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`NATURAL HAZARDS
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`JULY ZEIEI 1
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`VULUMEXXVNUMEER5
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`TriNet
`,
`~
`New Tools for Rapid Earthquake Response
`Ciplinary Research I,
`Through Interdis
`fan invited comment
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`
`“
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`.,_
`
`Irnniediately following‘a damaging earthquake, emergen-
`cy managers must quickly assess the situation and make
`response decisions. Where are theimajor incidents? What
`resources must be mobilized and in what quantities? What
`areas have sustained damage and what areas are relatively
`free of damage? Will mutual aid be needed?
`Typically, first response organizations learn the answers
`to these questions through reconnaissance, police and fire
`services reports from the stricken areas, and information
`, gathered from other agencies. Reconnaissance requires hours
`and sometimes days to complete; however, decisions regard—
`ing search and rescue, medical emergency response, mass ’
`care and shelter, and other critical response needs must be
`* made quickly on the basis of available information. Often,
`7 this information is inadequate.
`t-‘i
`_
`‘
`Historically, California’s seismic networks have con-
`‘ tributed to reconnaissance efforts after major earthquakes
`and provided, within the limits of available technology, rapid
`information on seismic activity. The information generated
`by the networks has, since the 1980s, included the magni-
`tude, location, and identification of the ruptured fault, and,
`more recently,
`the probability of damaging aftershocks.
`While useful, this information was not sufficient to support
`
`,
`
`critical postearthquake emergency management decisions.
`I With the implementation of TriNet in 1997, this situation has
`changed in southern California.
`,,
`_
`\-
`a
`In an assessment of seismic network performance
`conducted following the ,1994 Northridge earthquake,
`scientists concluded that use of new digital equipment,
`modern data communications methods; and advanced ,
`computing-could greatly improve the accuracy and timeli—
`ness of seismic information and provide useful decision
`support tools for emergency responders. In the months that
`followed Northridge, seismologists responsible for network
`operations assembled a proposal for a state-of-the—art seismic:
`and strong motion" network that would serve the needs of
`emergency management while also supporting scientific
`investigation and building code development. In 1997, the
`Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
`the
`California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OBS), -
`the US. Geological Survey (USGS), and other partners
`agreed to pr'oiride funding for the network.
`” '
`The TriNet project is named for the three organizations
`that haVe collaborated to build this network: the California
`Institute of Technology, the State of California Division of
`, Mines and Geology (CDMG), and the USGS. This fivelyear
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`IBM EX. 1014
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`displaced from their homes. Prior to the advent of TriNet,
`these loss estimation systems attempted to estimate ground
`motion based on quake magnitude and location. Using actual
`ground motion data will reduce the number of assumptions
`necessary for modeling damage and should improve the
`accuracy of loss estimates.
`Perhaps the most intriguing of the new technologies
`being developed through the TriNet project is a prototype
`earthquake early warning capability that will, for some
`earthquakes, provide a few seconds warning prior to the
`arrival of strong ground motion. Early warnings may
`provide the opportunity to take life safety measures and
`mitigate hazards, albeit in a very short period of time. The
`earthquake early warning component of the TriNet project
`was approached as a multidisciplinary effort that inVolved
`the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at the University of
`Delaware (see p. 23 of this Observer), the Center for Public
`Health and Disaster Relief at the University of California—
`Los Angeles (UCLA), EQE International, Inc., and several
`Trith working groups.
`The DRC first conducted a comprehensive assessment of
`the social science literature regarding both warning systems
`for other hazards and behavioral response to warnings.
`Building on these insights, the UCLA center conducted a
`survey of 200 organizations to assess the acceptability and
`feasibility of introducing earthquake early warning among
`four sectors of the community: education, health care, emer—
`gency management, and utilities and transportation lifelines.
`With both of these studies in hand, EQE International
`addressed the salient public policy issues raised by the intro—
`duction of earthquake early warning in California, including
`potential legal liabilities, costs and benefits, and the organi-
`zation and management of a warning system. These studies
`will set the stage for the selection of early warning pilot
`project partners with whom TriNet will test this emerging
`technology.
`The TriNet products hold great promise for improving
`emergency response after the next major earthquake in
`southern California. As it has proceeded, the project has
`benefited from the reservoir of experience held by the
`emergency services community, and it
`is
`through the
`cooperative efforts of many disciplines that earthquakes will
`be better understood and response will be more rapid and
`efficient. Based on the success of TriNet, a committee of
`scientists and emergency managers from northern and
`southern California is seeking state funding to implement the
`California Integrated Seismic Network. On an even larger
`scale, Congress has authorized and provided initial seed
`funding for the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS),
`a USGS project that would develop a TriNet-like system for
`the entire nation.
`
`(alter/t. edit.
`
`project will be completed at the end of 2001. The TriNet
`budget of approximately $21 million,
`including matching
`funds, has been invested in hardware, software development,
`data communications, and an outreach program that seeks to
`move technology from the laboratory to the emergency
`operations center. The real-time information products from
`TriNet are direct results of the new digital seismic and
`strong motion networks and include the rapid broadcast and
`web posting of accurate and reliable information on magni-
`tude, location, fault configuration, and ground shaking for
`all earthquakes in the region; maps showing the distribution
`‘ of ground motion expressed as intensity, peak acceleration,
`and *velocity; and a prototype earthquake early warning
`system.
`TriNet also provides ground shaking data for regional
`loss estimation software,
`including FEMA’s HAZUS
`program and the Early Post—Earthquake Damage Assessment
`Tool
`(EPEDAT) developed by EQE International,
`Inc.
`EPEDAT and HAZUS employ similar methodologies and
`provide similar outputs. However,
`they differ
`in that
`HAZUS is nationally applicable while EPEDAT is custom—
`ized with detailed building inventories for five southern
`California counties. EPEDAT was developed for, and is
`used by, California OES'and shared with Los Angeles,
`Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura counties.
`In addition, TriNet fulfills the other goals outlined above,
`' providing data to support seismological and earthquake engi—
`neering research and improvements in building codes——
`efforts led by CDMG.
`‘ The maps, which display ground motion, are particularly
`important for emergency management. Known as ShakeMap
`and available on the web at www.trinet.0rg/slzake,
`these
`maps offer important information beyond magnitude anti
`location of an earthquake’s epicenter. Because they can see
`the geographic distribution of ground shaking within five
`minutes of an earthquake, emergency responders can rapidly
`determine what areas have been severely impacted and begin
`responding based on an accurate overall assessment of the
`scope of the disaster. In Northridge, as in the 1989 Lorna
`Prieta earthquake, some areas of heavy damage were quickly
`identified through ground and aerial reconnaissance, but
`there were also relatively hidden pockets of severe damage
`that were belatedly discovered. These areas included Santa
`Cruz and Watsonville in 1989 and Santa Monica in 1994. In
`
`,
`
`future quakes, ShakeMap will identify these areas quickly
`and help minimize delays in response. Since March 1997,
`these maps have been generated automatically within five
`minutes for earthquakes as small as magnitude 3.5 and as
`large as the magnitude 7.1 Hector Mine earthquake that
`occurred on October 16, 1999.
`The rapid loss estimation software programs used by
`local, state, and federal agencies to calculate damage and
`population impacts in an earthquake now utilize ground
`motion data from TriNet. HAZUS and EPEDAT calculate
`estimates of economic loss as both total dollar loss and losses
`to structures and contents; damage in terms of the number of
`red— (unsafe to reoccupy) and yellow— (restricted access)
`tagged buildings (both residential and commercial); damage
`to water, power, and natural gas infrastructure; and popula-
`ition impacts, including the number of casualties and persons
`
`Natural Hazards Observer
`\
`
`July 2001
`
`James D. Goltz and Egill Hauksson
`Seismological Laboratory
`California Institute of Technology
`
`For additional information about TriNet. See the project web site: www.
`trt'net. org; or contact the authors at the Seismological Laboratory, Oflice of
`Earthquake Programs, MC 252—21, California Institute of Technology,
`Pasadena, CA 91125, e-mail: jgoltz@gps.mltech.edu (1r hauks.r0n@gps.
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`The Gilbert F. White
`Natural Hazards Mitigation Chair
`
`OKAY. THE
`ROCKING
`CHAIR IS
`DEFINITELY
`
`On May 2 of this year, in a ceremony at the Natural Hazards Center,
`Becky Turner, a representative of the State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance
`Company and State Farm General Insurance Company, presented a check for
`$100,000 toward the position. The donation represents the initial step in a
`University of Colorado Foundation campaign to raise $3 million to endow the
`chair by White’s 90th birthday on November 26.
`Persons interested in learning more about or donating toward the Gilbert
`F. White endowed chair should contact Linda Bachrach, C. U. Foundation,
`P. 0. Box 1140, Boulder, CO 80306-1140; (303) 492—5689; e—mail: Linda.
`Bachrach@cufund. colorado. edu.
`
`The University of Colorado and the Natural Hazards Research and
`Applications Information Center have launched a major fundraising effort to
`establish an endowed faculty position dedicated to understanding and reducing
`loss caused by disasters.
`Named after the center’s founder and long-time mentor, the Gilbert F.
`White Natural Hazards Mitigation Chair will honor White by reflecting his
`life—long dedication to furthering knowledge and research regarding ways to
`alleviate human suffering caused by natural hazards. The post will ensure that
`hazards mitigation remains at the forefront of scholarship in social science.
`The chair will be open to any relevant discipline and will reside at the Natural
`Hazards Center, which is part of the university’s Institute of Behavioral
`Science.
`
`July 2001
`
`Effective Disaster Warnings
`A National Tragedy
`
`How many Americans know what to do when a tornado
`touches down in their county? How should they respond
`when the main highway is closed because of a chemical spill
`or terrorists have poisoned the local water system? How can
`local officials warn them that a flash flood has been spotted
`near where they live or work?
`Accurate information delivered in a timely way can
`determine whether individuals take appropriate actions that
`protect themselves and their families, or dither about what
`to do, or even take steps that increase their risk.
`Current news broadcast systems work well for long—term
`warnings such as those for hurricanes. Many days before a
`storm reaches the coast, network and local news channels
`
`can provide reasonable estimates of landfall and intensity.
`On a shorter scale, although the exact track of a tornado is
`difficult to predict, if an effective communication system is
`available,
`the tomado’s progress can be monitored and
`communities in its path can be alerted minutes before it
`arrives. Warnings for chemical spills, terrorist acts, flash
`floods, or earthquakes, however, are rarely available before
`they occur, but accurate information immediately following
`the incident can often be used very effectively to reduce
`losses.
`
`Scientists are improving the accuracy of and increasing
`the lead time for warnings. At the same time, emergency
`responders are improving their information gathering and
`
`Natural Hazards Observer
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`3 of 28
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`re—
`commercial broadcasters and thus requires a special
`ceiver. Imagine how much more effective NWR would be
`if it could transmit to builtAin circuitry in every radio and
`television in the U.S. This circuitry would be able to detect
`local warnings and interrupt programming or even turn on
`a receiver, increase the volume, and issue a warning only to
`those to whom it applies. The Radio Data System (RDS)
`does this in the FM band
`and is in widespread use in
`Europe, but is not avail-
`able in the U.S.
`Cellular telephones are
`becoming an American
`fixture;
`111 million are
`currently in use, and rapid
`growth is anticipated in
`this market. The technol-
`ogy is available to broad-
`cast to or dial up all tele-
`phones within
`a
`cell.
`Imagine how many lives could be saved issuing warnings to
`cell phone users as a tornado weaves across the countryside!
`Despite the determined effort of several citizens to promote
`such a system, providers have been slow to respond because
`they fear a government mandate similar to the requirements
`for the EAS. Furthermore, the confused roles of public and
`private groups make it difficult for industry to evaluate the
`business consequences of adopting this system.
`Many entrepreneurs are developing systems to broadcast
`warnings only to people at risk. Some have found limited
`application around nuclear reactors and oil refineries, but
`market potential is limited by government programs and
`officials who favor outdated existing systems, by liabilities
`associated with issuing warnings, by the unclear delineations
`between public and private roles, by the reticence of
`investors to be associated with disasters or to be involved
`with government programs, and generally by the fog that
`obscures who is responsible for what and where the business
`opportunities lie.
`It is time to bring the people on all sides of these issues
`together to set some clear goals, agree on roles, and deliver
`to the American people the effective warnings they deserve.
`We do not need more government. We need an effective
`public-private partnership.
`
`group, e-mail the author at peward@wy0ming.cam.
`
`response systems. Yet, there is still a problem delivering
`critical information over the last mile—that is, to the people
`at risk no matter where they are and what they are doing.
`Experience shows that when people are showered with
`warnings that do not apply directly to them,
`they tend to
`tune out all subsequent advisories. To overcome this
`problem and improve individual response, warnings need to
`focus only on those at
`risk. In this technological
`age, numerous
`systems
`can accomplish this task,
`yet none have been imple-
`mented
`in
`the United
`States.
`
`The underlying issues
`in this country are wide-
`spread confusion over the
`appropriate roles of gov-
`ernment and industry, a
`substantial lack of coordi-
`
`nation among government agencies and private sector
`groups, and a lack of resources devoted to the problem. The
`poor state of warning systems in the U.S.
`is indeed a
`national tragedy.
`A recent report, Effective Disaster Warnings, released
`by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC),
`describes existing warning systems, the basic issues involved
`in providing effective warnings, and the many technologies
`that could be used to issue timely warnings. The report's
`primary conclusion is that a public-private partnership is
`needed to bring the appropriate groups together to imple—
`ment effective warning systems. The council points out that
`most warnings are currently issued by federal, state, and
`local government authorities, but most current or potential
`warning delivery systems are owned and operated by private
`industry. The inadequate coordination among them is the
`result of historical approaches to warnings, unclear signals
`from several different branches of government, fears of
`government mandate, and the difficulties of finding private
`investors for “government—related” ventures.
`Our current national warning system is the Emergency
`Alert System (EAS), managed by the Federal Communica-
`tions Commission and implemented by private broadcasters
`under government mandate. This system, originally designed
`to allow the president to address the nation in times of
`national crisis, interrupts local programming. Most broad-
`casters and advertisers are not excited about increasing the
`number of regional and local warnings their stations already
`provide, and, as stated before, the EAS reaches many more
`people than those at risk from most hazards. Although
`digital coding technology can focus a warning on a small
`area and transmit it to that location, few individuals have
`receivers that can decode these messages.
`The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
`NOAA Weather Radio (NWR), another national system, can
`be transmitted to over 95% of the population. It provides
`regular weather forecasts for the region surrounding each
`transmitter and issues warnings in both audio and digital
`formats. Unfortunately,
`this system uses a federal radio
`frequency far away from the AM/FM bands assigned to
`
`Natural Hazards Observer
`
`July 2001
`
`Peter L. Ward
`Chair
`
`Working Group on Natural Disaster
`Information Systems
`
`The report Effective Disaster Warnings (2001, 56 pp.) is available on
`the World Wide Web at www.nnic.n0aa. gov/CENR/NDIS_rev_Oct27.
`pdf. This report was the result of a year-long study by 19 federal
`employees from a dozen federal agencies who specialize in disaster
`warnings. This Working Group on Natural Disaster Information
`Systems (NDIS) was appointed by the Subcommittee on Natural
`Disaster Reduction under the NSTC’s Committee on Environmenth
`Natural Resources. For additional
`information about
`the working
`
`4 of 28
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`A New Special Publication
`from NHRAIC
`
`On Hurricanes and Politics
`in Central America and the Caribbean
`
`despite some successes during the United Nations Inter-
`national Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction,
`it was
`sadly ironic that even as this much-publicized event was
`coming to a close, Hurricane Georges and especially
`Hurricane Mitch would devastate three countries. .
`. With
`this in mind, we need to step back and look at the entire
`situation for the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and
`Nicaragua (and many other countries, for that matter). A
`relatively simple equation can outline why disaster losses
`are going up, not down:
`Population Growth + Urbanization + Mass
`Poverty-High Inequality + Deforestation and
`Other Environmental Degradation + Lack of
`Mitigation (Land Use and Building Standards) +
`Institutional
`(National Emergency Organiza-
`tion/Civil Defense) Weakness = Increasing Vul-
`nerability and Eventual Catastrophe
`
`A year ago, researchers Richard Olson, Juan Pablo
`Sarmiento Prieto, Robert Olson, Vincent Gawronski, and
`Amelia Estrada published The Marginalizotion of Disaster
`Response Institutions: The 1997-1998 El Nir’io Experience
`in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Natural Hazards Center
`Special Publication #36—see the Observer, Vol. XXIV,
`No. 5, p. 4, and www.colorado. edu/hazards/sp/sp.html). In
`their critical analysis of the organized response to El Nifio,
`they show that most lessons from the earlier 1982—83 El
`Nifio were lost—primarily because of a lack of prior plan—
`ning and the political exigencies that emerged when the
`1997-98 event became a major “catastrophe” that received
`national and global attention. Their principal finding is that,
`while at the outset the civil defense organizations in the
`respective countries were the nominal “national emergency
`organizations,” each was rapidly pushed aside and replaced
`by one or more ad hoc governmental organizations, with
`resulting confusion, duplication of effort, weakened morale,
`and loss of credibility in each country’s civil defense organi-
`zation.
`Would the same debilitating political process unfold
`following a high impact disaster such as a hurricane?
`Well, in at least three cases, it did.
`The Storms of ’98.- Hum'canes Georges and Mitch —
`Impacts, Institutional Response, and Disaster Politics in
`Three Countries, by Richard Olson, Ricardo Alvarez,
`Bruce Baird, Amelia Estrada, Vincent Gawronski, and Juan
`Pablo Sarmiento Prieto (Natural Hazards Center Special
`Publication #38, 2001, 68 pp.) examines the response and
`“disaster politics" (including media attention) associated
`with Hurricane Georges in the Dominican Republic and
`Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua. Again, a
`particular focus is the marginalization of agencies that were
`supposed to be the official response organizations. The
`authors conclude that
`
`July 2001
`
`As a list, this is hardly novel, but the combination of the
`first three variables sets the stage for Mitch—type catastro—
`phes.
`The authors go on to state that “disasters must be
`understood as innater political events .
`.
`. creating a
`variety of opportunities and constraints,” and that institu-
`tional readiness is the direct result of political and policy
`decision making. Being political, such institution building is
`extremely difficult—particularly in countries with very
`limited resources and particularly when disasters are not
`salient problems.
`To deal with the difficulty of establishing a strong,
`permanent emergency response institution, Olson and his
`colleagues offer their “accordion option.” Under
`this
`approach, a national emergency organization recognizes its
`probable marginalization in a major disaster and therefore
`prepares a plan to be presented to the head of state if such
`an event should ensue. In that plan, the organization out—
`lines how national—level disaster response can be expanded
`to include other ministries and organizations, while the
`emergency management office itself retains an organizing
`and coordinating role. The authors conclude by outlining
`the advantages of this approach.1
`The Storms of ’98: Hurricanes Georges and Mitch -—
`Impacts, Institutional Response, and Disaster Politics in
`Three Countries can be purchased for $20.00, plus shipping
`($5.00 for the US, Canada, and Mexico; $8.00 for inter-
`national mail beyond North America). Orders should be
`directed to the Publications Administrator, Natural Hazards
`Research andApplicotions Infomtation Center, University of
`Colorado, 482 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309-0482; (303) 492-
`6819; fax:
`(303) 492-2151;
`e-mail:
`janet.kroeckel@
`colorado.edu.
`
`1. At least one of the authors (Olson) intends to continue his
`research into the apparently universal problem of the marginalization
`of disaster response institutions in large catastrophes (an issue not just
`in poorer countries)—see the Grants section of this Observer.
`
`Natural Hazards Observer
`
`5 of 28
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`

`WASHINGTON
`
`UPDATE
`
`“film-Uh..-
`
`FEMA Issues Interim Rule on
`Public Assistance and
`
`Disaster Loan Programs
`
`In an effort to reduce the growing demand for federal
`disaster assistance, Congress passed the Disaster Mitigation
`Act of 2000 (see the Observer Vol. XXV, No. 3, p. 8).
`Recently,
`the Federal Emergency Management Agency
`(FEMA) issued an interim final rule to implement portions
`of that legislation that affect various aspects of both the
`agency’s Public Assistance Program and its Community
`Disaster Loan Program.
`
`Nonprofit organizations are no longer required to first
`apply for a disaster loan from the Small Business Adminis-
`tration for restoration work of critical facilities and services.
`The act defines critical services as water, sewer, and
`wastewater treatment; communications; and emergency
`medical care. All other private, nonprofit organizations are
`still required to apply to the SBA before receiving funding
`from the Disaster Assistance Program. FEMA proposes
`adding fire services, emergency rescue, and nursing homes
`to the list of critical facilities that may qualify for assistance
`under the Stafford Act.
`
`9500toc.htm.
`
`The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 also capped the
`amount of any loan made by FEMA under the Community
`Disaster Loan program at $5 million and states that a local
`government will not be eligible for future disaster loans if
`the community is behind in payments on a previous commu—
`nity disaster loan. For a community to be eligible to receive
`such a loan, it must show that it may suffer or has suffered
`a substantial loss of tax and other revenues as a result of a
`major disaster or emergency and must demonstrate a need
`for financial assistance in order to perform its government
`functions.
`
`The interim final rule was published in the May 4, 2001,
`Federal Register (Vol. 66, No. 87, pp. 22443-22445). For
`further information, contact Margaret Earman, Response
`and Recovery Directorate, FEMA, 500 C Street, S.W.,
`Washington, DC 20472; (202) 646—4172; e-mail: margie.
`eannan@fema.gov.
`‘
`For specific information on program policies, additional
`publications have been posted to the FEMA web site:
`
`0 Coordination Requirements for PA and FMA Assis-
`tance: www.fema. gov/r-n—r/pa/9510_1 . him.
`
`Project Supervision and Management Costs of
`Subgrantees: www.fema. gov/r—n—r/pa/9525_6. html.
`
`Payment of Contractors for Grant Management
`Tasks: www.fema.gov/r—n—r/pa/9525_I1.htm, and
`
`Updated Policy Manual: wmv.ferm.gov/r—n—r/pa/
`
`Specifically, the Disaster Mitigation Act amended the
`federal contribution for “alternate projects” under
`the
`Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assis—
`tance Act—repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing
`a public facility—from 90% to 75% of the cost, However,
`the legislation allowed an exception; where unstable soil at
`the site of a damaged facility makes repair or restoration
`unfeasible, the federal contribution remains 90%.
`
`Natural Hazards Observer
`
`July 2001
`
`6 of 28
`
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`

`

`the Prevention Loan
`For more information about
`Program, contact Fannie Mae; (800) 732—6643. Additional
`information can be obtained from FEMA '3 Project Impact;
`(202) 646-4117; WWW: www.fema.gov/impact{z;ar1ners/
`fanniemae.htm.
`
`[Adapted from Watermark, the National Flood Insurance Program’s
`newsletter (Fall 2000/Winter 2001).]
`
`FEMA Establishes Hurricane
`Evacuation Liaison Team
`
`In 1999, Hurricane Floyd threatened the southeastern
`United States, resulting in the largest evacuation in U.S.
`history. Because of large populations in this coastal region,
`many problems arose, such as jammed freeways and
`confusion about where and how to evacuate. Officials
`realized that,
`in fu-
`ture disasters, with-
`out effective man-
`
`agement, the volume
`of people leaving an
`area
`could
`over—
`whelm transporta—
`tion systems
`and
`delay shelter-
`ing. As a re—
`sult,
`FEMA
`and the U.S.
`
`Interior Asks NAPA to Study
`Wildfire Management
`
`The Department of the Interior has asked the National
`Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to study the
`procedures used by federal land management agencies to
`plan for and respond to Wildland fires. Previously, NAPA
`was asked to study the issue as it relates to the National Park
`Service and recommended further study of implementation
`and accountability systems for wildfire management, the use
`of program evaluations to enhance operations, improvements
`in risk management methods, and options for meeting
`workforce challenges.
`NAPA will also look at issues raised in the recently
`completed evaluation and update of the Federal Wildland
`Fire Management Policy (see the Observer, Vol. XXV,
`No. 5, p. 10). The new study will examine ways all five
`federal agencies that deal with wildfires—the National Park
`Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Land
`Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the U.S.
`Forest Service—can effectively implement the policy.
`An eight—member panel has been convened by NAPA to
`oversee the study and will use literature and document
`reviews,
`interviews, expert papers, a “best practices”
`conference, option papers, and panel meetings to develop
`recommendations
`for
`improving federal Wildland fire
`practices.
`For more information, contact NAPA, 1120 G Street,
`N.W., Suite 850, Washington, DC 20005; (202) 347—3190;
`fax: (202) 393—0993; WWW: www.napawash.org.
`
`Fannie Mae Expands
`Project Impact
`Prevention Loan Program
`
`Protecting a home from future natural disasters just got
`a little easier for homeowners in several states. Recently,
`Fannie Mae, the national home ownership financial institu-
`tion, joined with FEMA’s Project Impact and several states
`to offer consumer installment loans at competitive interest
`rates to homeowners for making disaster prevention im-
`provements. The Prevention Loan Program began in Florida
`in June 2000, and Fannie Mae expects to make it available
`throughout the U.S. Additional programs have already been
`launched in the San Francisco Bay area, Georgia, Kansas,
`and Oklahoma.
`The Prevention Loan Program, which includes a quick
`approval process, requires work be performed by certified
`contractors who are qualified to make disaster-resistant
`improvements to residences. Unsecured, fixed-rate loans of
`up to $20,000 are available with repayment terms of up to
`10 years. Interest rates are based upon market conditions for
`the terms of the loan, and there are no income limitations
`for borrowers. Projects that may be covered under this
`program include strengthening a home’s roofing system,
`installing hurricane shutters, constructing an in—home safe
`room, elevating a structure above base flood elevation, and
`bracing a chimney.
`
`July 2001
`
`Department of Transportation are
`working with state and local officials to improve coordina-
`tion and communication during major evacuations.
`On April 11, 2001, FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh
`announced that an evacuation liaison team would be estab-
`lished at the agency’s Atlanta regional office, and that
`additional teams will be created in other regions of the U.S.
`The Atlanta team will be staffed by FEMA and operated
`from the National Hurricane Center in Miami to assist
`emergency managers in making decisions and recommenda-
`tions when hurricanes threaten. It will provide emergency
`managers with forecast updates issued by the center and
`answer questions regarding those forecasts.
`Additionally, FEMA hopes to release a hurricane
`evacuation travel demand forecasting model by December
`2002 that will allow states to obtain via the Internet informa-
`tion for individual counties regarding storm intensity,
`expected evacuation compliance, current tourist occupancy,
`and probable destinations. The system will also provide the
`number of vehicles expected to cross state lines, compari-
`sons of traffic to forecast conditions, the number of vehicles
`generated by each county traveling to specific inland
`locations, and information regarding types and characteris-
`tics (e.g., number of lanes) of routes available.
`For more information about the evacuation liaison team
`and model, contact FEMA Region IV, 3003 Chamblee
`Tucker Road, Atlanta, GA 30341;
`(770) 220-5200; fax:
`(770) 220—5230; WWW: www.fema. gov/reg-iv. Information
`on the National Hurricane Program can be found on the
`FEMA web site: wwwfema.gov/mit/nhp.htm.
`
`Natural Hazards Observer
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`have occurred in an SFHA if more accurate topographic
`information becomes available.
`
`requesting Letters of Map
`The new guidelines for
`Revision can be found in the May 4 Federal Register (Vol.
`66, No. 87, pp. 22438—22443). Copies can be obtained from
`any federal repository library or on—line at www.access.
`gpo. gov.
`
`GAO Looks at Measurements
`of NFlP Effectiveness
`
`In the U.S., floods cause the greatest economic losses of
`any natural disaster. According to FEMA, from fiscal year
`1992 to 1999, 20 major floods caused over $97 billion in
`damage. The nation’s principle nonstructural program to
`address this problem is FEMA’s National Flood Insurance
`Program (NFIP). The General Accounting Office recently
`presented the preliminary results to Congress of its ongoing
`
`President Creates
`New FEMA Office
`
`of National Preparedness
`
`In order to assess national capability to deter terrorism
`and to coordinate response to terrorist attacks,
`including
`those involving biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, in
`May, President Bush announced that he was establishing the
`Office of National Preparedness within FEMA. In addition,
`a federal working group will assess these threats and report
`its findings to Congress by October 1, following review by
`the National Security Council. FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh
`testified before Congress that the new office will serve only
`as an organize