Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
` Paper 8
`
`
` Entered: November 7, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`IMMERSION CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, BRYAN F. MOORE, and MINN CHUNG,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
` Paper 8
`
`
` Entered: November 7, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`IMMERSION CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`
`
`Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, BRYAN F. MOORE, and MINN CHUNG,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`
`I. BACKGROUND
`
`A. Introduction
`
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Second Petition,”
`
`or “Second Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 13 and 18–20
`
`(the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,581,710 B2 (Ex. 1101, “the
`
`’710 patent”). As discussed further below, the claims challenged in the
`
`Second Petition cover essentially the same scope as the claims Petitioner
`
`challenged in its prior petition filed in Case IPR2016-01603 (Apple Inc. v.
`
`Immersion Corp., Case IPR2016-01603 (filed Aug. 12, 2016) (Paper 1,
`
`“First Petition” or “First Pet.”)). Immersion Corporation (“Patent Owner”)
`
`timely filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”).
`
`Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Under the circumstances of this case, for
`
`the reasons explained below, we exercise our discretion to not institute an
`
`inter partes review as to any of claims 13 and 18–20 of the ’710 patent.
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`
`According to the parties, the ’710 patent is the subject of the
`
`following proceedings: (1) Immersion Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`
`Nos. 1:16-cv-00077 and 1:16-cv-00325 (D. Del.); and (2) In the Matter of:
`
`Certain Mobile and Portable Electronic Devices Incorporating Haptics
`
`(Including Smartphones and Laptops) and Components Thereof, ITC
`
`Investigation No. 337-TA-1004 (USITC). Second Pet. 1; Paper 5, 2.
`
`The ’710 patent is also the subject of an instituted trial proceeding in
`
`Case IPR2016-01603. Apple Inc. v. Immersion Corp., Case IPR2016-01603
`
`(PTAB Feb. 23, 2017) (Paper 7, “1603 Dec. on Inst.”).
`
`2
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`
`C. The ’710 Patent
`
`The ’710 patent describes a system and method for haptic
`
`confirmation of commands on electronic devices. Ex. 1101, Abstract. In
`
`one exemplary embodiment, the device recognizes a speech input, e.g., “call
`
`home,” and determines a command associated with the recognized speech,
`
`e.g., making a telephone call to the phone number designated as “home.” Id.
`
`at col. 2, ll. 17–25. If the spoken command is recognized successfully, the
`
`device generates a haptic effect to provide a tactile feedback to the user that
`
`the command has been recognized and that the device will perform the
`
`requested function. Id. at col. 2, ll. 19–23. If, on the other hand, the device
`
`does not recognize a command, it generates a different haptic effect to
`
`indicate that no command is recognized and that no function will be
`
`performed. Id. at col. 2, ll. 25–29.
`
`In another embodiment, the device recognizes a touch input on a
`
`touch-sensitive display and determines a command corresponding to the
`
`touch input. Id. at col. 12, ll. 30–45. Figure 6 of the ’710 patent is
`
`reproduced below.
`
`
`
`3
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`Figure 6 depicts a block diagram of a system for haptic confirmation of
`
`commands in an exemplary embodiment. Id. at col. 11, ll. 12–14. As shown
`
`in Figure 6 above, the system comprises device 610 having housing 605, and
`
`display 650, which may be coupled to the housing or disposed within the
`
`housing. Id. at col. 11, ll. 14–15, 21–22. Device 610, in turn, comprises
`
`processor 620, memory 625, actuator 630, and sensor 640. Id. at col. 11,
`
`ll. 15–17. In an embodiment, display 650 is a touch-sensitive display, which
`
`transmits sensor signals to the processor when a user touches a location on
`
`the touch-sensitive display. Id. at col. 12, ll. 32–34.
`
`Upon receiving sensor signals from the touch-sensitive display, the
`
`processor attempts to identify a command corresponding to the signals, e.g.,
`
`a button or other user interface element on the display corresponding to the
`
`location of the user touch on the touch-sensitive display. Id. at col. 12,
`
`ll. 38–42. If the processor determines a command corresponding to the user
`
`touch input, it generates an actuator signal to produce a haptic effect that
`
`indicates that a command was recognized successfully. Id. at col. 12, ll. 42–
`
`45, 53–56. Otherwise, the processor generates another actuator signal to
`
`produce a haptic effect that indicates no command was recognized. Id. at
`
`col. 12, ll. 46–49. In either case, the processor then transmits the actuator
`
`signal to the actuator to output the appropriate haptic effect. Id. at col. 12,
`
`ll. 49–52, 56–59. If a command has been recognized, the processor executes
`
`the function associated with the command. Id. at col. 12, ll. 59–61.
`
`4
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`
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`
`D. Illustrative Claim
`
`Claim 13 is the only independent claim at issue. Claims 18–20
`
`depend directly from claim 13. Claim 13 is illustrative of the challenged
`
`claims and is reproduced below:
`
`13. A computer-implemented method comprising the steps of:
`
`receiving, from a sensor, a sensor signal associated with a user
`input;
`
`recognizing the user input and determining a command
`associated with the speech information;
`
`if the user input is recognized and the command is determined:
`
`generating a first actuator signal configured to cause an
`actuator to output a first haptic effect; and
`
`transmitting the first actuator signal to the actuator;
`
`otherwise:
`
`generating a second actuator signal configured to cause the
`actuator to output a second haptic effect; and
`
`transmitting the second actuator signal to the actuator.
`
`Ex. 1101, col. 14, l. 58–col. 15, l. 5.
`
`
`
`5
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`
`E. First Petition in IPR2016-01603
`
`On August 12, 2016, Petitioner filed the First Petition in Case
`
`IPR2016-01603 requesting an inter partes review of claims 1, 7–10, and 12
`
`of the ’710 patent. First Pet. 3, 57. In the First Petition, Petitioner asserted
`
`the following grounds of unpatentability (id. at 3).
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`
`Statutory Basis
`
`Reference(s)
`
`1, 7–10, and 12
`
`1, 7, 9, 10, and 12
`
`8
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Martin1
`
`Martin and Nokia2
`
`Martin, Nokia, and Rank3
`
`
`On February 23, 2017, based on the arguments and evidence
`
`presented in the First Petition, we instituted an inter partes review as to
`
`claims 1, 7–10, and 12 of the ʼ710 patent on the grounds that these claims
`
`are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Martin alone or
`
`Martin combined with Nokia. 1603 Dec. on Inst. at 39.
`
`F. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability in the Second Petition
`
`On May 4, 2017, which was more than two months after our Decision
`
`on Institution in Case IPR2016-01603 was entered, Petitioner filed its
`
`Second Petition in this case requesting an inter partes review of claims 13
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 7,336,260 B2 (issued Feb. 26, 2008) (Ex. 1106, “Martin”).
`2 Nokia 9110 Communicator User’s Manual (1999) (“Nokia”).
`3 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2003/0067440 Al (published Apr. 10,
`2003) (“Rank”).
`
`6
`
`
`
`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`and 18–20 of the ’710 patent. In its Second Petition, Petitioner asserts the
`
`following grounds of unpatentability (Second Pet. 3).
`
`Claims Challenged
`
`Statutory Basis
`
`References
`
`13, 19, and 20
`
`13, 18, and 20
`
`
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Martin and Makela4
`
`Theodore5 and Shahoian6
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Discretionary Non-Institution Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`
`Patent Owner asserts that the Second Petition should be denied
`
`because (1) it would be inequitable to Patent Owner to allow Petitioner’s
`
`second challenge to claims of essentially the same scope when Petitioner
`
`benefited from Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and the Board’s
`
`Decision on Institution in Case IPR2016-01603, and (2) Petitioner knew or
`
`should have known of the prior art references asserted in its Second Petition
`
`when filing its First Petition in Case IPR2016-01603. Prelim. Resp. 10–15
`
`(citing Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., Case
`
`IPR2017-00358 (PTAB May 2, 2017) (Paper 9)).
`
`Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 314(a) (authorizing institution of an inter partes review under particular
`
`circumstances, but not requiring institution under any circumstances);
`
`
`4 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2009/0164207 A1 (published June 25,
`2009) (Ex. 1107, “Makela”).
`5 U.S. Patent No. 6,505,159 B1 (issued Jan. 7, 2003) (Ex. 1104,
`“Theodore”).
`6 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2002/0033795 Al (published Mar. 21,
`2002) (Ex. 1105, “Shahoian”).
`
`7
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`
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (stating “the Board may authorize the review to
`
`proceed”) (emphasis added); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech, Inc., 815 F.3d
`
`1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that under § 314(a), “the PTO is
`
`permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). When
`
`determining whether to exercise our discretion under § 314(a), we consider
`
`the following non-exhaustive factors:
`
`1. whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to
`the same claims of the same patent;
`
`2. whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew
`of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have
`known of it;
`
`3. whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner
`already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the
`first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to
`institute review in the first petition;
`
`4. the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner
`learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing
`of the second petition;
`
`5. whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time
`elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the
`same claims of the same patent;
`
`6. the finite resources of the Board; and
`
`7. the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final
`determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the
`Director notices institution of review.
`
`Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357,
`
`slip op. 15–16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (Paper 19) (precedential)7 (hereinafter,
`
`“General Plastic”) (citing NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Elec. Co., IPR2016-
`
`00134, slip op. 6–7 (PTAB May 4, 2016) (Paper 9)).
`
`
`7 General Plastic was designated precedential on October 18, 2017.
`
`8
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
`
`
`A central issue addressed by the General Plastic factors is balancing
`
`the equities between a petitioner and a patent owner when information is
`
`available from prior Board proceedings for a subsequent proceeding.
`
`General Plastic, slip op. at 15–19. Accordingly, we use the non-exhaustive
`
`General Plastic factors as a framework for assessing, under the specific
`
`circumstances of this case, the equities of allowing the Second Petition filed
`
`by the same Petitioner that challenges claims of the same patent having
`
`essentially the same scope as the claims challenged in the First Petition to
`
`proceed to trial. We address each of these factors in turn, but note that not
`
`all the factors need to weigh against institution for us to exercise our
`
`discretion under § 314(a).
`
`Factor 1: Whether Petitioner Previously Filed a Petition Directed to the
`Same Claims of the Same Patent
`
`As discussed above, Petitioner’s First Petition challenged claims 1, 7–
`
`10, and 12 of the ’710 patent. First Pet. 3. In its Second Petition, Petitioner
`
`challenges claim 13, as well as claims 18–20, which depend from claim 13.
`
`See Second Pet. 3. Claim 13 is a method claim corresponding to system
`
`claim 1 in that claim 13 recites steps that are essentially identical to the steps
`
`performed by the “processor” recited in claim 1. Compare Ex. 1101,
`
`col. 14, ll. 5–17 (claim 1), with id. at col. 14, l. 60–col. 15, l. 5 (claim 13).
`
`Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that claim 13 recites “substantially
`
`identical ‘if’ and ‘otherwise’ conditional limitations as claim 1.” Second
`
`Pet. 9–10 (emphasis added). Claims 19 and 20, which depend from claim
`
`13, recite essentially the same limitations as claims 7 and 8, respectively,
`
`which depend from claim 1. Hence, claims 13, 19, and 20 challenged in
`
`Petitioner’s Second Petition cover essentially the same scope as claims 1, 7,
`
`9
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`and 8 that were challenged in its First Petition. This leaves claim 18 as the
`
`only claim challenged in the Second Petition that had no corresponding
`
`challenge in the First Petition. However, because claim 18 depends from
`
`claim 13, a challenge to claim 18 necessarily invokes a challenge to claim
`
`13. Thus, on the whole, the Second Petition overwhelmingly challenges the
`
`claims covering essentially the same scope as the claims challenged in the
`
`First Petition filed in Case IPR2016-01603. Apart from asserting that it was
`
`attempting to conserve the resources of the Board and the parties (Second
`
`Pet. 50)—which is unpersuasive for the reasons discussed below—Petitioner
`
`does not explain adequately why it could not have addressed claims 3 and
`
`18–20 in the First Petition. Accordingly, this factor weighs against
`
`institution.
`
`Factor 2: Whether Petitioner Knew of the Prior Art Asserted in the Second
`Petition When It Filed the First Petition
`
`As discussed above, the Second Petition presents two separate
`
`grounds—one based on Martin in view of Makela, and the other based on
`
`Theodore in view of Shahoian. Second Pet. 3. In these grounds, Petitioner
`
`relies on Martin and Theodore as the primary references in that Petitioner
`
`relies on them to teach most of the claim limitations of the challenged
`
`claims. See id. at 3, 15–33, 38–49.
`
`Petitioner knew of Martin when it filed the First Petition because, as
`
`discussed above, the First Petition asserted grounds involving Martin. As
`
`Patent Owner notes, the Reference Cited section on the face of the ’710
`
`patent lists the international application of Theodore (WO 99/45531).
`
`Ex. 1101 at [56]; Prelim. Resp. 12. Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that
`
`WO 99/45531 listed on the face of the ’710 patent is “the PCT application of
`
`10
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`Theodore.” Second Pet. 36. Hence, Petitioner knew or should have known
`
`of Theodore when it filed its First Petition. In other words, at the time of
`
`filing its First Petition, Petitioner knew or should have known of both of the
`
`two primary references relied upon in its Second Petition.
`
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner also knew or should have known
`
`of Shahoian at the time of its filing of the First Petition because Petitioner
`
`asserted grounds based on Shahoian in its Petition in Case IPR2016-01777,
`
`which was filed about a month after the First Petition was filed in Case
`
`IPR2016-01603. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. Although the record is somewhat
`
`unclear as to whether Petitioner knew or should have known of Shahoian
`
`when filing its First Petition, the timing of the filing of its Petition in Case
`
`IPR2016-01777 seems to indicate that Petitioner was likely aware of
`
`Shahoian when filing its First Petition in Case IPR2016-01603. Further,
`
`Petitioner says nothing about why it could not have presented Shahoian in
`
`the First Petition. See Second Pet. 50.
`
`Similarly, although there is not sufficient evidence in the record
`
`before us that Petitioner was aware of Makela prior to filing the First
`
`Petition, Petitioner says nothing about whether it reasonably should have
`
`known about Makela or why it could not have presented Makela in the First
`
`Petition. See id.
`
`Because Petitioner knew or should have known of three out of the
`
`four references, including the two primary references, asserted in its Second
`
`Petition when it filed its First Petition, and provided no explanation of why it
`
`could not have raised the last reference in the First Petition, this factor
`
`weighs against institution.
`
`11
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`Factor 3: Whether Petitioner Had Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`and the Board’s Institution Decision on the First Petition When Petitioner
`Filed the Second Petition
`
`Patent Owner filed its Preliminary Response to the First Petition on
`
`November 28, 2016. See Case IPR2016-01603, Paper 6. We issued our
`
`Decision on Institution addressing the First Petition on February 23, 2017.
`
`1603 Dec. on Inst. at 1. Hence, when Petitioner filed the Second Petition on
`
`May 4, 2017 (see Second Pet. 51), Petitioner had both Patent Owner’s
`
`Preliminary Response to the First Petition and the Board’s Decision on
`
`whether to institute review addressing the First Petition. Consequently, this
`
`factor weighs against institution.
`
`Factor 4: The Elapsed Time Between When Petitioner Had Patent Owner’s
`Preliminary Response and the Board’s Institution Decision on the First
`Petition and When Petitioner Filed the Second Petition
`
`The delay between when Petitioner had Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`
`Response to the First Petition, as well as the Board’s Decision on Institution
`
`addressing the First Petition, and when Petitioner filed the Second Petition
`
`left Petitioner with sufficient time to take advantage of Patent Owner’s and
`
`the Board’s responses to the First Petition. When Petitioner filed its Second
`
`Petition on May 4, 2017, Petitioner had Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`
`Response to the First Petition for over five months, and our Decision on
`
`Institution addressing the First Petition for over two months. Thus,
`
`Petitioner not only had the relevant materials from Patent Owner and the
`
`Board when it filed its Second Petition, but had ample time to take
`
`advantage of those materials in crafting its arguments in the Second Petition.
`
`As a result, this factor weighs against institution.
`
`12
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`Factor 5: Whether Petitioner Has Provided Adequate Explanation
`
`The fifth General Plastic factor is “whether the petitioner provides
`
`adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple
`
`petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent.” General Plastic,
`
`slip op. at 9, 16. A closely related factor often considered when determining
`
`whether to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) is “whether the petitioner
`
`provides adequate explanation why we should permit another attack on the
`
`same claims of the same patent.” Akamai, slip op. at 9; Xactware Sols., Inc.
`
`v. Eagle View Techs., Inc., Case IPR2017-00034, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr.
`
`13, 2017) (Paper 9).
`
`Petitioner addresses our discretion to deny institution only briefly.
`
`Petitioner asserts that the Second Petition addresses different claims based
`
`on different prior art. Second Pet. 50. Petitioner also cites a previous Board
`
`decision in Case IPR2016-00448 and states that Petitioner has not
`
`“‘overwhelmed Patent Owner with an unreasonable number of challenges of
`
`patentability’ because this is only the second petition that Petitioner has filed
`
`regarding the ’710 patent.” Id. Petitioner also asserts that the Second
`
`Petition challenges additional claims because the additional claims are
`
`asserted in the related district court proceedings, but were not asserted in the
`
`related ITC investigation. Id. Petitioner states that it omitted challenges of
`
`the additional claims from the prior Petition in order to conserve the
`
`resources of the Board and the parties. Id.
`
`These explanations, without more, do not justify permitting Petitioner
`
`to wait to file its Second Petition until after it has had the advantage of
`
`seeing our Decision on Institution addressing the First Petition. Petitioner’s
`
`stated reason for filing two separate petitions, i.e., to conserve resources of
`
`13
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`the Board and the parties, does not explain why Petitioner could not have
`
`filed the petitions at the same time and simultaneously challenged all of the
`
`claims asserted in the related ITC and district court proceedings. As the
`
`First and Second Petitions indicate, Petitioner knew of both the ITC and the
`
`district court proceedings when the First Petition was filed. See First Pet. 1,
`
`Second Pet. 1.
`
`Furthermore, as discussed above, the claims challenged in Petitioner’s
`
`Second Petition cover essentially the same scope as the claims challenged in
`
`its First Petition. Hence, contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the resources of
`
`both the Board and the parties would have been saved if the challenges to
`
`these claims were raised at the same time. Consequently, this factor also
`
`weighs against institution.
`
`Factors 6 and 7: Board Considerations
`
`The sixth and seventh General Plastic factors consider “the finite
`
`resources of the Board” and “the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11)
`
`to issue a final determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the
`
`Director notices institution of review.” General Plastic, slip op. at 9–10, 16.
`
`We conclude that these factors are not implicated under the
`
`circumstances of this case, and, therefore, do not weigh for or against
`
`exercising our discretion.
`
`Weighing the Factors for Discretionary Non-Institution Under § 314(a)
`
`We view Petitioner’s strategy in this particular case as burdensome to
`
`Patent Owner and the Board. Additionally, Petitioner has not provided a
`
`persuasive explanation of why its challenges raised in the Second Petition
`
`should be allowed. Petitioner does not even attempt to explain why it could
`
`14
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`not have raised the challenges in the Second Petition simultaneously with the
`
`challenges raised in the First Petition. And we find Petitioner’s explanation
`
`of why it chose to delay filing the Second Petition unpersuasive. We do not
`
`take lightly denying a petition on grounds unrelated to its substantive
`
`patentability challenges. Nor do we hold that multiple petitions against
`
`claims of the same patent that cover essentially the same scope are never
`
`permitted. Here, however, weighing the relevant factors under the
`
`circumstances of this case, which, as we explain above, all favor exercising
`
`our discretion not to institute, we view the prejudice to Patent Owner to be
`
`greater than that to Petitioner. We, therefore, decline to institute inter partes
`
`review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`For all of the reasons discussed above, we exercise our discretion
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) not to institute review in
`
`this proceeding with respect to claims 13 and 18–20 of the ’710 patent.
`
`
`
`IV. ORDER
`
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims of
`
`the ’710 patent, and no trial is instituted.
`
`
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`15
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`IPR2017-01368
`Patent 8,581,710 B2
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`PETITIONER:
`
`James Heintz
`jim.heintz@dlapiper.com
`
`Brian Erickson
`brian.erickson@dlapiper.com
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Michael Fleming
`mfleming@irell.com
`
`Babak Redjaian
`bredjaian@irell.com
`
`
`
`
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`16
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`
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