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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
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`Case No. 3:16-cv-790-SI
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`OPINION AND ORDER ON
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`BOYDSTUN EQUIPMENT
`MANUFACTURING, LLC, an Oregon
`limited liability company
`
`
`
`
`
`Cottrell, Inc., a Georgia corporation,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`Stephen J. Joncus, JONCUS LAW PC, 13203 SE 172nd Avenue, Suite 166 #344, Happy Valley,
`OR 97086; Andrew E. Aubertine, AUBERTINE LAW GROUP PC, 7128 SW Gonzaga Street,
`Suite 230, Portland, Oregon 97223; Philip S. Van Der Weele, K&L GATES LLP, One SW
`Columbia Street, Suite 1900, Portland, OR 97258. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff.
`
`Thomas R. Johnson, PERKINS COIE LLP, 1120 NW Couch Street, 10th Floor, Portland, OR;
`Shylah Alfonso, Ryan J. McBrayer, Cori G. Moore, and Kyle M. Amborn, PERKINS COIE LLP,
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900, Seattle, WA 98101-3099; J. Peter Staples and Jack R. Scholz,
`CHERNOFF VILHAUER LLP, 111 SW Columbia Street, Suite 725, Portland, OR 97201. Of
`Attorneys for Defendant.
`
`Michael H. Simon, District Judge.
`
`
`In this action brought by Plaintiff Boydstun Equipment Manufacturing, LLC
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`(“Boydstun”) against Defendant Cottrell, Inc. (“Cottrell”), Boydstun seeks a declaratory
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`judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,585,140 (“the ’140 patent”), among other
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`PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`things. The parties disagree over the construction of two terms. On October 6, 2017, the Court
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`held a claim construction hearing. Based on the parties’ submissions and the arguments of
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`counsel, the Court construes the two disputed terms as set forth below.
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`STANDARDS
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`Patent infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court construes the asserted
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`patent claims. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
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`banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Second, the factfinder determines whether the accused product
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`or method infringes the asserted claim as construed. Id. The first step, claim construction, is a
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`matter of law. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372; Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
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`F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a
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`patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v.
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`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v.
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`Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Patent claims must
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`precisely define the relevant invention and thereby put both the public and competitors on notice
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`of the claimed invention. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
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`“[T]he words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’”
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Vitrionics, 90 F.3d at 1582). There are two exceptions to this
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`general rule: (1) “when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer;” or
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`(2) “when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or
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`during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2012); see also Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563
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`(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is a well-established axiom in patent law that a patentee is free to be his or
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`her own lexicographer and thus may use terms in a manner contrary to or inconsistent with one
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`or more of their ordinary meanings.” (citation omitted)).
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`PAGE 2 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`The ordinary and customary meaning “is the meaning that the term would have to a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time” of the effective filing date of the patent
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`application. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. This is because “inventors are typically persons skilled in
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`the field of the invention,” and “patents are addressed to and intended to be read by others of
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`skill in the pertinent art.” Id. “[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim
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`term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the
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`context of the entire patent,” id., which includes the “written description and the prosecution
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`history,” Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`There are some cases in which “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by
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`a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction . . .
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`involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly
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`understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. “A determination that a claim term ‘needs no
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`construction’ or has [its] ‘plain and ordinary meaning’” may be sufficient when, for example, a
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`term has only “one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning . . .
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`resolve[s] the parties’ dispute.” O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d
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`1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`In other cases, determining a claim’s ordinary and customary meaning requires further
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`examination. This may be because the meaning is not “immediately apparent,” terms “have a
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`particular meaning in a field of art,” or the patentee has used a term “idiosyncratically.”
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In those cases, a court construing the claim will consider “those
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`sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood
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`disputed claim language to mean.” Id. (quoting Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116). Such “sources include
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`‘the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history,
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`PAGE 3 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms,
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`and the state of the art.” Id. (quoting Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116).
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`The language of “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning
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`of particular claim terms.” Id. Additionally, “[t]he context in which a claim term is used in the
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`asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. “Other claims of the patent in question, both
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`asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a
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`claim term.” Id. For example, “[b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout
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`the patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in
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`other claims.” Id. Courts should also interpret claim terms in a manner that does not render
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`subsequent claim terms superfluous. See Stubmo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that the court has “denounced” claim construction that renders phrases
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`“superfluous”); Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`(“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that
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`does not do so.”).
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`In addition to the claims themselves, courts must consider the specification in construing
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`claim terms, as the terms “are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d
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`at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). As the Federal Circuit has stated: “the specification
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`‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the
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`single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitrionics, 90 F.3d at 1582). A
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`patent’s “specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term . . . that differs from
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`the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and such definition would govern. Id. at 1316.
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`Similarly, a specification may “reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope”—
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`and again, “the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is regarded as dispositive.”
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`PAGE 4 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Id. Importantly, though, limitations from the specification should not be imported into the claims
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`and claims should not necessarily be confined to the “very specific embodiments of the
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`invention” in the specification. Id. at 1323; see also Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prod.
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`Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“While claim terms are understood in light of the
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`specification, a claim construction must not import limitations from the specification into the
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`claims.”); Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The
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`patentee is entitled to the full scope of his claims, and we will not limit him to his preferred
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`embodiment or import a limitation from the specification into the claims.”). Ultimately, a court
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`must “read the specification in light of its purposes in order to determine ‘whether the patentee is
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`setting out specific examples of the invention to accomplish those goals, or whether the patentee
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`instead intends for the claims and the embodiments in the specification to be strictly
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`coextensive.’” Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 527 F.3d 1300, 1308 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323).
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`In addition to the text of the claims and specification, courts “should also consider the
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`patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Markman,
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`52 F.3d at 980); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966) (“[A]n invention is
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`construed not only in light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper or
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`prosecution history in the Patent Office.”). The prosecution history of a patent “contains the
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`complete record of all the proceedings . . . , including any express representations made by the
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`applicant regarding the scope of the claims.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. The prosecution history
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`may “inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood
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`the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making
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`the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d
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`PAGE 5 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317). For example, a patentee may
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`make “a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution,” such as “by clearly
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`characterizing the invention in a way to try to overcome rejections based on prior art.” Comput.
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`Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quotation marks
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`omitted). The Federal Circuit, however, also has cautioned that “because the prosecution history
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`represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final
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`product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d
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`at 1317. Where there is ambiguity in the prosecution history, it should not limit the claim terms.
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`See Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
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`2002) (“It is inappropriate to limit a broad definition of a claim term based on prosecution
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`history that is itself ambiguous.”). Ultimately, the prosecution history “is less useful for claim
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`construction purposes” than the language of the claims and specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d
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`at 1317.
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`Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence in construing a claim, although such
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`evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative
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`meaning of claim language.’” Id. (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858,
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`862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence external to the patent and
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`prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”
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`Id. (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). Specifically, dictionaries—and particularly technical
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`dictionaries—may aid in a court’s claim construction. See id. at 1318. Expert testimony may also
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`be useful to a court to the extent that it “provide[s] background on the technology at issue,
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`[explains] how an invention works, [ensures] that the court’s understanding of the technical
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`aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or [establishes] that a
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`PAGE 6 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.” Id.
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`Expert testimony, however, consisting of “conclusory, unsupported assertions . . . as to the
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`definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.” Id. Further, expert testimony “that is clearly
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`at odds with the claim construction mandated by the . . . written record of the patent” should be
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`discounted. Id. (quoting Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir.
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`1998)).
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`BACKGROUND
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`Both Plaintiff and Defendant are in the business of manufacturing and selling commercial
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`car haulers. Their products are well known to drivers and passengers alike: commercial car
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`haulers, of which there are about fifteen thousand in the United States, are used to transport up to
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`ten vehicles, stacked on top of one another, all over the country. Passing drivers may wonder just
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`how all of those cars remain in place; the answer, in part, is the subject of this litigation.
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`The process of manufacturing a commercial car hauler involves many specialized
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`components that are built into a truck chassis (i.e., a frame) and trailer and are part of the
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`commercial car hauler design itself. Some of these specialized components involve patented
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`features. Two integral components, which are relevant to this case, are a tie-down system for
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`fastening cars and a ratcheting winch for the tie-down system.
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`Older tie-down systems—i.e., those built before or without the mechanisms at issue in
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`this case—also require operators to secure the vehicles being transported to the hauler doing the
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`transporting using tie-down straps tightened with ratcheting winches. These ratchets consist of a
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`gear with teeth that engage a pawl, allowing the gear to rotate in one direction only. Welded to
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`the gear is a ratchet head with a series of cross-holes, and the gear and head together are attached
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`to a shaft. Operators, when loading cars, insert a bar into the head and gear through the cross-
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`holes, using the shaft to wind a strap and secure the vehicle. With this type of mechanism, the
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`PAGE 7 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`ratchet head can only be turned in one direction. An operator may have to remove the bar,
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`reinsert it in a cross-hold, and repeat the turning process—possibly several times—in order to
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`completely secure a vehicle.
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`On March 27, 2008, Cottrell sought to patent a ratcheting winch through an expedited
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`review process with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).1 The PTO issued U.S.
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`Patent No. 7,585,140 (“’140 patent” or “ratcheting winch patent”) on September 8, 2009. The
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`ratchet that is the subject of Cottrell’s ’140 patent speeds up the tie-down process by allowing
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`operators to completely tighten the straps by inserting the tie down bar only once. It
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`accomplishes this by allowing the ratchet head to move in two directions, rather than one. In this
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`model, the ratchet head and ratchet gear move independently of one another. Between the ratchet
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`head and ratchet gear are “drive bodies,” which are spring-loaded pins. The drive bodies are
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`inserted into depressions in the head and corresponding ramped pockets in the gear. The pockets
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`have a ramp on one side and a “wall” on the other. When the ratchet head is rotated in one
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`direction, the spring-loaded drive bodies engage, move along the ramps, and are stopped by the
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`walls in the pockets of the gear; this in turn causes the gear to rotate. When turned the other way,
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`the head rotates independently of the gear.
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`In February 2016, Boydstun introduced a Rapid Ratchet™ winch, which similarly helps
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`drivers to more quickly and easily tie vehicles down by allowing them to tighten straps around
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`wheels without having to remove and replace the bar into the ratchet head with each quarter-turn.
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`On March 31, 2016, Cottrell sent Boydstun a demand letter, asserting that Boydstun’s Rapid
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`Ratchet™ winch infringed Cottrell’s ’140 patent. On February 21, 2017, Boydstun filed a
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`petition for Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”).
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`1 Under an expedited review, patent applicants have higher duties of disclosure, and must
`perform a pre-examination search, disclosing the search logic to the PTO.
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`PAGE 8 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Boydstun asserted in that petition that all claims in Cottrell’s ’140 patent are obvious on two
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`grounds: over Ruan (a prior art patent) in view of Cottrell’s own prior patent, U.S. Patent
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`No. 5,314,275 (“’275 patent”); and over Boice (a prior art patent) in view of Ruan. On
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`August 30, 2017, the PTAB granted the petition and instituted an IPR proceeding, after finding a
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`reasonable likelihood that Boydstun would prevail in its claims.2
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`The parties dispute the meaning of two terms in the ’140 patent: “mechanical contact”
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`and “coupled.” The relevant claims are as follows, with the disputed terms bolded:
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`1. A ratcheting tie down system for a vehicle transporter having
`one or more vehicle platforms, the system comprising: a ratchet
`assembly affixed to an end of a tie down shaft having a
`longitudinal axis, the tie down shaft being affixed to one of the one
`or more vehicle platforms; a pawl mechanism coupled to the
`ratchet assembly, wherein the ratchet assembly comprises: a
`ratchet gear having engagement teeth coupled to the pawl
`mechanism; a ratchet head coupled to the ratchet gear, wherein an
`inner face of the ratchet gear is positioned in opposition to and in
`mechanical contact with an inner face of the ratchet head, and
`wherein the ratchet gear, the ratchet head and the shaft are
`configured to rotate as a single integral unit when rotated in a
`forward direction about the longitudinal axis, and the ratchet head
`is configured to rotate with respect to the ratchet gear and the shaft
`when the ratchet head is rotated in reverse direction about the
`longitudinal axis.
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`. . .
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`7. The system as claimed in claim 5 wherein the drive bodies are
`configured to position in the lower-most portion and be in
`mechanical contact with the wall in response to a forward rotation
`of the ratchet head, the ratchet gear and the tie-down shaft.
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`Essentially, the dispute between the parties comes down to the following question: whether
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`the ’140 patent only covers a design in which the ratchet head and ratchet gear are directly in
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`2 Neither party objects to the Court taking judicial notice of the PTAB decision for
`purposes of this claim construction.
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`contact, or whether the patent extends to designs in which the ratchet head and ratchet gear are
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`indirectly connected.3 A related question is whether the spring-loaded drive bodies are part of the
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`ratchet head or a separate piece that connects the ratchet head to the ratchet gear.
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`A. First Disputed Term: “Mechanical Contact”
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`Boydstun’s Proposed Construction
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`Cottrell’s Proposed Construction
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`“pressing against”
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`“direct or indirect physical contact”
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`Boydstun argues that “mechanical contact” means “pressing against.” With respect to the
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`’140 patent, Boydstun’s position is that the spring-loaded drive bodies form a part of the ratchet
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`head, extending from the inner face of the head. The ratchet head, of which the drive bodies are a
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`part, according to Boydstun, directly presses against the ratchet gear. Boydstun argues that,
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`because the patent described the ratchet head and ratchet gear as being in mechanical contact, the
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`patentee must have conceived of the drive body pins as being a part of the ratchet head. This
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`conclusion, however, impliedly relies upon Boydstun’s understanding of “mechanical contact”
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`simply to mean directly pressing against.
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`Cottrell, on the other hand, argues that “mechanical contact” covers either direct or
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`indirect physical contact. As Cottrell explains, the ratchet head and the ratchet gear are in
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`indirect mechanical contact by way of the drive bodies, which are separate components. When
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`the ratchet head is rotated forward, the drive bodies press against ramped pockets in the ratchet
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`gear, causing it to rotate. Thus, Cottrell argues, the contact between the head and gear is indirect,
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`3 Boydstun suggests that the parties’ dispute is not over whether the inner faces of the
`ratchet gear and ratchet head are directly or indirectly interlocked. Rather, Boydstun
`characterizes the dispute as being “over the meaning of the phrase in mechanical contact with in
`light of the specification.” Although this latter characterization is also correct, the dispute over
`the meaning of “mechanical contact” involves a disagreement over whether that contact is direct
`or indirect.
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`and “mechanical contact” describes this indirect form of contact. Cottrell also suggests that
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`“mechanical contact” could mean an operational connection in which, when one piece moves, it
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`causes another to move in turn.
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`1. The Words of the Claim
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`The term “mechanical contact” is used twice in the ’140 patent claims—in Claim 1 and
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`Claim 7. Claim 1 describes “a ratchet head coupled to the ratchet gear . . . wherein an inner face
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`of the ratchet gear is positioned in opposition to and in mechanical contact with an inner face of
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`the ratchet head . . .” ECF 77-1 at 15. Claim 7 describes “drive bodies [that] are configured to
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`position in the lower-most portion and be in mechanical contact with the wall in response to a
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`forward rotation of the ratchet head, the ratchet gear and the tie-down shaft.” Id.
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`Boydstun argues that Claim 1 and Claim 2, read together, indicate that the drive bodies
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`are a part of the ratchet head. Claim 1, in relevant part, explains that “an inner face of the ratchet
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`gear is positioned in opposition to and in mechanical contact with an inner face of the ratchet
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`head.” Id. Claim 2 reads: “The system as claimed in claim 1 further comprising drive bodies
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`disposed in depressions positioned on the inner face of the ratchet head.” Id. Boydstun argues
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`that Claim 2 “describes the structure showing how these inner faces are in mechanical contact.”
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`ECF 73 at 13 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, Boydstun argues, the ratchet head, conceived of as
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`including the drive bodies, is in direct contact with the ratchet gear.
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`Boydstun emphasizes the fact that the word “face” does not necessarily indicate a flat
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`plane. Boydstun compares the “face” of the ratchet head with drive bodies to the “face” of a
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`building with recessed surfaces and protruding objects, and to the “face” of the moon. Boydstun
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`argues that the word “face,” in these contexts, does not necessarily indicate a flat, planar surface.
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`The Court does not disagree, in theory. Boydstun’s argument, however, ultimately is
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`unconvincing.
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`Boydstun’s theory is belied by the text of the claim itself. Claim 2 describes the drive
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`bodies as being “disposed in depressions” on the inner face of the ratchet head. ECF 77-1 at 15.
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`The plain and ordinary way to interpret this is that the drive bodies are a separate component, not
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`a part of the face, and are placed—or “disposed”—into the depressions on the face. Similarly,
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`Claim 7 speaks of drive bodies that are independently configured into position. Claim 7 uses the
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`term “mechanical contact” to describe the relationship between the drive bodies and the wall of
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`the ramped pockets in the ratchet gear, which occurs “in response to a forward motion.” Id. This
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`suggests, as Cottrell argues, that “mechanical contact” refers to either direct or indirect contact.
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`In Claim 7, the “mechanical contact” between the drive bodies and the ratchet gear is direct.
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`2. Specification
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`This understanding is confirmed by the specification and figures. Figures 8A-8D in
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`the ’140 patent, which purport to depict the ratchet head, do not depict the drive bodies. ECF 77-
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`1 at 11-12. Figure 4, which Boydstun argues constituted the only embodiment of how the parts of
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`the ratcheting winch fit together, depicts the drive bodies as separate components. ECF 77-1 at 5.
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`The implication is that the drive bodies are not a part of the ratchet head, but rather their own
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`independent components.
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`In describing the ratchet head, the specification indicates that it can “include a series of
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`depressions positioned along an inner face of the ratchet head.” ECF 77-1 at 14. Later, the
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`specification states that “the ratchet head includes the cross-holes, the depressions, the inner face,
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`and the mating pair.”4 Id. at 15. The depressions, unlike the drive bodies, are expressly
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`4 Both the ratchet gear and ratchet head can include a “mating pair,” which may be
`“male” or “female.” ECF 77-1 at 14. The specification explains that “[t]he ratchet gear and the
`ratchet head can mate via the first and second mating pairs,” going on to explain that “[t]he
`ratchet gear and the ratchet head are affixed to one another via a retaining pin.” Id. The mating
`pairs between the gear and head “form an outer groove, into which a seal can be installed to limit
`intrusion of water and contaminates.” Id.
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`PAGE 12 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`delineated as being a part of the ratchet head.5 The specification continues, explaining that “[i]n
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`exemplary embodiments, the series of depressions are cylindrical holes into which resilient
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`bodies (e.g., compression springs) are positioned. . . . In exemplary embodiments, drive bodies
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`(e.g., cylindrical drive pins) are further positioned in the series of depressions, generally adjacent
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`or on top of the resilient bodies.” ECF 77-1 at 14. This explanation—which separates those
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`things that are “included” in the ratchet head (such as depressions) and those that may be
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`“positioned” into parts of the head (the drive bodies)—supports the conclusion that the drive
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`bodies are separate components.
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`The specification consistently refers to the drive bodies as independent components. As
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`the specification explains, after “the ratchet gear and the ratchet head are assembled, the series of
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`drive bodies are constrained and spring-loaded via the resilient bodies.” Id. The “lengths of
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`the . . . drive bodies can vary in order to vary the compression of the drive bodies within the
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`depressions and the ramped pockets.” Id. As the specification further explains, “the motion of the
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`drive bodies is limited to an inward and outward motion into and out of the depressions.” Id.
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`The specification uses the term “in mechanical contact with” only once. It states:
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`“Rotation of the ratchet gear and the ratchet head in the opposite direction forces the spring-
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`loaded drive bodies into the lower-most portion and against and in mechanical contact with the
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`wall of the ramped pockets, resulting in a lock up condition between the ratchet gear and the
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`ratchet head.” Id. As with the text in Claim 7, this supports Cottrell’s suggestion that “in
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`mechanical contact” can mean direct contact as well as indirect contact. In this case, it is the
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`5 Similarly, the specification explains that “the ratchet gear includes the ramped pockets,
`each having the ramp surface, the upper-most portion, the lower-most portion, and the wall. The
`ratchet gear further includes, the engagement teeth, the inner face and the mating pair.” ECF 77-
`1 at 15.
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`PAGE 13 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`spring-loaded drive bodies that end up in direct “mechanical contact” with the wall of the
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`ramped pockets.6
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`Boydstun’s proposed construction—that “mechanical contact” means “pressing
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`against”—is unavailing for an additional reason: the specification notes that a seal may be
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`installed between the ratchet head and ratchet gear to limit the entry of water and other
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`contaminants. As Cottrell points out, in that case, the head and gear would not be “pressing
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`against” one another—at least not directly. Thus, a construction of “mechanical contact” to mean
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`“pressing against” would exclude this disclosed embodiment; it is, therefore, disfavored. See
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`Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[A]
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`claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim is rarely,
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`if ever, correct.”) (quoting On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH, 386 F.3d
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`1133, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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`Boydstun also argues that Cottrell’s interpretation is essentially without limit—and that
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`everything, in essence, could be characterized as “in mechanical contact” under Cottrell’s
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`proposed interpretation. For example, Boydstun remarks that a car’s tire is indirectly connected
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`to its steering wheel. The Court notes, first, that this has a limit—no one suggests that a car is
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`connected to the ground, which is connected to the rest of the planet. Boydstun, however, is
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`correct that there must be some limiting principle to the meaning of “mechanical contact.”
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`Therefore, Cottrell’s proposed construction—“direct or indirect physical contact”—is also not
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`entirely convincing.
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`6 Cottrell argues that Boydstun’s construction, if adopted, would “eliminate every
`embodiment the patent teaches, which all have drive bodies providing the claimed mechanical
`contact.” This is not entirely true because Boydstun also argues that the drive bodies are a part of
`the ratchet face, which would mean that the face, so construed, could be “pressing against” the
`ratchet gear. As discussed, however, the text of the Claims themselves belie this interpretation.
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`PAGE 14 – OPINION AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`3. Patent Prosecution History
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`In addition to the text of a patent’s claims and specifications, courts may consider a
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`patent’s prosecution history for further evidence of what both the PTO and the patentee intended
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`to include in a patent’s scope. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Boydstun argues that the
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`prosecution history of Cottrell’s ’140 patent indicates a disavowal of scope that precludes
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`Cottrell from now arguing its proposed interpretation of “mechanical contact.”
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`During prosecution of the ’140 patent, Cottrell distinguished its invention from U.S.
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`Patent No. 2006/0013667 (“Ruan” or “Ruan prior art”). Ruan is a patent for a “rapid rotating
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`device for ratchet belt shaft.” The Ruan patent, like the ’140 patent and the Rapid Ratchet™
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`winch, offers a speedier tie-down process than the older method. The Ruan patent consists of “a
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`fixed base and a rotating body. The fixed base is attached firmly to the belt shaft, and the rotating
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`device is fit circumferentially around the fixed base on one side.” In Ruan, the ratchet gear and
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`the ratchet head are positioned on opposite sides of the tie-down shaft.
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`In distinguishing its invention from Ruan, Cottrell stated: “Ruan does not teach . . . a
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`ratchet assembly . . . wherein an inner face of the ratchet gear is positioned in opposition to and
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`in mechanical contact with an inner face of the ratchet head.” ECF 74-3 at 5. Cottrell further
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`stated that Ruan