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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Shenzhen Zhiyi Technology Co. Ltd., d/b/a iLife,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`iRobot Corp.,
`Patent Owner
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`Case IPR2017-02078
`Patent 7,155,308
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`PATENT OWNER’S
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`Case IPR2017-02078
`Attorney Docket No: 44360-0002IP1
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
`I.
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 2
`II.
`III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ........................................ 3
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION .......................................................................... 5
`A.
`“re-direct[ing]” (claims 1 and 19) ......................................................... 6
`1.
`The Intrinsic Record Confirms that “re-direct[ing]” Should be
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`Construed as “changing a direction of travel” ............................ 7
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`2.
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`Extrinsic Evidence Supports Patent Owner’s Construction ..... 10
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`V. GROUNDS 1-4 SHOULD BE DENIED IN FULL BECAUSE THE
`CITED REFERENCES FAIL TO TEACH OR SUGGEST “RE-
`DIRECT[ING] THE AUTONOMOUS ROBOT” .................................... 11
`VI. THE PETITION’S ANALYSIS OF CLAIM 19 IS INCOMPLETE ...... 16
`A.
`THE PETITION’S ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS 19(A) – (B) .......... 16
`B.
`THE PETITION’S ANALYSIS OF CLAIM 19(C) ........................... 18
`VII. DRUNK-106’S SENSORS ARE NOT PROXIMATE TO A WHEEL
`(CLAIM 28) .................................................................................................. 21
`VIII. GROUNDS 2 AND 4 AGAINST CLAIMS 3 AND 17 BASED ON LEE-
`291 SHOULD BE DENIED ........................................................................ 27
`A.
`Petitioner Improperly Shifts Its Obviousness Theory For Claim 3 .... 27
`B.
`Petitioner’s Proposed Obviousness Theory For Claim 17 Is Rooted In
`Hindsight-Driven Speculation ............................................................. 31
`IX. THE PETITION IS REPLETE WITH SUBSTANTIVE
`DEFICIENCIES .......................................................................................... 35
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`i
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`A.
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`B.
`C.
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`Case IPR2017-02078
`Attorney Docket No: 44360-0002IP1
`Petitioner Offers Scant Evidence That The Jones-MR And Everett
`References Were Publicly Available Before The ’308 Patent ............ 36
`Petitioner’s Attorney Arguments Are Unsupported By Evidence ...... 38
`Grounds 3 And 4 Based On Everett Are Not Fully Set Forth In The
`Petition ................................................................................................. 38
`THE PETITION PRESENTS HORIZONTALLY REDUNDANT
`GROUNDS BASED ON JONES-MR AND EVERETT .......................... 40
`XI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 42
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`X.
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`ii
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`Case IPR2017-02078
`Attorney Docket No: 44360-0002IP1
`LIST OF EXHIBITS
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`IR2003
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`Description
`Exhibit No.
`American Heritage Dictionary, 4th Ed. (2000) (excerpted portions)
`IR2001
`IR2002 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Ed. (1997)
`(excerpted portions)
`Certain Robotic Vacuum Cleaning Products and Components
`Thereof Such as Spare Parts, Investigation No. 337-TA-1057,
`Claim Construction Order No. 27 (Nov. 9, 2017)
`Yongjie, et al., A Simulation Platform For The Cooperation Of
`Distributed Robot Team, Proceedings of the IEEE International
`Conference on Mechatronics & Automation (July 2005)
`U.S. Pat. Pub. No. 2008/0039974 (“Sandin”)
`U.S. Pat. No. 6,294,084 (“Henkin”)
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`IR2004
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`IR2005
`IR2006
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`iii
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`Attorney Docket No: 44360-0002IP1
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES
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`PAGES
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`Apple Inc., v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc., IPR2015-00449.................................. 34
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`C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Medline Industries, Inc., IPR2015-00511................................... 34
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`Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Constellation Techs. LLC, IPR2014-01179 ......................... 34
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`In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ...................................................... 20
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`In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....... 5
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`In re Nuvasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................ 20
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`Ineos USA LLC v. Berry Plastics Corp., 783 F.3d 865, 870-71 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ... 34
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) .................................. 20, 34
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`Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003 ......... 40
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Corel Software, LLC, IPR2016-01083 ...................................... 37
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`Oil States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, Case No. 16-712,
`certiorari granted (U.S. Jun. 12, 2017) ................................................................ 1
`One World Techs, Inc. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., IPR2016-01772 ....................... 20
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`ServiceNow, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., IPR2015-00707 .................................... 37
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`Verlander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1335, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................... 10
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`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 665 F. App’x 880, 887-88 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............ 34, 35
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`Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., v. Four Mile Bay, LLC, IPR2016-00011 ............... 10
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`STATUTES
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`Case IPR2017-02078
`Attorney Docket No: 44360-0002IP1
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`PAGES
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`35 U.S.C. § 323 .......................................................................................................... 1
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`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................... 36
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`REGULATIONS
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`PAGES
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 5
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)-(5) .................................................................................... 39
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`Case IPR2017-02078
`Attorney Docket No: 44360-0002IP1
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`The Board should deny institution because (1) the Petition fails to
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`demonstrate that the prior art teaches “re-directing” an autonomous robot as
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`required by independent claims 1 and 19, (2) the Petition provides an incomplete
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`analysis of claim 19, (3) the Petition fails to demonstrate that the prior art renders
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`obvious dependent claims 3, 17, and 28, and (4) the Petition is substantively
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`deficient in its analysis of individual claim elements and its scant evidence of
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`public availability of purported non-patent prior art. Each of these reasons is fatal
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`and warrants denial of institution.1
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`1 Arguments presented herein are presented without prejudice to presenting
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`additional arguments in a later response should the Board institute inter partes
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`review. No waiver is intended by Patent Owner and no waiver attaches to
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`arguments not presented in a patent owner’s preliminary response. 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 323. Moreover, as the Board is aware, the United States Supreme Court is
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`currently considering certain aspects of the inter partes review process in Oil
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`States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, Case No. 16-712,
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`certiorari granted (U.S. Jun. 12, 2017). Patent Owner respectfully reserves its right
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`to timely request permission to brief the implications of that decision on this
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`proceeding.
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`Attorney Docket No: 44360-0002IP1
`Additionally, without justification, the Petition presents horizontally
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`redundant grounds between the Jones-MR (Grounds 1 and 2) and Everett grounds
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`(Ground 3 and 4). For this additional reason, the Board should deny at least one of
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`the redundant sets of grounds.
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`II. BACKGROUND
`The ’308 patent is directed to “an obstacle detection system for an
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`autonomous robot, such as an autonomous cleaning robot.” Ex. 1001, 1:15-17.
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`Specifically, the ’308 patent provides a “detection system which prevents an
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`autonomous cleaning robot from driving off a stair or obstacle which is too high.”
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`Id., 54-57.
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`To improve stair or obstacle detection, the inventors of the ’308 patent
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`purposed specially configured sensors that enabled the robot to detect stairs while
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`traveling on a variety of surfaces, and to re-direct upon encountering stairs or other
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`drops that the robot could fall over. Id., 5:31-43, 5:63-6:5. For example, the ’308
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`patent describes sensor subsystems that include an optical emitter and a photon
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`detector, and which provide a region of intersection between a field of emission of
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`the optical emitter and a field of detection of the photon detector. Id., 53-61, FIGS.
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`5-7. The floor surface normally occupies the region of intersection of the sensor
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`subsystem, until the robot approaches stairs or a drop that remove the floor surface
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`from view of the sensor and causes the robot to “simply redirect.” Id., 6:59-64.
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`The inventors identified a number of advantages of their techniques in the
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`’308 patent, such as “provid[ing] a sensor subsystem for a robot which consumes a
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`minimal amount of power,” “provid[ing] a sensor subsystem which is unaffected
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`by surfaces of different reflectivity,” and providing a robot that can autonomously
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`clean a room in “a wall following mode” and “a random bounce mode.” E.g., id.,
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`1:51-2:19, 5:31-43, 6:56-58.
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`III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`Since the instant Petition was filed, the ITC in a co-pending case (Inv. No.
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`337-TA-1057) issued a claim construction order (IR2003) that addressed the
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`definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner in the ITC.
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`In that order, the ITC agreed with Petitioner that experience in robotics was
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`needed, but found that even more experience was needed than proposed by
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`Petitioner. Indeed, the ITC found that a POSITA should have at least three years
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`of experience in the design and implementation of robotics and embedded systems,
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`rather than the one year of experience that Petitioner proposed in that proceeding.
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`IR2003, p. 13. Patent Owner proposes that the Board adopt the same definition of
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`a POSITA as the ITC; namely, “a person having an ordinary level of skill would
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`hold a bachelor’s degree in physics, electrical engineering, mechanical
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`engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, and have at least three years
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`of experience in the design and implementation of robotics and embedded systems,
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`or some other equivalent combination of education and experience.” Id.
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`In contrast, Petitioner proposes here a definition of a POSITA that differs
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`not only from the definition adopted in the ITC action, but also differs from
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`Petitioner’s own definition that it proposed in the ITC. Petitioner provides no
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`explanation why the definition here should differ. The inconsistent defintitions are
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`shown below:
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`Definition from IPR Petition
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`Definition from ITC Proceeding
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`“A POSITA in the field of the ’308
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`A POSITA in the field of the ’308
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`patent at the time of the earliest possible
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`patent would have “a bachelor’s degree
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`priority date (January 24, 2000) would
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`in physics, electrical engineering,
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`have had at least a Bachelor’s Degree in
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`mechanical engineering, computer
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`electrical engineering or computer
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`science, or a related discipline, and have
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`science, with an emphasis on
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`at least one year of experience in the
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`microprocessor based systems, and
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`design and implementation of robotics
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`between three and five years of
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`and embedded systems, or some other
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`experience in a practical setting, or
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`equivalent combination of education and
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`equivalent combinations of education
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`experience.” (IR2003, p. 12)
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`and experience.” (Petition, pp. 5-6)
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`Notably, the definition of a POSITA proposed by Petitioner in this IPR is
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`devoid of any experience in mechanical design, physics, or even robotics. This
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`definition seems aligned with the electrical and computer engineering background
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`of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Neuhauser, whose CV describes his expertise to be in
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`“the field of computer architecture and system design.” Ex. 1003, pp. 8-10,
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`Appendix A. Although Dr. Neuhauser purports to have “analyzed … robotic
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`manufacturing systems” in his capacity as a technical consultant for litigation
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`matters, and “led teams” in the analysis of “robotic systems,” he does not mention
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`any direct experience in robotics design, mechanical design, or physics, which are
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`at issue in the challenged claims. Petition, p. 10.
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`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The ’308 patent is unexpired, and therefore each claim is to be “given its
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`broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
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`it appears” (“BRI”). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Federal Circuit “cases on BRI make
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`clear that the proper BRI construction is not just the broadest construction, but
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`rather the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification.” In re Man
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`Mach. Interface Techs. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`Patent Owner submits that the term re-direct of the ’308 patent requires
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`additional consideration in view of Petitioner’s arguments. Patent Owner does not
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`construe any other terms at this time, but reserves the right to do so at a later point
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`in this proceeding.
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`A.
`“re-direct[ing]” (claims 1 and 19)
`Independent claim 1 recites “a circuit in communication with the detector
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`providing an output when an object is not present in the region thereby re-directing
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`the autonomous robot.”2 Independent claim 19 recites “a circuit in communication
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`with the detectors to re-direct the autonomous robot when the surface is not
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`present in at least one region.”
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`Petitioner does not provide an explicit construction of the terms “re-direct”
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`or “re-directing.” Petition, 6. Instead, Petitioner offers an implicit, self-serving
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`construction arguing that “re-directing” is met by “stopping.” Petition, 26-29.
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`Petitioner’s implicit construction, however, is unreasonableit is inconsistent with
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`the claims and the entire disclosure of the ’308 patent.
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`As demonstrated below, in the context of the ’308 patent, the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation of the terms “re-direct” or “re-directing” is “changing a
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`direction of travel.” This construction is consistent with the intrinsic record, and
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`supported by extrinsic evidence. Petitioner’s implicit construction is not.
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`2 All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
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`1.
`The Intrinsic Record Confirms that “re-direct[ing]” Should be
`Construed as “changing a direction of travel”
`The intrinsic record fully supports Patent Owner’s construction that “re-
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`direct[ing]” means “changing a direction of travel.” Petitioner’s overly broad
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`construction equating “re-direct[ing]” with “stopping,” in contrast, finds no support
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`in the intrinsic record.
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`First, Patent Owner’s construction is supported by the language of the claims
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`themselves. Claim 1 provides that the robot “rides on a surface,” and claim 19
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`refers to “a surface upon which the autonomous robot travels.” Ex. 1001, 12:61-
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`62, 14:10-11. With this language, claims 1 and 19 contemplate a robot’s riding or
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`traveling on a surface. In this context, “re-directing” the robot involves changing
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`the direction in which the robot is riding or traveling. Indeed, the terms “re-direct”
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`and “re-directing” denote, from the stem “direct” and prefix “re,” that the robot
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`changes direction.
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`Additionally, the specification supports an interpretation of “re-directing” as
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`changing a direction of travel. The ’308 patent’s autonomous robot has two modes
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`of operation: a “random bounce mode” and a “wall following” mode. Ex. 1001,
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`1:29-41, 5:20-22. In every disclosed example for both modes, the specification
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`uses “re-direct” to indicate a change in the robot’s direction of travel.
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`In the random bounce mode, upon encountering an obstacle (e.g., a step), the
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`robot consistently changes direction and continues travel. For instance, the robot
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`“move[s] in a straight line until the robot comes into contact with an obstacle” and
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`“the robot then turns away from the obstacle and heads in a random direction.”
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`Id., 1:30-35; see also 5:39-43, 2:12-14 (“If the floor does not occupy the
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`predefined region, a stair or some other obstacle is present and the robot is directed
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`away accordingly.”), Abstract (“A circuit in communication with a detector
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`redirects the robot when the surface does not occupy the region to avoid
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`obstacles.”), 2:38-40, 6:59-64, 7:37-39. Thus, upon detecting an obstacle in
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`random bounce mode, the robot re-directs in a different direction. It never
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`maintains its direction and stops.
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`Similarly, in the wall following mode, the ’308 patent consistently describes
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`redirection as involving continued travel after a change in direction. In that mode,
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`“the robot encounters a wall, follows it for a time, and then returns to the random
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`mode.” Id., 1:35-37. To remain in proximity of the wall during wall following,
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`the robot is alternately “redirected” toward or away from the wall depending on
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`whether the wall is presently detected by a wall sensor on the robot. Id., 3:7-10
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`(“The circuit includes logic which redirects the robot away from the wall when the
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`wall occupies the region and back towards the wall when the wall no longer
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`occupies the region of intersection …”); see also 5:66-6:2, 7:1-3, 8:24:33, FIG. 17.
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`Consistent with this description, claims 4 and 5 of the ’308 patent use the
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`term “redirects” in claiming features related to wall-following. Id., 13:10:15-18.
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`For example, claim 4 recites “logic which redirects the robot away from the wall
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`when the wall occupies the region and back towards the wall when the wall no
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`longer occupies the region.” Id. With this usage, the claims align with the
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`specification and confirm that, when claiming redirection, the ’308 patent means
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`changing a direction of travel.
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`Notably, the ’308 patent never discusses “stopping” the robot upon
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`encountering an obstacle, and there is no example in the ’308 patent of the robot
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`“re-directing” by “stopping.” Rather, as discussed above, every instance of re-
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`direction described in the ’308 patent involves the robot continuing travel in a
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`different direction from which the robot previously traveled. In fact, the
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`specification twice uses “stop” in the context of stopping the robot’s turning, but
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`not in the context of redirecting or stopping the robot’s travel. See Ex. 1001,
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`10:33-35 (“[T]he robot monitors its wall sensor and if it detects a wall and then the
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`wall detection goes away, the root [sic] stops turning.”); 10:37-39 (“If the robot has
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`not seen its wall detector go on and then off by the time it reaches its maximum
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`angle, it stops anyway.”).
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`The only justification the Petition provides for its construction is an
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`uncorroborated statement from Dr. Neuhauser that “[o]ne of ordinary skill would
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`understand that the simple action of stopping the vehicle of Drunk-106 is
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`‘redirecting’ it because it will no longer continue on the previous path.” Petition,
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`p. 29 (citing Ex. 1003, ¶120). But Dr. Neuhauser’s statement is conclusory, and
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`fails to address any evidence that would support his opinion. This type of
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`conclusory analysis is entitled to no weight. See Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., v.
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`Four Mile Bay, LLC, IPR2016-00011, Paper 8 (Decision Denying Institution), p.
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`11 (PTAB 2016) (citing Verlander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1335, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
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`2003)).
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`Accordingly, the intrinsic record supports construing “re-direct” and “re-
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`directing” to mean “changing a direction of travel.”
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`2.
`Extrinsic Evidence Supports Patent Owner’s Construction
`Evidence outside the four corners of the ’308 patent also supports this
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`construction. Literature in the field of robotics consistently refers to the term
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`“redirect” (or variants of the term) to describe a change in the direction of travel.
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`For instance, a research paper discussing autonomous robots from the mid-2000s
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`described control logic that used “redirection values” to express an amount that an
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`autonomous robot should change direction during travel for collision avoidance
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`purposes. IR2004, p. 4. Patent literature also confirms that redirecting a robot
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`involves changing its direction. See IR2006, 4:20-30, 5:43-49 (patent describing a
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`robot that “redirect[s]” from a “forward direction of travel” to a reverse direction
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`of travel that “cause[s] it to back up”); IR2005, ¶¶0005, 0009, 0012, Abstract
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`(patent describing an autonomous cleaning robot that redirects by changing a
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`direction of travel to stay within active and passively defined boundaries). Finally,
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`dictionary definitions from the time of the ’308 patent further indicate that the
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`plain meaning of “re-direct[ing]” involves a change in direction. See, e.g., IR2001,
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`1464 (defining “re-direct” as “to change the direction or course of”); IR2002, 979
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`(“[T]o change the course or direction of.”).
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`In sum, Patent Owner’s construction is supported by the intrinsic and
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`extrinsic evidence. Petitioner fails to address either. Accordingly, the Board
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`should decline the Petition’s implicit construction and, instead, construe the terms
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`“re-direct” and “re-directing” to mean “changing a direction of travel.”
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`V. GROUNDS 1-4 SHOULD BE DENIED IN FULL BECAUSE THE
`CITED REFERENCES FAIL TO TEACH OR SUGGEST “RE-
`DIRECT[ING] THE AUTONOMOUS ROBOT”
`As discussed at Section IV.A, claim 1 recites “a circuit in communication
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`with the detector providing an output when an object is not present in the region
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`thereby re-directing the autonomous robot,” and claim 19 recites “a circuit in
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`communication with the detectors to re-direct the autonomous robot when the
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`surface is not present in at least one region.” The Petition’s reliance on Drunk-106
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`for these features is misplaced.
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`Specifically, the Petition presents two theories for how Drunk-106 teaches
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`the claimed “re-direct[ing],” but neither is availing. First, the Petition points to the
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`following portion of Drunk-106 and wrongly asserts that “stopping” constitutes
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`“re-directing” the robot:
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`These infrared sensors ascertain the distance from the
`floor by means of their downward beaming infrared
`radiation and the reception of the reflected energy. If
`there is an increase in this distance beyond a prescribed
`limit, for example because one of the infrared sensors
`100, 101, 102, 103 is over a lower step while wheels 20,
`21, 22 of cleaning vehicle 1 are still supported on the
`floor above the step, the excessive difference in distance
`detected by the infrared sensor releases a signal which
`stops the operation of cleaning vehicle 1 and, under
`circumstances, releases an acoustical or optical signal to
`inform an operator. In this manner, it is ensured that the
`cleaning vehicle does not fall.
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`Ex. 1004, 11:52-65 (cited by Petition, pp. 27-28).
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`As discussed in Section IV.A, supra, the broadest reasonable interpretation
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`of the terms “re-direct” and “re-directing” requires changing a direction of the
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`robot’s travel. Drunk-106’s robot fails to meet this basic requirement, because it is
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`configured to stoprather than change a direction of travelin response to
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`detecting a cliff with its infrared sensors 100-103. See Ex. 1004, 11:52-65, 6:4-13.
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`Indeed, not only does Drunk-106 fail to describe changing directions, it fails to
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`describe that the robot continues travel at all after detecting a cliff. Because
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`Drunk-106’s stopping does not fall within the broadest reasonable interpretation of
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`“re-direct[ing]” for the reasons discussed in Section IV.A, supra, the Petition’s
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`first theory fails.
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`The Petition also advances a second, back-up theory for how Drunk-106
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`meets the “re-directing” features of claims 1 and 19. For the second theory, the
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`Petition contends that “Drunk-106 also discloses that instead of stopping
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`navigation upon cliff sensing by the downward sensors, the autonomous robot can
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`be programmed to circumvent the ledge or cliff.” Petition, p. 28. This is simply
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`untrueDrunk-106 never discloses circumventing a ledge or cliff.
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`Specifically, Drunk-106 mentions cliff detection in only two passages. The
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`first passage, at column 6, lines 3-13, describes “drop monitoring sensors” that are
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`“aimed in a vertical direction” to detect a “step,” thereby causing the vehicle to
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`“stop.” Ex. 1001, 6:3-13. The second passage, at column 11, lines 47-65,
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`describes infrared sensors 100-103 detecting “a lower step” based on “the distance
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`from the floor” increasing “beyond a prescribed limit,” which results in the release
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`of “a signal which stops the operation of cleaning vehicle 1.” Id., 11:55-62. Both
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`passages describe the robot stopping upon detecting a step or cliff. Neither
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`passage, however, mentions circumventing the steps by changing a direction of
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`travel.
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`Faced without disclosure of step circumvention in Drunk-106, the Petition
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`wrongly attempts to connect Drunk-106’s discussion of “circumvent[ing]” an
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`above-ground obstacle using certain ultrasonic or optical “obstacle sensors” with
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`the separate discussion of step detection using “drop monitoring sensors,” such as
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`“infrared sensors 100-103.” Petition, pp. 28-29. This connection, however, is
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`missing from Drunk-106. Although Drunk-106 mentions that “[o]bstacles may …
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`take the shape of steps down which the vehicle might fall,” Drunk-106 never
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`mentions that “steps” are detected using its “obstacle sensors,” or that the robot
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`circumvents “steps” like any other above-ground obstacle. Petition, p. 28 (citing
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`Ex. 1004, 6:3-4). To the contrary, as discussed above, Drunk-106 only mentions
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`step detection using drop monitoring or infrared sensors, and only describes
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`stopping and waiting for operator help when it encounters a step. See Ex. 1004,
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`11:52-65. To the extent Petitioner contends that circumventing a step would be an
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`obvious modification of Drunk’s vehicle, the Petition fails to provide any evidence
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`or explanation for why a POSITA would have been led to such modification.
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`Moreover, Drunk-106 itself explains why stopping, not re-directing, makes
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`sense when Drunk-106’s robot detects a step. Specifically, Drunk-106’s robot
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`does not navigate in the same way as the ’308 patent’s robot, which independently
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`determines where to travel and in which mode to travel. Ex. 1001, 1:15-41, 5:18-
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`43, FIGS. 4, 16-17, 22.
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`In contrast, Drunk-106’s robot follows “a predetermined planned path” that
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`is generated by “an off-line programming system.” Ex. 1004, 3:22-23, 3:49-51.
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`Drunk-106’s robot follows the planned path by using sensor measurements to
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`determine its distance to known markers along the path. Id., 4:9-17. Although
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`Drunk-106’s robot is capable of making small deviations from the planned path to
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`avoid objects “which were not there when the planned path was entered,” these
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`types of objects are quite different from a set of steps, which are fixed in an
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`environment and would not unexpectedly move into the robot’s path. Id., 5:60-6:2,
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`11:66-12:3, 4:9-7, 5:60-6:2. If Drunk-106’s robot encounters a set of steps,
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`something has gone significantly wrong.
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`Additionally, steps present a dangerous hazard to the robot because of the
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`risk of falling. Given the potential risk of falling and the unusual circumstance of
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`encountering steps in navigating a planned path, as Drunk-106 describes multiple
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`times, the appropriate action for the robot is to “stop” and summon a human
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`operator. See id., 4:31-37, 6:55-65, 11:47-65. Stopping “ensure[s] that the
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`cleaning vehicle does not fall.” Id., 11:63-65. Thus, in light of Drunk-106’s
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`disclosure of stopping to achieve Drunk-106’s stated goal of ensuring that the
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`robot does not fall, a POSITA would have been dissuaded from altering Drunk-
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`106’s response to detection of steps.
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`For these reasons, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing against independent claims 1 or 19 for any of Grounds 1-4.
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`VI. THE PETITION’S ANALYSIS OF CLAIM 19 IS INCOMPLETE
`The Petition’s analysis of independent claim 19 in both Grounds 1 and 3
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`fails to account for material differences between the features recited in claim 19
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`and those recited in claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden of
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`showing a reasonable likelihood of claim 19 being unpatentable.
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`A. THE PETITION’S ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS 19(A) – (B)
`First, the Petition fails to establish that a POSITA would have incorporated
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`multiple sensors of the types described in Jones-MR (Ground 1) or Everett
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`(Ground 3) into Drunk-106’s robot. Elements 19a-19b of claim 19 recite:
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` at least two emitters, each for emitting a beam having a
`field of emission toward a surface upon which the
`autonomous robot travels;
` at least two photon detectors, each having a field of
`view which intersects at least one field of emission at a
`region
`The Petition provides limited analysis for these elements of claim 19, arguing only
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`that they are obvious for largely the same reasons as elements from claim 1. See
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`Petition, pp. 37-39, 62-64. Although the Petition rightly acknowledges that claim
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`19 differs from claim 1 in that claim 1 “does not expressly require multiple
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`emitters” (or detectors) (id., pp. 38-39), the Petition fails to show that a POSITA
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`would have been led to modify Drunk-106’s robot based on the teachings of either
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`Jones-MR or Everett to meet the requirement of multiple emitters and detectors.
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`For example, without evidence or further support, the Petition asserts that
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`“[a] POSITA would have understood in view of Jones-MR that multiple GP2D02
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`sensors would have been used on the Drunk-106 robot,” and, “[i]n particular, the
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`robot would have used multiple GP2D02 sensors as the downward-facing cliff
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`sensors (101) and (102) that are expressly disclosed in Drunk-106.” Petition, p.
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`38.3 But these assertions are mere attorney argument, unsupported by the record.
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`The Petition’s entire analysis of claim 19 in both Grounds 1 and 3 lacks citations to
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`Dr. Neuhauser’s declaration, or any other exhibits. Without evidence, the Petition
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`cannot meet its burden of proving unpatentability.
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`3 The Petition provides a similar conclusory analysis for Ground 3 based on
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`Drunk-106 in view of Everett. Petition, p. 63 (“A POSITA would therefore have
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`understood that multiple convergent mode sensors of Everett would be used on the
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`mobile robot of Drunk-106, including as the downward facing cliff sensors (101)
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`and (102).”)
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`Indeed, the Petition’s argument that a POSITA would have replaced each of
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`Drunk-106’s cliff sensors 101 and 102 with a respective sensor from Jones-MR or
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`Everett, simply because Drunk-106 already discloses the use of multiple sensors, is
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`conclusory and fails to address any number of practical issues that a POSITA
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`would have considered before making the modification. For example, the Petition
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`cites no evidence that addresses (1) whether multiple sensors from Jones-MR or
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`Everett would be necessary in view of their particular capabilities and
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`configurations, (2) whether implementing multiple sensors from Jones-MR or
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`Everett would be feasible in vie
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