throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`Paper No. 7
`Entered: March 19, 2018
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`AMBRY GENETICS CORPORATION,
`Petitioner
`v.
`THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`_______________
`
`
`Before LORA M. GREEN, TINA E. HULSE, and RICHARD J. SMITH,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`GREEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Ambry Genetics Corporation (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition to institute
`an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 15, 20, and 21 of U.S. Patent 8,859,206
`B2 (the “’206 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”) The Johns Hopkins University
`(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6
`(“Prelim. Resp.”).
`Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the
`information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that
`there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
`to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see
`37 C.F.R. §§ 42.4, 42.108. Upon considering the Petition and Preliminary
`Response, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable
`likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of challenged
`claims 1, 3, 15, 20, and 21. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter
`partes review of those claims.
`Related Proceedings
`A.
`The ’206 patent has been asserted in pending district court
`proceedings: Esoterix Genetic Laboratories, LLC and The Johns Hopkins
`University v. Ambry Genetics Corporation, United States District Court for
`the Middle District of North Carolina, Case No. 1:16-cv-1111-WO-JEP.
`Pet. 1–2; Paper 3, 2. The ’206 patent was also asserted in Esoterix Genetic
`Laboratories, LLC and The Johns Hopkins University v. Myriad Genetics,
`Inc. and Myriad Genetics Laboratories, Inc., United States District Court for
`the Middle District of North Carolina, Case No. 1:16-cv-1112-WE-JEP, but
`that case has been dismissed. Pet. 2; Paper 3, 2.
`Petitioner also filed petitions for inter partes review of certain claims
`
` 2
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`of related U.S. Patent No. 6,440,706 (IPR2017-02086); U.S. Patent No.
`7,915,015 (IPR2017-02095); and U.S. Patent No. 7,824,889 (IPR2017-
`02093). Pet. 2; Paper 3, 2.
`
`The ’206 Patent
`B.
`The ’206 patent issued on October 14, 2014, with Bert Vogelstein and
`Kenneth W. Kinzler as the listed co-inventors. Ex. 1001. The ’206 patent
`relates to diagnostic genetic analyses. Id. at 1:12. With the understanding
`that somatic mutations are the primary cause of cancer, new opportunities
`for basic research into the pathogenesis of cancer have arisen. Id. at 1:19–
`22. For example, in some cases, detecting neoplastic cells in urine, stool,
`and sputum is possible at a stage when the primary tumors are still curable
`and the patients are asymptomatic. Id. at 1:27–33. Thus, it is important to
`be able to detect small populations of mutant cells among a large excess of
`normal cells. Id. at 1:25–27. Accordingly, the specification states that “[i]t
`is an object of the present invention to provide methods for determining the
`presence of a selected genetic sequence in a population of genetic
`sequences.” Id. at 1:65–67.
`The claimed method involves diluting a biological sample to a point
`where a practically usable number of the diluted samples contain a
`proportion of the selected genetic sequence (analyte) relative to total
`template molecules. Id. at 4:12–16. The diluted samples are separately
`amplified so that the amplified products have a proportion of the analyte
`sequence that is detectable by the detection means chosen. Id. at 3:66–4:2.
`With this method, single template molecules can be amplified so that the
`products are completely mutant or completely wild-type. Id. at 4:3–5.
`
` 3
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`The specification refers to this method as “[d]igital amplification.” Id.
`at 4:34–35. According to the specification, “[t]he ultimate utility of Digital
`Amplification lies in its ability to convert the intrinsically exponential nature
`of PCR to a linear one.” Id. at 5:51–53. The specification states further that
`“[i]t should thereby prove useful for experiments requiring the investigation
`of individual alleles, rare variants/mutations, or quantitative analysis of PCR
`products.” Id. at 5:53–55.
`Illustrative Claim
`C.
`Petitioner challenges claims 1, 3, 15, 20, and 21 of the ’206 patent, of
`which claim 1 is an independent claim. Claim 1 is reproduced below:
`1. A method for detecting quantity of a genetic sequence in
`a mixed population of human genomic nucleic acid sequences
`comprising at least a first and a second human genomic
`sequence, wherein the first sequence is a sequence of a wild-
`type allele of a locus and a second sequence is a sequence of a
`mutant allele of the locus, comprising:
`[(a)] distributing or diluting a mixed population of cell-free,
`human genomic nucleic acid template molecules from a
`sample in which the fraction of mutant alleles is less than
`20%, into a set comprising at least fifteen assay samples
`such that said at least fifteen assay samples each
`comprises less than ten template molecules;
`[(b)] amplifying the template molecules in the assay
`samples, wherein an assay sample with a single template
`molecule forms homogeneous amplification products in
`the assay sample;
`[(c)] analyzing by determining nucleic acid sequence of
`amplification products in the assay samples of the set
`with homogeneous amplification products to determine a
`first number of assay samples in the set which contain the
`
` 4
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`
`first sequence and a second number of assay samples in
`the set which contain the second sequence;
`[(d)] comparing the first number to the second number to
`ascertain a ratio which reflects the composition of the
`mixed population;
`[(e)] identifying a mutation in the mixed population if a
`statistically significant fraction of assay samples
`comprises the second sequence.
`Ex. 1001, 15:43‒67; 16:41‒43 (with step designations used by Petitioner
`added in brackets).
`The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`D.
`Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and/or 103 based on the following specific grounds.
`Pet. 4.
`Reference[s]
`Sykes1
`
`Claims challenged
`1, 3, 20, 21
`
`Basis
`§ 102(b)
`
`Sykes and Brown2
`
`§103
`
`15
`
`
`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Gregory A. Buck, Ph.D.
`Ex. 1007.
`Patent Owner submitted the Declaration of its expert, Fred Russell
`Kramer, Ph.D. (Ex. 2001), with its Preliminary Response.
`
`
`1 P.J. Sykes et al., Quantitation of Targets for PCR by Use of Limiting
`Dilution, 13 BIOTECHNIQUES 444–49 (1992) (“Sykes”) (Ex. 1011).
`2 Brown et al., US Patent No. 6,143,496, issued Nov. 7, 2000 (“Brown”)
`(Ex. 1010).
`
` 5
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`
` ANALYSIS
`Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`A.
`Petitioner asserts that as of August 2, 1999, a person of ordinary skill
`in the art “would typically have earned a Master’s degree in the biological
`sciences or a related field, and have at least four years of laboratory
`experience, or alternatively, have a Ph.D. degree in the biological sciences or
`a related field, and have at least two years of molecular biology laboratory
`experience.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 12).
`Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner, and contends that one of
`ordinary skill in the art “would have been a person with training and
`education in molecular biology techniques, such as PCR and related
`laboratory procedures, having either a Bachelor’s degree in biological or
`chemical sciences and at least three years of experience in a laboratory, or a
`Master’s degree in biochemical sciences and at least one year of laboratory
`experience.” Prelim. Resp. 3 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 12).
`On this record and at this stage of the proceeding, we do not discern
`an appreciable difference in the parties’ respective definitions of a person of
`ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill
`in the art (1) would have had a Master’s degree in the biological or
`biochemical sciences, and (2) at least two years of molecular biology
`laboratory experience.
`We further note that the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill
`in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
`1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding
`ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an
`appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton
`
` 6
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir.
`1985)).
`
`Claim Construction
`B.
`We interpret claims using the “broadest reasonable construction in
`light of the specification of the patent in which [they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
`2144–46 (2016). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim
`terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would
`be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
`In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Absent
`claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the
`claim based on the specification . . . when [it] expressly disclaim[s] the
`broader definition.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`“Although an inventor is indeed free to define the specific terms used to
`describe his or her invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity,
`deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
`1994).
`We determine that at this stage of the proceeding, we need only
`determine whether the preamble should be read as limiting the claimed
`method steps. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor
`Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe
`terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d
`795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
` 7
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`“A method for detecting quantity of a genetic sequence in a mixed
`population of human genomic nucleic acid sequences comprising at least a
`first and a second human genomic sequence, wherein the first sequence is a
`sequence of a wild-type allele of a locus and a second sequence is a
`sequence of a mutant allele of the locus”
`Petitioner asserts that under the broadest reasonable construction of
`
`the method of independent claim 1, the preamble should not be read as
`limiting. Pet. 9. Patent Owner responds that “the preamble of claim 1 is
`limiting because it provides definitions and antecedent basis for the first and
`second sequences, which are referenced in the analyzing step and the
`identifying step.” Prelim. Resp. 12.
`If the claim preamble, when read in the context of the
`entire claim, recites limitations of the claim, or, if the claim
`preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the
`claim, then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the
`balance of the claim. . . . If, however, the body of the claim
`fully and intrinsically sets forth the complete invention,
`including all of its limitations, and the preamble offers no
`distinct definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations,
`but rather merely states, for example, the purpose or intended
`use of the invention, then the preamble is of no significance to
`claim construction because it cannot be said to constitute or
`explain a claim limitation.
`Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
`1999).
`Here, we agree with Patent Owner that the preamble should be read as
`limiting the claimed method. In particular, the claimed analyzing step
`recites “analyzing by determining nucleic acid sequence of amplification
`products in the assay samples of the set with homogeneous amplification
`products to determine a first number of assay samples in the set which
`contain the first sequence and a second number of assay samples in the set
`
` 8
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`which contain the second sequence.” Ex. 1001, 15:59‒64 (emphasis added).
`The only portion of the claim that defines the relationship of the first
`sequence to the second sequence, and, thus, defines the scope of the claim, is
`the preamble. Specifically, the preamble requires that “the first sequence is
`a sequence of a wild-type allele of a locus and a second sequence is a
`sequence of a mutant allele of the locus.” Id. at 15:46‒48. The preamble,
`therefore, limits the scope of the first and second sequences as being a wild-
`type allele of a locus and a mutant allele of a locus. See Seachange
`International, Inc. v. C-Cor Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(construing the preamble as limiting where it “provide[d] the only
`antecedent basis and thus the context essential to understand the meaning”
`and scope of a term that derived antecedent basis from the preamble).
`Anticipation by Sykes3
`C.
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 3, 20, and 21 are anticipated by Sykes.
`Pet. 10‒17. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner has not established a
`reasonable likelihood that Sykes anticipates those claims. Prelim. Resp. 19‒
`29.
`
`Sykes (Ex. 1011)
`1.
`Sykes “describe[s] a general method to quantitate the total number of
`initial targets present in a sample using limiting dilution, PCR and Poisson
`statistics.” Ex. 1011, Abstract. Sykes uses the rearranged immunoglobulin
`
`
`3 Patent Owner argues also that we should exercise our discretion under 35
`U.S.C. § 325(d) and decline to institute trial as Sykes and Brown have
`already been considered by the office. Prelim. Resp. 7‒9. As we determine
`that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that the challenged
`claims are unpatentable, we need not address this argument.
`
` 9
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`heavy chain (IgH) gene from a leukemic clone as an example. Id. at 444. In
`a particular patient with acute lymphoblastic leukemia, all leukemic cells
`will have the same rearranged IgH gene that can act as a genetic marker to
`distinguish leukemic cells from normal cells. Id. Sykes also used the N-ras
`gene as an internal control. Id. at Abstract.
`Sykes identified two problems with quantitating the unique
`rearrangement of the leukemic clones: (1) only a few copies may be present
`in a tissue sample taken from a patient in remission following treatment; and
`(2) germ-line IgH genes from cells other than B lymphocytes and rearranged
`IgH genes from normal B lymphocytes will be present and may compete
`with the target gene in PCR. Id. at 444. To address these problems, Sykes
`uses the principle of limiting dilution, which uses a qualitative all-or-none
`end point. Id. By having some end points that are positive and some that
`are negative, the number of targets present can be calculated from the
`proportion of negative end points by using Poisson statistics. Id.
`Analysis
`2.
`Petitioner relies on Sykes for its teaching of quantifying the number of
`initial target nucleic acids in a sample using limiting dilution PCR and
`Poisson statistics. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1011, Abstract). According to
`Petitioner, the method taught by Sykes allowed for the detection of two
`potentially amplifiable leukemic IgH target nucleic acids in the presence of
`160,000 competing non-leukemic genomes. Id. at 10‒11 (citing Ex. 1011,
`Abstract; Ex. 1007 ¶ 38).
`
`Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the target nucleic acid of Sykes
`was a rearranged immunoglobulin heavy chain from a leukemic Ho clone.
`Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1011, 444‒445). “Serial dilutions of 10 replicates of Ho
`
`10
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`DNA were made and amplified by PCR,” and “10 replicates were tested for
`IgH and 10 replicates were tested for N-ras.” Id. (citing Ex. 1011, 446
`(Table 1)). Amplification of N-ras was used by Sykes as “an internal
`control to quantitate the number of potentially amplifiable genomes present
`in a sample.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1011, Abstract). Sykes also “discloses
`diluting the Ho DNA to form a set of at least 20 assay samples.” Id. Sykes
`teaches further, Petitioner asserts, that “[a]s seen in Table 1, the positive
`number of IgH (mutant allele) was only 1 per 10 tubes for the 0.375 copies
`added and the 0.113 copies added reactions,” thus, Petitioner asserts, “Sykes
`discloses that the fraction of mutant alleles is less than 20%.” Id. Petitioner
`contends, therefore, that Sykes teaches step (a) of claim 1, as Sykes teaches
`that “less than ten template molecules (IgH and N-ras) were added to thirty
`of the PCR reaction tubes (Table 1, “Number of Copies Added” columns).”
`Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 39).
`
`Petitioner argues further that Sykes amplified the IgH genes and the
`N-ras genes in the Ho DNA sample. Id. As “an amplification reaction with
`a single template molecule inherently forms a homogeneous amplification
`product as the sole amplification product,” Petitioner asserts that Sykes also
`teaches step (b) of claim 1. Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 40). Moreover, Petitioner
`avers, Sykes counted the number of assay samples with IgH and the number
`of assay samples with N-ras, and used Poisson statistics to quantitate the
`number of initial leukemic and non-leukemic templates present. Id. at 12
`(citing Ex. 1011, Abstract, 444, 446‒447). Thus, Petitioner contends, Sykes
`teaches step (c) of challenged claim 1. Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 42‒44).
`
`Regarding step (d), the comparing step, Petitioner asserts that Sykes
`teaches comparing the number of assay samples that contain IgH to the
`
`11
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`assay samples containing the total templates, “to ascertain a ratio (‘Ratio N-
`ras/IgH,’ Table 2) which reflects the composition of the mixed population
`(i.e., Ho DNA).” Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 45).
`
`With respect to step (e), Petitioner asserts “Sykes discloses that in two
`experiments, 1.7 and 2.6 copies of N-ras could be detected, and in three
`experiments, 3.5, 6.1 and 10 copies of Ho IgH could be detected in the
`presence of 1 μg of PBL1 DNA,” and that the data was consistent with a
`Poisson distribution. Id. (citing Ex. 1011, 446 (Table 1), 447). Thus,
`according to Petitioner, “Sykes teaches identifying a mutation (IgH) in the
`mixed population.” Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 46).
`
`Patent Owner responds that Sykes fails to teach the “analyzing,”
`“comparing,” and “identifying” steps, that is, steps (c), (d), and (e) as
`identified by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 20.
`
`Specifically, as to the “analyzing step” (step (c)), Patent Owner
`contends that the “claims require that the first and second sequences in the
`mixed population be sequences of a wild-type allele of a locus and a mutant
`allele of the locus, respectively.” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 15:42‒47).
`Patent Owner asserts, however, that “Sykes discloses analyzing mutant IgH
`(a first gene at a first locus) and wild-type N-ras (a second gene at a second
`locus) in a patient sample, but IgH and N-ras are alleles of two different
`loci.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 41, 44).
`
`We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established a
`reasonable likelihood that Sykes anticipates challenged claim 1.
`Anticipation requires that “each and every element as set forth in the claim is
`found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art
`reference.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation
`
`12
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`omitted). “To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear
`that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing
`described in the reference.’” Id.
`
`Petitioner equates the IgH gene from a leukemic clone Ho as the
`target DNA, i.e., the second sequence, and appears to equate the N-ras gene
`with the first sequence required by claim 1. See Pet. 11‒16. As discussed
`above, however, we have construed the preamble of claim 1 as limiting the
`claimed method as it defines the relationship of first sequence to the second
`sequence, defining the scope of the claim. The preamble of claim 1 specifies
`that “the first sequence is a sequence of a wild-type allele of a locus and a
`second sequence is a sequence of a mutant allele of the locus.” That is,
`claim 1 requires that the first and second sequences correspond to alleles of
`the same locus. Petitioner, however, does not explain why the IgH gene
`would be considered by the ordinary artisan to be a mutant allele of the N-
`ras gene.
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown a
`reasonable likelihood that Sykes anticipates independent claim 1. Claims 3,
`20, and 21 depend from claim 1, and incorporate all of the limitations of that
`claim, and, thus, the challenge as to those claims suffers the same
`deficiencies discussed above with respect to claim 1. We, thus, decline to
`institute inter partes review as to the challenge of claims 1, 3, 20, and 21 as
`being anticipated by Sykes.
`D. Obviousness over Sykes and Brown
`Petitioner asserts that claim 15 is rendered obvious by the
`combination of Sykes and Brown. Pet. 17–18. Patent Owner contends that
`Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that the combination of
`
`13
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`Sykes and Brown renders that claim obvious. Prelim. Resp. 29‒33.
`Brown (Ex. 1010)
`1.
`Brown describes “[m]ethods of filling miniaturized sample chambers”
`and “methods for determining the number of template molecules in a sample
`by conducting replicate nucleic acid sequence amplification reactions on a
`set of terminally diluted samples and counting the number of positive
`amplification reactions. The methods can be used to detect a single starting
`nucleic acid target molecule.” Ex. 1010, Abstract. Brown further states that
`“[p]referred sample chambers according some embodiments of the
`invention, for nucleic acid amplification methods to detect single target
`nucleic acid molecules, have volumes of from about 1 microliter to about 1
`picoliter or less. . . . Photolithographic methods can provide from about
`10,000 to over 100,000 sample chambers of about 100 picoliters each on a
`1"×3" substrate.” Id. at 16:1–4 and 17–19.
`Analysis
`2.
`Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would
`prevail in showing that the combination of Sykes of Brown renders claim 15
`obvious.
`Petitioner relies on Sykes as set forth above with respect to the
`anticipation challenge discussed above. See Pet. 17. As noted by Patent
`Owner (Prelim. Resp. 32), Petitioner does not rely on Brown to remedy the
`deficiency of Sykes as set forth in our analysis of the anticipation challenge.
`
`Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has not established a
`reasonable likelihood that claim 15 is rendered obvious by the combination
`of Sykes and Brown.
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-02096
`Patent 8,859,206 B2
`
`
` CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has not
`established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that any of
`claims 1, 3, 15, 20, and 21 of the ’206 patent are unpatentable.
` ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the
`Petition is denied.
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER:
`
`Bhanu K. Sadasivan
`Jacqueline F. Mahoney
`MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
`bsadasivan@mwe.com
`jfmahoney@mew.com
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Tina McKeon
`John Alemanni
`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
`tmckeon@kilpatricktownsend.com
`jalemanni@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Benjamin Hsing
`BAKER & HOSTETLER, LLP
`bhsing@bakerlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket