throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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` Paper No. 6
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` Entered: September 11, 2017
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`SALESLOFT, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`INSIDESALES.COM, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`____________
`
`Before WILLIAM V. SAINDON, ROBERT J. WEINSCHENK, and
`JASON W. MELVIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MELVIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Petitioner, SalesLoft, Inc., filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting
`inter partes review of claims 1–9 and 23–31 of U.S. Patent No. 7,072,947
`B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’947 patent”). Patent Owner, InsideSales.com, Inc., did
`not file a Preliminary Response. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.4(a), we have authority to determine whether to institute review.
`An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information
`presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
`1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the
`reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood
`that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of the
`challenged claims. We therefore institute inter partes review of those
`claims.
`Our conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are preliminary and
`are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. This is not a final
`decision as to the patentability of the claims for which inter partes review is
`instituted. Our final decision will be based on the record as fully developed
`during trial.
`
`A. RELATED MATTERS
`The parties identify the following pending judicial matter as relating
`to the ’947 patent: InsideSales.com, Inc. v. SalesLoft, Inc., Case 2:16-cv-
`00859 (D. Utah, filed Aug. 4, 2016). Pet. 3; Paper 5, 2.
`Additionally, IPR2017-01071 involves a petition for inter partes
`review of U.S. Patent No. 7,076,533, which shares a specification with the
`’947 patent.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`
`B. THE ’947 PATENT
`The ’947 patent is directed to a “system for monitoring email and
`website behavior of an email recipient.” Ex. 1001, 2:34–35. To that end, it
`describes a “mail enhancement server . . . configured to intercept all
`outgoing emails from a mail server” and a “logging server configured to
`capture and store relevant information relating to the outgoing email.” Id. at
`2:37–39, 3:3–5. “The mail enhancement server modifies each outgoing
`email to include a tracking code,” which may be “embedded within an image
`call” or part of a hyperlink in the original email that is “modified to include
`the tracking code.” Id. at 2:42–48. The ’947 patent describes that the
`functionality of the mail enhancement server may be provided at any point
`prior to delivery of the email to the recipient, including at the email client
`used to send the mail. Id. at 6:4–20.
`When a recipient’s computer opens the modified email, the image call
`or hyperlink causes it to contact the logging server, which may then deliver a
`cookie to the requesting computer. Id. at 2:61–66. The logging server uses
`the tracking code and cookie to “monitor the activities of the recipient in
`relation to the email as well as websites visited by the recipient.” Id. at
`3:14–17.
`
`C. CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`Challenged claims 1, 9, 23, and 31 are independent. Claim 1
`(reproduced below) is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
`1. A system for monitoring email behavior of an email
`recipient, the email recipient being associated with a first
`email domain, comprising:
`control logic configured to modify an outgoing email
`addressed to the email recipient and sent using an email
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`
`client configured to allow a sender to send the outgoing
`email and access one or more personal or corporate
`emails belonging to the sender, wherein the control logic
`configured to modify the outgoing email is further
`configured to edit the outgoing email to include a
`tracking code, wherein the tracking code is uniquely
`associated with the outgoing email, the email recipient,
`the sender or the business entity associated with the
`sender or a combination thereof; and
`control logic configured to monitor the email behavior of
`the email recipient With respect to the modified
`outgoing email;
`wherein the monitoring of the email behavior is performed
`within an Internet domain related to the sender or a
`business entity associated with the sender;
`wherein the first email domain and the Internet domain
`related to the sender or the business entity associated
`with the sender are different;
`wherein upon the email recipient opening the modified
`outgoing email, a connection to a remote server is made
`in which the tracking code is transmitted to the remote
`server;
`wherein the connection to the remote server is an image call
`inserted into the modified outgoing email;
`wherein the tracking code is embedded within the image
`call; and
`wherein upon receipt of the tracking code by the remote
`server, the remote server is able to determine whether
`the modified outgoing email has been opened by the
`email recipient.
`Ex. 1001, 13:54–14:21.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`
`D. PROPOSED GROUNDS OF UNPATENTABILITY
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability, each based
`on 35 U.S.C. § 103(a):1
`
`References
`
`Lessa2
`Lessa and Brown3
`
`Challenged
`Claims
`1, 2, 5–7, 9, 23, 24, 27–29, and 31
`3, 4, 8, 25, 26, and 30
`
`
`Pet. 15. Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Dr. Don Turnbull
`(Ex. 1007).
`
`E. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`1. Obviousness Overview
`An invention is not patentable “if the differences between the subject
`matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
`as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
`person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of
`underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the
`prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the
`prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and, (4) where in evidence, so-called
`secondary considerations, including commercial success, long-felt but
`
`
`1 The America Invents Act included revisions to, inter alia, 35 U.S.C. § 103
`effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’947 patent issued from an
`application filed before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103 applies.
`2 U.S. Pat. Pub. No. US 2002/0040387 A1 (pub. Apr. 4, 2002).
`3 U.S. Pat. No. 7,584,251 B2 (iss. Sep. 1, 2009).
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`unsolved needs, and failure of others. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
`1, 17−18 (1966). When evaluating a combination of teachings, we must also
`“determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known
`elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR Int’l Co. v.
`Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441, F.3d 977,
`988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Whether a combination of elements produced a
`predictable result weighs in the ultimate determination of obviousness. KSR,
`550 U.S. at 416–17.
`
`2. Anticipation overview
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 if “the four
`corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the claimed
`invention, either expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill
`in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.” 4
`Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed.
`Cir. 2000).
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of
`November 6, 2001, “would have had an Associate or Bachelor’s degree in
`computer science or information systems and/or one to three years of
`software development experience in the field of Internet (Web and email)
`technologies and/or one to three years of experience in the field of digital
`
`
`4 We address the standard for anticipation because, as discussed below,
`Petitioner effectively presents a ground of anticipation by Lessa.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`marketing using software tools.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 23). We
`adopt that definition for purposes of this decision.
`
`B. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Petitioner asserts that “specific construction of any claim terms is not
`required because the prior art relied on meets each of the claim limitations
`under any reasonable construction of the terms.” Pet. 9. We agree that no
`term requires express construction for purposes of this decision.
`
`C. UNPATENTABILITY
`As summarized above, Petitioner asserts that the subject matter of
`claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 23, 24, 27–29, and 31 would have been obvious over
`Lessa alone. Pet. 17–29. Petitioner also asserts that the subject matter of
`claims 3, 4, 8, 25, 26, and 30 would have been obvious over Lessa and
`Brown combined. Pet. 29–38. We determine that Petitioner has shown a
`reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to unpatentability of claims
`1 and 3, and we institute review of all the challenged claims.
`
`1. Lessa alone
`Petitioner asserts that Lessa teaches all of the limitations of claim 1.
`Pet. 20–25. It asserts that Lessa is prior art to the challenged claims under
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) because Lessa is entitled to the filing date of its own
`provisional application. Id. at 16. Petitioner supports that assertion by
`pointing to Lessa’s provisional application (see Ex. 1010) as supporting
`Lessa’s claim 1. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800
`F.3d 1375, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding petitioner bears the ultimate
`burden of showing the prior art’s entitlement to an earlier priority date,
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`which may include showing that the prior-art claims find support in an
`earlier provisional application).
`Regarding the limitations of claim 1, Petitioner points primarily to
`Lessa’s paragraphs 9 through 22, in which Lessa teaches modifying an
`outgoing email by passing it through a “gateway” that inspects the address
`of the recipient, and when that address is formatted according to a certain
`rule (Lessa ¶¶ 10–14), modifies the email to include an HTML <IMG> tag
`that contains a “unique identification code (UIC)” that is both specific to the
`message and associated with the sender’s address (id. at ¶¶ 15–20). When
`the recipient opens the modified message in Lessa, the <IMG> tag causes
`the recipient’s email client to request a CGI script from the gateway server
`while passing the UIC to that server. Id. at ¶ 22. Using the UIC, the server
`can notify the sender that the recipient viewed the email. Id.
`We note that Patent Owner has not, at this stage of the proceeding,
`addressed Petitioner’s analysis or supporting evidence. We have evaluated
`Petitioner’s assertions mapping claim 1’s limitations onto Lessa’s teachings
`and, on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has shown
`adequately at this stage of the proceeding a reasonable likelihood of
`succeeding on its obviousness challenge to claim 1 over Lessa. Because the
`present record indicates no substantial difference between Lessa’s teachings
`and claim 1’s limitations, we exercise our discretion and institute review of
`claim 1 as both (1) directed to subject matter that would have been obvious
`to a person of skill in light of Lessa and (2) anticipated by Lessa.
`Having decided that Petitioner’s showing regarding Lessa supports a
`reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is
`unpatentable as anticipated and obvious, we exercise our discretion under
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108 to have the review proceed on all challenged claims
`within these grounds—claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 23, 24, 27–29, and 31.
`
`2. Lessa combined with Brown
`For claims 3, 4, 8, 25, 26, and 30, Petitioner relies on Lessa in
`combination with teachings from Brown. Pet. 29–38. It asserts that Brown
`is prior art to the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) because Brown
`is entitled to the filing date of its own provisional application, August 28,
`2000. Id. at 16; see Ex. 1005, [60]. Petitioner supports that assertion by
`pointing to Brown’s provisional application (see Ex. 1011) as supporting
`Brown’s claim 1. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380–81.
`Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and further recites that “the control
`logic configured to modify the outgoing email is embedded within the email
`client, a plug-in to the email client or an email client utility.” Ex. 1001,
`14:26–29. Petitioner asserts that Brown teaches this additional limitation by
`teaching an “e-mail client” that is “configured to provide user selection
`capabilities for rich media content enhancements.” Ex. 1005, 11:1–7;
`accord id. at 18:16–31 (“[S]tandard e-mail user interface client programs
`such as Microsoft Outlook are modifiable to enable the user to apply rich
`media enhancement template identifiers for e-mail messages generated and
`transmitted. As noted above, rich media enhancement templates are
`predefined software code containing formatting instructions and other
`specifications for rich media content for the delivery of rich media content
`into the body of an e-mail message when the message is viewed by a
`recipient.”); see also Pet. 35–36.
`Petitioner assert that a skilled artisan would have understood that an
`email could be modified at any point before delivery to the recipients (see
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`Ex. 1001, 6:7–20) and that Brown teaches one option for where to perform
`the modification. Pet. 32–34. Petitioner also asserts that modifying an email
`at the email client would have been a predictable way of accomplishing the
`functionality taught by Lessa (“tracking activities of an email recipient” by
`“modifying an outgoing email to include a tracking code”). Id. We
`understand Petitioner to argue that substituting Brown’s email-modification
`location for that of Lessa would have been a simple substitution yielding a
`predictable result. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416–17. We conclude that, on the
`present record, Petitioner has presented “articulated reasoning with some
`rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”
`Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
`We have evaluated Petitioner’s assertions mapping claim 3’s
`limitations onto Lessa’s and Brown’s teachings and, on the present record,
`we determine that Petitioner has shown adequately at this stage of the
`proceeding a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on its obviousness
`challenge to claim 3 over Lessa and Brown.
`Regarding other claims for which Petitioner applies other teachings
`from Brown, Petitioner provides additional reasoning that a skilled artisan
`would have looked to those other teachings and used them in combination
`with Lessa. Regarding the requirement in claim 4 that the system generate a
`copy of the email specific to each recipient when addressed to multiple
`recipients (see Ex. 1001, 14:30–39), Petitioner asserts that Brown teaches
`application to emails with a plurality of recipients and that a skilled artisan
`would apply that teaching to Lessa’s tracking method to reach the solution
`of claim 4. Pet. 33. Regarding the requirement of claim 8 that the system
`update a database with information relating to the recipient (see Ex. 1001,
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`14:53–54), Petitioner asserts that Brown teaches such a database and that a
`skilled artisan would apply Brown’s teachings to Lessa as “nothing more
`than the application of commonly used technology to store results for later
`accessibility” to get the benefit of “facilitating the evaluation of the
`effectiveness of an email campaign.” Pet. 34. On the present record, we
`conclude that Petitioner has provided an adequate rationale for the asserted
`combinations of teachings.
`Patent Owner has not, at this stage of the proceeding, addressed
`Petitioner’s analysis or supporting evidence. Having decided that
`Petitioner’s showing regarding Lessa and Brown supports a reasonable
`likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims—claim 3—is
`unpatentable as obvious, and having also concluded that Petitioner provides
`an adequate rationale regarding the combinations asserted against claims 4
`and 8, we exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 to have the
`review proceed on all challenged claims within this ground—claims 3, 4, 8,
`25, 26, and 30.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the information
`presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner
`would prevail in showing the challenged claims unpatentable.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01070
`Patent 7,072,947 B1
`
`
`IV. ORDER
`
`Accordingly, it is:
`ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes
`review of the ’947 patent is hereby instituted on the following grounds:
`A. Whether claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 23, 24, 27–29, and 31 are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Lessa; and
`B. Whether claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 23, 24, 27–29, and 31 are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lessa; and
`C. Whether claims 3, 4, 8, 25, 26, and 30 are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lessa and Brown;
`FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; and
`FURTHER ORDERED that no other grounds are authorized for inter
`partes review.
`PETITIONER:
`
`Patrick McPherson
`Daniel T. Xue
`Duane Morris LLP
`pdmcpherson@duanemorris.com
`DTXue@duanemorris.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Thomas S. Fletcher
`Christopher S. Geyer
`Williams & Connolly LLP
`tfletcher@wc.com
`cgeyer@wc.com
`
`
`12
`
`

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