Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`
`
`
`
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`Paper No. 72
`Filed: April 2, 2019
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`YAMAHA GOLF CAR COMPANY,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CLUB CAR, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-02143
`Patent 7,480,569 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before JOSIAH C. COCKS, CARL M. DEFRANCO, and
`ROBERT L. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`KINDER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper No. 72
`Filed: April 2, 2019
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`YAMAHA GOLF CAR COMPANY,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CLUB CAR, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-02143
`Patent 7,480,569 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before JOSIAH C. COCKS, CARL M. DEFRANCO, and
`ROBERT L. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`KINDER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2017-02143
`Patent 7,480,569 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Yamaha Golf Car Company (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of
`U.S. Patent No 7,480,569 B2, issued on January 20, 2009 (Ex. 1002, “the
`’569 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Club Car, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a
`Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Pursuant to our request
`(Paper 12) the parties each filed a supplemental claim construction brief.
`See Paper 13 (Patent Owner’s brief), Paper 15 (Petitioner’s brief).
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) we issued an
`Initial Decision (“Dec.”) on April 4, 2018, determining “that Petitioner has
`not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that any
`of claims 1–20 of the ’569 patent are unpatentable.” Paper 17, Dec. 30.
`On May 4, 2018, Petitioner filed a request for rehearing of our Initial
`Decision pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Paper 19.
`On June 26, 2018, we granted Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`(Paper 19). Paper 21 (“Rehearing Dec.”). In the Rehearing Decision, we
`reasoned that we overlooked material fact disputes with respect to a key
`prior art reference and competing witness testimony, which at the institution
`stage should have been viewed in a light most favorable to Petitioner rather
`than Patent Owner. Rehearing Dec. 4 (citing 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c)). We
`determined that considering the competing expert testimony in a light most
`favorable to Petitioner, that “Petitioner sets forth a reasonable likelihood that
`claim 1 is anticipated by the ’053 Unexamined Application.” Id. at 7. Based
`on the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S.Ct. 1348,
`1359–60 (2018), and the Office’s Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA
`Trial Proceedings, which states that “if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB
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`will institute on all challenges raised in the petition”
`(https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-
`board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial), we instituted review based on all
`grounds and claims as set forth in the Petition. Rehearing Dec. 7–8.
`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 32, “PO Resp.”), to which Petitioner replied (Paper 44, “Pet. Reply”).
`Patent Owner also filed a Sur-Reply (Paper 49, “PO Sur-Reply”).
`Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude evidence (Paper 51), to which
`Petitioner opposed (Paper 57), which Patent Owner replied (Paper 58).
`Petitioner filed a Motion to Exclude evidence (Paper 52), to which
`Patent Owner opposed (Paper 56), to which Petitioner replied (Paper 59).
`Patent Owner filed a Notice of Improper Reply Arguments (Paper 54),
`to which we allowed Petitioner to file a Response (Paper 67).
`Oral argument was conducted on February 14, 2019, and the transcript
`of the hearing has been entered as Paper 70 (“Tr.”).
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). After considering the
`evidence and arguments of both parties, and for the reasons set forth below,
`we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the
`evidence, that claims 1–11 and 13–20 of the ’569 patent are unpatentable.
`We deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as moot. We grant-in-part and
`deny-in-part Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude for the reasons set forth below.
`
`On April 27, 2018, Patent Owner, Club Car, filed a statutory
`disclaimer with the Patent Office under 35 U.S.C. § 253 for claim 12 of the
`’569 patent. See IPR2017-02144, Paper 22, Exhibits A and B (included as
`part of Paper 22). Because claim 12 of the ’569 patent has been disclaimed
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`pursuant to § 253 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), we do not consider it as part of
`this final decision.
`
`
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`A. The ʼ569 patent (Ex. 1002)
`The ʼ569 patent is titled “Method and System for Golf Cart Control.”
`Ex. 1002, [54]. The ’569 patent claims priority from U.S. Provisional
`Application No. 60/440,894 (“the ’894 Provisional”), filed January 17, 2003.
`Id. at [60], 1:6–9.
`As stated in the ’569 patent, “[t]he present invention relates in general
`to the field of vehicle control, and more particularly to a method and system
`for control of a golf cart based on location of the golf cart.” Id. at 1:20–22.
`The system and method use a golf cart’s GPS position on a golf course for
`monitoring the location of and controlling golf carts “to preempt or
`otherwise reduce damage from golf cart movement” in certain at-risk
`portions of a golf course. Id. at 2:3–5.
`As described in the ’569 patent, “[g]olf course owners generally make
`a substantial financial investment in a golf course in order to develop and
`maintain the appearance and quality of play.” Id. at 1:25–27. In a relatively
`short period of time, “a thoughtless golfer can create considerable damage to
`sensitive golfing areas, such as greens, simply by driving a golf cart in the
`wrong place, such as locations having wet turf that . . . [are] particularly
`susceptible to damage.” Id. at 1:43–47. “Inattentive and even malicious
`golf cart drivers can cause even greater amounts of damage and also present
`a safety hazard by driving too fast or recklessly near other golfers or natural
`hazards.” Id. at 1:47–51. Based on these problems faced in the art, the ’569
`details that “a need has arisen for a method and system which applies a golf
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`cart’s GPS position on a golf course to preempt or otherwise reduce damage
`from golf cart movement.” Id. at 2:3–5. Another stated objective is to
`define areas of a golf course where golf carts have limited access and
`movement is restricted. Id. at 2:5–9.
`The ’569 patent solves the problems identified in the prior art by,
`among other things, incorporating a controller that “automatically imposes
`restrictions on a golf cart’s movement . . . if the golf cart is positioned to
`enter a limited access area.” Id. at 2:54–59. As depicted in Figure 1 below,
`a golf cart control system is used to implement these concepts.
`
`
`
`Figure 1 of the ’569 patent above, “depicts a functional block diagram of a
`golf cart having a limited access controller.” Id. at 3:36–37. Movement of
`golf cart 10 is restricted “in response to driver inputs,” “if the movement
`violates a limited access area of the golf course.” Id. at 4:4–7. “A limited
`access controller 12 determines limited access area violations by comparing
`golf cart position determined from a GPS receiver 14 with limited access
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`areas defined in a limited access map 16.” Id. at 4:7–11. In one
`embodiment, when golf cart 10 approaches “a predetermined distance of
`green 18, limited access controller 12 reduces the maximum available speed
`of golf cart 10 and notifies the driver with a message and/or audible alert if
`the projected path of golf cart 10 will traverse green 18 or approach 20.” Id.
`at 4:49–53. Further, “[i]f the GPS position of golf cart 10 enters into
`approach 20, the available speeds of golf cart 10 are restricted, such as to
`selections like reverse gear that will result in a velocity vector out of the
`approach without crossing into green 18.” Id. at 4:56–60.
`
`B. Illustrative Claim
`Claims 1 and 2, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claims at
`
`issue:
`
`A system for control of a golf cart on a golf course, the
`1.
`golf cart having a motor for moving the golf cart, the system
`comprising:
`a GPS receiver operable to determine the golf cart position on
`the golf course;
`a map defining restrictions associated with predetermined areas
`of the golf course; and
`a controller interfaced with the GPS receiver and the map, the
`controller operable to apply predetermined control over the
`motor if the golf cart has a predetermined position relative to the
`predetermined areas of the golf course.
`2.
`The system of claim 1 wherein the predetermined control
`comprises an override of a driver input to the motor.
`Ex. 1002, 7:59–8:5.
`
`C. Related Proceedings
`Petitioner and Patent Owner identify a related litigation in the
`Southern District of Georgia involving the ʼ569 patent: Club Car, LLC v.
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`Yamaha Golf-Car Company, Case No. 1:17-cv-00034. Pet. 1; Paper 4, 1.
`Patent Owner also identifies a related petition (IPR2017-02144) challenging
`claims of the ’569 patent and two additional petitions (IPR2017-02141 and
`IPR2017-2142) challenging claims of related U.S. Patent No. 7,239,965 B2
`(“the ’965 patent”). Paper 4, 1. The patent at issue in this proceeding, the
`’569 patent, issued from a continuation of the application for the ’965 patent
`and shares an almost identical specification.
`D. Real Party-in-Interest
`Petitioner certifies that the real party-in-interest for this Petition is
`Yamaha Golf Car Company. Pet. 1. Patent Owner certifies that Club Car,
`LLC is the real party-in-interest. Paper 4, 1.
`
`E. References
`Petitioner relies on the following references:
`U.S. Patent No. 5,711,388, issued January 27, 1998 (Ex. 1008, “the
`’388 patent”);
`U.S. Patent Publication No. 2006/0052918 A1, filed March 18, 2003,1
`published March 9, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “the ’918 Publication”);
`Japanese Unexamined Patent Application Publication No. H9-128053
`B2, filed November 1, 1995, published May 16, 1997 (Ex. 1009, Ex. 1003
`(Petitioner’s translation), Ex. 2001 (Patent Owner’s translation), “the ’053
`Application”);
`
`
`1 Petitioner contends the ’918 Publication is entitled to priority to an earlier
`filed provisional application. Pet. 15–21. Specifically, Petitioner alleges
`that the ’918 Publication is entitled to priority to U.S. Provisional
`Application No. 60/365,339 (the “’339 Provisional”), which was filed on
`March 18, 2002. Based on the final record before us, we accept Petitioner’s
`contentions for purposes of this proceeding. See id.
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`Japanese Unexamined Patent Application Publication No. H9-75496,
`filed September 11, 1995, published March 25, 1997 (Ex. 1011, Ex. 1005
`(Petitioner’s translation), “the ’496 Unexamined Application”).
`Japanese Unexamined Patent Application Publication No. H11-
`316605, filed April 11, 1994, published November 16, 1999 (Ex. 1010, Ex.
`1004 (Petitioner’s translation), “the ’605 Unexamined Application”).
`F. Grounds Asserted
`Petitioner challenges the patentability of claims 1–20 of the
`
`ʼ569 patent on the following grounds (Pet. 3–4):
`References
`Basis
`’053 Application
`§ 102(a)
`
`Claims Challenged
`1–3 and 6–9
`
`’053 Application
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`4 and 8–10
`
`’053 Application and ’918 Publication
`’053 Application, ’918 Publication, ’496
`Unexamined Application, and ’605
`Unexamined Application
`’388 Patent
`
`’388 Patent
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`1–4 and 6–10
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`5, 11, and 122
`
`§ 102(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`13 and 14
`
`15
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`’388 Patent and ’918 Publication
`’388 Patent, ’918 Publication, ’053
`Unexamined Application, and ’496
`Unexamined Application
`’388 Patent, ’918 Publication, ’053
`Unexamined Application, and ’605
`Unexamined Application
`
`2 Petitioner’s chart (Pet. 3) lists claim 20 for this ground, but Petitioner’s
`later analysis is directed to claim 12 and not claim 20. See Pet. 39, 43.
`Regardless, claim 12 has been disclaimed as discussed in detail above.
`Thus, our final decision does not address claim 12.
`
`13–15
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`17–20
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`Petitioner also relies on the Declarations of Kevin C. Breen (Exs.
`1001, 1047). Patent Owner relies on the Declaration of Henry DeLozier
`(Ex. 2013) as well as the Declaration of Scott Andrews (Ex. 2015). The
`parties rely on other evidence and exhibits as addressed in the analysis
`below.
`To show the ’918 Publication qualifies as prior art, Petitioner relies on
`a priority date—March 18, 2002—of an earlier provisional application for
`the ’918 Publication, U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/365,339 (“the
`’339 Provisional”). Pet. 14–21. Patent Owner does not dispute that the
`’918 Publication is entitled to that earlier date. As such, we consider the
`’918 Publication to be prior art to the challenged claims for purposes of this
`proceeding.3
`We also note that Petitioner continues to fault Patent Owner for
`something it did in the institution phase—Patent Owner relied on improperly
`certified translations of the ’053 Publication. See Pet. Reply 7–10, 24 n.16.
`While the parties’ competing translations were a point of contention in the
`course of institution, they are no longer an issue now. Patent Owner
`concedes in its Response that, for purposes of this proceeding, it “will rely
`on Petitioner’s translation of the ’053 Application.” PO Resp. 14; Tr.
`63:17–64:6 (Patent Owner confirming that “[d]uring the trial . . . Petitioner’s
`translation is fine”). As such, we consider only the certified translation of
`the ’053 Publication offered into evidence by Petitioner and marked as
`Exhibit 1003. The two uncertified translations offered by Patent Owner—
`
`
`3 We note that Petitioner does not make this same contention in the
`companion 2144 IPR, relying instead on the ’918 Publication’s filing date of
`March 18, 2003, as the effective date for determining its prior art status.
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`Exhibits 2001 and 2003—will be disregarded. Tr. 64:5–9 (Patent Owner
`conceding that “there’s no prejudice” if the Board were to “exclude” the
`uncertified translations).
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`A petition must show how the construed claims are unpatentable
`under the statutory ground it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner
`bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and the
`burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware,
`LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To
`prevail, Petitioner must establish the facts supporting its challenge by a
`preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d).
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016).4
`Petitioner proposes the construction of two limitations –– “golf cart”
`and “driver.” Pet. 4–6; Pet. Reply 4–17. Patent Owner focuses its analysis
`
`
`4 The claim construction standard to be employed in an inter partes review
`recently has changed. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for
`Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
`Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Nov. 13, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
`42). That new standard, however, applies only to proceedings in which the
`petition is filed on or after November 13, 2018. This Petition was filed on
`September 26, 2017. Under the standard in effect at that time, “[a] claim in
`an unexpired patent . . . shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in
`light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b).
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`on these same two limitations. PO Resp. 4–12; PO Sur-Reply 6–14. Based
`on the final record before us, only the terms “golf cart” and “driver” need to
`be construed expressly as set forth below.
`1. “golf cart”
`The parties dispute the proper interpretation of the term “golf cart,”
`and as discussed below, their dispute centers on whether the claim term
`encompasses a rideable cart that carries a player and other passengers, as
`Club Car contends, or more broadly includes a riderless cart, such as a
`“caddy cart,” that carries only a player’s golf bag, as Petitioner argues. The
`reason for the dispute is because Petitioner relies on prior art disclosing pull
`type carts without a driver. Patent Owner contends that such a “cart caddie”
`does not disclose a “golf cart” and “driver” as those terms are used in the
`’569 patent. See PO Resp. 4–12. In our Institution Decision, after
`entertaining supplemental briefing, we construed the term “golf cart” to
`mean a motorized cart for carrying golfers or other passengers over a golf
`course. Having considered the parties’ latest contentions, addressing both
`intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, we maintain our initial construction of the
`term “golf cart” as a golf cart that carries golfers and other passengers, in
`other words, a rideable cart.
`Petitioner contends that the broadest reasonable construction of the
`term “golf cart” is “a motorized, wheeled vehicle intended for use on a golf
`course.” Pet. 4–5. According to Petitioner, the specification uses the term
`“golf cart” to refer not only to a vehicle used by a player, “but also to refer
`to any motorized wheeled vehicle that is intended to be operated on the
`course—manned or unmanned—including, for example, beverage carts and
`mowers.” Id. at 5 (citing Ex. 1002, 7:5–21). Petitioner notes the purpose of
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`the invention “is to ‘preempt or otherwise reduce damage from golf cart
`movement,’” thus, the specification must be referring to any motorized,
`wheeled vehicle intended for use on a golf course because any such vehicle
`could do harm. Id. at 6 (quoting Ex. 1002, 2:4–5).
`Resolution of the meaning of “golf cart” is important because, in
`asserting its anticipation and obviousness challenges, Petitioner relies on a
`broad definition of “golf cart” that means “any motorized, wheeled vehicle
`intended for use on a golf course.” Pet. 5–6. The term “golf cart,”
`according to Petitioner, “is not limited to a riding cart,” but encompasses any
`cart “that can carry either a passenger or equipment, or both.” Pet. Reply 2.
`In Petitioner’s view, the specification of the ’569 patent uses the term “to
`refer to any motorized wheeled vehicle that is intended to be operated on the
`course—manned or unmanned—including, for example, beverage carts and
`mowers.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002, 7:5–21). Petitioner further notes that the
`purpose of the invention described in the ’569 patent specification is to
`“preempt or otherwise reduce damage from golf cart movement,” which it
`asserts could be caused by “any motorized, wheeled vehicle,” regardless of
`whether or not it includes a driver or other rider. Id. at 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002,
`2:4–5); see also Pet. Reply 15–17 (citing Ex. 1002, 7:49–54).
`Patent Owner responds that the intrinsic record—the claim language
`and the specification of the ’569 patent—supports a construction of “golf
`cart” that requires “a cart with a driver.” PO Resp. 6 (emphasis omitted);
`see also PO Sur-Reply 8 (“[E]ach type of ‘golf cart’ described in the’569
`[p]atent is a cart with a driver.”) (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 34–42; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 61–
`63). Patent Owner points to the additional limitations of “‘driver interface
`unit’ and the ability to ‘override’ a ‘driver input’ (or ‘limit’ performance of
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`‘driver commands’),” found in dependent claims and asserts, in that context,
`the “golf cart” must be a rideable cart that carries golfers or other
`passengers. PO Resp. 5 (quoting Ex. 1002, claims. 2–5, 13). In further
`support, Patent Owner notes the ’569 patent’s objective of controlling a golf
`cart to address “damage caused by ‘[i]nattentive and even malicious golf cart
`drivers,’” which, it asserts, can only mean “manned golf cart operation.” Id.
`at 6; PO Sur-Reply 8. In addition, Patent Owner contends that the only type
`of “golf cart” contemplated by the ’569 patent “is a cart with a driver” and,
`in support, points to the specification’s reference to marshal carts, player
`carts, utility carts, beverage carts, handicap carts, and mowers. Id. at 6
`(citing Ex. 1002, 7:8–21). According to Patent Owner, those carts are all
`“manned vehicles controlled by an operator who rides in the vehicle.” Id. at
`6–7 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 34–42; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 61–63; Ex. 2016, 62:4–67:25).
`Patent Owner also relies on extrinsic evidence in the form of expert
`testimony and various federal and state regulations to contrast the industry’s
`definition of the terms “golf car” and “golf cart” as vehicles that “convey a
`person or persons and equipment to play the game of golf” and “are heavier
`and typically capable of much higher speeds,” with the industry’s
`understanding of the term “caddie carts,” which “do not carry golfers” and
`“are lighter and operate at slower speeds,” and, thus, “many of the
`environmental and safety concerns relevant to ‘golf carts’ are not present.”
`Id. at 9–11 (citing Ex. 2007, 2; Ex. 2009, 7; Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 19–24, 32, 33;
`Ex. 2015 ¶ 65; Ex. 2016, 47:2–20, 69:16–70:4).
`As we previously determined at the institution stage, the intrinsic
`evidence supports a construction of the term “golf cart” that means a
`motorized cart for carrying golfers or other passengers over a golf course.
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`Dec. 11. First, we note that the claim language itself focuses on limiting the
`ability of a “driver” to move the cart. For example, dependent claim 2
`recites “an override of a driver input to the motor.” That the “driver input”
`needs to be overridden or otherwise restricted presumes that the golf cart is
`being driven by a person who has independent control of the cart and is
`susceptible to driving in an unruly manner, in other words, an onboard driver
`of the cart. This is especially true given the lack of any indication in the
`claims of remote or autonomous operation of the cart. Numerous other
`dependent claims include similar references to a driver of the cart, for
`example, “override of driver input” (claim 3), “driver interface unit” (claim
`4), “limits the performance of driver commands” (claim 14), and “driver
`command” (claim 17).
`That the “golf cart” as claimed is construed to be a rideable cart with a
`driver onboard is further supported by the specification of the ’569 patent.
`At the outset, the specification explains a need “for control of a golf cart”
`due to the “substantial financial investment” that golf course owner’s make
`in the appearance of the golf course and the purchase of “golf carts for
`golfers to drive.” Ex. 1002, 1:20–38 (emphasis added). Golf carts place a
`risk on the owner’s investment because thoughtless golfers have the
`potential to damage sensitive areas “by driving a golf cart in the wrong
`place, such as locations having wet turf that is particularly susceptible to
`damage.” Id. at 1:43–47. “Inattentive and even malicious golf cart drivers,”
`the specification states, “also present a safety hazard by driving too fast or
`recklessly near other golfers or natural hazards, such as cliffs, water, steep
`inclines or sharp turns.” Id. at 1:47–51. Those types of actions are logically
`attributable to a driver of the cart. A riderless cart, on the other hand, being
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`much lighter in weight and slower in speed, does not raise those same
`groundskeeping and safety concerns, as even Petitioner’s expert
`acknowledges. See, e.g., Ex. 2016, 46:24–47:20 (confirming a rideable cart
`is “a lot heavier” than a caddy cart), 49:13–22 (testifying that a caddy cart
`has a “smaller” footprint than a rideable cart), 69:16–70:4 (testifying that the
`“speed” of a caddy cart is “walking pace; so you’re talking at most five
`miles an hour”).
`Indeed, the only depiction of a golf cart in the ’569 patent is figure 1,
`which shows a rideable cart equipped with a steering wheel, an accelerator
`pedal, and a seat for a driver and passenger. Ex. 1002, Fig. 1. As described,
`the golf cart moves “in response to driver inputs,” which include, for
`example, “throttle settings input through an accelerator pedal.” Id. at 4:4–7,
`5:11–19. Furthermore, the specification refers to a “driver” for the cart in
`describing the limited access areas where the cart cannot be driven: “areas
`in which driving a golf cart causes damage to the golf course grounds, and
`areas in which driving a golf cart presents a danger to the driver or others,
`such as sharp turns, steep hills and crowded parking areas.” Id. at 4:14–19
`(emphases added). Those descriptions, along with the only depiction of a
`golf cart in the ’569 patent, suggest a golf cart that is under the control of an
`onboard driver capable of steering and accelerating the cart in a manner that
`risks harm to the course, himself, and others.
`Moreover, while not conclusive, the fact that the specification is silent
`as to any remote operation or other autonomous control for the cart would
`indicate that the claimed “golf cart” is not directed to a riderless cart, such as
`a “caddy” cart. Indeed, the only golf carts exemplified in the ’569 patent are
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`rideable carts that carry a driver. For instance, the specification describes
`the claimed invention in terms of the following types of carts:
`Alerts of a limited access area violation are provided to the
`marshal and pro shop based on the type of golf cart that is
`violating the limited access area . . . . In alternative limited access
`areas, different types of defined areas, such as greens and driving
`ranges, may have different selections for different types of golf
`carts. For instance, the marshal and utility carts may be
`permitted to cross the driving range whereas other types of carts,
`such as player or beverage carts, are limited from such
`movement for safety reasons. As another example, a handicap
`vehicle and a mower are allowed on a green while all other types
`of vehicles are prohibited.
`
`Ex. 1002, 7:8–21 (emphasis added). Both parties’ experts confirm that each
`of the above-described golf carts is a “ridable cart” that “conveys a person or
`persons.” See Ex. 2016, 62:4–65:22, 67:21–25 (Petitioner’s expert
`confirming as much); Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 34–42, Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 61–63 (Patent
`Owner’s experts confirming as much). Indeed, Petitioner’s expert
`acknowledges “there is no mention of a caddy cart” in the ’569 patent,
`which he defines as “a vehicle that only carries clubs” and “is not a rideable
`golf cart.” Ex. 2016, 76:6–8, 144:8–12.
`
`Nonetheless, Petitioner argues at length that the term “golf cart” is a
`genus for two species of carts, namely, a “golf car” that carries a person and
`a “riderless cart,” such as a “caddie cart,” that carries only a golf bag. Pet.
`Reply 11–17. Petitioner contrasts the purportedly generic use of the term
`“golf cart” in the ’569 patent to the purportedly more specific term “golf
`car” in the provisional application to which the ’569 patent claims priority,
`and contends that “if the Patent’s inventors had wanted to restrict ‘golf cart’
`to only a riding cart (i.e., a golf car), they knew how to do so.” Id. at 15
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`(emphasis omitted). In other words, Petitioner would have us believe that
`the change from “golf car” to “golf cart” between the provisional application
`and the actual application proves the inventors’ intent to capture both species
`of carts—rideable and riderless—within the scope of the claimed invention.
`But what Petitioner overlooks is that the ’569 patent itself uses the terms
`“golf cart” and “golf car” interchangeably. In particular, Figures 3 and 4 of
`the ’569 patent use the terms “golf cart” and “golf car” without ever drawing
`any distinction between two. Ex. 1002, Figs. 3, 4. Figure 3 even uses both
`terms interchangeably in the same screen alert. Id. at Fig. 3 (“your cart has
`been slowed . . . [y]our car will continue to slow”). Thus, we are not
`persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the inventors intended one term to
`be more specific than the other. And because the ’569 patent uses the terms
`interchangeably and uses them in the specific context of a cart that carries a
`driver, as already discussed, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument
`that the term “golf cart” would have been understood to be a generic term
`encompassing more than just a rideable cart.
`The extrinsic evidence cited by both parties, while helpful, does not
`persuade us to deviate from the meaning of “golf cart” as derived from the
`intrinsic record. Petitioner cites several patents and brochures that use the
`term “golf cart” to describe a riderless cart that carries a golf bag (Pet. Reply
`10–11) and use the term “golf car” to describe a rideable cart (id. at 13–14).
`We note, however, that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
`(NHTSA) uses those terms interchangeably to mean “passenger-carrying
`vehicles,” or as defined in the glossary, a vehicle meant “to carry one or
`more people.” Ex. 2007, 1, 1 n.1, 2. Indeed, the NHTSA notes that “states
`from California to Florida” use the term “golf cart” (id. at 1) and gives an
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`example of a regulation from California that defines “golf cart” as “a motor
`vehicle . . . designed to carry golf equipment and not more than two persons,
`including the driver.” See, e.g., id. at 1, 3 n.5; see also Ex. 2009, 7. See
`Mars, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., L.P., 377 F.3d 1369, 1374, n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
`(“[R]egulations issued by regulatory agencies can be helpful to a claim
`construction analysis if they are probative of an industry-specific meaning
`for a disputed claim term.”); AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Sols., 419
`F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (relying on a U.S. Customs Service
`regulation, as well as a USITC ruling classifying “fiberfill” as synthetic or
`polyester fill material). Although we give this extrinsic evidence less weight
`than the intrinsic evidence, the regulations cited above show an industry
`understanding of the term “golf cart” that supports Patent Owner’s proposed
`interpretation.
`Thus, both the intrinsic and extrinsic record support a construction
`that limits the meaning of “golf cart,” particularly in the context of the
`’569 patent, to a motorized, rideable cart for carrying golfers or other
`passengers over a golf course. As such, we are not persuaded by
`Petitioner’s argument that a skilled artisan would have understood the term
`“golf cart” to refer to both a rideable cart and a riderless cart.
`2. “driver” – Claims 2, 3, 4, 17, 18, and 20
`Intertwined with our construction of “golf cart” is the meaning of
`“driver” as also recited in claims 2, 3, 4, 17, 18, and 20. Petitioner contends
`the term “driver” is “an individual who inputs movement-related commands
`to a golf cart.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002, 4:4–7). Patent Owner, in turn,
`proposes that it means “a person that rides in or on a motor vehicle while
`controlling its direction and speed.” PO Resp. 11–12. In our Institution
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`Decision, we observed that, “under a broad but reasonable interpretation,”
`the term “driver” as used in the context of the ’569 patent does not
`contemplate a “remote operator.” Dec. 12. We maintain that view and
`further clarify that the claimed “driver” is onboard the cart.
`As discussed above with respect to the claimed “golf cart,” the
`specification of the ’569 patent provides no suggestion of a remote operator
`for the golf cart, or, for that matter, that the driver is ever not physically
`present in the cart. Indeed, Petitioner’s own expert confirms that the ’569
`patent does not describe a riderless cart:
`Q [Counsel] There is no example anywhere in the ’965 patent5
`specifical
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