Effective Disaster
`Warnings
`
`Report by the Working Group on
`Natural Disaster Information Systems
`Subcommittee on Natural Disaster Reduction
`
`National Science and Technology Council
`Committee on Environment and Natural Resources
`
`November 2000
`
`1 of 56
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`IBM EX. 1013
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`Effective Disaster
`Warnings
`
`Report by the Working Group on
`Natural Disaster Information Systems
`Subcommittee on Natural Disaster Reduction
`
`National Science and Technology Council
`Committee on Environment and Natural Resources
`
`November 2000
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`General Information ........................................................................... 3
`Transmittal Letter............................................................................... 4
`Working Group On Natural Disaster Information Systems......................... 5
`Executive Summary and Recommendations............................................. 6
` Disaster Warnings: Technologies And Systems................................... 6
` Recommendations......................................................................... 7
` Scope Of This Report.................................................................... 8
`
` 1. Introduction................................................................................. 9
` 2. The Escalating Costs And Changing Nature Of Disasters.....................11
` 3. Increasing Capabilities To Provide Accurate Warnings.........................15
` 4. Issuing Effective Warnings.............................................................18
` 5. Warning Terminology...................................................................20
` 6. The Universal Digitally Coded Warning............................................23
` 7. Alternatives For Funneling Warnings Into Broadcast Systems...............24
` 8. Alternatives For Focusing Warnings On The People At Risk................26
` 9. The Emergency Alert System (EAS)................................................28
`10. Radio Broadcast Data System (RBDS)..............................................30
`11. Other Alternatives For Delivering Warnings......................................32
`12. Preparedness And Response Plans...................................................37
`13. Alternatives For In-Depth Information.............................................38
`14. A Plan For Action.......................................................................39
`
`References
`Appendix 1: List Of Acronyms.............................................................43
`Appendix 2: EAS Operations And Plans.................................................45
`Appendix 3: Existing Federal Warning Systems.......................................49
`Appendix 4: Primary Federal World-Wide-Web Sites
` For Disaster Information....................................................................55
`Acknowledgements.............................................................................56
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`General Information
`
`About the National Science and Technology Council
`
`President Clinton established the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) by Executive Order on
`November 23, 1993. This cabinet-level council is the principal means for the President to coordinate
`science, space, and technology policies across the Federal Government. The NSTC acts as a virtual agency
`for science and technology to coordinate the diverse parts of the Federal research and development enterprise.
`The NSTC is chaired by the President. Membership consists of the Vice President, the Assistant to the
`President for Science and Technology, Cabinet Secretaries and Agency Heads with significant science and
`technology responsibilities, and other senior White House officials.
`
`An important objective of the NSTC is the establishment of clear national goals for Federal science and
`technology investments in areas ranging from information technology and health research to improving
`transportation systems and strengthening fundamental research. The Council prepares research and
`development strategies that are coordinated across Federal agencies to form an investment package to
`accomplish multiple national goals.
`
`To obtain additional information regarding the NSTC, contact the NSTC Executive Secretariat at
`(202) 456-6100.
`
` About the Office of Science and Technology Policy
`
`The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was established by the National Science and
`Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976. OSTP’s responsibilities include advising the
`President on policy formulation and budget development on all questions in which science and technology
`are important elements; articulating the President's science and technology policies and programs; and
`fostering strong partnerships among Federal, State, and local governments and the scientific communities in
`industry and academia.
`
`To obtain additional information regarding the OSTP, contact the OSTP Administrative Office at
`(202) 395-7347
`
`About the Committee on Environment and Natural
`
`The Committee on Environment and Natural Resources (CENR), one of five committees under the NSTC,
`is charged with improving coordination among Federal agencies involved in environmental and natural
`resources research and development; establishing a strong link between science and policy; and developing a
`Federal environment and natural resources research and development strategy that responds to national and
`international issues.
`
`To obtain additional information about the CENR, contact the CENR Executive Secretary at
`(202) 482-5916.
`
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`THE WHITE HOUSE
`
`WASHINGTON
`
` August 2000
`
`Dear Colleague:
`
`I am pleased to transmit the NSTC Report, Effective Disaster Warnings, which has been prepared by the
`Working Group on Natural Disaster Information Systems under the Committee on Environment and
`Natural Resources (CENR) Subcommittee on Natural Disaster Reduction. This document compiles into a
`single reference a wealth of information on public and private sector R&D capability to provide early
`warning of natural or technological hazards that threaten the safety and well-being of our citizens. It is
`designed to assist scientists, engineers, and emergency managers in developing more accurate and more
`numerous warnings as they deploy better sensors to measure key variables, employ better dynamic models,
`and expand their understanding of the causes of disasters. Warnings are becoming much more useful to
`society as lead-time and reliability are improved and as society devises ways to respond effectively.
`
`The goal of this Report is to provide a broad overview of major issues related to warning the right people at
`the right time so that they can take appropriate action with respect to the disaster. It addresses the problems
`of delivering warnings reliably to only those people at risk and to systems that have been preprogrammed to
`respond to early warnings. Although the technology presently exists to build smart receivers to customize
`warnings to the users’ local situation whether at home, at work, outdoors, or in their cars, substantial
`improvement can be made with better utilization of emerging opportunities provided by existing and new
`technologies. Current warnings can target those at risk at the county and sub-county levels and it should
`also be possible to customize the information for trucks, trains, boats, and airplanes. One high priority that
`needs to be addressed concerns agreeing on data/information standards and dissemination systems to be used.
`
`This Report focuses on needs for improving delivery and effectiveness of warnings over the next 5 to 10
`years. It recommends close collaboration between Federal, State, local, and private sector organizations to
`leverage government and industry capabilities and needs to deliver effective disaster warnings.
`
`We hope that scientists, engineers, and emergency managers will find this Report to be a valuable reference
`on the policy issues of implementing advanced technologies for delivering warnings to people at risk.
`
`Sincerely,
`
`Neal Lane
`Assistant to the President
` for Science and Technology
`
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`Working Group on Natural Disaster Information Systems
`
`Peter Ward
`
`Chairman, Seismologist and Volcanologist, U.S.Geological Survey
`
`Rodney Becker
`
`Dissemination Services Manager, National Weather Service
`
`Don Bennett
`
`Deputy Director for Emergency Planning, Office of the Secretary of Defense
`
`Andrew Bruzewich CRREL, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
`
`Bob Everett
`
`Office of Engineering, Voice of America, International Broadcasting Bureau,
`U.S. InformationAgency
`
`Michael Freitas
`
`Department of Transportation/Federal Highway Administration
`
`Karl Kensinger
`
`Federal Communications Commission, Satellite and Radio Communications
`Division
`
`Frank Lucia
`
`Director, Emergency Communications, Compliance and Information Bureau,
`Federal Communications Commission
`
`Josephine Malilay National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease Control and
`Prevention
`
`John O'Connor
`
`National Communications System
`
`Elaine Padovani
`
`National Science and Technology Council, Office of Science and Technology
`Policy, Executive Office of the President
`
`John Porco
`
`Office of Emergency Transportation, Department of Transportation
`
`Ken Putkovich
`
`Chief, Dissemination Systems, National Weather Service
`
`Tim Putprush
`
`Federal Emergency Management Agency
`
`Carl P. Staton
`
`National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NESDIS
`
`David Sturdivant
`
`Federal Communications Commission
`
`Jay Thietten
`
`Bureau of Land Management
`
`Bill Turnbull
`
`National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
`
`John Winston
`
`Federal Communications Commission
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`Executive Summary and Recommendations
`
`People at risk from disasters, whether natural or human in origin, can take actions that save lives, reduce
`losses, speed response, and reduce human suffering when they receive accurate warnings in a timely manner.
`Scientists are developing more accurate and more numerous warnings as they deploy better sensors to
`measure key variables, employ better dynamic models, and expand their understanding of the causes of
`disasters. Warnings can now be made months in advance, in the case of El Niño, to seconds in advance of
`the arrival of earthquake waves at some distance from the earthquake. Computers are being programmed to
`respond to warnings automatically, shutting down or appropriately modifying transportation systems,
`lifelines, manufacturing processes, and such. Warnings are becoming much more useful to society as lead-
`time and reliability are improved and as society devises ways to respond effectively. Effective dissemination
`of warnings provides a way to reduce disaster losses that have been increasing in the United States as people
`move into areas at risk and as our infrastructure becomes more complex and more valuable.
`
`This report addresses the problems of delivering warnings reliably to only those people at risk and to
`systems that have been preprogrammed to respond to early warnings. Further, the report makes
`recommendations on how substantial improvement can be made if the providers of warnings can become
`better coordinated and if they can better utilize the opportunities provided by existing and new technologies.
`Current warnings can target those at risk at the county and sub-county level. The technology presently
`exists to build smart receivers to customize warnings to the users’; local situation, whether at home, at
`work, outdoors, or in their cars. It should also be possible to customize the information for trucks, trains,
`boats, and airplanes. The problem is to agree on standards and dissemination systems.
`
`Disaster Warnings: Technologies and Systems
`
`Disaster warning is a public/private partnership. Most warnings, including all official warnings, are issued
`by government agencies. Most dissemination and distribution systems are owned and operated by private
`companies. Liability issues make it problematic for private entities to originate warnings. Public entities
`typically cannot afford to duplicate private dissemination and distribution systems.
`
`Effective warnings should reach, in a timely fashion, every person at risk who needs and wants to be
`warned, no matter what they are doing or where they are located. Such broad distribution means utilizing
`not only government-owned systems such as NOAA Weather Radio and local sirens, but all privately
`owned systems such as radio, television, pagers, telephones, the Internet, and printed media. If warnings can
`be provided efficiently and reliably as input to private dissemination systems, and if the public perceives a
`value and desire to receive these warnings, then private enterprise has a clear mandate to justify the
`development of new distribution systems or modification of existing systems. What if a warning-receiving
`capability were simply an added feature available on all radios, televisions, pagers, telephones, and such?
`The technology exists not only to add such a feature, but to have the local receiver personalize the warnings
`to say, for example, “Tornado two miles southwest of you. Take cover.” What does not exist is a
`public/private partnership that can work out the details to deliver such disaster warnings effectively.
`
`The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is the national warning system designed primarily to allow the
`President to address the nation reliably during major national disasters. All radio and television stations (and
`soon all cable systems) are mandated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to have EAS
`equipment and to issue national alerts. The stations and cable systems may choose whether they wish to
`transmit local warnings and they may also delay transmission for many minutes. The warnings consist of a
`digital packet of information and a verbal warning of up to two minutes in length. The EAS interrupts
`normal programming or at least adds a “crawl” to the margin of the television screen. Program
`producers and advertisers want to minimize unnecessary interruptions. As a result, only a modest percent of
`severe weather warnings issued by the National Weather Service are relayed to citizens by available stations.
`The warnings that are relayed may only apply to a small part of the total listening area but are received by
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`all listeners. When people receive many warnings that are not followed by the anticipated events, they tend
`to ignore such warnings in the future.
`
`The information and technology revolutions now underway provide a multitude of ways to deliver effective
`disaster warnings. Digital television, digital AM radio, and FM radio offer the capability to relay warnings
`without interrupting programming for those not at risk. Techniques exist to broadcast warnings to all
`wireless or wired telephones or pagers within small regions. Existing and planned satellites can broadcast
`throughout the country and the world. The Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems are providing
`inexpensive ways to know the location of receivers. The technology exists. The problem is to implement
`standards and procedures that private industry can rely on to justify development and widespread distribution
`of a wide variety of receivers.
`
`Recommendations
`
`This report provides the background information to justify the following recommendations:
`
`1. A public/private partnership is needed that can leverage government and industry
`needs, capabilities, and resources in order to deliver effective disaster warnings. The
`Disaster Information Task Force (1997) that examined the feasibility of a global disaster information
`network has also recommended such a partnership. The partnership might be in the form of a not-for-profit
`corporation that brings all stakeholders together, perhaps through a series of working groups, to build
`consensus on specific issues for implementation and to provide clear recommendations to government and
`industry.
`
`2. One or more working groups, with representatives from providers of different types of warnings in many
`different agencies, people who study the effectiveness of warnings, users of warnings, equipment
`manufacturers, network operators, and broadcasters, should develop and review on an ongoing basis:
`
`• A single, consistent, easily-understood terminology that can be used as a standard across all hazards and
`situations. Consistency with systems used in other countries should be explored.
`• A single, consistent suite of variables to be included in a general digital message. Consistency with
`systems used in other countries should be explored.
`• The mutual needs for precise area-specific locating systems for Intelligent Transportation Systems and
`Emergency Alert Systems to determine where resources can be leveraged to mutual benefit.
`• The potential for widespread use of the Radio Broadcast Data System (RBDS) and other technologies that
`do not interrupt commercial programs for transmitting emergency alerts.
`• Cost effective ways to augment existing broadcast and communication systems to monitor warning
`information continuously and to report appropriate warnings to the people near the receiver.
`
`3. A standard method should be developed to collect and relay instantaneously and
`automatically all types of hazard warnings and reports locally, regionally, and
`nationally for input into a wide variety of dissemination systems. The National Weather
`Service (NWS) has the most advanced system of this type that could be expanded to fill the need. Proper
`attribution of the warning to the agency that issues it needs to be assured.
`
`4. Warnings should be delivered through as many communication channels as
`practicable so that those users who are at risk can receive them whether inside or
`outside, in transportation systems, or at home, work, school, or shopping, and such.
`Delivery of the warning should have minimal effect on the normal use of such communication channels,
`especially for users who will not be affected.
`
`The greatest potential for new consumer items in the near future is development of a wide variety of smart
`receivers as well as the inclusion of such circuits within standard receivers. A smart receiver would be able
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`to turn itself on or interrupt current programming and issue a warning only when the potential hazard will
`occur near the particular receiver. Some communication channels where immediate expansion of coverage
`and systems would be most effective include NOAA Weather Radio, pagers, telephone broadcast systems,
`systems being developed to broadcast high-definition digital television (HDTV), and the current and Next
`Generation Internet.
`
`Scope of This Report
`
`This report focuses on the needs for and the policy issues of implementing advanced technologies for
`delivering warnings to people at risk. The report does not address the many research and development needs
`for such issues as developing more accurate and reliable warnings, for evaluating the most effective ways to
`get people to take action, and for implementing new technologies such as the Next Generation Internet.
`
`The intended audience for this report includes:
`
`• Legislators and other policymakers in Federal, State, and local government
`• Emergency managers in public and private organizations and in the military
`• Manufacturers of dissemination equipment and consumer receivers
`• Government and private standards groups
`• Citizens concerned with the need for more adequately warning people
`• Economic and financial communities
`• Insurance companies
`• Broadcasters, cable operators, media, telecommunication companies, and related trade organizations
`• Researchers working on ways to improve the provision and utilization of warnings
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` 1. Introduction
`
`Effective warnings allow people to take actions that save lives, reduce damage, reduce human suffering,
`and speed recovery. Rapid reporting of what is happening during a disaster can be very effective in helping
`people reduce damage and improve response. Scientists and emergency managers are developing the
`capabilities to warn for more hazards and to increase warning accuracy, but our ways of delivering these
`warnings in a timely manner and to only those people at risk needs significant improvement. This report
`summarizes the major issues involved and the opportunities that technological advances make possible.
`There is a major need for better coordination among the warning providers, more effective delivery
`mechanisms, better education of those at risk, and new ways for building partnerships among the many
`public and private groups involved. In this report, we take the broad view over the next decade, to show
`where better coordination, standards, and regulations can lead to significant improvements and to encourage
`partnerships that can take the necessary actions. There are many new technologies that provide the chance
`not only to reach just the people at risk, but also to personalize the message to their particular situation.
`Industry is poised to design and market those systems that prove to be cost effective. Industry needs to
`know how the warnings can be provided to their systems and what standards or regulations they can depend
`on. The opportunities are available right now to reduce significantly the loss of life and economic hardship
`if we simply become better coordinated.
`
`The major components of the warning process are shown in Figure 1. Signals from tens of thousands of
`sensors on the ground, sensors flown in the atmosphere, and sensors on numerous satellites are monitored
`at hundreds of centers throughout the country. At these sites specialists and their computers process the
`data, apply scientific techniques, compare it with models and the historic record, and issue warnings about
`anticipated hazardous events. These sensors are operated by Federal, State, and local government entities,
`universities, research laboratories, and volunteer organizations. The primary responsibility for providing
`warnings for natural disasters lies within the Federal Government, primarily with the National Weather
`Service (NWS) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Warnings of accidents, chemical spills, terrorism,
`computer viruses, and such may come from the Federal or local governments, industry, or emergency
`managers. These warnings then need to be communicated to the people at risk. Many informal channels
`exist to communicate warnings to local groups. Widespread communication depends on funneling the
`information from many or all centers into communications systems that can reach thousands to millions of
`people rapidly. When the information gets to the right people in a timely way, they can take actions to
`reduce disaster losses, speed response, and improve recovery.
`
`There are numerous examples where warnings have been issued in a timely manner but were not received by
`the people at risk for a variety of reasons. For example:
`
`• March 27, 1994, a tornado killed 20 worshipers at a Palm Sunday service at the UMC Goshen Church in
`northern Alabama. A warning had been issued 12 minutes before the tornado struck the church. Though it
`was broadcast over the electronic media, the warning was not received by anyone in or near the church.
`The region also was not covered by NOAA Weather Radio.
`
`• February 22-23, 1998, unusually strong tornadoes occurred in east central Florida during the late night
`and early morning, killing 42. The NWS issued 14 tornado warnings, which received wide distribution by
`the electronic media and NOAA Weather Radio. The warnings were not widely received as people were
`asleep and did not own tone-alert NOAA Weather Radios.
`
`• May 31, 1998, a tornado killed six in Spencer, South Dakota. A warning was issued, but the sirens failed
`to sound because the storm had knocked out the power. Again, the area was outside reception of NOAA
`Weather Radio. Issuing warnings is primarily a government responsibility. Liability laws, in fact, make
`it problematic for private entities to issue warnings. Disseminating warnings, on the other hand, is
`primarily the domain of private industry, which owns and manufactures the infrastructure. Thus effective
`warning relies on close cooperation between public and private entities. In the past, some cooperation has
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`been mandated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and other cooperation has been
`volunteered. The challenge is to develop a partnership where all parties gain and where major
`developments are market-driven.
`
`In this report, we provide the background for these issues by reviewing the problem,
`the potential for solutions, the kinds of systems available, and how the information
`can best be utilized.
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`2. The Escalating Costs and Changing Nature of Disasters
`
`We have a major national problem: disaster costs are high and rising. Recently, OSTP has estimated that
`between 1992 and 1996, natural disasters cost the United States approximately $1 billion each week
`(Padovani, 1997). The Northridge earthquake of 1994 was the most expensive single disaster in the United
`States with total costs in excess of $40 billion. Future disasters are expected to increase these costs
`dramatically. For example, an anticipated earthquake in the eastern San Francisco Bay region is likely to
`cause more than $150 billion in losses (EQE International, 1995), similar to the 1996 Kobe earthquake in
`Japan. A repeat of the 1906 earthquake near San Francisco or the 1857 earthquake north of Los Angeles is
`likely to cost more than $200 billion (Risk Management Solutions, Inc., 1995). A repeat of the 1811-1812
`earthquakes in southeast Missouri is likely to cost more than $200 billion (Risk Management Solutions,
`Inc., 1999).
`
`Worst-case hurricane scenarios (e.g., direct hits of category 5 hurricanes on either New York City or New
`Orleans) would result in comparable losses. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida and Louisiana.
`Though a category 4 storm, it caused $15.5 billion in insured losses to South Florida alone. If Andrew had
`struck downtown Miami, twenty miles to the north of its actual landfall, losses would have approached $50
`Billion (IRC, 1995). The Insurance Research Council (IRC) in 1995 noted that insured exposures for
`coastal counties adjacent to the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts exceeds $3 trillion. Concerning the potential for
`catastrophic loss of life, 36 million people live along the nation’s hurricane-prone coasts. This figure is
`expected to swell to 73 million by 2010 (IRC, 1995).
`
`Additionally, development along inland flood-prone areas is creating escalating disasters as well. Each year,
`on average, 139 people die in inland flooding while damage exceeds $3.5 billion. In the first nine months
`of1997, floods claimed more than 80 lives, with damages of $6 billion (Department of Commerce, 1998).
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`While consistent statistics on disaster losses are difficult to develop, global losses also appear to be high
`and rising. The numbers shown in Table 1 for the world and Table 2 for the United States are based on the
`Emergency Events Database (EMDAT) developed by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
`Disasters at the University of Louvain in Brussels, Belgium (http://www.cred.be/ ). This database
`includes only disasters that killed at least 10 persons or affected more than 100
`persons or, in the United States, if a disaster was officially declared and a request was
`made for assistance. Damage is based primarily on insured losses that significantly
`underestimate losses in developing countries and are often assumed in the United
`States to represent approximately one-third of the total costs. No adjustment has been
`made for inflation. On average, according to this source, during the period from 1972
`through 1997, insured damage caused by natural and technological hazards was more
`than $40 billion per year, with 16.6 percent of the damage occurring within the United
`States.
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`Life loss in the United States, however, is only 0.4 percent of the global life loss. Lives lost during
`disasters averaged 585 per year in the United States and 132,951 per year globally. Improved warnings and
`building codes have significantly reduced the numbers of lives lost in the technologically advanced nations
`so that the global average of lives lost has been relatively flat since 1976. An earthquake near Tangshan,
`China, killed at least 240,000 people in 1976 (U.N. Global Programme, 1996), and a major tropical
`cyclone in the densely populated delta region of Bangladesh killed 300,000 people in 1970 (Tobin and
`Montz, 1997). The potential for saving lives through more effective warnings is especially great in the
`developing nations.
`
`In terms of insured damage, the greatest hazards in the United States since 1972 are storms, hurricanes,
`earthquakes, floods, accidents, cold waves, droughts, forest fires, heat waves, and urban fire. In terms of life
`loss, the greatest U.S. hazards are storms, accidents, heat waves, floods, cold waves, urban fire, hurricanes,
`landslides, cyclones, and earthquakes. Effective warnings can provide a significant reduction in the loss of
`both life and property.
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`All disaster statistics have their own inconsistencies based on the selection and reporting criteria. EMDAT
`underreports disasters that effect small numbers of people in single instances. For example, lightning,
`which strikes the earth 100 times per second, rarely kills 10 people, so that it would not be included in the
`EMDAT database. But lightning has killed 1,444 people in the United States from 1975 to 1994 (National
`Climatic Data Center, 1996). A more detailed discussion of U.S. disaster losses is presented in the second
`national assessment of hazards (Mileti et al., 1999).
`
`Manmade or technological disasters are of increasing concern, whether acts of terrorism or accidental. Time
`is of the essence in limiting the effects of such disasters, especially biological or chemical spills, and even
`computer viruses. The needs for rapid notification are similar and just as great as for natural disasters.
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`3. Increasing Capabilities to Provide Accurate Warnings
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`Scientists are providing more and more warnings with increasing accuracy as they:
`
`• Deploy improved monitoring instrumentation in more areas.
`
`• Develop better understanding of the physical processes that cause disasters.
`
`• Improve modeling capabilities that predict expected time of occurrence, impact area(s), and severity.
`
`Some warnings are months in advance; others are seconds in advance. Even rapid notification during
`emergencies helps people understand what is happening and what they should do to minimize their risk.
`Some examples:
`
`• In 1997, early warning of a likely peak in El Niño a