UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
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`UNITED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
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`SUSAN McKNIGHT, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01686 (Patent 9,253,973 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01687 (Patent 9,066,511 B2)
`____________
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`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: October 18, 2018
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`Before JAMES A. TARTAL, TIMOTHY J. GOODSON, and RICHARD H.
`MARSCHALL, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`UNITED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SUSAN McKNIGHT, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01686 (Patent 9,253,973 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01687 (Patent 9,066,511 B2)
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: October 18, 2018
`____________
`
`
`
`
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`
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`Before JAMES A. TARTAL, TIMOTHY J. GOODSON, and RICHARD H.
`MARSCHALL, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`Case IPR2017-01686 (Patent 9,253,973 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01687 (Patent 9,066,511 B2)
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`APPEARANCES:
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`MICHAEL HOUSTON, ESQUIRE
`NAIKANG TSAO, ESQUIRE
`Foley & Lardner, LLP
`150 East Gilman Street
`Madison, Wisconsin 53703-1482
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER:
`JOHN C. LINDERMAN, ESQUIRE
`JUSTIN L. DURELLI, ESQUIRE
`McCormick, Paulding & Huber, LLP
`185 Asylum Street
`Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3410
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday,
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`October 18, 2018, commencing at 1:00 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`Case IPR2017-01686 (Patent 9,253,973 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01687 (Patent 9,066,511 B2)
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE TARTAL: Good afternoon and welcome. We are here for
`a final hearing in inter partes review cases captioned United Industries
`Corporation, petitioner, versus Susan McKnight, Incorporated, patent owner,
`case IPR2017-01686 concerning U.S. patent number 9,253,973 B2 and case
`IPR2017-01687 concerning U.S. patent number 9,066,511 B2.
`First let me begin by introducing the panel. I'm joined by Judge
`Goodson and Judge Marschall, and I am Judge Tartal. May we please have
`the parties' appearances? Who do we have appearing today on behalf of
`petitioner?
`MR. HOUSTON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm Michael
`Houston, lead counsel for petitioner, United Industries Corporation. With
`me today is my colleague, Mr. Naikang Tsao, who will be conducting the
`oral argument today.
`JUDGE TARTAL: Good afternoon and welcome, counsel. For
`patent owner, who do you have appearing today?
`MR. LINDERMAN: Your Honor, this is John Linderman. I'll be
`representing Susan McKnight, Inc. I also have with me my associate, Justin
`Durelli. And we also have Mrs. McKnight here. She is just a participant as
`a -- wanted to see what's going on.
`JUDGE TARTAL: Thank you. Welcome counsel and welcome to
`our guests as well. We set forth the procedure for today's hearing in our trial
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`order. And as a reminder, the two cases have not been consolidated or
`joined but entail overlapping issues, and the parties have agreed to proceed
`with a single hearing for both cases. Each party will have 60 minutes of
`total time to present arguments for both cases. Petitioner has the burden of
`proof and will go first. Petitioner may also address the motion to amend
`pending in IPR2017-01686. Patent owner may then present arguments in
`opposition and may also address the motion to amend. Then to the extent
`that petitioner has reserved time, petitioner may present arguments in reply
`for the case and in opposition to the motion to amend. And finally, if patent
`owner has reserved time, patent owner may present reply or sur-rebuttal
`arguments.
`Counsel, are there any questions in that regard?
`MR. TSAO: No.
`JUDGE TARTAL: Any questions from patent owner in that
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`regard?
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`MR. LINDERMAN: Only, Your Honor, Mr. Durelli and I were
`going to be sharing. Is it all right that we have both of us, not at the same
`time, but covering different portions?
`JUDGE TARTAL: That's perfectly fine. It may be helpful just to
`clarify if there's a -- if your arguments are with regard to a particular case or
`to be clear as to who is speaking about what when. But beyond that, you are
`welcome to divide up your time between counsels as you see fit.
`For clarity of the transcript and for the benefit of Judge Goodson,
`who is participating remotely, when you refer to an exhibit on the screen,
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`please state for the record the exhibit and page number, and for
`demonstratives, the slide number to which you are referring. We remind
`each party that under no circumstances are they to interrupt the other party
`while that party is presenting its arguments and demonstratives.
`Any remaining questions from patent owner at this time?
`MR. LINDERMAN: None, Your Honor.
`JUDGE TARTAL: Thank you. Any remaining questions from
`petitioner at this time?
`MR. TSAO: No, Your Honor.
`JUDGE TARTAL: Petitioner, would you like to reserve a portion
`of the 60 minutes at the outset?
`MR. TSAO: Yes, Your Honor. We would like to reserve
`20 minutes.
`JUDGE TARTAL: Counsel, you may proceed when you are
`ready. And there should be a timer that will give you an indication as to
`how much of the 40 minutes you have remaining during the presentation.
`MR. TSAO: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Board,
`my name is Naikang Tsao from Foley & Lardner on behalf of the petitioner.
`Two prefatory comments. First, since the 1800s, the mid-1800s,
`it's been known and understood that insect traps could have rough exterior
`surfaces, either molded rough or with some kind of adhered grit or fabric to
`make them rough and also smooth or slippery interior surfaces to prevent
`insects from climbing out of the trap once they have fallen into the trap.
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`You know, it's the definition of a trap: They can fall in and they can't get out.
`So we'll go through some of that art kind of briefly today.
`The second prefatory point is that Jennerich, which is
`Exhibit 1002, was a heavily considered prior art reference during the '973
`examination, and one point I wanted to make is that at no point did the
`examiner or the Board reviewing the examiner or the examiner post-board
`decision ever determine anything other than the fact that Jennerich disclosed
`two pitfall traps that were slippery. And we'll go over that as well. There
`was never any -- no one representing the PTO ever concluded that Jennerich
`was a single pitfall trap or didn't have slippery surfaces both in the inner
`receptacle and the outer receptacle.
`JUDGE GOODSON: Isn't it the case that the examiner allowed
`the claims after language was added inserting the slipperiness of the
`surfaces?
`MR. TSAO: It was. And if I could just show the exhibit, its's
`Exhibit 1019 -- Exhibit 1020, actually. It's Exhibit 1020. It's page 2, Your
`Honor. I don't know if you have that up or can see that, but --
`JUDGE GOODSON: Yes, thank you.
`MR. TSAO: What I'm showing you is the examiner initiated
`interview summaries. So what happened during prosecution is that there
`was an RCE, request for continued examination. There was a claim
`amendment, and this is the examiner's take on that amendment. And what
`the highlighted portion shows is the examiner maintained the view that
`Jennerich disclosed first and second pitfall traps wherein the first trap was
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`the area designated (k) and the second trap was the area designated between
`a’ and (b). And that's what that first highlighted portion talks about.
`But what the examiner says is the reason it's allowing the claims is
`that the examiner found that the reason Jennerich's surfaces, the first and
`second pitfall traps are slippery is because of a powder, what's called a
`paralyzing powder that's put on those surfaces. So if you see, so the
`proposed amendment by the examiner here is that it's the highlighted portion
`near the end which says, each having a surface roughness which is slippery
`to prevent bedbugs from climbing out and to define over Jennerich.
`So the point here is that even here at the point of allowance, the
`examiner still continues to maintain the position that Jennerich does disclose
`two pitfall traps that are slippery, but the reason that they are slippery is
`because there's paralyzing powder, and it is allowing the claims based on a
`surface roughness limitation that's being added in the claims through this
`agreed-upon amendment.
`And the point there is, if you look at the prior art and the history of
`the art going back to the 1870s, this notion that you could have a surface
`roughness and interior trap surface that's smooth or slippery to prevent
`insects from climbing out was -- it just was obvious, as repeatedly stated
`throughout the prior art. And Jennerich was a later innovation. Jennerich
`was 1934. And it's basically saying you can also make slippery surfaces,
`you know, even more slippery by adding powder.
`So what the examiner is doing here, by allowing the claims based
`on a surface roughness limitation that's being added, they are going back to
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`what preceded Jennerich where it was well established that you could make
`interior surfaces slippery.
`And it also contradicts what the examiner had previously found
`and which the Board had affirmed. And if I can just show you that, if we go
`to demonstrative slide 15, please, so during the prosecution -- I'm showing a
`snapshot of Exhibit 1018 at 7, which is in the '973 case, IPR-01686. And
`here the Board's discussing Jennerich. What the Board is saying is that they
`are agreeing with the examiner's prior finding that Jennerich discloses first
`and second pitfall traps and also that the outer trap or the second trap, you
`know, it is slanted around its surfaces capable of preventing bedbugs from
`crawling out, and citing Jennerich, and that each of these surfaces would be
`slippery with the powder (h) found in the trough preventing at least some
`bedbugs from exiting. So the Board is affirming the examiner's finding that
`the surfaces are slippery.
`And if we go to the next slide, page 16 of the demonstratives, this
`is the Board's reasoning continuing its discussion of Jennerich. It also finds
`that the Board is agreeing with the examiner's findings that it would be
`obvious -- an obvious matter of design choice. What I'm pointing to is the
`beginning right here: It will be an obvious matter of design choice to modify
`the surface roughness of the slippery surfaces of the inner and outer
`peripheral surfaces to have a surface roughness of about 100 micro inches or
`less, which is what some of the patent claims talk about in terms of a
`smoother slippery surface. And then it goes on in the second paragraph,
`although appellants, you know, challenge those find findings, they offer no
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`persuasive rebuttal. They failed to offer any persuasive rebuttal as to why a
`person of ordinary skill wouldn't design the surface roughness to ensure that
`the interior surfaces are slippery and the exterior surfaces are rough.
`So what we highlight there, the discussion by the Board, and the
`interesting thing here is rather than appeal the Board's determination, you
`know, the patent owner, the applicant decided to file an RCE, and then they
`amended the claims and it ended up where it ended up. But when the
`examiner finally allowed the claims, you know, it did so based on a
`rationale, a surface roughness slippery rationale that directly contradicted
`what the examiner had previously found during examination and which the
`Board affirmed here. So we've included these pages.
`And so that's kind of the story basically on Jennerich. But even in
`the allowance there's no point when the examiner or the Board disputed the
`fact that Jennerich did disclose two pitfall traps that were slippery. And as
`to the rationale, the rationale for allowance that the examiner used, you
`know, we submit that it directly contradicted what the examiner previously
`found himself and which the Board affirmed, as referenced in slides 15 and
`16, which is Exhibit 1018 at pages 8 and then 9 through 11.
`JUDGE GOODSON: How does that square with your issue
`preclusion argument? If the examiner has basically changed his mind about
`what distinguishes Jennerich and ultimately allowing the claims, does that
`mean that the earlier findings are nonbinding in terms of collateral estoppel
`or issue preclusion?
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`MR. TSAO: We don't think so. We think that the Board decision,
`which is a final decision, should have been accorded issue preclusive effect.
`We cite a case, if we can go to the next page, slide 17, so MaxLinear is a
`Federal Circuit case decided earlier this year. And in MaxLinear, what the
`Court holds is that basically that issue preclusion applies to final decisions of
`the Board just as it does to final decisions -- written decisions of the TTAB.
`And citing, you know, the Supreme Court's decision B&B Hardware.
`So as a practical matter, here is the way we think you should look
`at this issue. Let's assume that there was no IPR in this case, because we
`initiated the IPR. We didn't have to do that, right. What happened in this
`case is the claims get allowed and then the patent owner files an
`infringement action against our client. That's pending. It's been stayed,
`right. If that was the way the world works, we would argue in that District
`Court proceeding that under MaxLinear that their issue precluded from
`arguing -- taking a position as to Jennerich different than what the Board
`found. That's what MaxLinear stands for, that when you have a court
`proceeding and you have an administrative final decision of the Board, the
`preclusive effect applies to it as to the issue decided. And the issue that was
`decided by the Board is that Jennerich discloses both surface
`roughness/slippery limitations and two pitfall traps that are slippery. But
`they could have appealed that. They didn't appeal that. So that would be the
`preclusive effect in a case where in District Court arguing about the effect of
`the Board decision.
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`JUDGE MARSCHALL: But we are not a District Court. So are
`any of your cases analogous to our situation here where you have a prior
`Board decision during ex parte prosecution and then we have an IPR
`revisiting those same findings?
`MR. TSAO: We don't think there's been a decision that's resolved
`that issue yet. You know, like the patent owner points to a brief that direct --
`or found in a case last year in 2017, and what that case -- what that brief
`says, in our view, is that there is no statutory requirement that the Board
`apply issue preclusion, but it also says on page 22 that the Board could
`implement rules or could apply issue preclusion in a given case through
`precedential opinions. If you would like to see that, we can pull that up.
`JUDGE MARSCHALL: We haven't promulgated such rules or
`precedential opinions yet, correct?
`MR. TSAO: That's correct. But if you take a look at the next
`slide, this is the point we are making. So we've talked about the MaxLinear
`situation where you have a court proceeding and a parallel administrative
`decision by the Board like the decision that was issued during examination.
`There's also an MPEP provision here that says the filing of an RCE, the
`effect of not appealing the Board decision results in the finality of the
`decision, and that that decision, the Board's prior decision would be subject
`to res judicata and law of the case.
`So what that means is that if you just had a prosecution that was
`ongoing, right, if it was still ongoing now, this MPEP rule which the Board
`has opined on -- you know, it's cited this rule in a decision that we cite. It's
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`called In re Banatwala. It's in our reply brief. But the effect of this rule is
`that during the prosecution, the applicant couldn't do what it's trying to do
`now. They couldn't go back and during prosecution keep going, no,
`Jennerich only discloses one pitfall trap because they would be bound by the
`Board decision.
`It's really an anomalous situation where during prosecution, they
`would be bound. During a litigation they would be bound by the Board
`decision, but because of this slight anomaly, the fact that the PTO hasn't
`finalized this view on the preclusive effect in the IPR context, they get a
`second bite at the apple and get to reargue an issue what Jennerich discloses
`that they litigated and lost before the Board. You see what I'm saying? It's
`an anomaly. It's kind of a hole, right. Why should they be bound in
`prosecution as to this application or any related application? Why should
`they also be bound in the District Court litigation by what position that the
`Board concluded but not bound in an IPR proceeding? It's -- we don't think
`it makes any sense. But there is an ambiguity because as Judge Marschall
`noted, we haven't seen any definitive decision or precedential rule about
`that.
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`JUDGE MARSCHALL: Presumably patent owner will argue that
`our governing statute is remedial in nature and we are here to correct errors
`during the original prosecution of the patent, which would include any ex
`parte appeals, and therefore, our statutes allow us to revisit these factual
`findings without being bound by them. What would be the response to that?
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`MR. TSAO: I think that's true. But if you look at like the brief
`that the PTO director filed, what it says is it leaves open the possibility that
`the PTO could determine that these are subject to, you know -- it is remedial.
`But at the end of the day, the issue that we are arguing should be given a
`preclusive effect is what Jennerich discloses. As we showed, you know, the
`Board had an exhaustive discussion of that issue as to the examiner. And so
`whether this panel is bound by the Board's prior determination or not, you
`know, we think it's guidance, and we think what the Board found, what the
`examiner found, what was never disputed at the end of the day is the correct
`reading of which Jennerich discloses.
`JUDGE MARSCHALL: Getting to the substance of that issue, is
`it your position that the claim requires the outer pitfall to prevent the insect
`from moving from that pitfall to the inner pitfall?
`MR. TSAO: The claim doesn't say that. Let me just pull up the
`claim. Can we pull up claim 1? Are you talking about the '973 patent?
`JUDGE MARSCHALL: Correct.
`MR. TSAO: Let's just take a look at the claim. Yeah, well, the
`claim says it's a surface roughness which is slippery to prevent bedbugs from
`climbing out. Our reading of that is that we don't think that requires or
`prevents all of them from climbing out or some of them from climbing out.
`It just has to have that function. And if we go to Jennerich, let me show
`you --
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`JUDGE MARSCHALL: By climbing out, does that refer to both
`directions out of the trap as well as out of the outer pitfall towards the inner
`pitfall?
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`MR. TSAO: Yes, I believe so.
`JUDGE TARTAL: Counsel, this implicates the motion to amend.
`I believe this is language that was at issue in whether “climbing out” refers
`to “out of the trap” or “out of the outer receptacle.” Was it petitioner's
`position that they agreed with the proposed construction by patent owner and
`said the motion to amend wasn't necessary? I'll just read from the patent
`owner's response in reference to this limitation. It says, these recitations
`should be construed to mean that the inner and outer peripheral surfaces of
`the outer receptacle are slippery to prevent bedbugs in the outer receptacle
`from climbing out of the outer receptacle.
`Does petitioner agree with that construction?
`MR. TSAO: We agree with that, but we also believe that no
`amendment is required because we think that's evident from the way the
`claim is written. I think we lay that out. I mean, it you talks about -- let me
`just find it for you. Yeah, it talks about each of them being slippery to
`prevent bedbugs from climbing out, and then it talks about this intended use,
`basically. And so, yeah, our view is that it's talking about both the inner and
`outer receptacles being slippery to prevent insects from climbing out. If you
`are in the outside receptacle, you would be climbing out of the trap or
`climbing into the inner receptacle. But we don't believe an amendment is
`necessary. We don't think there's any ambiguity in the claim language.
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`JUDGE TARTAL: I think that's consistent with petitioner's
`argument which is that the requested motion to amend is contingent on the
`construction of the claim term that would be contrary to the construction
`patent owner proposed. So in the absence of dispute between the parties, it
`seems like the motion to amend is not pertinent to our discussion.
`MR. TSAO: I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
`JUDGE TARTAL: It seems like the motion to amend isn't actually
`at issue at this point.
`MR. TSAO: We agree.
`JUDGE MARSCHALL: Is it your position that Jennerich
`discloses the limitation because at least some insects will be trapped in that
`outer receptacle?
`MR. TSAO: Yes.
`JUDGE MARSCHALL: Even though Jennerich acknowledges
`that some insects at least will glide down that outer receptacle into the inner
`receptacle, correct?
`MR. TSAO: Yes.
`JUDGE MARSCHALL: So you do acknowledge that some
`insects are not going to be trapped?
`MR. TSAO: Well, let me just show you the language of Jennerich.
`It's easier than talking about it. Here is Jennerich's disclosure in relevant
`part. I think both sides cite to this. I think the key part is the first part which
`basically talks about the effect of this paralyzing powder. If you look at it in
`Figure 1, the paralyzing powder is (h). And you see it in both the outer
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`receptacle between a’ and (b) and also the inner receptacle which is the area
`called (k). That's the paralyzing powder. And I think the key disclosure is
`that it's capable of depriving insects in question of their ability to move on
`vertical or inclined surfaces.
`And I think what the examiner found during prosecution both
`before and after the RCE and what the Board found and correctly found is
`that the effect of having paralyzing powder in the outer receptacle a’ and b,
`because it is a trough that has inclined surfaces on both sides, is that it would
`trap some insects and it would meet the claim limitation. It talks about
`rounded outer walls (a), rounded glaze portion (b) leads to a catching space
`(k). So although it goes on to talk about the fact that some could glide in, I
`think the fair reading of both of these disclosures together is that some
`insects could be trapped based on the disclosure that the paralyzing powder
`deprives the insects of their ability to move on inclined surfaces.
`And Your Honor, it's further supported by the fact that it talks
`about -- if you see the part that's not highlighted starting here, it talks about
`insects reaching the portion a’ get their legs in the powder, and even if they
`want to turn back and flee, cannot help gliding down into the catching space
`(k). What they are saying is that if our position is and I think consistent with
`what the Board previously found and the examiner previously found is if the
`paralyzing powder affects the insect such that it can't climb the incline
`surface a’ and flee, it likewise couldn't climb or in some cases couldn't climb
`the incline surface (b) given that it's similarly inclined.
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`So the whole point is that it would serve that catching purpose.
`And like I said, even on allowance, the examiner does not dispute that there
`was a pitfall trap that was slippery, the outer pitfall trap. No one at the PTO
`has ever concluded that the area between a’ and (b) is not an outer pitfall
`trap.
`
`JUDGE GOODSON: Is there any part of the Board decision, of
`the ex parte Board decision that suggest that this outer rim or outer area is
`slippery without the paralyzing powder?
`MR. TSAO: Yeah, if we can go back -- Your Honor, are you
`asking about disclosure of Jennerich itself or what the Board found?
`JUDGE GOODSON: What the Board found.
`MR. TSAO: If we can just go back to that section, the next page,
`okay, so this is the Board discussion on page 7 where they talk about
`Jennerich and they agree with the examiner's findings that there are two
`pitfall traps, and they agree that the outer trough between (a), a’ and (b)
`would catch some bedbugs. And they say, Thus, the prior art structure is
`capable of performing the intended use.
`On the next page they address specific -- the next page of the
`demonstrative, which is page 16, which is pages 9 through 11 of the Board's
`decision, they talk about these surface roughness issues. You know, there
`are specific limitations that talk about slippery surfaces having a surface
`roughness of 100 microinches or less or rough exterior surfaces that have a
`surface roughness over 300 microinches. And what the Board is saying here
`is they say that appellants failed to offer any persuasive rebuttal to the
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`findings by the examiner that the degree of surface roughness is a matter of
`design choice and that it would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill to
`make the surface roughness slippery so as to prevent bugs and insects from
`escaping from the trap and then also make the exterior surfaces rough to
`bring them into the trap. And that's what it says over here on the left-hand
`column of demonstrative page 16.
`JUDGE GOODSON: So is that an alternative rationale for
`affirming the examiner or is that -- well, yeah, let me just start there. Is that
`an alternative basis for affirming the examiner's rejection of the claim or is it
`addressing a different limitation? I'm trying to understand if that section that
`you are quoting on the left side of slide 16 is necessary to the judgment or if
`it's just an alternative basis for the affirmance.
`MR. TSAO: I think what the Board is doing here, there were
`claim limitations, there were general claims during prosecution that just
`talked about the surface being slippery without characterizing why it was
`slippery and that there were also specific claims that defined surface
`roughness amounts, like 100 microinches or 300. And what they are saying
`here even as to the more specific claim limitations that talk about
`microinches or ranges, that the notion of making interior trap surfaces
`slippery like the 100 microinches or less or making external surfaces rough,
`300 microinches or more, were obvious. It's something that somebody
`would just know how to design in view of the prior art. That's what traps
`are, you don't want bugs escaping from the traps.
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`I'm not sure if I answered your question. I don't think it's an
`alternative ground. I mean, basically during the appeal, there were mainly
`three arguments that were made. One was whether or not Jennerich
`disclosed these two pitfall traps, and the Board affirmed the examiner's
`finding that there are two pitfall traps that are slippery because of the
`powder. The second related to whether or not these microinch limitations as
`to the surface roughness were disclosed. And the third was the effect of
`statements of intended use -- that it's for bedbugs or for purposes of serving
`a discrimination function. And as to that point the Board found that the
`structure serves the purpose. It doesn't matter if there's a statement of
`intended use given that these are apparatus claims in the '973 patent.
`So this goes to one of those points, but it has direct bearing on the
`issue of surface roughness which became -- the examiner came around at the
`end after the RCE and ended up allowing the claims based on an addition of
`the phrase "where the surface roughness is slippery" in the '973 claims. But
`the examiner previously found the exact opposite -- that those limitations are
`obvious, which the Board is affirming here.
`JUDGE GOODSON: Thank you.
`MR. TSAO: I'm just going to quickly click through some of these
`slides. So the '973 patent specification, you know, talks itself about the
`importance of having rough surfaces on the outside and smooth surfaces on
`the inside. You know, it says by the mid-18th century, cheap metal
`bedsteads were known to deter bedbugs. Smooth glass containers were
`known that you could capture crawling insects. We've shown excerpts of
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`some of the prior art dating back to 1870 where they are disclosing the use
`of rough exterior surfaces and smoother, slippery internal surfaces to prevent
`insects from climbing out of the trap. Williams is an example.
`DeFranceschini from 1874 is an example on page 11. Jennings is an
`example. And again, here they use both, you know, a rough surface and a
`smooth surface, and so when the bug basically climbs out of the smooth, it
`loses its footing and falls into the trap. Dempster is another example. The
`inclined walls have smooth interfaces to prevent insects from crawling up
`the walls and escaping and the outer faces are roughened to enable, in this
`case it's cock roaches, to crawl readily up the inclined sides.
`So all these patents are really talking about surface roughness.
`You could have a glass jar or a metal bedstead or just make the trap itself
`with smooth surfaces on the inside and rough surfaces on the outside.
`Then you get to Jennerich which discloses, you know, both the use
`of slippery surfaces and roughened surfaces in and of itself, which is here,
`roughened outer walls (a) from which a smoothly inclined surface and a
`rounded glazed porti
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