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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`___________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`___________________
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`COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`ROVI GUIDES, INC.,
`Patent Owner
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`__________________
`
`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`___________________
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`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`BY THE DIRECTOR PURSUANT TO UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX
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`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
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`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 1
`II.
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................... 4
`IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 5
`A.
`The Board’s motivation-to-combine findings were erroneous. ............ 5
`1.
`The Board applied incorrect legal standards. .............................. 5
`2.
`The Board erred in finding a motivation to combine Sato
`and Humpleman because Humpleman teaches away from
`the static control-and-command logic used in Sato. ................... 6
`The Office’s current Director-review procedures are unlawful. ......... 10
`1.
`Commissioner Hirshfeld cannot provide the required layer
`of principal-officer review because he is an inferior officer. ... 10
`Commissioner Hirshfeld’s assumption of authority to
`perform the functions and duties of the Director was
`contrary to statute. ..................................................................... 11
`The Director-review procedures are invalid because they
`were not promulgated through notice-and-comment
`rulemaking. ............................................................................... 14
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15
`
`2.
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`3.
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`B.
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`V.
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`I.
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`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
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`INTRODUCTION
`Patent Owner Rovi Guides, Inc. (PO) requests Director review of the
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`PTAB’s October 16, 2018 Final Written Decision (Pap. 36). This request is timely
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`filed within 30 days of the Federal Circuit’s September 2, 2021 remand order.
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`The Board’s conclusion that an ordinary artisan would have been motivated
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`to combine Sato and Humpleman was erroneous. At the outset of this proceeding,
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`the Board misapplied the law by analyzing what a POSA could do rather than what
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`a POSA would have been able and motivated to do. Then, in its final decision on
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`obviousness, the Board—without justification—disregarded unambiguous
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`language in Humpleman that criticizes systems like Sato’s. This language would
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`have discouraged a POSA from combining Sato and Humpleman in the manner
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`claimed. Because controlling law dictates that obviousness cannot be based on a
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`combination of references that teach away from one another, the Board’s finding
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`that the ’413 patent is obvious over Sato and Humpleman should be set aside.
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`II. BACKGROUND
`A.
`The patent. The ’413 patent claims a novel system and method for al-
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`lowing a user to remotely control a program guide for her television. The invention
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`improved upon prior art program guide systems, which “require[d] that the user be
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`physically present in the home to access important program guide features such as
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`program reminders, parental control, and program recording.” EX1101, 2:16–19.
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`The patent discloses a system in which two distinct “interactive program
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`
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`guides”—a “local IPG” and a “remote IPG” (or “remote access IPG”)—
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`communicate with one another. The local IPG is implemented on “local interactive
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`television program guide equipment,” while the remote IPG is implemented on a
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`“mobile device.” Id., 40:6–47. These guides offer robust, interactive features that
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`allow users to control television activity remotely in ways previously unavailable.
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`For example, the user can instruct the remote IPG to schedule future recordings,
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`access information about program listings, schedule a program reminder, or dis-
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`play program listings in subsets according to user-selected criteria. The remote IPG
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`then sends those instructions to the local IPG, which performs the necessary opera-
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`tions on the local IPG equipment. Id., 15:9–32, 18:4–12, 25:45–59, 40:6–47.
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`B.
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`The prior art. Sato discloses a system that allows users to access a
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`schedule of programs on a browser rendered on a device in the home, such as a
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`personal computer. Then, in response to the user’s instructions, the home device
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`sends commands to an “interface box,” which generates an infrared signal that in-
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`structs a video tape recorder/player to record the program at the indicated time.
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`EX1115, 1:7–12, 4:40–5:2, 5:18–25. Sato’s “interface box” must contain control
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`and command logic for each device that it controls. Id., 6:62–7:6 (“[C]odes and
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`carriers for controlling electronic devices are different among different manufac-
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`turers and even among different devices from the same manufacturer….”).
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`Humpleman discloses a system that allows a user to control various “home
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`
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`devices” connected to a home network. EX1106, 1:21–36, 2:15–18. These “home
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`devices” include “all electronic devices … typically found in the home.” Id., 1:21–
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`25. “As long as each device on the network has HTML files to describe their
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`[graphical user interface] and as long as they use HTTP protocol to transfer those
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`files, then any ‘client’ device that understands how to ‘web-browse’ and render
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`HTML will be able to use the device with the human-interface GUI.” EX1107, 3.
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`Humpleman also discloses an embodiment in which “a user can remotely
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`control home devices connected to a home network” via an Internet connection.
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`EX1106, 20:44–47. “For example, if a user is … unable to watch the Monday night
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`football game, the user can program a DVCR connected to their home network via
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`the Internet, in order to record the particular event.” Id., 20:47–51.
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`Humpleman disparages systems like Sato that use “static control and com-
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`mand logic.” Id., 1:52–58. As the Humpleman provisional application says, under
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`the static-control-and-command-logic approach, the user must “control every-
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`thing,” which requires a “complex GUI” with a “detailed command set for every
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`device.” EX1107, 18. The Humpleman system, according to its specification,
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`“eliminates a requirement for a remote control device to include … control codes
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`specific to each of the devices on the network. EX1106, 23:46–49.
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`C.
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`The Board found all claims obvious over Sato and Humpleman. The
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`Board concluded that an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to combine
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`
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`Sato’s program guide system with Humpleman’s local generation of customized
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`program guides for display by a remote device. FWD, 65. The Board asserted that
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`where “a technique has been used to improve one device (i.e., Humpleman’s local
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`generation of a customized program guide for display by a remote device), and [a
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`POSA] would have recognized that it would improve similar devices in the same
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`way (i.e., applying Humpleman’s technique to Sato’s program guide system to
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`render a customized program guide as a webpage on the browser operating on
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`Sato’s external portable computer 107), using the technique is obvious.” Id., 66.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`In United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021), the Supreme Court
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`held that “[o]nly an officer properly appointed to a principal office may issue a fi-
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`nal decision binding the Executive Branch” in IPRs. Id. at 1985. Accordingly, be-
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`cause PTAB APJs are inferior officers, “[d]ecisions by APJs must be subject to re-
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`view by the Director.” Id. at 1986. “The Director accordingly may review final
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`PTAB decisions and, upon review, may issue decisions himself on behalf of the
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`Board.” Id. at 1987. The PTO has indicated that Director review “may address any
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`issue … and will be de novo.” USPTO Guidance, Arthrex Q&A, A1 (July 20,
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`2021). The Guidance advises that “decisions may warrant review if they include,
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`for example, material errors of fact or law, matters that the Board misapprehended
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`or overlooked, novel issues of law or policy, issues on which Board panel deci-
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`sions are split, issues of particular importance to the Office or patent community,
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`or inconsistencies with Office procedures, guidance, or decisions.” Id., D2.
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`IV. ARGUMENT
`A. The Board’s motivation-to-combine findings were erroneous.
`The Board applied incorrect legal standards.
`1.
`If a petitioner seeks to show obviousness based on multiple prior-art refer-
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`ences, the petitioner must show that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to
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`combine those references. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380
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`(Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, in showing a motivation to combine, it is not enough
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`to show merely that a skilled artisan “would have been able to” combine the refer-
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`ences; the petitioner must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated
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`to do [so] at the time of the invention.” Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882
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`F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For example, in Personal Web Technologies,
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`LLC v. Apple, Inc., the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s motivation-to-combine
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`finding because the Board’s “reasoning seem[ed] to say no more than that a skilled
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`artisan, once presented with the two references, would have understood that they
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`could be combined.” 848 F.3d 987, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[T]hat,” the Federal Cir-
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`cuit explained, “is not enough: it does not imply a motivation to pick out those two
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`references and combine them to arrive at the claimed invention.” Id. at 993–94.
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`Here, the Board’s application of these legal principles was infected with two
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`
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`distinct errors. As shown by the Board’s institution decisions, the Board both in-
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`verted the burden (requiring PO to show a lack of a motivation to combine rather
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`than requiring Petitioner to show the presence of one) and applied the wrong sub-
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`stantive standard (focusing on whether a skilled artisan would have been capable
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`of combining the references, rather than whether a skilled artisan would have been
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`motivated to combine them). For example, the Board stated “the record before us
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`does not include sufficient or credible evidence that Sato’s program guide system
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`would be incapable of being modified to generate customized program guides, as
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`taught by Humpleman.” DI, 24. This statement is revealing. PO did not have the
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`burden to show that a skilled artisan would have been incapable of implementing
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`Petitioner’s asserted combinations. Instead, Petitioner had the burden to show that
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`a skilled artisan would have been both able and motivated to implement them. Po-
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`laris, 882 F.3d at 1068. The Board misunderstood this basic principle. This misun-
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`derstanding led to error in its motivation-to-combine analysis.
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`2.
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`The Board erred in finding a motivation to combine Sato
`and Humpleman because Humpleman teaches away from
`the static control-and-command logic used in Sato.
`The Board’s ultimate findings on the motivation-to-combine issue reflect a
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`similar misunderstanding of the applicable legal principles. If one of the references
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`in a proposed combination teaches away from the combination, a motivation-to-
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`combine finding is improper as a matter of law. Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. v.
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`
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`Warner Chilcott Co., LLC, 711 F. App’x 633, 637 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (reversing dis-
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`trict court’s finding of motivation to combine because prior art criticized the pro-
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`posed combination); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376,
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`1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (same); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d
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`1361, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same). Similarly, a finding of motivation to com-
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`bine is improper where the combination “would require a substantial reconstruc-
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`tion and redesign of the elements shown in … [the prior-art reference] as well as a
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`change in the basic principles under which [that reference’s] construction was de-
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`signed to operate.” Application of Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1959). The
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`Board’s findings that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Sato
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`and Humpleman are inconsistent with these principles.
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`Humpleman’s express purpose is to replace conventional, device-specific
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`electronic program guides (EPGs) with a universal HTML guide that can command
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`and control any device. EX1106, 1:55–58 (criticizing systems where “a particular
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`remote control unit can only control and command those home devices for which it
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`includes the necessary control and command logic”). Each suitable home device in
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`Humpleman contains HTML data that it sends to the user device, which uses that
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`data to display an HTML page on a browser. Id., 4:7–19. This setup “eliminates a
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`requirement for a remote control device to include … control codes specific to
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`each of the devices on the network.” Id., 23:46–49. That is because any “device
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`that understands how to ‘web-browse’ and render HTML will be able to use the
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`device with the human-interface GUI.” EX1107, 3.
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`Sato’s system presents precisely the sort of problems that Humpleman is de-
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`signed to avoid. In Sato, the infrared remote control box must contain control and
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`command logic for each device it controls. EX1115, 6:62–7:6. Humpleman is spe-
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`cifically designed to “eliminate[] [the] requirement for a remote control device to
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`include … control codes specific to each of the devices on the network.” EX1106,
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`23:46–49. A POSA would not have modified Sato to use Humpleman’s program
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`guides because Humpleman expressly teaches away from using a system that relies
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`on device-specific commands and controls like Sato’s. Indeed, the combination
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`would vitiate Humpleman’s basic principle of operation. Ratti, 270 F.2d at 813.
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`The Board found otherwise because, it said, Sato and Humpleman were not
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`“fundamentally different and incompatible” because they “fall in the same field of
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`endeavor.” FWD, 66–67. While two references must necessarily be in the same or
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`analogous fields to be combinable for obviousness purposes, that alone is not suffi-
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`cient to show combinability. The “analogous art” determination merely “begins the
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`inquiry.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Board must still ar-
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`ticulate some reason why the skilled artisan would have combined the two purport-
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`edly analogous references, see id., and it did not do so here.
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`The Board’s other rationales similarly do not withstand scrutiny. For exam-
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`ple, the Board also said that Humpleman “do[es] not mention, much less criticize,
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`using an interface box that stores code data … as taught by Sato.” FWD, 68. Re-
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`spectfully, however, that misses the point. The point is that Humpleman criticizes
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`systems, like Sato, in which the remote control must have “control codes specific
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`to each of the devices on the network.” EX1106, 23:46–49. The Board’s apparent
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`misunderstanding of what Humpleman means by “static control and command log-
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`ic” is further exemplified by its statement that Sato’s “interface box” could be
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`“configured to introduce and store new code data for transmission to new home
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`electronic devices.” FWD, 68. Humpleman disparages systems in which the remote
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`control must contain code data for every device it is supposed to control. Humple-
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`man’s solution is to put HTML data on each device and then use a remote control
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`that can display the HTML pages associated with that data. The result is that the
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`remote can control any home device via its HTML webpage; the remote does not
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`need specific control codes for each specific device.
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`*
`*
`*
`The Board’s motivation-to-combine analysis applied the wrong legal stand-
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`ards and reached the wrong result. The Board’s decision should be set aside.
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`B.
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`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`The Office’s current Director-review procedures are unlawful.
`Commissioner Hirshfeld cannot provide the required layer
`1.
`of principal-officer review because he is an inferior officer.
`Under Arthrex, an inferior officer cannot render a final IPR decision. “Only
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`an officer properly appointed to a principal office” may do so. 141 S. Ct. at 1985.
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`That was precisely the constitutional infirmity: “the nature of [APJs’] responsibili-
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`ties” was not “consistent with their…appointment” by the Secretary of Commerce.
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`The current Director-review process, however, merely repeats the constitu-
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`tional violation identified in Arthrex. It is settled law that one “who temporarily
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`performs the duties of a principal officer is an inferior officer for constitutional
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`purposes.” United States v. Smith, 962 F.3d 755, 764 (4th Cir. 2020); see United
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`States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (same). Commissioner Hirshfeld was not
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`presidentially appointed nor Senate-confirmed; instead, he is temporarily perform-
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`ing the functions and duties of the PTO Director. He is thus an inferior officer, and
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`so he cannot provide the required layer of principal-officer review. The Supreme
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`Court was clear: “[o]nly an officer properly appointed to a principal office may is-
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`sue a final decision binding the Executive Branch.” 141 S. Ct. at 1985.
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`Arthrex’s passing reference to “remand to the Acting Director,” 141 S. Ct. at
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`1988, does not alter the analysis. First, interpreting this language to permit review
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`of PTAB decisions by an inferior officer would undermine Arthrex’s core holding
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`that only principal officers may issue final decisions in IPRs. Second, Commis-
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`
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`sioner Hirshfeld is not the Acting Director. So even if a true Acting Director could
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`perform the required layer of review, Commissioner Hirshfeld cannot.
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`2.
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`Commissioner Hirshfeld’s assumption of authority to per-
`form the functions and duties of the Director was contrary
`to statute.
`Even if an officer properly performing the functions and duties of the Direc-
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`tor could provide the required layer of principal-officer review, Commissioner
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`Hirshfeld cannot do so because his assumption of authority was unlawful.
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`a. FVRA. The FVRA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345 et seq., governs succession
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`when principal offices become vacant. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929,
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`934–35 (2017). The statute “authorizes three classes of Government officials to
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`become acting officers.” Id. The default rule—set forth in § 3345(a)(1)—“is that
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`the first assistant to a vacant office shall become the acting officer.” Id. Subsec-
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`tions (a)(2) and (a)(3) set forth two alternatives to that default rule: “[t]he President
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`may…direct[] either a person serving in a different PAS office or a senior employ-
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`ee within the relevant agency to become the acting officer instead.” Id.
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`Commissioner Hirshfeld does not fall within any of these categories. He
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`does not meet the criteria for 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) because he is not the Director’s
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`first assistant. And does not meet the criteria for § 3345(a)(2) or (a)(3) because the
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`President did not direct him to perform the functions and duties of the Director.
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`Moreover, even if Commissioner Hirshfeld had been properly appointed
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`pursuant to the FVRA, he still could not implement the Director-review procedures
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`for two additional reasons. First, those procedures were not in place during the
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`180-day period preceding the vacancy. See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(B)(ii). Second, a
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`person serving as a temporary principal officer under § 3345 may do so only for
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`210 days. See 35 U.S.C. 3346(a). Commissioner Hirshfeld assumed his post in
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`January 2021. It is now September, meaning the 210-day time limit has elapsed.
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`b. 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1). The FVRA sets forth “the exclusive means for
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`temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties” of a
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`principal officer unless a statute expressly “(A) authorizes the President, a court, or
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`the head of an Executive department, to designate an officer or employee to per-
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`form the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capaci-
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`ty; or (B) designates an officer or employee to perform the functions and duties of
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`a specified office temporarily.” 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a). That is, other statutes may
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`“‘expressly’ create[] an alternative mechanism for filling vacancies.” Nw. Immi-
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`grant Rights Project v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 496 F. Supp. 3d 31,
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`53 (D.D.C. 2020). In accordance with § 3347(a), 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1) provides that
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`the PTO Deputy Director has “authority to act in the capacity of the Director in the
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`event of the absence or incapacity of the Director.” But Commissioner Hirshfeld
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`does not satisfy this provision either because he was not the PTO Deputy Director.
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`Commissioner Hirshfeld appears to have assumed his role pursuant to the
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`
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`Department of Commerce’s Department Organization Order 10-14, which purports
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`to allow the Commissioner of Patents to perform the functions and duties of the
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`PTO Director if both the Director and Deputy Director posts are vacant. DOO 10-
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`14 § 2.04 (Sept. 28, 2012). But the FVRA permits department heads to create al-
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`ternative succession arrangements for principal offices only when expressly per-
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`mitted to do so by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a). And no statute authorized the Secre-
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`tary of Commerce to enact DOO 10-14.
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`The Department appears to have relied on 35 U.S.C. § 1, which provides the
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`Secretary with “policy direction” over the PTO. But the FVRA is clear that a gen-
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`eral grant of oversight authority to a department head is not enough to displace the
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`default succession plan. See 5 U.S.C. § 3347(b). Instead, a statute must “express-
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`ly…authorize[] the [department head] to designate an officer or employee to per-
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`form the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capaci-
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`ty.” Id. § 3348(a)(1). There is no such statute here.
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`The Secretary thus lacked authority to displace the succession plans of the
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`FVRA and § 3(b)(1). Commissioner Hirshfeld’s assumption of the Director’s du-
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`ties complied with neither statute, so his actions—including issuance of the review
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`procedures and any Director reviews he purports to perform—are without “force or
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`effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1); Nw. Immigrant, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 53.
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`3.
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`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`The Director-review procedures are invalid because they
`were not promulgated through notice-and-comment rule-
`making.
`The PTO is required to use the notice-and-comment procedures of 5 U.S.C.
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`§ 553 when enacting regulations governing IPRs. Under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), regu-
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`lations that “govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office” “shall be made in
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`accordance with section 553 of title 5.” And § 316(a), which concerns IPRs, re-
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`quires the Director to “prescribe regulations…establishing and governing inter
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`partes review.” Id. § 316(a)(4) (emphasis added); see Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City
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`Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (§ 316(a) requires Direc-
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`tor to “prescribe regulations” governing IPRs). The PTO has effectively admitted
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`as much. Resp. BIO 9, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446 (Dec. 2015)
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`(defending adoption of BRI claim-construction standard because it was contained
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`in regulation enacted pursuant to § 316(a)(4) “following notice and comment”).
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`The Director-review procedures indisputably “govern[] inter partes review,”
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`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4). They thus must be implemented via notice-and-comment
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`rulemaking. Because the current procedures were not, they are invalid. See 5
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`U.S.C. § 552(a)(1); United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 523 (3d Cir. 2013).
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`Moreover, even setting aside the requirements of §§ 2(b)(2) and 316(a)(4)—
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`which apply to all rules governing IPRs—section 553 applies of its own force to
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`the substantive portions of the Arthrex guidance. See Animal Legal Defense Fund
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`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 931 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (§ 553 requires notice and comment
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`for substantive rules). A substantive rule “effects a change in existing law or policy
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`which affects individual rights and obligations.” Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536
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`F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The PTO guidance sets forth substantive stand-
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`ards by which the agency intends to evaluate Director-review requests. Arthrex
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`Q&A D2, D3. Those are substantive rules, and they are therefore subject to § 553.
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`See Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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`Nor can the PTO rely on § 553(b)(B)—which provides an exception for the
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`notice-and-comment requirements “when…notice and public procedure thereon
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`are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest”—to justify its
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`failure to use notice-and-comment procedures. To take advantage of this to provi-
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`sion, the agency must “for good cause find[] (and incorporate[] the finding and a
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`brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)” that § 553(b)(B) is satis-
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`fied. Id. The PTO has not made any such finding here.
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`V. CONCLUSION
`PO respectfully requests that this proceeding be held in abeyance until (i) the
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`President appoints and the Senate confirms a PTO Director and (ii) the PTO enacts
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`notice-and-comment regulations governing the constitutionally required layer of
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`Director review. Once that occurs, PO requests that the Director set aside the Final
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`Written Decision and confirm the patentability of the challenged claims.
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`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
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`Respectfully submitted,
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
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`/Jason D. Eisenberg/
`
`Jason D. Eisenberg
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Registration No. 43,447
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`Date: October 1, 2021
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`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
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`Case IPR2017-01049
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above-
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`captioned PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING BY THE
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`DIRECTOR PURSUANT TO UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX was served
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`electronically via email on October 1, 2021, in its entirety on the following counsel
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`of record for Petitioner:
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`fmeeker@bannerwitcoff.com
`Frederic M. Meeker (Lead Counsel)
`bwright@bannerwitcoff.com
`Bradley C. Wright (Back-up Counsel)
`skelly@bannerwitcoff.com
`Scott M. Kelly (Back-up Counsel)
`adike@bannerwitcoff.com
`Azuka C. Dike (Back-up Counsel)
`jdavenport@bannerwitcoff.com
`Joshua Davenport (Back-up Counsel)
`csauer@bannerwitcoff.com
`Camille Sauer (Back-up Counsel)
`bingvoldstad@bannerwitcoff.com
`Bennett A. Ingvoldstad (Back-up Counsel)
`BANNER AND WITCOFF, LTD.
`ComcastIPRService@bannerwitcoff.com
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
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`/Jason D. Eisenberg/
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`Jason D. Eisenberg
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Registration No. 43,447
`
`Date: October 1, 2021
`
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
`
`
`
`