throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORP. and AISIN SEIKI CO., LTD.,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
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`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`__________________________________
`
`Case No. IPR2017-01494
`U.S. Patent No. 7,683,509
`__________________________________
`
`DECLARATION OF JOSEPH J. BEAMAN, JR., Sc.D.
`
`
`INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II EX. 2004
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
`IPR2017-01494
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`

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`IPR2017-01494
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
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`1.
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`I, Joseph J. Beaman, Jr., Sc.D., am making this declaration at the
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`request of Patent Owner Intellectual Ventures II LLC (“IV”) in the matter of the
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`Inter Partes Review (IPR2017-01494) of U.S. Patent No. 7,683,509 (“the ’509
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`Patent”). I understand that this declaration is being submitted in the IPR as Exhibit
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`2004.
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`2.
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`I am being compensated for my work in this matter at my standard
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`hourly rate of $475 for consulting services. My compensation in no way depends
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`on the outcome of this proceeding.
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`3.
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`In forming my opinions, I considered, in addition to my own
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`knowledge and experience in the relevant field from the perspective of a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time, the following written materials:
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`Exhibit 1001 (the ’509 Patent);
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`Petitioners’ Petition in this IPR (Paper 3);
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`Exhibit 1114 (Dr. David L. Trumper’s declaration);
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`Exhibit 1102 (Stephan);
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`IV’s Patent Owner Preliminary Response (Paper 7);
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`Decision Instituting Inter Partes Review (Paper 10);
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`Exhibit 2005 (My curriculum vitae); and
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`Exhibit 2006 (Transcript of cross examination of Dr. David L.
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`Trumper).
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`IPR2017-01494
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
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`4.
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`Exhibit 2005 is a copy of my current curriculum vitae (“CV”).
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`PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
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`5.
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`I have extensive education, research, and work experience in the field
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`of cooling systems for electromagnetic devices. I received a B.S. degree in
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`Mechanical Engineering from The University of Texas at Austin in 1972, then
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`received an M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from The University of Texas
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`at Austin in 1975, then received an Sc.D. degree in Mechanical Engineering from
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`Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1975.
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`6.
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`I have conducted significant research and published significant papers
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`in the field of temperature control in electromechanical systems and advanced
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`manufacturing. For example, I have published over 100 papers and I have received
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`approximately 15 US patents in this field. My specific manufacturing
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`research interest is in Additive Manufacturing (AM). I was the first academic
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`researcher in the field. One of the most successful AM approaches, Selective Laser
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`Sintering, was a thermal process that was developed in my laboratory. I was one of
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`the founders of DTM Corporation (now merged with 3D Systems), which markets
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`Selective Laser Sintering (SLS). While at DTM, I was CTO and responsible for the
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`first machine design, which included the cooling systems for the galvanometer
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`driven laser scanning systems. I am a Fellow of both the American Society of
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`IPR2017-01494
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
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`Mechanical Engineers and the Society of Manufacturing Engineers. I was elected
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`to the National Academy of Engineers in 2013.
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`7.
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`Since 1979, I have continuously worked as an assistant professor,
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`associate professor, or professor of Mechanical Engineering at The University of
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`Texas at Austin. In these positions, I have continually taught the types of courses
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`relevant to temperature control in electromechanical systems and advanced
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`manufacturing, including dynamic systems and control, which includes
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`electromechanical devices. Further, I have conducted my own research, and
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`supervised Ph.D. candidates, in research related to temperature control in
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`electromechanical systems and advanced manufacturing. For example, my research
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`team has just completed the design and construction of a new high temperature
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`SLS machine with unparalleled temperature control of the processing temperature
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`environment.
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`8.
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`The foregoing experience and education, a large portion of which was
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`completed before the relevant time for assessing the patentability of the ’509
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`Patent, more than qualify me as a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’509
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`Patent at the relevant time. In addition, I worked with people that were persons of
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`ordinary skill in the art. From my personal experience working on temperature
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`control in electromechanical systems and advanced manufacturing myself and with
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`others, I understand the types of problems and the knowledge that a person of
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`IPR2017-01494
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`ordinary skill in the art would have confronted and known at the relevant time.
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`Further, in view of my education and experience both before and after the relevant
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`time, I am an expert in temperature control in electromechanical systems and
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`advanced manufacturing, with knowledge and skill of the art of the ’509 Patent
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`that is well beyond the level of knowledge and skill of a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art of the ’509 Patent
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`SCOPE OF TESTIMONY
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`9.
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`I understand that this IPR involves a number of subjects related to the
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`patentability of certain claims of the ’509 Patent. For example, I understand that
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`the ultimate questions of whether the ’509 Patent is anticipated by, or would have
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`been obvious in view of, the prior art at the relevant time, are at issue in this IPR.
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`However, I understand that my testimony in this IPR is limited in scope, and that I
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`have been asked to testify regarding a limited set of subjects relevant to this IPR.
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`The specific topics that I have been asked to address are listed in the numbered,
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`bold headings of the section of this declaration labeled “SUBSTANTIVE
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`TESTIMONY.” I have spent a significant amount of time, over multiple days, to
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`analyze and express opinions about the specific topics addressed in this
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`declaration.
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`10. With respect to this IPR, I have not analyzed nor expressed any
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`opinion, nor endeavored to analyze or express an opinion, about any subject that is
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`IPR2017-01494
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`not expressly included in the section labeled “SUBSTANTIVE TESTIMONY.”
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`While I could, if given sufficient time, analyze and express an opinion concerning
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`additional subjects related to data caching that are not expressly included in this
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`declaration, doing so would require a significant investment of time, over multiple
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`days, similar to the significant amount of time I devoted to the issues addressed in
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`this declaration.
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`RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
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`11.
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`I am a mechanical engineer by training and profession. The opinions I
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`am expressing in this declaration involve the application of my knowledge and
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`experience to the evaluation of the ’509 Patent and certain prior art with respect to
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`the ’509 Patent. My knowledge of patent law is that of a lay person, albeit one who
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`has had some experience relevant to patent law. Therefore, the attorneys from
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`Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP, who represent IV, have provided me with
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`guidance as to the applicable patent law in this matter. The paragraphs below
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`express my understanding of how I must apply current principles related to
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`patentability to my analysis.
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`12.
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`I understand that, in assessing the patentability of a patent claim, the
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`Patent Office must construe the claim by giving the claim its broadest reasonable
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`interpretation consistent with the specification. I understand that, under the
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`broadest reasonable interpretation standard (sometimes abbreviated as the “BRI”
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`standard), a claim phrase is generally given its plain and ordinary meaning within
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`the relevant art if the specification is consistent with the plain and ordinary
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`meaning.
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`13.
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`It is my understanding that a claim is unpatentable as “anticipated”
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 102 if a single prior art reference discloses every limitation of
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`the claim, arranged as in the claim. I understand that a prior art reference does not
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`anticipate a claim, however, when it discloses multiple, distinct teachings that a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art might somehow combine to achieve the claimed
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`invention.
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`14.
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`I understand that a claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the
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`claimed subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary
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`skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention. I also understand that an
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`obviousness analysis takes into account the scope and content of the prior art, the
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`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and the level of
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`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
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`15.
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`In determining the scope and content of the prior art, it is my
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`understanding that a reference is considered appropriate prior art if it falls within
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`the field of the inventor’s endeavor. In addition, a reference is appropriate prior art
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`if it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was
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`involved. A reference is reasonably pertinent if it logically would have
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`commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. If a
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`reference relates to the same problem as the claimed invention, that supports use of
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`the reference as prior art in an obviousness analysis.
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`16. To assess the differences between prior art and the claimed subject
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`matter, it is my understanding that 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires the claimed invention
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`to be considered as a whole. This “as a whole” assessment requires showing that
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`one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention, confronted by the same
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`problems as the inventor and with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would
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`have selected the elements from the prior art and combined them in the claimed
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`manner.
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`17.
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`It is my further understanding that the Supreme Court has recognized
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`several rationales for combining references or modifying a reference to show
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`obviousness of claimed subject matter. Some of these rationales include:
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`combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable
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`results; simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable
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`results; a predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
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`functions; applying a known technique to a known device (method or product)
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`ready for improvement to yield predictable results; choosing from a finite number
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`of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success; and
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`some teaching, suggestion, or motivation that would have led one of ordinary skill
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`to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art reference teachings to
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`arrive at the claimed invention.
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`18.
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`I understand that an assessment of what a reference discloses or
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`teaches—for purposes of an anticipation analysis or an obviousness analysis—
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`must be conducted from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at
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`the time of the invention. In other words, a reference discloses or teaches a claim
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`limitation if a person of ordinary skill in the art would, at the relevant time,
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`interpret the reference as expressly, implicitly, or inherently disclosing the claim
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`limitation. I further understand that a reference does not need to use the exact
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`language of the claim to disclose a claim limitation.
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`19.
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`I understand that a patent owner may attempt to establish a date of
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`invention that is earlier than the filing date printed on the face of the patent.
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`However, I understand that IV is not attempting to establish an earlier invention
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`date for the purpose of this IPR, and, thus, for the purpose of this IPR, the time of
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`the invention (also called the “relevant time” herein) is July 9, 2006.
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`SUBSTANTIVE TESTIMONY
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`1.
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`The field of the invention and the level of ordinary skill in the art.
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`20.
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`I was asked by counsel to assess the field of the invention of the ’509
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`Patent and the level of ordinary skill in the art. In making this assessment, I have
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`considered the ’509 Patent, my experience, and the testimony of Petitioners’
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`expert, Dr. Trumper.
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`21.
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`In my opinion, the field of the invention of the ’509 Patent is “cooling
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`systems for electromagnetic devices.” This emphasis on cooling systems is
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`supported by both the “FIELD OF THE INVENTION” section and the claims of
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`the ’509 Patent. Specifically, the “FIELD OF THE INVENTION” section states:
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`The present invention relates generally to electromagnetic devices that
`include heat exchange mechanisms. It relates particularly to motors,
`generators, transformers, relays and solenoids that are cooled by a
`fluid coolant.
`Ex. 1001 at 1:6–9 (emphases added). Further, every independent claim of the ’509
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`Patent recites a “fluid-cooled electromagnetic field-functioning device” or “fluid-
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`cooled motor,” along with “a non-linear heat transfer fluid pathway in the
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`monolithic body.” Ex. 1001, claims 1, 3, 4, 5, and 14 (emphases added).
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`22. Dr. Trumper did not specify the field of the invention of the ’509
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`Patent. Instead, he opined generally that:
`
`a POSITA would be familiar with the fundamentals of electric motor
`design and operation, the concept of encapsulating various
`components in an electric motor, the types of materials that could be
`used for encapsulation and their thermal and dimensional properties
`(e.g., CLTE), and thermofluid concepts. A POSITA would further be
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`aware of the existence of various techniques for manufacturing
`encapsulated motors, including by the use of injection molding.
`Ex. 1114 ¶ 31. In my view, Dr.Trumper’s general opinion does not adequately
`
`identify the field of the invention of the ’509 Patent. For example, the only
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`reference to heat transfer in Dr. Trumper’s testimony regarding the relevant art is a
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`vague reference to “thermal . . . properties.” Id.
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`23.
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`In my opinion, Dr. Trumper exaggerates the level of ordinary skill in
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`the art. For example, I disagree with Dr. Trumper’s opinion that a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art may have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering. Id.
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`Because the emphasis of the ’509 Patent is on heat transfer, not the electrical
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`components of a motor or other electromagnetic device, a person of ordinary skill
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`in the art would have a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering. I also
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`disagree with Dr. Trumper’s opinion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
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`have “at least two years of experience in the design of electric motors.” Id. In my
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`view, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have at least one year of
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`experience, but no more than two years, in the application of heat transfer for
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`electromechanical devices.
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`24. Dr. Trumper’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art
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`“would be familiar with” or would “be aware” of various subject matters, including
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`“the types of materials that could be used for encapsulation and their thermal and
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`dimensional properties (e.g., CLTE)” and “various techniques for manufacturing
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`encapsulated motors, including by the use of injection molding,” (id.), is
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`ambiguous. Specifically, the precise amount of knowledge about those subject
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`matters—from very minimal knowledge to expert-level knowledge—that Dr.
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`Trumper attributes to a person of ordinary skill in the art, is unclear. However, in
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`my opinion, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have no more than very
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`limited knowledge about “the types of materials that could be used for
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`encapsulation and their thermal and dimensional properties (e.g., CLTE)” and
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`“various techniques for manufacturing encapsulated motors, including by the use
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`of injection molding.” Therefore, to the extent Dr. Trumper suggests that a person
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`of ordinary skill in the art would have anything more than very limited knowledge
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`about these subject matters, I disagree with Dr. Trumper.
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`25.
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`In summary, in my opinion, a person of ordinary skill in the art of the
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`’509 Patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering and at least
`
`one year or experience, but no more than two years, in the application of heat
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`transfer for electromechanical devices. The person of ordinary skill in the art
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`would have no more than very limited knowledge about “the types of materials that
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`could be used for encapsulation and their thermal and dimensional properties (e.g.,
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`CLTE)” and “various techniques for manufacturing encapsulated motors, including
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`by the use of injection molding.”
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`26. All of my analysis and opinions set forth herein are from the
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`perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, set forth above in Paragraph 25,
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`at the relevant time. While, in the interest of conciseness, some portions of this
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`declaration do not expressly include language indicating that the testimony is from
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`the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time, it should
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`be understood that my analysis and opinions are from the perspective of a person
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`of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time. For example, my opinion that a
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`reference does not disclose a claim limitation should be understood to mean that, in
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`my opinion, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would interpret
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`the reference as not disclosing the limitation.
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`2.
`
`The broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim phrase “fluid-
`cooled.”
`27.
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`I was asked by counsel to analyze and answer the question: “What is
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`the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim phrase “fluid-cooled” as used in
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`the claims of the ’509 Patent?” This section of my declaration is limited to
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`answering that question and setting forth my underlying analysis that I found
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`necessary to answer that question.
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`28. Every challenged claim of the ’509 Patent uses the adjective “fluid-
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`cooled” to modify the claimed device. Independent claims 1 recites a “fluid-cooled
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`electromagnetic field-functioning device, while independent claim 14 recites a
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`“fluid-cooled motor.” The dependent claims challenged in this IPR—claims 2, 7,
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`and 15—recite the same limitation by virtue of their dependency from claim 1 or
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`claim 14.
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`29.
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`I understand that the claim phrase “fluid-cooled” appears in the
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`preamble of each of the claims in which it appears. I understand that a preamble
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`phrase is not always considered to be a claim limitation, but that a preamble phrase
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`is a claim limitation if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the
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`claim. In my opinion, the claim phrase “fluid-cooled” is a claim limitation, for two
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`reasons.
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`30. First, in my view the preamble phrase including the adjective “fluid-
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`cooled” is a claim limitation in both challenged independent claims 1 and 14
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`because the preamble phrase is necessary to understand the meaning of a limitation
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`set forth in the body of the claims. With respect to claim 1, “the device” referenced
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`in the “wherein the monolithic body completely covers the exterior of the device”
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`limitation is the “fluid-cooled electromagnetic field-functioning device” recited in
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`the preamble. Similarly, with respect to claim 14, “the motor” referenced in the
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`“wherein the monolithic body of injection molded thermoplastic material
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`substantially encapsulates a stator of the motor” limitation is the “fluid-cooled
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`motor” recited in the preamble. Therefore, I believe that the preamble phrase
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`provides important context to define what “the device” and “the motor” are in the
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`claims.
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`31. Second, the specification of the ’509 Patent repeatedly and
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`consistently indicates that cooling of the motor is an important part of the
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`invention disclosed and claimed in the ’509 Patent. The Abstract refers multiple
`
`times to cooling the motor:
`
`Electromagnetic components are provided with a heat exchange
`mechanism. For example, a fluid-cooled electromagnetic field-
`functioning device, such as a motor, generator, transformer, solenoid
`or relay, comprises one or more electrical conductors. A monolithic
`body of phase change material substantially encapsulates the
`conductors or an inductor. At least one liquid-tight coolant channel is
`also substantially encapsulated within the body of phase change
`material. The coolant channel may be part of a heat pipe or cold plate.
`The coolant channel may be made by molding a conduit into the
`body, using a “lost wax” molding process, or injecting gas into the
`molten phase change material while it is in the mold. The coolant
`channel may also be formed at the juncture between the body and a
`cover over the body.
`Ex. 1001, Abstract (emphases added). In addition, the Field of the Invention
`
`section of the specification states that “[t]he present invention . . . relates
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`particularly to motors, generators, transformers, relays and solenoids that are
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`cooled by a fluid coolant.” Ex. 1001 at 1:6–9 (emphases added).
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`32. The Background of the Invention section makes it very clear that one
`
`of the problems in the prior art that the disclosed invention is intended to solve is
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`heat, which has significant harmful effects on performance of a motor or other
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`device.
`
`An important factor in motor design is the lowering of the operating
`temperature of the motor. Increased operating temperature affects
`the electrical efficiency of the motor and bearing life. As temperature
`increases, resistive loses [sic] in wire increase, thereby reducing total
`motor power. Further, the Arrhenius equation predicts that the failure
`rate of an electrical device is exponentially related to its operating
`temperature. The frictional heat generated by bearings increases with
`speed. Also, as bearings get hot they expand, and the bearing cages
`get stressed and may deflect, causing non-uniform rotation and the
`resultant further heat increase. One drawback with existing motor
`designs is their limited effective dissipation of the heat, and difficulty
`in incorporating heat sinks to aid in heat dissipation. In addition, in
`current motors the operating temperatures generally increase as the
`size of the motor is decreased.
`Id. at 1:43–57 (emphases added).
`
`33. The specification further emphasizes that the disclosed invention
`
`meets a need “for an improved motor that includes an effective and practical way
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`of using a liquid to carry heat away from the motor.” Id. at 2:6–9 (emphasis
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`added). The specification also states that it is a great benefit to ensure that “liquids
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`or gasses could be channeled in such a way that they picked up heat from an
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`electromagnetic device without damaging the device, and then carried that heat to
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`a place where the heat was desired.” Id. at 2:15–19 (emphases added).
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`34. Accordingly, the ’509 Patent discloses a motor or device that uses
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`fluid for the purpose of cooling the motor or device. In my opinion, a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would understand that the ’509 Patent does not disclose a
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`motor or device that merely moves heat transfer fluid around, without using the
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`heat transfer fluid for the purpose of cooling the motor or device. In view of the
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`Board’s broad construction of “heat transfer fluid,” I do not believe that the claims
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`of the ’509 Patent would correctly define the scope of the invention, unless the
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`preamble term “fluid-cooled” is given meaning to require the device or motor to
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`use the heat transfer fluid for the purpose of cooling. Further, because the
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`specification so consistently shows that the purpose of the heat transfer fluid is
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`cooling of the device, I believe that the preamble term “fluid-cooled” must be
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`given meaning so that the claims adequately capture the scope of the invention.
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`35.
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`In my view, the ordinary meaning of “fluid-cooled” would be
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`apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art in view of the specification of the
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`’509 Patent. The same portions of the specification that I discuss above
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`consistently show that “fluid-cooled” means that the claimed motor or device uses
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`fluid for the purpose of cooling the motor or device. Therefore, in my opinion, the
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`broadest reasonable interpretation of “fluid-cooled motor” or “fluid-cooled . . .
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`device” is “a motor [or device] that uses fluid for the purpose of cooling the motor
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`[or device].”
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`36.
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`I do not believe that it would be reasonable to construe the claim
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`terms “fluid-cooled motor” or “fluid-cooled . . . device” so broadly that these terms
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`cover every motor or device in which a fluid merely causes a minor and purely
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`incidental effect of cooling the motor or device. Such a construction would be
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`unreasonable at least because it would cover all motors and all devices simply
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`because environmental air that is cooler than a heated motor or device is a fluid
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`that has a minor and purely incidental effect of cooling the motor or device.
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`Accordingly, the practical result of construing “fluid-cooled” so broadly as to
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`cover any minor and purely incidental cooling effect is to write “fluid-cooled” out
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`of the claims entirely. I do not believe that a person of ordinary skill in the art
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`would consider the resulting construction to be reasonable because a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art would understand that the term “fluid-cooled” limits the
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`claimed motors or devices to the subset of motors or devices that use a fluid for the
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`purpose of cooling the motor or device.
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`3.
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`The broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim phrase “pathway.”
`37.
`
`I was asked by counsel to analyze and answer the question: “What is
`
`the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim phrase “pathway” as used in the
`
`-17-
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01494
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
`
`claims of the ’509 Patent?” This section of my declaration is limited to answering
`
`that question and setting forth my underlying analysis that I found necessary to
`
`answer that question.
`
`38.
`
`I first note that the Board, in its Institution Decision, agreed with IV’s
`
`proposed construction of “pathway” to mean a structural “channel.” Specifically,
`
`the Board stated:
`
`Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`understand that “pathway” is a structural element because the claims
`recite additional fluid inlet and fluid outlet structures of the pathway.
`See id. at 8. Patent Owner asserts that the ’509 Patent Specification
`consistently discloses the pathway structure as a channel. See id. at 8
`(quoting Ex. 1001, Abstract, 3:47–56, 8:34–35).
`For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction
`of “pathway” as “channel,” because it is consistent with the ’509
`Patent Specification.
`Inst. Dec. at 9.
`
`39. As indicated above, I reviewed IV’s Patent Owner Preliminary
`
`Response. As part of this review, I reviewed the portion of IV’s Patent Owner
`
`Preliminary Response in which IV proposed a construction for “heat transfer fluid
`
`pathway.” I understand that the Board agreed with IV’s proposed construction of
`
`“pathway” but not IV’s proposed construction of “heat transfer fluid.”
`
`-18-
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01494
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
`
`40. After reviewing the ’509 Patent as a whole, IV’s Patent Owner
`
`Preliminary Response, and the Board’s Institution Decision, I agree with the
`
`Board’s construction of “pathway” to mean a structural “channel,” which I
`
`understand to be IV’s proposed construction.
`
`41.
`
` I understand that IV’s Patent Owner Preliminary Response was
`
`submitted to the Board before I conducted my analysis. However, after reviewing
`
`the ’509 Patent as a whole, I concur with the reasons IV provided in the Patent
`
`Owner Preliminary response why the claimed “pathway” should be construed to be
`
`a structural “channel.”
`
`42. The plain language of the claims shows, to a person of ordinary skill
`
`in the art, that the claim term “pathway” is a structural element by reciting specific
`
`structure—namely, a “fluid inlet” and a “fluid outlet”—of the pathway. In
`
`addition, the specification of the ’509 Patent consistently calls the pathway
`
`structure a “channel.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001 at Abstract (“At least one liquid-tight
`
`coolant channel is also substantially encapsulated within the body of phase change
`
`material. The coolant channel may be part of a heat pipe or cold plate. The coolant
`
`channel may be made by molding a conduit into the body, using a ‘lost wax’
`
`molding process, or injecting gas into the molten phase change material while it is
`
`in the mold. The coolant channel may also be formed at the juncture between the
`
`body and a cover over the body.”); 3:47–56 (“a motor can be cooled by passing
`
`-19-
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01494
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
`
`liquid through a coolant channel . . . . The flow path or chamber for the coolant . .
`
`.”); 8:34–35 (“The coolant is captive to the system and continuously recirculates
`
`through the hollow structure of the heat pipe 62.”).
`
`43.
`
`In view of the foregoing, in my opinion, a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art would understand that the claim term “pathway” means a structural
`
`“channel.” Therefore, in my view, the broadest reasonable interpretation of
`
`“pathway” is a structural “channel.”
`
`4.
`
`Application, for purposes of this IPR, of the Board’s construction of
`“monolithic body,” “heat transfer fluid,” and “non-linear . . . pathway.”
`44.
`
`I understand that the Board, in its Institution Decision, construed
`
`“monolithic body” to mean “a body formed as a single piece.” Inst. Dec. at 8. I
`
`also understand that the Board’s construction of “monolithic body” does not
`
`exclude “a body formed by multiple pieces joined together with fasteners, glue, or
`
`welding.” Id. at 7. I have been informed that, for purposes of this IPR, IV agrees
`
`with the Board’s construction of “monolithic body.” Accordingly, while I have not
`
`conducted an independent analysis of, and express no opinion concerning, the
`
`broadest reasonable interpretation of “monolithic body,” I have, for the purposes of
`
`my analysis set forth in this declaration, applied the Board’s construction of
`
`“monolithic body” to mean “a body formed as a single piece.”
`
`-20-
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01494
`Toyota Motor v. Intellectual Ventures II
`
`45.
`
`I understand that the Board, in its Institution Decision, construed
`
`“non-linear . . . pathway” to mean a “channel that cannot be formed by a simple
`
`core pin in an injection mold tool.” Id. at 10. I have been informed that, for
`
`purposes of this IPR, IV does not contest the Board’s construction of “non-linear
`
`. . . pathway.” Accordingly, while I have not conducted an independent analysis of,
`
`and express no opinion concerning, the broadest reasonable interpretation of “non-
`
`linear . . . pathway,” I have, for the purposes of my analysis set forth in this
`
`declaration, applied the Board’s construction of “non-linear . . . pathway” to mean
`
`“channel that cannot be formed by a simple core pin in an injection mold tool.”
`
`46.
`
`I understand that the Board, in its Institution Decision, construed “heat
`
`transfer fluid” to mean “liquids or gases, or combinations thereof, that are capable
`
`of heat transfer.” Id. at 9. I have been informed that, for purposes of this IPR, IV
`
`does not contest the Board’s construction of the claim phrase “heat transfer fluid,”
`
`standing alone, to mean “liquids or gases, or combinations thereof, that are capable
`
`of heat transfer.” Accordingly, while I have not conducted an independent analysis
`
`of, and express no opinion concerning, the broadest reasonable inte

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