UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________
`DENSO CORPORATION,
`Petitioner
`v.
`COLLISION AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`___________
`Case IPR2017-01709 (Patent 6,268,803 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01715 (Patent 6,268,803, B1)
`___________
`
`
`Before BARRY L. GROSSMAN, JASON W. MELVIN, MATTHEW R.
`CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges
`
`BARRY L. GROSSMAN, Administrative Patent Judge
`
`
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`
`__________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________
`DENSO CORPORATION,
`Petitioner
`v.
`COLLISION AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`___________
`Case IPR2017-01709 (Patent 6,268,803 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01715 (Patent 6,268,803, B1)
`___________
`
`
`Before BARRY L. GROSSMAN, JASON W. MELVIN, MATTHEW R.
`CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges
`
`BARRY L. GROSSMAN, Administrative Patent Judge
`
`
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`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2017-01709 (Patent 6,268,803 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01715 (Patent 6,268,803, B1)
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`PAUL R. STEADMAN, ESQUIRE
`
`
`HARPREET SINGH, ESQUIRE
`
`
`DLA Piper LLP
`
`
`444 West Lake Street, Suite 900
`
`
`Chicago, IL 60606
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`DECKER A. CAMMACK, ESQUIRE
`
`
`Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz PLLC
`
`
`301 Commence Street, Suite 3500
`
`
`Fort Worth, TX 76102
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing Tuesday, October 2, 2018,
`commencing at 1:00 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 600
`Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`Case IPR2017-01709 (Patent 6,268,803 B1)
`Case IPR2017-01715 (Patent 6,268,803, B1)
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
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`JUDGE GROSSMAN: We'll go on the record now. This is a
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`combined hearing in IPR2017-01709 and 01715. First thing we'll do is we'll
`have counsel make their appearances and then go over some of the ground
`rules and then we'll get started.
`So we'll let Patent Owner go first and then we'll have Petitioner and then the
`Petitioner can stay at the podium because then you'll begin your argument.
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`Will the Patent Owner make appearance first.
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`MR. CAMMACK: Decker Cammack from Whitaker, Chalk
`for the Patent Owner, Collision Avoidance Technologies.
`
`
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Thank you. For Petitioner?
`
`
`MR. STEADMAN: Good afternoon. I'm Paul Steadman from
`DLA Piper for the Petitioner. With me is Mr. Harpreet Singh, today.
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`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. Will you be doing the argument,
`Mr. Steadman?
`
`
`MR. STEADMAN: I will.
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`
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: We'll go over some of the basic ground
`rules. They were in our hearing order. Just so there's no misunderstanding.
`We're going to have a single transcript for the combined hearing. Each side
`will have 90 minutes. The reason for combining the hearings is we're -- the
`cases are related. We're talking about the same patent and so we don't have
`to go over claim construction or anything about the patent twice, whatever
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`Case IPR2017-01715 (Patent 6,268,803, B1)
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`you say with respect to one will apply to both cases unless you delineated
`specifically that you're talking about the 09 case or the 15 case. Whichever
`way you want to indicate those. You can allocate your time as you see fit
`with either case. We're not going to have 45 minutes for the first and 45
`minutes for the second. You'll have 90 minutes to present your combined
`arguments. That will also apply to any outstanding motions, and I think we
`only have one where the Petitioner has a motion to exclude some evidence.
`If you'd like to address your motion to exclude, that's included in your 90
`minutes, and if the Patent Owner can then respond to that in the Patent
`Owner's 90 minutes. Both sides will have an opportunity to reserve some
`rebuttal time using our updated trial practice guide which will ask the Patent
`Owner to ask for any surrebuttal time. And so I'll ask both sides about
`rebuttal time.
`Before we do that, I do want to just check one administrative
`matter. We have received demonstrative exhibits from the Petitioner but
`have not received any demonstrative exhibits from the Patent Owner, so I
`don't know whether those were filed, and we somehow missed them or
`whether they were not filed. So I'll ask counsel for the Patent Owner to
`respond.
`
`MR. CAMMACK: We did not file demonstrative exhibits.
`We're going to be arguing strictly from the record, so everything we put on
`the screen will be a record exhibit, Judge.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: When you say a "record exhibit," what
`do you mean by that?
`MR. CAMMACK: I mean, it's an exhibit that's part of the
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`record. It's not a demonstrative that was created for this hearing. It's
`something that has been filed by a party that is part of the record.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Have you served anything on the
`Petitioner stating what you would be using for your demonstrative or that
`you would be using demonstratives?
`MR. CAMMACK: No, Judge. I have not because they're not
`demonstratives. They're exhibits. They're exhibits that are part of the
`record.
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`JUDGE GROSSMAN: So you're going to include the entire
`document of whatever the exhibit is --
`MR. CAMMACK: I'm not going to show every page of it, but
`I'm going to call up pages within the record that are part of the record. Not
`demonstratives that are created for this proceeding, but I'm going to refer to
`pages within the exhibits themselves as you would do at any trial.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: And I think you're certainly free and
`welcome to do that as you said at any trial. I don't think you can use a slide
`to do that. You can point us to the page and line, we have it right in front of
`us on our screens, but unless a copy was served -- of what you're going to
`put on the screen was served to the Petitioner, that you can't use it here
`because the Petitioner had no opportunity to make any kind of objection.
`For example, an incomplete excerpt or incorrect page or something like that.
`MR. CAMMACK: Everything here was served though.
`Everything here was -- is part of the record and if they didn't object to record
`evidence then, you know, they have the ability to rebut. They have rebuttal
`time they can bring up the responsive time.
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`JUDGE GROSSMAN: But you don't have the opportunity to
`put something on the screen unless you provided a copy of it first to the
`Petitioner.
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`MR. CAMMACK: I'm not aware of the rule that prohibits that.
`JUDGE MELVIN: Can I just clarify something? Do you have
`a power point that's made from pages of the exhibits or you have --
`MR. CAMMACK: No.
`JUDGE MELVIN: -- you just have the exhibits themselves?
`MR. CAMMACK: Correct. I'm going to call up the exhibits
`and point you to the exhibits -- the page of the exhibit just like you can look
`at it on your record.
`JUDGE MELVIN: Right. Okay.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: So you're going to call it up from
`
`where?
`
`MR. CAMMACK: Well, I have it on my device that I -- I have
`the entire record on my device just as you have the entire record on your
`device.
`
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. And is your record the same as
`
`our record?
`
`it.
`
`MR. CAMMACK: It's what -- I hope so because I downloaded
`
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Well, that's the question. It's not
`inconceivable that you've got a document in your file that's something
`different than what was filed in our record.
`MR. CAMMACK: Everything that I have was, as of yesterday,
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`part of the ptabe2e website. There's nothing that I'm going to present that's
`not part of the record on the e2e website.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Before we get started, I'll ask the
`Petitioner, do you have any objection to them using slides or something on
`the screen as they've outlined?
`MR. STEADMAN: Your Honor, I'm not aware of a rule on
`this one way or the other. I have no objection to them using PDFs of the
`actual filed papers and exhibits. I think perhaps it could be clarified in the
`rules, but I have no objection to it today.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Yeah, but it's not a rule. It was in our
`trial order and trial order varies from case to case. And this particular trial
`order required that a copy of anything that's going to be put on the screen, a
`demonstrative, would be served on the other side 7 days in advance of the
`hearing and that a copy of whatever was going to be put on the screen also
`be filed with the Board 7 days in advance of the hearing.
`Now, one of the issues is we have Judge Clements who is
`appearing remotely from our California courtroom in Silicon Valley in San
`Jose. So if you didn't file it as our trial order instructed you to do, then
`Judge Clements doesn't have a copy of whatever you're going to put on the
`screen, some excerpt. So the only way that it can be identified either for
`Judge Clements or for our transcript is for you just to tell us the exhibit
`number and page and we all have it on our screens. We'll call it up on our
`screen. We don't need to see a copy on this big screen in the courtroom. I
`don't know -- is there some problem with us looking at the same record that
`you've got on your computer on our computers?
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`MR. CAMMACK: No. I'm not sure where this came into an
`attack on me to --
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: No, it's just a compliance with our trial
`order. The trial order required that it be served and filed.
`MR. CAMMACK: Well, for the record, the trial order required
`demonstrative exhibits which by definition are exhibits that are created for
`the trial or for the hearing to be served in advance. I am not using anything
`that was created for the hearing. I am using exhibits that are on the -- that
`are already of record. If I want to point you to something, you're telling me
`that I can't put it on the screen. I would object to that and say that is
`improper and let the federal circuit sort it out. But what I'm saying is it's
`everything that -- I haven't created anything that's not already in your
`possession or in the possession of the record.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: I'm going to see what we said in our
`
`trial order.
`
`MR. CAMMACK: I can put it up on the screen.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: I have a copy in front of me.
`"The parties that note that at least one member of the Panel will
`be attending electronically from a remote location. If a demonstrative is not
`filed or otherwise made fully available or visible to the judge presiding over
`the hearing remotely, that demonstrative will not be considered," is what we
`said in our hearing order.
`MR. CAMMACK: Correct. I'm looking at it right now and
`what I'm saying is I'm not using demonstratives. I want to put the exhibits
`themselves on the screen. They're not demonstratives, they are exhibits.
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`JUDGE GROSSMAN: I don't think we have defined
`demonstrative in any way and I consider a demonstrative to be anything that
`is put on the screen in the courtroom as to demonstrate what it is. We have
`electronic copies on our computers. Judge Clements has an electronic copy.
`You tell us what page you're putting up, you would have put on the screen,
`we will call up that page and we can look at it.
`MR. CAMMACK: But you're not going to allow me to put it
`on the screen as you would in a trial court -- to put something on the screen
`that was an admitted exhibit.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: All you have to do is refer it to us. We
`have all those admitted exhibits. Every exhibit is in our record, we have it in
`front of us, and I don't -- tell me if you think there's some prejudice to you
`by not being able to put it on the big screen rather than having it on the small
`screen.
`
`MR. CAMMACK: Take a little more time, Judge, but it's all
`there so I think that the lack of any -- everyone says demonstrative as though
`everyone knows what it means and that clearly that's not the case as we're
`having this discussion now.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: And so you interpreted demonstrative
`to be something specially prepared?
`MR. CAMMACK: Correct. And something that's not admitted
`or of record in the proceeding. I am only going -- I endeavored only to
`present what was of record in the proceeding.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: And the prejudice to you from having it
`on our small screens rather than on the big screen --
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`MR. CAMMACK: I like to highlight certain things and call
`them out so that I can show exactly what I'm talking about.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: But Judge Clements won't be able to
`see that because he doesn't see the big screen in the courtroom. He sees it on
`his little screen.
`MR. CAMMACK: Then I guess the Board needs to redefine
`what a demonstrative is because a demonstrative is something that's
`prepared especially, and I'm talking about arguing on the fly. Pulling out
`exhibits and showing things specifically and if that's the case -- I mean,
`obviously you're in charge, you're going to tell me what I can and can't do.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: But you just told me that you're going
`to highlight and point to things on the screen and that's something that's not
`in our record. Any of your highlighting is not in our record, so I don't
`understand why that's not a demonstrative.
`MR. CAMMACK: I mean, we were in this hearing for the
`prior -- you know, I did the same thing that weren't in the record for
`demonstratives last time. Even when I served demonstratives, I called out
`and highlighted things and that apparently, Judge Clements, who was also
`part of that prior hearing, couldn't see and there was no objection or problem
`with doing that. And so I assumed with that being the case, that if they're
`going to go through their slides that they submitted, that they're not going to
`be allowed to call anything out, or laser point anything, or blow anything up,
`or those sorts of things.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: They can use their demonstrative
`because they were filed and served in accordance with the order and Judge
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`Clements has a copy of those, so he can look at it.
`MR. CAMMACK: But they can't do anything to those is my
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`point.
`
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: That's correct.
`JUDGE CLEMENTS: If I may interject. To the extent that the
`dispute is driven out of concern for prejudice to me, I have a copy of all the
`papers and exhibits, and I don't anticipate having any trouble following
`along as long as Mr. Cammack identifies where he's reading from when
`there's something up on the screen. So I have no objection to the use of the
`papers and exhibits from end to end.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. We'll let you use the slides, but
`there can be no highlighting on the slide unless you want to say, "Line 17,
`I'm going to highlight the words," whatever words you choose to highlight.
`MR. CAMMACK: And again, there's no slides, judge. That's
`not what I'm saying. There's no slides. I would call out the actual exhibit on
`the screen. The actual exhibit that is of record.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Well, the only actual exhibit of record
`is one that we have in our file. And I'm not certain that the one in your
`computer is identical to the one in our computer.
`MR. CAMMACK: Okay.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: No one's had an opportunity to do that,
`but we'll let you do that. And I now understand your position is that unless
`you have the permission to highlight, you think you will be prejudiced?
`MR. CAMMACK: Unless I have the ability to use the exhibits
`that are of record in a way that's appropriate for a proceeding that is
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`consistent with trial practice under the federal rules, which is everything
`that's not governed by PTAB practice is under the federal rules. So if I can't
`do it in the federal rules then I won't try to do it here. I mean, I -- that's my
`understanding. I'm not acquiescing to your characterization of it.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. We'll let you proceed.
`MR. CAMMACK: Okay. Thank you.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. And Petitioner, you may take
`the podium and you'll have 90 minutes. If you would like to reserve some
`rebuttal time, let me know.
`MR. STEADMAN: I will reserve 30 minutes. I actually don't
`anticipate using all 90 minutes of argument time. I'm cognizant of the
`Panel's time and the fact that at least Judge Clements and Judge Grossman
`have already heard substantial arguments on this patent already. So my
`intent is to focus on the disputes that have actually arisen from the briefing
`between these two parties quite narrowly and try to focus on those disputes
`and as they apply to these two proceedings.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. So we will reserve 30 minutes.
`I will try to remind you -- I will remind you when you're close, but you can
`watch the clock yourself only because the yellow light in this courtroom on
`this particular timer is not working.
`MR. STEADMAN: I see. Is there an official clock or should I
`time it myself?
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Sort of. This has the official clock
`which I set for 90 minutes and when it gets down to 30 I will give you notice
`that you're in your rebuttal time, if you go that far.
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`MR. STEADMAN: Thank you.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: So you may begin whenever you're
`
`ready.
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`MR. STEADMAN: Okay. As I said, we are cognizant that
`arguments were held on this patent on August 7th. We have reviewed that
`record thoroughly and we don't wish to waste the Panel's time or anybody
`else's time by repeating arguments that have already been made in those
`proceedings. So we are happy to answer any questions, but to the extent
`possible as I said I'm going to focus on the things that we feel are still in
`dispute.
`
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. And just for your understanding
`that to the extent that there have been related proceedings on this same
`patent with some different records, different parties, different judges. You
`may not want to assume that those records are automatically transferred over
`to this transcript. So to the extent that there's something that you need us to
`focus on, you ought to make sure that you include it in this transcript.
`MR. STEADMAN: Yes, sir. Okay. I would like to begin by
`talking about the instituted grounds for patent ability, and I'm on Slide 2. As
`the Panel knows, a number of the grounds were denied and then instituted
`after the Supreme Court decision in SAS Institute v. Iancu. There is an
`institution now on almost every claim in the patent. Interestingly, and I'm
`on Slide 3, many of those grounds, perhaps most of them, are uncontested.
`Grounds 1 through 9 and 17 through 20 do not appear anywhere in Patent
`Owner's briefing and, in fact, they don't appear anywhere in Patent Owner's
`evidence either. We contend that, and at his deposition as I'll show, the
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`Patent Owner's expert did not consider and offered no evidence on any of
`Claims 1 through 9 or 17 through 20.
`So the only record evidence on those claims is the evidence
`proffered by our expert, which I believe in every case has been found in the
`preliminary opinion of the Panel to constitute grounds showing the
`likelihood of invalidity. And we would say that their failure to raise any
`arguments in their briefing constitutes a waiver and so, therefore, decision
`for us on all of Claims 1 through 9 and 17 through 20 should follow without
`any further argument.
`JUDGE MELVIN: I have a question on that. In their response,
`Patent Owner's first argument includes Claims 1 through 3, 5, 6, and 9, and
`the argument that those claims are not anticipated by Kikuta.
`MR. STEADMAN: Uh-huh.
`JUDGE MELVIN: So --
`MR. STEADMAN: But if you look at -- they have to support
`that somehow.
`JUDGE MELVIN: You saying with expert testimony?
`MR. STEADMAN: Correct. With some kind of evidence.
`JUDGE MELVN: Well, are not the references themselves
`
`evidence?
`
`MR. STEADMAN: The references themselves are evidence,
`but typically something more is required in order to show a case. If the
`Panel decides that it is sufficient simply to point to the reference and make
`an argument, then I agree with you that is sufficient. But their expert did not
`even consider them and was not even asked to consider them.
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`JUDGE MELVIN: But the burden here is on you.
`MR. STEADMAN: Correct. And as I pointed out, our expert
`actually did offer evidence on all of those claims.
`JUDGE MELVIN: But that doesn't mean you automatically
`carry your burden.
`MR. STEADMAN: It doesn't mean automatically, but as the
`Panel's already found, there was a sufficient amount of evidence in order to
`institute on those claims.
`JUDGE MELVIN: Right. And that's a different standard from
`the standard for unpatentability; is it not?
`MR. STEADMAN: The Panel has to find, and at least up until
`now, the Panel found on a claim-by-claim basis whether there was likely
`evidence of unpatentability on a claim-by-claim basis. On all of those
`claims, the Panel's already found sufficient evidence to show
`unpatentability. The only --
`JUDGE MELVIN: That's the standard that there's sufficient
`evidence or that there's enough --
`MR. STEADMAN: A likelihood.
`JUDGE MELVIN: -- evidence that there's a likelihood?
`MR. STEADMAN: Correct.
`JUDGE MELVIN: So my question was, isn't that a different
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`standard?
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`MR. STEADMAN: It is a different standard, but in this case
`there's no -- what I'm saying is there's no rebuttal evidence.
`JUDGE MELVIN: Okay. And I'm trying to clarify that, in
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`fact, there need not be any rebuttal evidence. You need to still show that
`you've carried your burden and so I think that maybe you should address the
`merits of your arguments instead of the lack of an expert rebuttal.
`MR. STEADMAN: Fair enough. If that's not persuasive to
`you, then we'll skip it. We did ask the expert whether he considered those
`claims and he said no. And I'll leave it at that.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Just to clarify -- before we move off --
`too far off that point, if your argument and your expert says -- Kikuta says
`the element is black and cites a passage out of Kikuta, and we go to that
`passage and it says it can be black or any other color such as white, green,
`red, or blue, we don't need an expert to tell us that. We can read it in what
`Kikuta says. So if we read that Kikuta evidence differently than your expert
`has testified about the Kikuta reference, isn't that the same as saying that
`your evidence now of Kikuta may not be -- there may not be a
`preponderance because of the probative value we would give to the experts
`testimony as we now have a more fully developed record and an opportunity
`to hear the Patent Owner response.
`MR. STEADMAN: I think that one can imagine a case like
`that. I think in this particular case, the record is no more fully developed
`than it was at the time of the Institution Decision precisely because no
`additional evidence was offered.
` JUDGE GROSSMAN: Okay. Thank you.
`MR. STEADMAN: In addition, the Patent Owner offered no
`evidence on any of the Institution Decisions that rely on obviousness.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: And if you could just identify your
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`slide number so Judge Clements can --
`MR. STEADMAN: Sure. I am now on Slide 6. And we'll
`come back to this, but the Patent Owner's expert considered the references
`only individually and criticized them individually. At no point in his
`declaration did he actually consider any aspect of an obviousness
`combination. And at his deposition, we asked him that. "Is there any place
`in your declaration where you analyze a combination of these references?"
`And he says, "No."
`This particular quote is about Kikuta and Nakajima, but it was
`the case actually that he said the same thing about every combination of
`references. And we have several slides on that as shown in Slides 7 and 8.
`And so perhaps you'll find this as unpersuasive as you did my prior
`argument, but our position would be that having failed to consider
`obviousness and any contrary evidence on obviousness, that actually covers
`all the rest of the claims.
`So if you look at Claims 1 through 9 and 17 through 20 as
`having no evidence and you look at obviousness grounds, there's at least one
`obviousness ground that is a combination that was not considered by the
`Patent Owner's expert. And that actually takes care of all of the claims that
`are in evidence here. So that criticism -- my point is, the criticism that
`they've raised no record evidence applies to at least one ground on every
`claim that's been instituted.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: And that would apply to the 103
`grounds which --
`MR. STEADMAN: It would --
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`JUDGE GROSSMAN: -- there are some 102 grounds.
`MR. STEADMAN: Correct. But as to the 102 grounds, that's
`what I was saying, they didn't -- they're asked to -- if you look the totality of
`all the claims, every claim either they didn't ask their expert to consider that
`claim at all or before that claim there is an obviousness ground for which
`they did not ask their expert to consider it.
`JUDGE GROSSMAN: Right. So I understand the point is that
`if following your logic on your obviousness point that there's no testimony
`from anyone other than your expert who has concluded that it would have
`been obvious, there's no contrary testimony that it would not have been
`obvious, and so every claim is covered by 103. So even if we don't get to
`the 102s, the 103s take care of all the claims that are being challenged as I
`understand your point.
`MR. STEADMAN: You stated it better than I did. Yes, sir.
`All right. So then I'd like to talk briefly about claim construction and
`bearing in mind that the Panel has instructed that we should not assume that
`the prior two -- prior three IPRs are in record here, I'll spend a little bit of
`time that I wasn't planning to spend here. We agree there was some back
`and forth in the briefing, but we agree at this point and concede at this point
`that the Phillips standard applies not the broadest reasonable interpretation.
`We do not see any claim -- any difference in the interpretation of the claims,
`and we actually accept and adopt all of the Board's claim constructions that
`had offered in its preliminary Institution Decision.
`I'm going to skip from Slide 11 to Slide 13. At issue, at the end
`of the briefing are really two terms: control module and fuses data. We
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`agree with the Board's construction of control module and accept that
`construction, and believe that we have shown invalidity of every claim under
`that construction. The Institution Decision carefully considered the
`argument the Patent Owner is offering here and has already rejected it. That
`is that control module must be limited to, quote, "a customized PC,"
`unquote. And the Board's already considered that. We actually adopted
`your exact reasoning and we agree with it. So that, we feel, is the correct
`construction of control module.
`Going back one slide, the Patent Owner's construction of
`control module is incorrect and wrong. When we deposed their expert, he
`told us not only that the construction of control module had to be a
`customized PC, but that in order to show in the prior art that a customized
`PC existed, that had 7 or 8 lines of additional gloss that had to go with it. So
`in their experts view, in order to show a control module which had to be a
`customized PC, you had to have a large amount of memory, both ram and
`rom, as compared to a microprocessor or microcontroller, a wider address
`and data bus compared to the microprocessor or microcontroller, a faster
`clock speed than a microprocessor or microcontroller, a 12-volt transient
`filtered power supply. It should be vibration hardened, it would have an
`extended temperature range, it would have a solid-state hard drive, and
`would be miniaturized and heat synced. So they are trying to read all of that
`in through the two words, "customized PC." And then, if you look carefully
`at his argument he then finds that the prior art doesn't meet customized PC
`because it doesn't have all of those things. We contend that customized PC
`is but one embodiment in the specification as the Institution Decision found
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`but furthermore, that they're trying to read in not only big pieces of the
`specification but things outside the specification into control module in order
`to avoid the Institution Decision. And that has to be incorrect.
`It is -- I'm now on Slide 15 -- it is important, indeed critical,
`that the Patent Owners expert did not consider any of the prior art under the
`claim construction in the preliminary opinion. He used only his own
`construction, the one that had been rejected in the Institution Decision. So if
`the Panel finds that the construction is anything other than customized PC,
`the Patent Owner has offered no evidence as to any -- as to analyzing any
`prior art under any other construction.
`I'm going to skip ahead by a slide again so I'm now on Slide 17.
`As to the construction of fuses data, once again, we agree with the Panel.
`The Panel carefully considered this term in its Institution Decision and
`preliminarily interpreted fuses data as combines data from multiple sensors
`to determine a location of an object. That is supported by the specification
`and we agree with it and that is the construction that we apply here. Going
`back one slide to 16, again, the Patent Owner is using a construction that is
`flawed. When asked at his deposition, the Patent Owner's expert, we asked,
`"What does the term 'fuses data' mean," he said, "An object seen by the
`system from one or more sensors and the information about that object is
`retained in memory. As the next cycle commences, the information about
`that object is updated and compared to the previous one. This is necessary
`to differentiate between false objects such as rain or snow or a highway
`sign." Again, a very, very specific construction attempting either to import
`the specification into the claim or even information beyond the specification
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