UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`Washington, D.C.
`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN ROBOTIC VACUUM
`CLEANING DEVICES AND
`COMPONENTS THEREOF SUCH AS
`SPARE PARTS
`
`Inv. N0. 337-TA-1057
`
`/I
`
`ORDER N0. '27:
`
`CONSTRUING TERMS OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS
`
`(November 9, 2017)
`
`The claim tcnns construed in this Order are done so for the purposes of this Investigation.
`
`Hereafter, discovery and briefing in this Investigation shall be governed by the construction of the
`
`claim terms in this Order. Thosc terms not in dispute need not be construed. See Vanderlande
`
`Indus. Nederland BV v. Int’! Trade Comm ’n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the
`
`administrative law judge need only construe disputed claim terms).
`
`1
`
`IROBOT 2003
`Shenzhen Zhiyi Technology v. iRobot
`IPR2017-02061
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... .. 1
`
`RELEVANT LAW .............................................................................................................. ..2
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL ........................................................................................ ..8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Complainantfs Contentions ...................................................................................... ..8
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ....................................................................................... ..8
`
`Analysis.................................................................................................................... ..9
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS ........................................................... ..9
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ..............................
`
`...................... ..11
`
`A.
`
`“A SENSOR SUBSYSTEM FOR AN AUTONOMOUS ROBOT WHICH RIDES
`ON A SURFACE” / “A SENSOR SUBSYSTEM FOR AN AUTONOMOUS
`ROBOT” ................................................................................................................ .. ll
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Con1plaina.nt’sContentions ........................................................................
`
`.. 12
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ......................................................................... .. 14
`
`Analysis ......................................................................................................
`
`.. 15
`
`B.
`
`“HOUSING” ..........................................................................................................
`
`.. 18
`
`1.
`
`Complainant’s Contentions ........................................................................ .. 19
`
`I 2.
`
`' 3.
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ......................................................................... ..20
`
`Analysis ......................................................................................................
`
`..21
`
`C.
`
`“CONTROL SYSTEM CONFIGURED TO OPERATE THE ROBOT IN A
`PLURALITY OF OPERATIONAL MODES AND TO SELECT FROM AMONG
`THE PLURALITY OF MODES IN REAL TIME IN RESPONSE TO SIGNALS
`GENERATED BY THE OBSTACLE DETECTION SENSOR” ......................... ..22
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Complainant’s Contentions ...............
`
`................................................... ..23
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ......................................................................... ..25
`
`Analysis ...................................................................................................... ..28
`
`D.
`
`“SPEED SETTING” .............................................................................................. ..32
`
`1.
`
`Complainanfs Contentions........................................................................ ..33
`
`2
`
`

`

`2.
`
`3.
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ......................................................................... ..35
`
`Analysis...................................................................................................... ..37
`
`E.
`
`“HEADING SETTING” ........................................................................................ ..38
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Comp1ainant’s Contentions ........................................................................ ..39
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ......................................................................... ..39
`
`Analysis...................................................................................................... ..4()
`
`F.
`
`“WHILE CONTINUING TOWARDS THE OBJECT” ........................................ ..41
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Complainant’s Contentions ........................................................................ ..41
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ......................................................................... ..42
`
`Analysis...................................................................................................... ..44
`
`G.
`
`“INSTRUCTIONS CONFIGURED TO CAUSE A PROCESSOR” .................... ..45
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Complainant’ s-Contentions ........................................................................
`
`..47
`
`Respondents’ Contentions ......................................................................... ..50
`
`Analysis ...................................................................................................... ..51
`
`CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ............................................................................................... ..55
`
`ii
`
`3
`
`

`

`CIMB
`
`CRMB
`
`CBPB
`
`RIMB
`
`RRMB
`
`RBPB
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`C0mpla_inant’sInitial Markman Brief
`
`C0mplainant’s Reply Markrnan Brief
`
`C0mplainant’s Bullet Point Brief
`
`Respondents’ Initial Markrnan Brief
`
`Respondents’ Reply Markman Brief
`
`Respondents’ Bullet Point Brief
`
`Hr’ g Tr.
`
`Transcript of the Markman Hearing
`
`iii
`
`4
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`By publication of a notice in the Federal Register on May 23, 2017, the U.S. International
`
`Trade Commission ordered that:
`
`Pursuant to subsection (b) of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
`as amended, an investigation be instituted to determine whether
`there is a violation of subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 337 in the
`importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the
`sale within the United States after importation of certain document
`cameras and software for use therewith by reason of infringement of
`one or more of claims 1-3, 7, 12, and 42 of the ’490 patent; claims
`1-3, 7, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20, 28, and 34 ofthe ’308 patent; claims 1-3,
`- 7, 8,-10, ll, 14, 15, and 17-19 ofthe ’090 patent; claims 1, 2, 4, 8,
`11, 12, 21, 22, and 25 ofthe ’553 patent; claims 1, 10, ll, and 14­
`16 of the ’233 patent; and claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, and 13 of the ’924
`patent, and whether an industry in the United States exists as
`required by subsection (a)(2) of section 337;
`
`82 FR 23593 (May 23, 2017). The Complainant in this Investigation is iRobot Corporation
`
`(“iRobot”). The named respondents are Hoover Inc., Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co., d/b/a
`
`TTI Floor Care North America Inc., The Black & Decker Corporation, Black & Decker (U.S.)
`
`Inc., Shenzhen Silver Star Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd., BISSELL Homecare, Inc., Matsutek
`
`Enterprises Co., Ltd., Bobsweep, Inc., Bobsweep USA, Shenzhen Zhiyi Technology Co., Ltd.,
`
`Suzhou Real Power Electric Appliance Co., Ltd. (“Respondents”). The Oftice of Unfair Import
`
`Investigations has not and will not participate as a party in this Investigation.
`
`_
`
`On July 13, 2017, I issued the procedural schedule for this investigation.
`
`(See Order No.
`
`11.) In accordance with that schedule, the parties exchanged: (i) on July 28, 2017, their lists of
`
`proposed terms for construction, as required by G.R. 8.1; and (ii) on August 8, 2017, their
`
`preliminary constructions for those terms, as required by G.R. 8.2. The parties filed their Joint
`
`Claim Construction Chart on August 18, 2017. Thereafter, on September 1, 2017, the parties filed
`
`their initial claim construction briefs, and, on September 15, 2017, the rebuttal claim construction
`
`briefs.
`
`_
`
`1
`
`5
`
`

`

`On September 25, 2017, in accordance with the procedural schedule, I held a technology
`
`tutorial and Markman hearing. Prior to the hearing, the parties informed me that they had reached
`
`agreement on three of the ten disputed terms and would not be addressing them at the hearing;
`
`specifically the terms “pass between the cliff detector and the floor surface,” “bounce mode
`
`whereby the robot travels substantially in a direction away from an obstacle after encounteringthe
`
`obstacle,” and “isolated area.” At the conclusion of the hearing, I directed the parties to file bullet­
`
`point style briefs on each of the terms which remained at issue. (Hr’g Tr. at 172:9—173:5.)The
`
`parties filed bullet~point briefs on October 2, 2017. Upon my request, the parties filed an Updated
`
`Joint Claim Construction Chart on October 27, 2017 to reflect for the Record which terms
`
`remained in dispute and agreed constructions for terms previously in dispute.
`
`II.
`
`RELEVANT LAW
`
`“An infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is determining the meaning and
`
`scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. The second step is comparing the properly
`
`construed claims to the device accused of infringing.” Markman v. WeslviewInstruments, Inc, 52
`
`F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane) (internal citations omitted), afi"d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
`
`,
`
`Claim construction is a “matter of law exclusively for the court.” Id. at 970-71. “The construction
`
`of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language in order to understand
`
`and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.” Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp, 216
`
`F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`-
`
`.
`
`Claim construction focuses on the intrinsic evidence, which consists of the claims
`
`themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH Corp, 415 F.3d
`
`1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. As the Federal Circuit
`
`in Phillips explained, courts must analyze each of these components to determine the “ordinary
`
`and customary meaning of a claim term” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in art at the
`
`2
`
`6
`
`

`

`time of the invention. 415 F.3d at 1313. “Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of
`
`the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Bell Ail. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad
`
`C0mmc’ns Grp., ]nc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`i
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
`
`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d llll,
`
`1115 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004)). “Quite apart from the written description and the prosecution history, the claims
`
`themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claims terms.”
`
`Id. at 1314; see also Interactive Gzfi Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc, 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2001) (“In construing claims, the analytical focus must begin and remain centered on the
`
`language of the claims themselves, for it is that language that the patentee chose to use to
`
`‘particularly point [ ] out and distinctly claim [ ] the subject matter which the patentee regards as
`
`his invention”). The context in which a term is used in an asserted claim can be “highly
`
`instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Additionally, other claims in the same patent, asserted or
`
`unasserted, may also provide guidance as to the meaning of a claim term. Id. “Courts do not
`
`rewrite claims; instead, we give effect to the terms chosen by the patentee.” K-2 Corp. v. Salomon
`
`S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`_
`
`The specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually it
`
`is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (quoting
`
`Vilronics Corp. v. Conceplronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “[T]he specification
`
`may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning
`
`it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the_inventor’s lexicography governs.” Id. at 13.16. “In
`
`other cases, the specification may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by
`
`the inventor.” Id. As a general rule, however, the particular examples or embodiments discussed
`
`3
`
`7
`
`

`

`in the specification are not to be read into the claims as limitations. Id. at 1323. In the end, “[t]he
`
`construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s
`
`description of the invention will be
`
`the correct construction.” Id. at 1316 (quoting Renishaw
`
`PLC v. Marposs S0cieta'per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
`
`In addition to the claims and the specification, the prosecution history should be examined,
`
`if in evidence. Id. at 1317; see also Liebel-Flarsheim C0. v. Medrad, Inc, 358 F.3d 898, 913
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2004). The prosecution history can “often inform the meaning of the claim language by
`
`demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
`
`invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise
`
`be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; see also Chimie v. PPG Indus. 1nc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a claim is to exclude
`
`any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution”).
`
`When the intrinsic evidence does not establish the meaning of a claim, then extrinsic
`
`evidence (i.e., all evidence extemal to the patent and the prosecution history, including
`
`dictionaries, inventor testimony, expert testimony, and learned treatises) may be considered.
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Extrinsic evidence is generally viewed as less reliable than the patent
`
`itself and its prosecution history in determining how to define claim terms. Id. “The court may
`
`receive extrinsic evidence to educate itself about the invention and the relevant technology, but the
`
`court may not use extrinsic evidence to arrive at a claim construction that is clearly at odds with
`
`the construction mandated by the intrinsic evidence.” Elkay Mfg. C0. v. Ebco Mfg. C0., 192 F.3d
`
`973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`The construction of a claim term is generally guided by its ordinary meaning. However,
`
`courts may deviate from the ordinary meaning when: (1) “the intrinsic evidence shows that the
`
`patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly
`
`.
`
`4
`
`_
`
`­
`8
`
`

`

`disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention;” or
`
`(2) “the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed
`
`claim term in either the specification or prosecution history.” Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook
`
`Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also GE Lighting Sols, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750
`
`F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“the specification and prosecution history only compel
`
`departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal”); Omega
`
`Engineering, Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]here the patentee
`
`has unequivocally disavowcd a certain meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of prosecution
`
`disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the
`
`surrender.”); Rheox, Inc. v. Entact, Inc., 276 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The prosecution
`
`history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was
`
`disclaimed during prosecution”). Nevertheless, there is a “heavy presumption that a claim term
`
`carries its ordinary and customary meaning.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d
`
`1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The standard for deviating from the plain and
`
`ordinary meaning is “exacting” and requires “a clear and unmistakable disclaimer.” Thorner v.
`
`Sony Computer Entm ’tAm. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Epistar Corp.
`
`v. Int ’l Trade Comm ’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (requiring “expressions of manifest
`
`exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope” to deviate from the
`
`ordinary meaning) (citation omitted).
`
`.
`
`Courts are not required to construe every claim limitation of an asserted patent. See O2
`
`Micro Intern. Ltd v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
`
`(citations omitted). Rather, “claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
`
`teclmieal scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims,
`
`for use in the determination ofinfringementf’
`
`Id. at 1362 (quoting US Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon,
`
`5
`
`9
`
`

`

`1nc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1347 (“The construction
`
`of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language in order to understand
`
`and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims”) (citation omitted). In addition, “[a]
`
`determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’
`
`may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a
`
`term's ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361.
`
`Claim construction, however, is not an “obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical C0rp.,
`
`103 F.3d at 1568. “[M]erely rephrasing or paraphrasing the plain language of a claim by
`
`substituting synonyms does not represent genuine claim construction.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. US.
`
`Surgical Corp, 388 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`I
`
`-
`
`Regarding claim preambles, the Federal Circuit has held that “a claim preamble has the
`
`import that the claim as a whole suggests for it. In other words, when the claim drafter chooses to
`
`use both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the
`
`invention so defined, and not some other, is the one the patent protects.” Bell Comrnc’ns
`
`Research, Inc. v. Vitalink C0mmc’ns Corp, 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Put another way,
`
`“the preamble may be construed as limiting “if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is
`
`‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.” Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.,
`
`618 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Catalina Mlag. Infl, Inc. v. C00lsavings.c0m, Ina,
`
`289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Pilney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard C0., 182 F.3d 1298,
`
`1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Federal Circuit held “the preamble has no separate limiting effect if,
`
`for example, ‘the preamble merely gives a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of
`
`the claim that completely set forth the invention.”’
`
`Ia’.at 1359 (citing [MS Tech, Inc. v. Haas
`
`Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
`
`6
`
`10
`
`

`

`The determination as to whether a claim limitation invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112 116 is a two­
`
`step process. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2014). First, I
`
`must detemiine if the claim limitation is drafted in the means-plus-function format. Id. In
`
`particular the use of the term “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 116 is invoked.
`
`Id. If “means” is not used, the converse rebuttable presmnption arises, but that presumption can
`
`be overcome if “the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function
`
`without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
`
`“The standard is Whetherthe words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the
`
`art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Williamson v. Citrix Online,
`
`LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`If it is determined that § 112 116 applies, then the “corresponding structure, material, or
`
`acts described in the specification” must be identified and the claim term will be given a scope
`
`commensurate to the structures, materials, or acts so described. See Id (internal citation omitted);
`
`Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Ina, 574 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009). If I am unable to
`
`identify any “corresponding structure, material, or acts” in the specification, then the claim term is
`
`indefinite.
`
`Id; see also Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “For
`
`means-plus-function limitations where the disclosed structure is a computer programmed to
`
`implement an algorithm, the patent must disclose enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary
`
`structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112116.” In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
`
`(internal citation omitted). The algorithm may he presented in any “Luiderstandablemanner,
`
`including as a flowchart, so long as sufficient structure is disclosed.” Id.
`
`7
`
`11
`
`

`

`III.
`
`LEVEL OFQRDINARY SKILL
`
`A.
`
`Complainant’s Contentions
`
`E,iRobot does not offer a description for the person having ordinary skill in the art. (See
`
`generally CIMB; CRMB.) Rather, iRobot explains:
`
`Respondents’ expert Dr. Martens sets forth in his claim construction
`declaration his opinion as to a person having ordinary skill in the art
`for all of the asserted patents as one “hold[ing] a bachelor’s degree
`in physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, computer
`science, or a related discipline, and [having] at least one year of
`experience in the design and implementation of
`robotics and
`embedded systems, or some other equivalent combination of
`education and experience.” [Respondents’ Ex. B, Decl. of Martens
`at 1128.] Complainant neither refutes nor adopts this statement at this
`time and reserves its right to have its experts opine on the level of
`ordinary skill in the art during expert disclosures.
`
`(CRMB at 16, n.7.) At the hearing held on September 25, 2017, iRobot communicated that it does
`
`in fact agree with Respondents’ proposed level of skill. (Hr’g Tr. at 39: 1-6.)
`
`B.
`
`Respondents’ Contentions
`
`Respondents offer the same level of skill for each of the Asserted Patents in this
`
`investigation. Respondents propose:
`
`The [asserted patent] relates to the field of robotics, which is a
`multidisciplinary field that encompasses mechanical, electrical, and
`computer technology. A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
`of the alleged invention of the ’308 patent would hold a bachelor’s
`degree in physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering,
`computer science, or a related discipline, and have at least one year
`of experience in the design and implementation of robotics and
`embedded systems, or some other equivalent combination of
`education and experience. See Exh. B, Martens Decl. at 1128.
`
`(See RIMB at 7, 10, 15, 19, 42, 51.) Respondents’ expert explains:
`
`In my experience, the field of robotics is a multidisciplinary field
`and often encompasses mechanical,
`electrical, and computer
`technology. . . . That my definition of a PHOSITA is identical across
`the Asserted Patents stems from the fact that those patents pertain to
`the same multidisciplinary field of robotics.
`I have accounted for
`
`8
`
`­
`­
`12
`
`

`

`the various time frames of each of the Asserted Patents in forming
`this opinion . . . .
`
`(RIMB, EX. B at 1i23.)
`
`C.
`
`Analysis
`
`With Respondents’ proposed level of skill going unopposed by iRobot, I am inclined to
`
`accept it. I pause, however, due to the variety of disciplines mentioned by Respondents’ expert
`
`and the diverse focuses of the asserted patents, which range from low-level mechanical structure
`
`(see ’090 patent) to high—leveloperating mode routines (see ’49Opatent) to inter-device
`
`communication techniques (see ’924 patent). It seems unlikely to me that a person of Ordinary
`
`skill (i.e., not entry-level skill) for all asserted patents would have just a bache1or‘s degree and
`
`one year of experience. I also do not find Respondents’ expert to be particularly persuasive as his
`
`explanation towards the proffered level of skill is mostly conclusory.
`
`(See RIMB, Ex. B at 1]28.)
`
`Overall, I find an increased amoimt of skill and/or education is warranted. Thus, I find a person
`
`having an ordinary level of skill would hold a bachelor’s degree in physics, electrical engineering,
`
`mechanical engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, and have at least three years of _
`
`experience in the design and implementation of robotics and embedded systems, or some other
`
`equivalent combination of education and experience.
`
`IV.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS
`
`As contained in the parties’ original joint claim construction chart and updated joint claim
`
`construction chart, the following terms are to be construed as follows:
`
`Patent
`I
`
`i
`
`Term
`
`collimator
`(claims 1], 12, 20)
`
`’308 patent
`
`Agreed Construction
`structure through which light passes to
`botmd the optical field of an emitter or
`a detector
`
`defined field of view /
`i defined field of emission
`
`region within which light can be
`detected / region within which light
`
`9
`
`13
`
`

`

`can be emitted
`
`the frame of the floor cleaning robot to
`which components are attached or
`integrated
`passes tmder a portion of a drive
`wheel not in contact with the floor
`surface being cleaned
`
`the bundles of bristles pass through
`the area the light beam occupies when
`it is on,
`during a rotation of the side brush
`around the axis, the bundles of bristles
`being
`separated by a gap, the gap being
`configured to prevent occlusion of the
`cliff detector
`beam
`
`4
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`(claims 1, 2, 3)
`
`chassis
`(claim 1, 10, 17)
`
`090 Patent
`
`’233 Patent
`
`passes between a portion of
`a drive wheel of the robot
`and the cleaning surface
`(claim 14)
`
`the side brush having
`bundles of bristles
`and being positioned such
`that the btmdles
`of bristles pass between the
`cliff detector
`and the floor surface during
`a rotation of
`the side brush around the
`axis, the bundles
`of bristles being separated
`by a gap, the gap
`being configured to prevent
`occlusion of the
`cliff detector beam during
`at least part of the
`rotation of the side brush
`around the axis
`(Claims 1, 15)
`a bounce mode wherebythe
`robot travels
`substantially in a direction
`away from an
`obstacle after encountering
`the obstacle
`(Claims 1, 42)
`
`490 Patent
`
`means for manually
`selecting an operational
`mode
`(claim 12)
`
`'
`V
`
`Function: manually selecting an
`operational mode
`
`Structure: an input element [such as] a
`selector switch, push button, or remote
`control [by which] the user can select
`the particular operational mode (8:43­
`45; 17:5-l0)
`
`means for moving the robot Function: moving the robot over a
`l0
`
`14
`
`

`

`over a surface
`(claims 1, 13, 21, 26, 36,
`42)
`
`’553 Patent
`
`isolated area
`(Claims 1, 42)
`nor-linear
`(claim 21)
`
`driving surface
`
`Structure: two wheels and motors 21
`for driving them independently (5:60)
`limited area that is cleaned according
`to a non-random coverage algorithm
`non-linear
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
`
`g
`
`“A SENSOR SUBSYSTEM FOR AN AUTONOMOUS ROBOT WHICH
`RIDES ON A SURFACE” / “A SENSOR SUBSYSTEM FOR AN
`AUTONOMOUS ROBOT”
`
`The term “[a] sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot which rides on a surface” appears
`
`in asserted claims l,:and “[a] sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot” appears in claim 19 of
`
`the 308 patent. These claims read:
`
`l. A sensor subsystemfor an autonomous robot which rides on a
`surface, the sensor subsystem comprising:
`
`an optical emitter which emits a directed optical beam having a
`defined field of emission;
`
`a photon detector having a defined field of view which intersects
`the field of emission of the emitter at a region; and
`
`a circuit in communication with the detector providing an output
`when an object is not present in the region thereby re-directing the
`autonomous robot.
`
`l9. A sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot,
`subsystem comprising:
`
`the sensor
`
`at least two emitters, each for emitting a beam having a field of
`emission toward a surface upon which the autonomous robot
`travels;
`.
`
`at least two photon detectors, each having a field of view which
`intersects at least one field of emission at a region; and
`
`ll
`
`15
`
`

`

`the
`in communication with the detectors to re-direct
`a circuit
`autonomous robot when the surface is not present in at least one
`region.
`
`(emphasis added).
`
`The constructions proposed by the parties for these terms are as follows
`
`Term
`
`Coi:nplainant’s Construction
`
`Respondents’ Construction
`
`’308 Patent
`
`Preamble is not limiting
`
`Preamble is limiting
`
`If the preamble is limiting,
`“sensor subsystem” means
`“obstacle detection sensor”
`
`A sensor subsystem
`for an autonomous
`robot which rides
`on a surface (claim
`1) / A sensor
`subsystem for an
`autonomous robot
`(claim 19)
`'
`
`l.
`
`Complainant’s Contentions
`
`iRobot identifies the dispute as whether the preambles are limiting. (CIMB at 10.) iRobot­
`
`contends neither is limiting as they “merely present[] a descriptive name for the set of limitations
`
`defined in the body of the claim.” (Id) Essentially, as argued by iRobot, “sensor subsystem is the
`
`descriptive name for the recited system that includes ‘an optical emitter,’ ‘a photon detector,’ and
`
`‘a circuit.”’ (Id. at 10-11.) iRobot also notes that claim 19 uses the same descriptive name,
`
`“sensor subsystem,” but recites different c0mponents——therebypreventing the term “sensor
`
`subsystem” from “hav[ing] specific structure.” (Id at 11.)
`
`iRobot claims “Respondents’
`
`contention that the ‘sensor subsystem’ is a separate, additional limitation of the claims is logically
`
`inconsistent with the ‘sensor subsystem’ itself being defined by the body of each of claims 1 and
`
`19, respectively.” (Id)
`
`iRobot concludes to point out that the “specification frequently describes
`
`a sensor subsystem as a combination of one or more emitters, one or more detectors, and a circuit
`
`12
`
`16
`
`

`

`in communication with the detector(s)” (id. (citing ’308 patent at Abstract, 2:25-29, 2:34-40, 3:14­
`
`2l)) and nothing in the prosecution history suggests the term was used to overcome prior art (id. at
`
`12). Should I decide it is limiting, iRobot argues it should be construed as an “obstacle detection
`
`sensor,” which, according to iRobot, is consistent with the specification.
`
`(Id. (citing ’308 patent at
`
`Abstract, 2130-42).)
`
`l
`
`‘
`
`In its reply brief, iRobot contends the claim term “adds nothing substantive to the body of
`
`these claims, which fully describe the elements of the sensor subsystem” and thus has no limiting
`
`effect. (CRMB at 2 (citing inter alia,Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1359
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2010); Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1347-48 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012)).) In response to Respondents, iRobot argues that “preamble language that states only a
`
`purpose or intended use of an invention is not limiting.” (Id at 3 (citing Georgetown Rail Equip.
`
`C0. v. H0llandL.P., No. 2016-2297, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15345, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Aug. l,
`
`2017)).) iRobot also points to a prosecution history moment from the ’308 patent’s parent where
`
`it was “recognized” that “for an autonomous robot” language was an “intended use of the sensor
`
`system and imparts no patentable significance.” (Id. (citing CRMB, Ex. 9 at 2).) iRobot then
`
`disputes the antecedent basis significance of claim body limitations which recite the same “sensor
`
`subsystem” and “the autonomous robot” used in the preamble.
`
`(Id. at 3-4 (citing Catalina Mktg.,
`
`289 F.3d at 808).)
`
`In its bullet point brief, iRobot claims that “Respondents suggest that this preamble
`
`language should’be construed as a limitation requiring that the claimed sensor subsystem be
`
`‘mounted on the robot.”’
`
`(CBPB at l (citing Hr’g Tr. at 55:2-18).) iRobot also argues “the word
`
`‘for’ does not mean ‘on’ or ‘mounted on.”’ (Id. (citing Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. C0., 802
`
`F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. cit. 2o15)).)
`
`13
`
`17
`
`

`

`2. Respondents’ Contentions
`
`_
`
`Respondents begin with the maxim “[i]t is black letter law that a claim preamble is"limiting
`
`when it “breathes life and meaning into the claim.” (RIMB at 8 (citing In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d
`
`257, 269 (CCPA 1976)).) Respondents explain:
`
`The preamble reads “A sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot
`which rides on a surface, the sensor subsystem comprising: . . .” The
`claim body then goes on to list three distinct elements: (1) an optical
`emitter...;
`(2)
`a photon detector...;
`and (3) a
`circuit
`in
`communication...” These three claim elements standing alone lack
`the life and meaning necessary to understand what
`is claimed.
`Indeed, these elements are just part of the claimed subsystem. And,
`only once the preamble is taken into account does it become clear
`that these three elements are for something less than an entire robot:
`“a sensor subsystemfor an autonomous robot.”
`
`(1a'.) Respondents also point out how the body of the