`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822 Entered: December 5, 2017
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`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FUEL AUTOMATION STATION, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`FRAC SHACK INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01349
`Patent 9,346,662 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before BEVERLY M. BUNTING, JAMES A. WORTH, and
`RICHARD H. MARSCHALL, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MARSCHALL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
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`
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`IPR2017-01349
`Patent 9,346,662 B2
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Fuel Automation Station, LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for inter
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`partes review of claims 1–12 of U.S. Patent No. 9,346,662 B2 (Ex. 1001,
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`“the ’662 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”), 1. Frac Shack Inc. (“Patent Owner”)
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`filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). The Petition
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`asserts that claims 1–12 of the ’662 patent are unpatentable. Pet. 19, 61–64
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`(addressing claim 12). After the Petition was filed, claim 12 of the ’662 was
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`disclaimed. Ex. 2001 (disclaimer filed Aug. 31, 2017); Prelim. Resp. 62.
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`We will treat the Petition as directed to claims 1–11, and will not discuss
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`claim 12 further. See Facebook, Inc. v. Skky, LLC, Case CBM2016-00091,
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`slip op. at 4–8 (PTAB Sept. 28, 2017) (Paper 12) (holding that statutory
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`disclaimer filed after the Petition but prior to a Decision on Institution
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`requires treating disclaimed claims as though they never existed).
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`Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute only when
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`“the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows
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`that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
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`respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. For the reasons set forth below, we
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`conclude that the information presented in the Petition fails to establish a
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`reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in showing the
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`unpatentability of claims 1–11. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter
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`partes review.
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`A. Related Matters
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`Petitioner and Patent Owner identify the following pending district
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`court matter involving the ’662 patent that would likely affect, or be affected
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`by, a decision in this proceeding: Frac Shack Inc. v. Atlas Oil Co. and Fuel
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`2
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`IPR2017-01349
`Patent 9,346,662 B2
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`Automation Station, LLC, No. 16-cv-02275-STV (D. Colo. filed Sept. 9,
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`2016). Pet. 1; Paper 4, 2.
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`B. The ’662 Patent
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`The ’662 patent discloses a fuel delivery system “for reducing the
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`likelihood that a fuel tank of equipment at a well site during fracturing of a
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`well will run out of fuel.” Ex. 1001, Abstract. According to the Background
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`of the ’662 patent, conventional filling of equipment at a well site requires
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`manually discharging fuel “into each fuel tank one after the other.” Id. at
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`1:10–14.
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`
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`Figure 1 of the ’662 patent is reproduced below:
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`
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`Figure 1 shows fuel delivery system 14 for delivery of fuel to multiple fuel
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`tanks 12 of “multiple pieces of equipment 10 at a well site during fracturing
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`3
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`IPR2017-01349
`Patent 9,346,662 B2
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`of a well.” Id. at 2:29–30. Fluid delivery system 14 includes fuel source 16,
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`which includes fuel storage tanks 18, 20, with each tank having plural fuel
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`outlets 22. Id. at 2:35–41. Hoses 24 connect fuel outlets 22 to fuel cap or
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`fuel head 26 on respective fuel tanks 12 for delivery of fuel to fuel tank 12.
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`Id. at 2:41–44.
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`
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`Each fuel cap 26 includes fuel level sensor 54, which communicates
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`with control station or controller 56 located on trailer 14. Id. at 3:37–44.
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`Controller 56 opens electrically operable valve 58 located on each fuel outlet
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`22, and starts fuel flow to tank fuel 12 when sensor 54 sends a low fuel level
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`signal to controller 56. Id. at 4:31–49.
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`C. Claims
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`Claim 1 is the only independent claim and is reproduced below:
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`1. A fuel delivery system for fuel delivery to multiple pieces of
`equipment at a work site, comprising:
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`a fuel source comprising one or more manifolds, the one or more
`manifolds being connectable to a fuel supply;
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`each manifold of the one or more manifolds having multiple fuel
`outlets, each fuel outlet of the multiple fuel outlets having a
`hose connection;
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`plural hoses, each hose having a first end and a second end and
`being connected at the first end of the hose to a corresponding
`one of the multiple fuel outlets and having a fuel delivery
`connection at the second end of the hose for securing the
`second end of the hose to a corresponding one of the multiple
`pieces of equipment to which fuel is to be delivered;
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`an electrically operable valve responsive to electronic control
`signals on each fuel outlet;
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`a sensor associated with each combination of fuel outlet, hose
`and fuel delivery connection, each sensor being configured to
`detect a low fuel condition associated with each of the
`multiple pieces of equipment to which fuel is to be delivered;
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`4
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`IPR2017-01349
`Patent 9,346,662 B2
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`a controller responsive to signals supplied from each sensor
`through respective communication channels, the controller
`being configured to provide control signals to open and close
`the respective electrically operable valves; and
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`in which the controller is responsive to the detection of the low
`fuel condition, to display an indication of the low fuel
`condition or to open at least one of the electrically operable
`valves for each of the multiple pieces of equipment that is
`associated with the low fuel condition.
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`Ex. 1001, 8:52–9:15.
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`D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
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`Petitioner challenges claims 1–11 based on the following grounds
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`(Pet. 19):
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`Reference(s)
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`Basis
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`Challenged Claims
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`Toshio1 and Griswold2 or
`Hose Handbook3
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`Toshio, Griswold or Hose
`Handbook, and Witter4
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`Toshio, Griswold or Hose
`Handbook, and Lohmann5
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`§ 103
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`1–7, 9, 10, 11
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`§ 103
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`3
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`§ 103
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`4, 5
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`
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`1 JP 2003002400A (pub. Jan. 8, 2003) (Exs. 1003, 1004). We will cite to an
`English translation of Toshio provided by Petitioner. See Ex. 1004.
`2 U.S. Patent No. 599,702 (issued Mar. 1, 1898) (Ex. 1005).
`3 Hose Handbook, published by Rubber Manufacturers Assoc., Inc. (7th ed.
`2003) (Ex. 1006).
`4 U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2008/0313006 (pub. Dec. 18, 2008) (Ex. 1028).
`5 WO 2009/068065 A1 (pub. June 4, 2009) (Ex. 1009).
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`5
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`IPR2017-01349
`Patent 9,346,662 B2
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`Reference(s)
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`Basis
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`Challenged Claims
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`Toshio, Griswold or Hose
`Handbook, and McCauley6
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`§ 103
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`2, 6
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`Toshio, Griswold or Hose
`Handbook, and McNabb7
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`Toshio, Griswold or Hose
`Handbook, and Admitted
`Prior Art8
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`§ 103
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`8
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`§ 103
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`7
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`A.
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`Claim Construction
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`In an inter partes review, a claim in an unexpired patent shall be given
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`its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent
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`in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v.
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`Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation standard). Consistent with the broadest reasonable
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`construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary
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`meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context
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`of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249,
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`1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`The parties propose a number of constructions for several terms,
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`including whether the preamble limits claim 1 and its proper scope. Pet.
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`
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`6 U.S. Patent No. 2,340,070 (issued Jan. 25, 1944) (Ex. 1007).
`7 U.S. Patent No. 5,927,603 (issued July 27, 1999) (Ex. 1010).
`8 Petitioner cites to the Background of the ’662 patent as evidence of
`allegedly admitted prior art. See Ex. 1001, 1:9–14; Pet. 60.
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`6
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`Patent 9,346,662 B2
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`10–14; Prelim. Resp. 11–33. Based on the arguments and evidence of
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`record, we determine that certain language in the preamble requires
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`construction, and that no other claim term needs express interpretation. See
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`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
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`1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and
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`only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).
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`1. Preamble as a limitation
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`“In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential
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`structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to
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`the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d
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`801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). “Conversely, a preamble is
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`not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in
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`the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use
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`for the invention.’” Id. In other words, the preamble is regarded as limiting
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`if it recites essential structure that is important to the invention or necessary
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`to give meaning to the claim. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418
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`F.3d 1282, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds, see IRIS
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`Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359, 1361 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014). If
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`the preamble language in dispute appears again in the body of the claim,
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`with the preamble providing antecedent basis for the limitation, the preamble
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`language “may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance on both the
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`preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention.” Catalina Mktg.,
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`289 F.3d at 808. In addition, “clear reliance on the preamble during
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`prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art
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`transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance
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`indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.” Id.
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`“Without such reliance, however, a preamble generally is not limiting when
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`the claim body describes a structurally complete invention.” Id. at 809.
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`Similarly, “preamble language merely extolling benefits or features of the
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`claimed invention does not limit the claim scope without clear reliance on
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`those benefits or features as patentably significant.” Id.
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`Here, the preamble of claim 1 refers to “[a] fuel delivery system for
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`fuel delivery to multiple pieces of equipment at a work site.” Ex. 1001,
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`8:52–53. Petitioner argues in the Petition that “[t]he preamble of claim 1 is
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`not a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction.” Pet. 13.
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`Specifically, Petitioner argues that the preamble “merits no weight” because
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`the “body of claim 1 defines a structurally complete apparatus and uses the
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`preamble only to recite intended purpose or use.” Pet. 14. Petitioner
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`contends that “rather than impose any structural limits on the claimed
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`system, the preamble merely recites things that would be outside of or
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`separate from the system as claimed, i.e., the equipment that may be
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`serviced by the system and the surrounding environment (work site) at
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`which the system may be used.” Id.
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` Patent Owner counters that the preamble is limiting. Prelim. Resp.
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`16. Patent Owner contends that the preamble provides antecedent basis for
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`several claim limitations and helped differentiate claim 1 from the prior art
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`during prosecution. Id. at 21–23.
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`We first consider Patent Owner’s argument that the preamble provides
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`antecedent basis for claim limitations in the body of claim 1. Patent Owner
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`notes that the phrase “multiple pieces of equipment” provides antecedent
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`basis for the same phrase appearing in the body of the claim. Id. at 22.
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`Patent Owner also notes that “at a work site” provided antecedent basis for
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`the precursor to dependent claim 7 during prosecution. Id. n.8.
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`The body of claim 1 refers to “the multiple pieces of equipment” three
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`times, and therefore refers back to the preamble’s “multiple pieces of
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`equipment” for an antecedent basis. Ex. 1001, 8:52–53, 8:64, 9:4, 9:14–15.
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`The use of the preamble phrase “multiple pieces of equipment” as an
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`antecedent for the repeated use of that same phrase in the body of the claim
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`strongly supports a conclusion that the phrase limits the claim. Catalina
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`Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808; see also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329
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`F.3d 823, 835 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that if body of claim had included
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`language repeating relevant language from the preamble, the preamble
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`language “unquestionably would have been a limitation”).
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`The preamble phrase “at a work site” immediately follows “multiple
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`pieces of equipment” in the preamble, but “at a work site” does not provide
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`antecedent basis because it does not appear in the claim body. Ex. 1001,
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`8:52–53. In some cases, using one portion of the preamble as antecedent
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`basis may justify treating other portions of the preamble as a limitation, but
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`we must remain mindful that finding one portion of a preamble limiting does
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`not justify importing the entire preamble as a limitation. Compare
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`Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005) (treating phrase in preamble as limiting even though another phrase
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`provided antecedent basis for claim terms in the body of claim), with
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`TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 1315, 1322–23 (finding that district court
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`erred in treating entire preamble as limiting because a portion of the
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`preamble provided antecedent basis for claim terms). Further, although
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`Patent Owner contends that “at a work site” provided antecedent basis for a
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`dependent claim during prosecution, claim 7 as issued does not mention
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`“work site” and instead recites a “well site.” Prelim. Resp. 22; Ex. 1001,
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`10:1–2. Accordingly, consideration of the antecedent basis issue strongly
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`suggests that the phrase “multiple pieces of equipment” limits claim 1, and
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`that the patentee chose to use the preamble to limit the claim, at least in part.
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`The antecedent basis inquiry does not conclusively establish that the phrase
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`“at a work site” limits the claim, but does suggest that “at a work site” limits
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`the claim because it immediately follows and further describes the location
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`of the multiple pieces of equipment.
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`We next consider Patent Owner’s argument that “during prosecution,
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`the patentee argued that the preamble was limiting and differentiated the
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`prior art from the claimed invention,” and that such reliance on the preamble
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`renders the preamble a claim limitation. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1001 at
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`105–07; Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801,
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`808–09 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Patent Owner further relies on arguments made
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`during prosecution when contending that its reliance on the preamble
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`supports its contention that the preamble limits the claim. Prelim. Resp. 22.
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`As noted above, Catalina states that “clear reliance on the preamble during
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`prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art
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`transforms the preamble into a claim limitation.” Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d
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`at 808 (emphasis added). In Catalina, the applicants “did not rely on the
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`preamble phrase to distinguish over” the prior art in question. Id. at 810; see
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`also Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., 867 F.3d 1229, 1238
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`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding arguments in prosecution history in relation to
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`claim limitations in the body of the claim insufficient to distinguish the prior
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`art based on the language in the preamble). Based on the foregoing, the
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`prosecution history must show a “clear reliance” on the specific, disputed
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`language in the preamble in an effort to distinguish over the prior art.
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`Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808. Such clear reliance transforms the
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`language into a limitation even if the language otherwise appears to be mere
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`intended use or features of the claimed invention that would typically not
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`limit the claim. Id. at 809.
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`Here, applicants “clearly relied” on the entire “multiple pieces of
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`equipment at a work site” phrase to distinguish claim 1 from the prior art
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`during prosecution. Ex. 1002, 105–07. Applicants characterized claim 1
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`(then pending claim 37) as “directed to a system for delivery of fuel to
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`multiple pieces of equipment at a work site” and went on to note how the
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`claimed system addressed how the system advantageously supplies fuel,
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`where “equipment at the work site may need to be refueled several times.”
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`Id. at 105. Applicants then relied on the “multiple pieces of equipment at a
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`work site” phrase to distinguish three different prior art references. See id. at
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`105 (“Hockner is directed to filling fuel tanks at a filling station (Hockner,
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`Field of the Invention) and not to refuel[]ing of multiple pieces of equipment
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`at a work site.” . . . “The system in Hockner is unlike the system in Claim 37
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`which provides for the delivery of fuel to multiple pieces of equipment at a
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`work site.”); id. at 106 (“Corts does not disclose a fuel delivery system for
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`fuel delivery to multiple pieces of equipment at a work site.”); id. at 107
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`(“Lohmann neither discloses nor is related to the field of fuel delivery to
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`multiple pieces of equipment at a work site”).9 In addition, by describing the
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`Hockner prior art as directed to filling tanks at a filling station and arguing
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`that is not the same as refueling multiple pieces of equipment at a work site,
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`the prosecution history suggests that the “work site” requirement does not
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`encompass filling stations, and was a specific distinction made to overcome
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`the prior art. See id. at 105.
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`We note that the preamble phrase was not used to distinguish all of
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`the references at issue, and other arguments for patentability were made by
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`the patentee that were necessary to obtain allowance of the claims.
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`However, the record makes clear that “multiple pieces of equipment at a
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`work site” was relied on as part of a separate, succinct argument in support
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`of distinguishing multiple prior art references. See id. at 105–07. Under
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`these circumstances, we conclude that the applicants clearly relied on the
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`phrase “multiple pieces of equipment at a work site” to distinguish claim 1
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`from the prior art.
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`Federal Circuit precedent addressing reliance on preambles during
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`prosecution supports our interpretation here. In Hearing Components, for
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`example, the dispute was whether the phrase “readily installed and replaced
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`by a user” (the “readily installed” phrase) in the preamble limited the claim.
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`9 See also id. at 105 (“The equipment at the work site may need to be
`refuelled several times (Present Application, ¶ 0002). The system claimed in
`Claim 37 [issued claim 1] having a controller responsive to detection of a
`low fuel condition allows the system to remain connected to the equipment
`continuously during its operation and continuously refuelled in response to
`the detection of a low fuel condition. Conventional refuelling during
`operation of equipment increases the dangers, including the potential fire
`hazard from fuel and fuel vapors (Present Application, ¶ 0002).”).
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`Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir.
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`2010), abrogated on other grounds by Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instr., Inc.,
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`134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014). The patentee in Hearing Components argued that the
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`“readily installed” phrase did not limit the claim. Id. at 1365. During
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`prosecution, however, the patentee distinguished a “Moser” reference on the
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`basis that it lacked a “disposable wax guard” that was “readily installed and
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`replaced by a user,” two phrases from the preamble, with the body of the
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`claim only providing antecedent basis for the first phrase by referring to
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`“said guard.” Id. at 1362, 1366. The patentee also distinguished two
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`additional references based on the “readily installed” phrase. Id. The
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`Federal Circuit concluded that such reliance on the disputed preamble
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`language during prosecution justified treating the “readily installed” phrase
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`as a claim limitation. Id. Similarly, in Storage Technology, the patentee
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`argued that the term “forwarding device” in the preamble did not limit the
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`claims. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 834 (Fed. Cir.
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`2003). The Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee’s reliance on
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`“forwarding device” to distinguish a reference during prosecution supported
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`the conclusion that the language limited the claim, even though the
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`patentee’s argument during prosecution went on to argue other distinctions
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`between limitations in the body of the claim and the prior art. Storage Tech.,
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`329 F.3d at 827–28, 835.
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`Based on consideration of the evidence and arguments before us, and
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`in particular the use of portions of the preamble as an antecedent basis and
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`the clear reliance on the preamble to distinguish prior art during prosecution,
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`we conclude that the preamble phrase “multiple pieces of equipment at a
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`work site” limits claim 1.
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`2. “at a work site”
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` Petitioner does not provide an express construction for the phrase “at
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`a work site.” Pet. 13–14. In its obviousness analysis, however, Petitioner
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`suggests that if the preamble does limit the claim, “at a work site” merely
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`means “wherever the location of the system is, such as a building.” Pet. 21.
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`Patent Owner contends that “at a work site” means “a temporary
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`construction area.” Prelim. Resp. 24. According to Patent Owner, this
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`construction comports with how one of ordinary skill in the art would read
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`the term in light of the specification, which refers to “well sites” and the
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`temporary nature of the site. Id. at 24–25. The Patent Owner also alleges
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`that certain prior art disclosing a construction site was not distinguished
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`from the claimed “work site,” which implicitly suggests the patentee viewed
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`a construction site as falling within the scope of a work site. Id. at 25.
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`We are not persuaded that either party’s proposed construction of the
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`phrase “at a work site” is the broadest reasonable construction in light of the
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`specification. Petitioner’s position suggests that any fuel delivery system
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`automatically meets the “at a work site” limitation because any system will
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`have a location (“wherever it is” in Petitioner’s approach), and any location
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`suffices to meet the “at a work site” requirement. Pet. 21. Such an approach
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`effectively reads the requirement out of the claim. The prosecution history
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`also undermines Petitioner’s proposed construction because applicants
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`distinguished the Hockner prior art as directed to filling tanks at a filling
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`station, and argued the claimed “work site” does not encompass a filling
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`station. Ex. 1002, 105. Accordingly, “work site” cannot encompass any
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`building, or any location where a fuel delivery system is located.
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`Patent Owner’s proposed construction emphasizes the allegedly
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`“temporary” nature of the site. Patent Owner does not, however, direct us to
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`any passage in the specification describing the site as “temporary.”
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`Moreover, use of the term “temporary” begs the question of how briefly a
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`system must remain in place to fall within the scope of “temporary.” In
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`addition, Patent Owner does not explain adequately how the well site
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`described in the specification falls within the scope of a “construction site.”
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`The written description of the ’662 patent does not use the term “work
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`site” and instead consistently refers to the use of the system at a “well site.”
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`Ex. 1001, 1:11, 1:26, 1:29, 1:49, 2:24, 2:29, 2:33–34, 5:12, 5:22, 5:33–36.
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`The specification also suggests that the purpose of the claimed system is to
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`deliver fuel to a well site during fracturing of a well. Id. at 1:9–30. Reading
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`the phrase “at a work site” in light of the specification, therefore, does not
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`suggest that “work site” refers to a “construction site” and instead “work
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`site” refers to a “well site.” Extrinsic evidence submitted by Patent Owner
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`also suggests that one of skill in the art uses these terms interchangeably.
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`See Ex. 2010, 2–3 (Dept. of Labor guidelines discussing “well site” and
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`“work site” without noting any differences between the two sites).
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`We also consider whether limiting “work site” in claim 1 to a “well
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`site” renders dependent claim 7, which refers to a “well site,”10 meaningless.
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`Patent Owner argues persuasively that claim 7 contains further limitations
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`that go beyond the term “well site.” See Prelim. Resp. 29–33. We need not
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`determine the scope of those limitations, but note that their presence
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`10 Claim 7 reads: “The fuel delivery system of claim 1 set up for delivery of
`fuel at a well site during fracturing of a well.” Ex. 1001, 10:1–2.
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`indicates that the doctrine of claim differentiation does not necessarily
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`suggest a broader scope for “work site.”
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`Accordingly, based on the current record, we construe “at a work site”
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`in the preamble of claim 1 under the broadest reasonable interpretation
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`standard that governs this proceeding, to mean “at a well site.”11 Claim 1,
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`therefore, requires a fuel delivery system capable of supplying fuel to
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`multiple pieces of equipment at a well site.
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`B. Obviousness Based on Toshio
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`Relying on the Declaration of Dr. C. Arthur MacCarley (Ex. 1035),
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`Petitioner alleges that the combination of Toshio with either Griswold or the
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`Hose Handbook renders claims 1 obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Pet. 19.
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`Petitioner relies on additional prior art in its assertion that dependent claims
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`2–11 would have been obvious. Id. We determine, on this record, that
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`Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its
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`assertion that any of claims 1–11 would have been obvious.
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`1. Overview of Toshio
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`Toshio discloses “a centralized oil supply system for feeding liquid
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`fuel in a storage tank installed underground or above ground to a plurality of
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`combustion instruments via a relay tank.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 1. Toshio describes
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`11 A person of ordinary skill in the art may understand “work site” to refer to
`a non-permanent or moveable site. See, e.g., Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 40–42. We need
`not reach this level of detail in our construction to resolve the current
`controversy on the asserted grounds of unpatentability, and we express no
`opinion as to potential further requirements of the claimed “well site.” See
`Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
`(“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve
`the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200
`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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`supplying kerosene from the storage tank to a number of relay tanks
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`“installed on each floor of a multistory structure, such as a building.” Id. at
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`¶¶ 2, 34. The relay tanks on each floor supply fuel to combustion
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`instruments such as heaters or water heaters located on the same floor. Id. at
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`¶ 6. Toshio also discloses a supply sensing sensor that indicates when fuel
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`in a relay tank decreases below a certain level (indicating the need for
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`additional fuel), and a stop signal sensor that indicates when the fuel reaches
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`an upper limit (indicating the need to stop refueling). Id. at ¶¶ 7–9.
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`2. Discussion
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`Our claim construction analysis above drives the analysis of
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`Petitioner’s obviousness assertions. With respect to the preamble, Petitioner
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`relies on its assertion that the preamble does not limit the claim. Pet. 20.
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`Petitioner also alleges that Toshio discloses the preamble requirements,
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`apparently as a backup argument in the event that the preamble limits the
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`claim. Id. at 20–21. With regard to the “at a work site” limitation, Petitioner
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`alleges that Toshio discloses the requirement because “at a work site” means
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`“wherever the location of the system is, such as a building” and cites to
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`portions of Toshio that describe use of its system in a building. Id. at 21
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`(citing Ex. 1004, 9, 22, ¶ 34). Petitioner also cites to the Declaration of Dr.
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`MacCarley for support, with that testimony generally repeating the
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`assertions in the Petition. Id. (citing Ex. 1035 ¶¶ 98–101); Ex. 1035 ¶ 101
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`(“Toshio’s system is for delivery of fuel to multiple pieces of equipment at a
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`work site, or at wherever the system is located. One example disclosed in
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`Toshio is at a building. (Ex. 1004, [0034])”).
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`As discussed above, we reject Petitioner’s assertion that “at a work
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`site” can be read so broadly that it means “wherever the location of the
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`system is.” Instead, we construe it to mean “at a well site.” Petitioner does
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`not provide credible evidence or argument to the effect that Toshio discloses
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`use of its fuel delivery system at a well site. Pet. 20–21. Instead, we are
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`more persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Toshio describes a
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`permanently-installed fuel delivery system within a building, which is not a
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`well site.12 Prelim. Resp. 34–40. Further, Petitioner does not rely on
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`Griswold or the Hose Handbook as disclosing the “at a work site” limitation.
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`See id. at 26–29.
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`In an argument in the context of claim 7, Petitioner notes the
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`similarity in some of the structures of Toshio and the ’662 patent, and argues
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`that “Toshio is not limited to buildings” and thus “the system of Toshio is
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`capable of being set up for delivery of fuel at a well site.” Pet. 40. While
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`Toshio does not state that it is limited to buildings, it does not state that the
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`disclosed system is suitable for application outside buildings. Mere
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`assertions that prior art “is not limited” to its stated environment do not
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`establish a rationale for modifying the disclosed system to a completely
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`different environment. This is particularly true here, where permanent
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`installation in a multi-story building environment does not appear, on its
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`face, as analogous to a well site. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2–4. Petitioner further
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`relies on alleged “admitted prior art” in the ’662 patent specification in the
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`context of claim 7 and the “well site” limitation. Pet. 59–61. Petitioner does
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`12 The Petition also fails to set forth credible evidence or argument to
`establish that Toshio’s building amounts to a “construction site.”
`Accordingly, even if we construed “work site” as a “construction site” or
`“temporary construction site,” that would not change the outcome of this
`Decision.
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`not rely on admitted prior art in the context of claim 1, and those alleged
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`“admissions” merely go to the known need to refuel tanks at a well site. Id.
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`at 60. The alleged admissions do not establish a rationale for modifying the
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`building-based system of Toshio for use at a well site. In summary, we do
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`not view Petitioner’s arguments with respect to claim 7 as filling the gaps
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`evident from the analysis of claim 1.
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`Based on the foregoing, the Petition fails to provide sufficient
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`evidence and argument that the prior art, alone or in combination, discloses
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`delivery of fuel to multiple pieces of equipment at a work site. We are,
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`therefore, not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that claim 1
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`would have been obvious based on Toshio and either Griswold or the Hose
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`Handbook. Each of dependent claims 2–11 depends directly or indirectly
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`from independent claim 1. Petitioner’s analyses of the dependent claims do
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`not cure the deficiencies noted above with respect to the disputed limitation.
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`Therefore, for the same reasons as discussed supra with respect to claim 1,
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`our determination concerning the insufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence
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`applies equally to the arguments a