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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`___________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`___________________
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`COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`ROVI GUIDES, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`
`__________________
`
`Case IPR2017-01050
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`___________________
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`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`BY THE DIRECTOR PURSUANT TO UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX
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`
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`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
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`Case IPR2017-01050
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`B.
`
`C.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 2
`II.
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................... 4
`IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 5
`A.
`The Board erred in construing “interactive program guide” to
`encompass mere Internet browsers that render EPGs on web
`pages. ..................................................................................................... 5
`The Board erred in finding a motivation to combine Blake with
`Killian because Blake operates effectively on its own and
`Petitioner identified no reason why a POSA would have altered
`Blake. ..................................................................................................... 7
`The Office’s current Director-review procedures are unlawful. ........... 9
`1.
`Commissioner Hirshfeld cannot provide the required layer
`of principal-officer review because he is an inferior officer. ..... 9
`Commissioner Hirshfeld’s assumption of authority to
`perform the functions and duties of the Director was
`contrary to statute. ..................................................................... 10
`The Director-review procedures are invalid because they
`were not promulgated through notice-and-comment
`rulemaking. ............................................................................... 13
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15
`
`2.
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`3.
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`V.
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`Case IPR2017-01050
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Patent Owner Rovi Guides, Inc. (PO) requests Director review of the
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`PTAB’s October 16, 2018 Final Written Decision (Pap. 36). This request is timely
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`filed within 30 days of the Federal Circuit’s September 2, 2021 remand order.
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`The Board erred in construing “interactive program guide” (IPG) to
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`encompass mere Internet browsers that render electronic program guides lacking
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`any interactive capabilities on web pages. The claims’ use of the word
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`“interactive,” combined with the specification’s disclaimer of prior-art online
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`electronic program guides and web browsers, demonstrates that the claims cover
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`only program guides that allow the user to both view program listings and use the
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`program guide interactively to execute recording, reminder, and parental-control
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`functions. The Board, however, determined that the “remote user interface on
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`Blake’s input device 332,” which is simply an electronic program guide displayed
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`through a web browser, satisfied the claimed remote IPG limitations. That was
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`legal error, and the Board’s obviousness determination must therefore be set aside.
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`The Board’s conclusion that a POSA would have been motivated to combine
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`Blake and Killian was also erroneous. The Board adopted Petitioner’s contention
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`that a POSA would have been motivated to entirely redesign Blake’s rudimentary
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`system—designed to be operational on systems as simple as a conventional push-
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`button phone—to incorporate Killian’s JAVA-based user profiles. Neither
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`Petitioner nor the Board, however, explain how to even store Killian’s user profiles
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`on a conventional push-button telephone. Moreover, this hypothetical redesign
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`offers no benefits. Both Killian’s system and Blake’s system allows users to
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`customize the list of television programs to better identify desired and undesired
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`content. Because Blake operates effectively on its own, the Board’s finding that the
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`’413 patent is obvious over Blake and Killian should be set aside.
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`II. BACKGROUND
`A.
`The patent. The ’413 patent claims a novel system and method for al-
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`lowing a user to remotely control a program guide for her television. The invention
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`improved upon prior art program guide systems, which “require[d] that the user be
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`physically present in the home to access important program guide features such as
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`program reminders, parental control, and program recording.” EX1201, 2:16–19.
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`The patent discloses a system in which two distinct “interactive program
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`guides”—a “local IPG” and a “remote IPG” (or “remote access IPG”)—
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`communicate with one another. The local IPG is implemented on “local interactive
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`television program guide equipment,” while the remote IPG is implemented on a
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`“mobile device.” Id., 40:6–47. These guides offer robust, interactive features that
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`allow users to control television activity remotely in ways previously unavailable.
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`For example, the user can instruct the remote IPG to schedule future recordings,
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`access information about program listings, schedule a program reminder, or dis-
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`play program listings in subsets according to user-selected criteria. The remote IPG
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`then sends those instructions to the local IPG, which performs the necessary opera-
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`tions on the local IPG equipment. Id., 15:9–32, 18:4–12, 25:45–59, 40:6–47.
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`B.
`
`The prior art. Blake discloses a rudimentary system that “allows us-
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`ers to schedule recordings from a remote location” using a computer or a push-
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`button phone. EX1222, 2:10–15. This system contains three key features: (i) a cen-
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`tral processor that receives and processes user input to find program data associat-
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`ed with a program the user wants to record; (ii) an input device that can transmit
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`the input from a remote location; and (iii) a recording device that can record pro-
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`gram in response to instructions from the processor. Id., 2:19–25. The user can use
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`the input device to, for example, “record[] a program, tun[e] to a channel, access[]
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`a related internet site, purchas[e] a pay-per-view program, or purchas[e] merchan-
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`dise.” Id., 15:5–7.
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`In one embodiment of the Blake’s system, the user may “group shows” and
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`select programs to record according to “themes.” Id., 2:17–18, 11:29. “Examples
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`of themes which the user may select from include sports, movies, science fiction,
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`sit-coms and the like.” Id., 18:2–3. Using this theme functionality, “the user may
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`enter Bulls” or “select sports when presented with a list of theme selections” “if the
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`user wishes to record the Chicago Bulls v. L.A. Lakers game.” Id., 18:5–8. This
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`feature is “particularly helpful,” according to Blake’s written description, “when
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`the user is not quite sure of the title of the program, or when the user desires to
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`record a sports event.” Id., 18:3–5.
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`Killian discloses a single JAVA-based electronic program guide that “oper-
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`ates on a computing platform that is associated with a television.” EX1208, 2:1–3,
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`3:27–33. Petitioner relied on Killian to the extent it discloses interactive “viewer
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`profiles.” FWD, 25. In Killian, a user may generate a “viewer profile” that tailors
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`the contents of the program guide to the particular user’s preferences. Id., 8:36–56.
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`C.
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`The Board found all claims obvious over Blake and Killian. The
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`Board concluded that a POSA would have been motivated to modify Blake to in-
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`clude Killian’s interactive viewer profiles. FWD, 59. The Board asserted that
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`where “a technique has been used to improve one device (i.e., Killian’s technique
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`of generating program guide displays based on viewer profiles), and [a POSA]
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`would have recognized that it would improve similar devices in the same way (i.e.,
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`applying Killian’s technique to Blake’s television system, thereby allowing the re-
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`mote user interface … to generate a display … based on user preferences), using
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`the technique is obvious.” Id.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`In United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021), the Supreme Court
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`held that “[o]nly an officer properly appointed to a principal office may issue a
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`final decision binding the Executive Branch” in IPRs. Id. at 1985. Accordingly,
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`because PTAB APJs are inferior officers, “[d]ecisions by APJs must be subject to
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`review by the Director.” Id. at 1986. “The Director accordingly may review final
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`PTAB decisions and, upon review, may issue decisions himself on behalf of the
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`Board.” Id. at 1987. The PTO has indicated that Director review “may address any
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`issue…and will be de novo.” USPTO Guidance, Arthrex Q&A A1 (July 20, 2021).
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`The Guidance advises that “decisions may warrant review if they include, for
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`example, material errors of fact or law, matters that the Board misapprehended or
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`overlooked, novel issues of law or policy, issues on which Board panel decisions
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`are split, issues of particular importance to the Office or patent community, or
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`inconsistencies with Office procedures, guidance, or decisions.” Id., D2.
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`IV. ARGUMENT
`A. The Board erred in construing “interactive program guide” to en-
`compass mere Internet browsers that render EPGs on web pages.
`The ’413 patent claims require two separate and distinct IPGs: one on local
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`equipment and one on a mobile device. Both program guides must be interactive,
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`such that they allow the user to view television program listings, “set in-home re-
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`minders for programming, … adjust parental control settings, or … select pro-
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`grams for recording.” EX1201, 1:43–2:25. It is not enough that the device on
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`which the guide is displayed is interactive; the guide itself must offer these interac-
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`tive features. Id. (claim 1) (the “program for recording” is “selected by the user
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`with the remote access interactive television program guide”) (emphasis added).
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`The specification explicitly states that online program guides displayed us-
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`ing an Internet browser—alone—are not “interactive program guides” within the
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`meaning of the claims. Indeed, the specification criticizes prior-art program guides
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`that merely “allow[] users to view program listings using a web browser” because
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`they do not provide the interactive features that is at the heart of the claimed inven-
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`tion. Id., 1:43–44. To be sure, the specification describes an embodiment in which
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`the user accesses an interactive program guide using a web browser. Id., 14:48–
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`15:8. But this embodiment is consistent with the above analysis because, in this
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`embodiment, the guide is a separate software application from the web browser
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`with interactive features beyond those present in a simple web browser. For exam-
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`ple, one may use a browser to display a static non-interactive map of Asia, such as
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`the map on ontheworldmap.com/asia. Or one may use a browser to display an in-
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`teractive map of Asia, such as the map on the Google Maps software application
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`(http://tinyurl.com/y59okvdb). Google Maps may be accessed through a web
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`browser, but it is still a separate software application with interactive features be-
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`yond those present in a simple web browser. To make the point another way, the
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`claims require a dedicated code at the remote device because a generic web brows-
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`er displaying a guide, itself, is not interactive within the meaning of the claim.
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`In defiance of these disclosures, the Board relied on the “remote user inter-
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`face on Blake’s input device 332” for the claimed remote IPG. FWD, 40. The
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`Board’s reliance is misplaced because there is no separate software application at
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`Blake’s remote device that displays a guide and allows the user to input instruc-
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`tions. Instead, Blake’s remote device uses a generic web browser to access the
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`electronic program guide that resides on Blake’s central processing system.
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`EX1222, 6:11–23. In fact, Blake arguably does not even suggest an electronic pro-
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`gram guide at the remote device; the user can merely enter simple instructions,
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`such as selecting a program to record, on an input device from a remote location.
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`Id., 17:1–21. At most, only the input device is interactive in Blake’s system. Id.
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`(describing an embodiment wherein the user may enter on a push-button telephone
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`(i.e., the input device) “a predetermined program code that corresponds to the start-
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`ing time, ending time, channel, date, and time of the program”). Thus, the Board
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`erred in finding that Blake teaches the remote IPG limitation.
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`B.
`
`The Board erred in finding a motivation to combine Blake with
`Killian because Blake operates effectively on its own and Petition-
`er identified no reason why a POSA would have altered Blake.
`Blake discloses a rudimentary system in which a user can schedule a record-
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`ing from a remote location using a variety of input devices, such as a computer or
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`traditional push-button cell phone. EX1222, 17:5–8. The user can do so by entering
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`a program code, by entering the time, channel, or date information, by entering the
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`title of a program, or by selecting a program according to themes. Id., 2:12–18.
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`Petitioner argued—and the Board agreed—that one would have reconfigured
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`this simple system to incorporate Killian’s “viewer profiles,” which allow the user
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`to “identify and narrow desired content.” FWD, 56, 59. But such a reconfiguration
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`would have entailed a substantial redesign. Blake’s system is designed to operate
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`on simple devices, requiring only that the remote input device be “capable of
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`transmitting data from a remote location.” EX1222, 17:5–8. Killian’s electronic
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`program guide, on the other hand, can only operate on “platform[s] suitable to sup-
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`port JAVA-based operation” or “other suitable programming language.” EX1208,
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`3:34–50, 16:1–4. Indeed, it is hard to image—and Petitioner did not explain—how
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`Killian’s JAVA-based user profiles could have been stored on a conventional push-
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`button phone. EX2211, ¶187.
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`Moreover, the Board failed to identify any plausible purpose for revamping
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`Blake in this way. The Board stated that Killian’s user profiles could have allowed
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`Blake’s system to “better identify desired and undesired content.” FWD, 63. But
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`Blake’s system already has this functionality: it allows the user to customize the
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`list of programs using the “themes” embodiment, described above in Section II.
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`EX1222, 18:1–16; EX2211, ¶187. A POSA would have no reason to significantly
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`complicate Blake’s system to install a functionality that it already possess. The
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`Board thus erred in concluding that there was a motivation to combine these two
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`references. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1369
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`(Fed. Cir. 2012) (if prior-art device “independently operates effectively,” a POSA
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`would have no motivation to combine the device with other prior art).
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`Finally, the Board’s statement that it did “not agree … that Comcast must
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`identify a problem in Blake that a POSA would have been motivated to solve in
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`order to” combine Killian and Blake as claimed, respectfully, misses the point.
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`FWD, 62. It is true that Petitioner did not have to identify a “problem” in Blake,
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`but Petitioner did have to identify some reason why a POSA would have wanted to
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`put Killian’s viewer profiles in Blake’s system. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
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`829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (reversing obviousness determination be-
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`cause the petitioner “fail[ed] to explain why a [POSA] would have sought to com-
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`bine the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention”) (emphasis added);
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`see also Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
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`2018) (petitioner must show that a POSA would have been both able and motivat-
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`ed to combine multiple references as claimed). Petitioner failed to do so.
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`C. The Office’s current Director-review procedures are unlawful.
`Commissioner Hirshfeld cannot provide the required layer
`1.
`of principal-officer review because he is an inferior officer.
`Under Arthrex, an inferior officer cannot render a final IPR decision. “Only
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`an officer properly appointed to a principal office” may do so. 141 S. Ct. at 1985.
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`That was precisely the constitutional infirmity: “the nature of [APJs’] responsibili-
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`ties” was not “consistent with their…appointment” by the Secretary of Commerce.
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`The current Director-review process, however, merely repeats the constitu-
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`tional violation identified in Arthrex. It is settled law that one “who temporarily
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`performs the duties of a principal officer is an inferior officer for constitutional
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`purposes.” United States v. Smith, 962 F.3d 755, 764 (4th Cir. 2020); see United
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`States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (same). Commissioner Hirshfeld was not
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`presidentially appointed nor Senate-confirmed; instead, he is temporarily perform-
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`ing the functions and duties of the PTO Director. He is thus an inferior officer, and
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`so he cannot provide the required layer of principal-officer review. The Supreme
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`Court was clear: “[o]nly an officer properly appointed to a principal office may is-
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`sue a final decision binding the Executive Branch.” 141 S. Ct. at 1985.
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`Arthrex’s passing reference to “remand to the Acting Director,” 141 S. Ct. at
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`1988, does not alter the analysis. First, interpreting this language to permit review
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`of PTAB decisions by an inferior officer would undermine Arthrex’s core holding
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`that only principal officers may issue final decisions in IPRs. Second, Commis-
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`sioner Hirshfeld is not the Acting Director. So even if a true Acting Director could
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`perform the required layer of review, Commissioner Hirshfeld cannot.
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`2.
`
`Commissioner Hirshfeld’s assumption of authority to per-
`form the functions and duties of the Director was contrary
`to statute.
`Even if an officer properly performing the functions and duties of the Direc-
`
`tor could provide the required layer of principal-officer review, Commissioner
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`Hirshfeld cannot do so because his assumption of authority was unlawful.
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`a. FVRA. The FVRA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345 et seq., governs succession
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`when principal offices become vacant. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929,
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`934–35 (2017). The statute “authorizes three classes of Government officials to
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`become acting officers.” Id. The default rule—set forth in § 3345(a)(1)—“is that
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`the first assistant to a vacant office shall become the acting officer.” Id. Subsec-
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`tions (a)(2) and (a)(3) set forth two alternatives to that default rule: “[t]he President
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`may…direct[] either a person serving in a different PAS office or a senior employ-
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`ee within the relevant agency to become the acting officer instead.” Id.
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`Commissioner Hirshfeld does not fall within any of these categories. He
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`does not meet the criteria for 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) because he is not the Director’s
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`first assistant. And does not meet the criteria for § 3345(a)(2) or (a)(3) because the
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`President did not direct him to perform the functions and duties of the Director.
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`Moreover, even if Commissioner Hirshfeld had been properly appointed
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`pursuant to the FVRA, he still could not implement the Director-review procedures
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`for two additional reasons. First, those procedures were not in place during the
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`180-day period preceding the vacancy. See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(B)(ii). Second, a
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`person serving as a temporary principal officer under § 3345 may do so only for
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`210 days. See 35 U.S.C. 3346(a). Commissioner Hirshfeld assumed his post in
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`January 2021. It is now September, meaning the 210-day time limit has elapsed.
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`b. 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1). The FVRA sets forth “the exclusive means for
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`temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties” of a
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`principal officer unless a statute expressly “(A) authorizes the President, a court, or
`
`the head of an Executive department, to designate an officer or employee to per-
`
`form the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capaci-
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`ty; or (B) designates an officer or employee to perform the functions and duties of
`
`a specified office temporarily.” 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a). That is, other statutes may
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`“‘expressly’ create[] an alternative mechanism for filling vacancies.” Nw. Immi-
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`grant Rights Project v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 496 F. Supp. 3d 31,
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`53 (D.D.C. 2020). In accordance with § 3347(a), 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1) provides that
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`the PTO Deputy Director has “authority to act in the capacity of the Director in the
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`event of the absence or incapacity of the Director.” But Commissioner Hirshfeld
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`does not satisfy this provision either because he was not the PTO Deputy Director.
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`Commissioner Hirshfeld appears to have assumed his role pursuant to the
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`Department of Commerce’s Department Organization Order 10-14, which purports
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`to allow the Commissioner of Patents to perform the functions and duties of the
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`PTO Director if both the Director and Deputy Director posts are vacant. DOO 10-
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`14 § 2.04 (Sept. 28, 2012). But the FVRA permits department heads to create al-
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`ternative succession arrangements for principal offices only when expressly per-
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`mitted to do so by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a). And no statute authorized the Secre-
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`tary of Commerce to enact DOO 10-14.
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`The Department appears to have relied on 35 U.S.C. § 1, which provides the
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`Secretary with “policy direction” over the PTO. But the FVRA is clear that a gen-
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`eral grant of oversight authority to a department head is not enough to displace the
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`default succession plan. See 5 U.S.C. § 3347(b). Instead, a statute must “express-
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`ly…authorize[] the [department head] to designate an officer or employee to per-
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`form the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capaci-
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`ty.” Id. § 3348(a)(1). There is no such statute here.
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`The Secretary thus lacked authority to displace the succession plans of the
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`FVRA and § 3(b)(1). Commissioner Hirshfeld’s assumption of the Director’s du-
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`ties complied with neither statute, so his actions—including issuance of the review
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`procedures and any Director reviews he purports to perform—are without “force or
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`effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1); Nw. Immigrant, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 53.
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`3.
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`The Director-review procedures are invalid because they
`were not promulgated through notice-and-comment rule-
`making.
`The PTO is required to use the notice-and-comment procedures of 5 U.S.C.
`
`§ 553 when enacting regulations governing IPRs. Under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), regu-
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`lations that “govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office” “shall be made in
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`accordance with section 553 of title 5.” And § 316(a), which concerns IPRs, re-
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`quires the Director to “prescribe regulations…establishing and governing inter
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`partes review.” Id. § 316(a)(4) (emphasis added); see Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City
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`Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (§ 316(a) requires Direc-
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`tor to “prescribe regulations” governing IPRs). The PTO has effectively admitted
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`as much. Resp. BIO 9, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446 (Dec. 2015)
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`(defending adoption of BRI claim-construction standard because it was contained
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`in regulation enacted pursuant to § 316(a)(4) “following notice and comment”).
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`The Director-review procedures indisputably “govern[] inter partes review,”
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`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4). They thus must be implemented via notice-and-comment
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`rulemaking. Because the current procedures were not, they are invalid. See 5
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`U.S.C. § 552(a)(1); United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 523 (3d Cir. 2013).
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`Moreover, even setting aside the requirements of §§ 2(b)(2) and 316(a)(4)—
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`which apply to all rules governing IPRs—section 553 applies of its own force to
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`the substantive portions of the Arthrex guidance. See Animal Legal Defense Fund
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`v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 931 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (§ 553 requires notice and comment
`
`for substantive rules). A substantive rule “effects a change in existing law or policy
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`which affects individual rights and obligations.” Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536
`
`F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The PTO guidance sets forth substantive stand-
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`ards by which the agency intends to evaluate Director-review requests. Arthrex
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`Q&A D2, D3. Those are substantive rules, and they are therefore subject to § 553.
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`See Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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`Nor can the PTO rely on § 553(b)(B)—which provides an exception for the
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`notice-and-comment requirements “when…notice and public procedure thereon
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`are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest”—to justify its
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`failure to use notice-and-comment procedures. To take advantage of this to provi-
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`sion, the agency must “for good cause find[] (and incorporate[] the finding and a
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`brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)” that § 553(b)(B) is satis-
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`fied. Id. The PTO has not made any such finding here.
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`V. CONCLUSION
`PO respectfully requests that this proceeding be held in abeyance until (i) the
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`President appoints and the Senate confirms a PTO Director and (ii) the PTO enacts
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`notice-and-comment regulations governing the constitutionally required layer of
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`Director review. Once that occurs, PO requests that the Director set aside the Final
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`Written Decision and confirm the patentability of the challenged claims.
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`- 15 -
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`
`
`Case IPR2017-01050
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`/Jason D. Eisenberg/
`
`Jason D. Eisenberg
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Registration No. 43,447
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`Date: October 1, 2021
`
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
`
`- 16 -
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`
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`
`
`Case IPR2017-01050
`U.S. Patent No. 8,578,413
`CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above-
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`captioned PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING BY THE
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`DIRECTOR PURSUANT TO UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX was served
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`electronically via email on October 1, 2021, in its entirety on the following counsel
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`of record for Petitioner:
`
`fmeeker@bannerwitcoff.com
`Frederic M. Meeker (Lead Counsel)
`bwright@bannerwitcoff.com
`Bradley C. Wright (Back-up Counsel)
`skelly@bannerwitcoff.com
`Scott M. Kelly (Back-up Counsel)
`adike@bannerwitcoff.com
`Azuka C. Dike (Back-up Counsel)
`jdavenport@bannerwitcoff.com
`Joshua Davenport (Back-up Counsel)
`csauer@bannerwitcoff.com
`Camille Sauer (Back-up Counsel)
`bingvoldstad@bannerwitcoff.com
`Bennett A. Ingvoldstad (Back-up Counsel)
`BANNER AND WITCOFF, LTD.
`ComcastIPRService@bannerwitcoff.com
`
`Respectfully submitted,
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`
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`
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`
`
`
`
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`/Jason D. Eisenberg/
`
`Jason D. Eisenberg
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Registration No. 43,447
`
`Date: October 1, 2021
`
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
`
`
`
`
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