scenarios, thereby expanding the user’s ability to
`program the device). See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
`398, 416 (2007); Ex. 1002, ¶64.
`
`
`Id.
`
`v. “producing an executable code . . .”
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`the combination of Maes and Preston teaches “producing an executable code
`that can be executed by a microcontroller of the mobile communication
`device to perform the respective operation associated with the operative
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`language.” Pet. 26–30; Ex. 1005, 1:63–65, 5:58–64; 6:11–37; 8:34, 11:23–
`33, 15:45–49, Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 7–8, 49, 59, 61, 77–82, 185; Ex. 1002 ¶ 64. On
`the present record, Petitioner articulates sufficient reasons for combining
`Maes and Preston including at least that the combination uses known method
`to obtain predictable results. Pet. 29. For example, Petitioner relies on the
`reasons stated in the quoted section above. Additionally, Petitioner asserts:
`Given the disclosures of Preston and Maes, a POSA at the time
`of the alleged invention for the ’124 patent would have
`recognized the benefit of modifying the system and processes of
`Maes to implement producing an executable code that can be
`executed to perform the respective operation associated with the
`operative language, similarly to as described in Preston. Ex.
`1002, ¶64; see also Ex. 1006, ¶¶ [0007]-[0008]. Additionally, a
`POSA would have found this modification to be a simple
`combination of familiar elements (e.g., Maes’s natural language
`input and Preston’s conversion of natural language input into
`executable code) according to known methods (e.g., generation
`of executable code by producing source code and compiling it to
`generate object code for execution by a processor, as was well
`known in the art) to yield predictable results. See KSR, 550 U.S.
`at 416; Ex. 1002, ¶64. Modifying Maes in this way would have
`yielded the predictable result of generating executable code that
`could be executed by a device, as expressly contemplated by
`Maes. Ex. 1005, 3:64-65; Ex. 1002, ¶64.
`
`
`Id. at 28–29.
`
`vi. “determining level of complexity and
`implementation of the high-level code”
`
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision
`that Maes teaches “determining level of complexity and
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`implementation of the high-level code.” Pet. 31–32; Ex. 1005, 3:1–5,
`4:36–44; 11:8–10, 16:42–47; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64.
`vii. “designating an application software to
`process the high level code”
`
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision
`that Maes teaches “designating an application software to process the
`high level code.” Pet. 32–33; Ex. 1005, 3:60–62, 4:20–62; Ex. 1002,
`¶ 64.
`
`viii. “wherein the high-level code comprises at least
`one sentence . . .”
`
`
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision
`that Maes teaches “wherein the high-level code comprises at least one
`sentence formatted in accordance with a first context.” Pet. 33–34;
`Ex. 1005, 4:15–17, 24–29, 10:59–62; 15:49–55; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64.
`ix. “wherein the high-level code is processed by a
`natural language compiler . . .”
`
`
`
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`Maes teaches “wherein the high-level code is processed by a natural
`language compiler comprised of one or more modules executed on one or
`more independent computing systems, depending on the level of complexity
`and the implementation of the high-level code” Pet. 34–36; Ex. 1005, 2:66–
`3:10, 4:24–29, 42–45, 57–62, 8:34–35, 11:23–33, 15:55–61, 16:42–47, Fig.
`1; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64. On the present record, Petitioner articulates sufficient
`reasons for combining Maes and Preston. Pet. 36. For example, Petitioner
`argues in the alternative that “it would have been obvious to a POSA to
`17
`
`Ex. 2001 17/42
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
`
`
`modify the NLU engines in Maes to produce such executable code, in view
`of Preston, which describes such features that result in executable code, for
`the reasons discussed [in regard to the limitation directed to ‘producing an
`executable code’].” Pet. 36.
`x. “wherein application software is executed on a
`distributed environment . . .”
`
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`Maes teaches “wherein application software is executed on a distributed
`environment comprising the mobile communication device and a network
`server connected to the mobile communication device, and the application
`software performs the parsing and determining steps depending on
`implementation.” Pet. 37–39; Ex. 1005, 3:1–5, 4:10–62, 15:55–61, 16:42–
`47; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64.
`xi. “wherein when the high-level code comprises a
`complex structure . . .”
`
`Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that
`Maes teaches “wherein when the high-level code comprises a complex
`structure the parsing and determining steps are performed by application
`software executed on a network server connected to the mobile
`communication device and when the high-level code comprises a less
`complex structure the parsing and determining steps are performed by
`application software executed on the mobile communication device.” Pet.
`39–40; Ex. 1005, 3:1–5, 16:42–47; Ex. 1002, ¶ 64.
`
`18
`
`Ex. 2001 18/42
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
`
`
`
`b. Patent Owner Response
`i. “parsing the high-level code for the keywords . . .”
`Claim 1 recites “parsing the high-level code for the keywords to
`recognize the operative language associated with controlling one or more
`operations of the mobile communication device.” Patent Owner argues
`“Petitioner has failed to show that Maes, upon which Petitioner exclusively
`relies, discloses or suggests the specific parsing technique recited in claims 1
`and 6 of the ’124 Patent, which require ‘parsing the high level code for
`keywords. . . .’” Prelim. Resp. 17. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts
`Maes’s “generic identification of a ‘parser,’ however, does not suggest
`parsing an input for ‘keywords.’ Though NLU services may utilize some
`form of a parser, there is no indication in Maes of any specific parsing
`technique as being part of its NLU service.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 2001
`(Chase Dec.) ¶ 51 (internal citations omitted)). Based on the current record
`and the parties’ arguments, we disagree.
`In order to evaluate this argument, we examine how parsing of
`keywords is accomplished in the Specification. Petitioner correctly asserts
`“regarding the parsing features . . . the specification refers to application
`software that is implemented to parse high-level code for keywords in an
`attempt to recognize any data sources.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:44–51).
`In fact, the Specification does not explain sufficiently how the parsing for
`keywords is accomplished by the application software.
`Patent Owner, through its Declarant, asserts “[a] person of ordinary
`skill in the art would understand that when parsing for keywords, the parser
`
`19
`
`Ex. 2001 19/42
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
`
`
`does not account for or rely upon items in the input (high-level code) that are
`not keywords, but rather selectively and individually identifies particular
`items in the input sequence (i.e., the keywords).” Ex. 2001 ¶ 48; Prelim.
`Resp. 3–4. Thus, Patent Owner suggests that the claims require a negative
`limitation to a parser that avoids accounting for non-keywords. Id. Patent
`Owner’s Declarant does not cite the specification or any other reference for
`this proposition nor does Patent Owner provide sufficient evidence to
`support so limiting the claims. Therefore, we find no basis to depart from
`the ordinary and customary meaning of the term, i.e. parsing the input to
`find keywords. See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
`1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining the presumption favoring ordinary
`meaning will be overcome by the inventor’s use of words that represent “a
`clear disavowal of claim scope”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003). Thus,
`we disagree with Patent Owner’s suggestion that the claim is limited to
`avoiding accounting for non-keywords.
`Petitioner asserts that Maes “recognize[s] operative language (e.g.,
`‘dial’) in the user’s command associated with controlling operations of the
`client device (e.g., dialing a phone number). See e.g., [Ex.1001,] 15:49–54;
`Ex. 1002, ¶ 64. For instance, Maes describes ‘recognition/understanding’ of
`the word ‘dial’ in a command to dial a phone number. Ex. 1005, 15:49–61;
`Ex. 1002, ¶ 64.” Pet. 21. Additionally, Maes uses a parser to accomplish
`this task. Id. In other words, Maes parses keywords. Thus, on this record,
`we disagree with Patent Owner.
`
`20
`
`Ex. 2001 20/42
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124 B2
`
`
`
`For the reasons above, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the
`combination of Maes and Preston teaches “parsing the high-level code for
`the keyw

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