throbber

`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________________
`
`WESTERN DIGITAL CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`SPEX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`Patent Owner
`_________________________
`
`Case No. IPR2018-00082
`Patent 6,088,802
`_________________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER WESTERN DIGITAL’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO THE PETITION FOR INTER PARTES
`REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 6,088,802
`(AS AUTHORIZED BY PAPER 7)
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop Patent Board
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`

`

`
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`GENERAL PLASTIC IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT
`STATUTE AND THE APA, DOES NOT APPLY TO PETITIONS
`FILED BY A DIFFERENT PARTY, AND DOES NOT WARRANT
`A DISCRETIONARY DENIAL EVEN IF APPLIED ................................... 1 
`A.  General Plastic Is Contrary to Statutory Authority and the APA ........ 1 
`B.  General Plastic Should Only Apply to Repeat Petitions by the
`Same Party; But, Even if Applied Here, Does Not Warrant
`Denial .................................................................................................... 3 
`THE PETITION PROPERLY STATED HOW THE CHALLENGED
`CLAIMS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED UNDER 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.104(b)(3) .................................................................................................. 6 
`
`i
`
`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`Cases
`Apple Inc. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech.,
`IPR2017-00210, Paper 18 (June 30, 2017) ........................................................... 3
`Aqua Prod., Inc. v. Matal,
`872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 2
`Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
`488 U.S. 204 (1988) .............................................................................................. 2
`Carefusion Corp. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`IPR2016-01456, Paper 9 (Feb. 6, 2017) ............................................................... 7
`Famy Care Ltd. v. Allergan, Inc.,
`IPR2017-00566, Paper 12 (July 12, 2017) ........................................................... 5
`General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha,
`IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (Sept. 6, 2017) ............................................................ 1
`I.M.L. SLU v. WAG Acquisition, LLC,
`IPR2016-01657, Paper 11 (Feb. 27, 2017) ........................................................... 4
`Morton v. Ruiz,
`415 U.S. 199 (1974) .............................................................................................. 2
`NetApp Inc. v. Realtime Data LLC,
`IPR2017-01354, Paper 16 (Nov. 4, 2017) ........................................................ 1, 4
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee,
`797 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 8
`SAP Am. Inc. v. Clouding IP, LLC,
`IPR2014-00306, Paper 12 (May 19, 2014) ........................................................... 3
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC.,
`825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 2
`
` ii
`
`

`

`
`
`Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp.,
`514 U.S. 87 (1995) ................................................................................................ 2
`Toyota Motor Corp. v. Blitzsafe Texas LLC,
`IPR2016-00422, Paper 12 (July 6, 2016) ............................................................. 7
`Visa Inc. v. Leon Stambler,
`IPR2014-00694, Paper 1 (Apr. 25, 2014) ............................................................. 8
`Visa Inc. v. Leon Stambler,
`IPR2014-00694, Paper 10 (Oct. 31, 2014) ........................................................... 8
`Statutes
`5 U.S.C. §§ 552-553................................................................................................... 2
`5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................................................................ 2
`35 U.S.C. § 301(a)(2) ................................................................................................. 8
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ..................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 315(d) ..................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ..................................................................................................... 1
`Other Authorities
`157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (2011) .................................................................................... 8
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(1) .............................................................................................. 6
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 5
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) ........................................................................................ 6, 7
`37 C.F.R. § 42.106(a) ................................................................................................. 6
`37 C.F.R. § 42.106(b) ................................................................................................ 6
`
`
`
`
` iii
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`Exhibit List
`
`Exhibit Number
`1001
`
`Document
`U.S. Patent No. 6,088,802 (“the ’802 Patent”)
`
`1002
`
`1003
`
`1004
`
`1005
`
`1006
`
`1007
`
`1008
`
`1009
`
`1010
`
`1011
`
`1012
`
`1013
`
`1014
`
`Summons Returned as Executed, SPEX Techs., Inc. v.
`Western Digital Corp., Case No. 8:16-cv-01799 (C.D. Cal.
`filed Oct. 31, 2016)
`
`File History of the ’802 Patent
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,887,145 to Harari et al. (“Harari”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,199,163 to Dumas et al. (“Dumas”)
`
`Don Anderson, PCMCIA SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE: 16-
`BIT PC CARDS (MindShare, Inc., 2nd ed. 1995)
`(“PCMCIA Architecture”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,822,196 to Hastings et al. (“Hastings”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,922,060 to Goodrum (“Goodrum”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,941,965 to Moroz et al. (“Moroz”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,943,482 to Culley et al. (“Culley”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,009,151 to Staples (“Staples”)
`
`Windows Developers Journal, Vol. 7, No. 8 (Aug. 1996)
`
`Claim Construction Briefing in SPEX Techs., Inc. v.
`Western Digital Corp., Case No. 16-cv-01799 (C.D. Cal.)
`(“SPEX Claim Construction Brief”)
`
`Tentative Order Regarding Claim Construction in SPEX
`Techs., Inc. v. Western Digital Corp., Case No. 16-cv-
`01799 (C.D. Cal.) (“Tentative Construction”)
`
`1015
`
`Declaration of Dr. Martin Kaliski, Ph.D. (“Kaliski Decl.”)
`
` iv
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`1016
`
`1017
`
`1018
`
`1019
`
`1020
`
`1021
`
`Exhibit A (Updated) to Defendants’ Reply Claim
`Construction Brief
`
`Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings in SPEX Techs, Inc.
`v. Kingston Tech. Corp., et al., Case No. 16-cv-01790
`(C.D. Cal.) (“Markman Hearing Transcript”)
`
`Declaration of Sylvia Hall-Ellis, Ph.D. (“Hall-Ellis Decl.”)
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,765,027 to Wang et al. (“Wang”)
`
`MARC Record
`
`Teleconference Transcript, IPR2018-00082, -00084 (Feb.
`8, 2018)
`
` v
`
`

`

`
`
`I.
`
`GENERAL PLASTIC IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT
`STATUTE AND THE APA, DOES NOT APPLY TO PETITIONS
`FILED BY A DIFFERENT PARTY, AND DOES NOT WARRANT A
`DISCRETIONARY DENIAL EVEN IF APPLIED
`A. General Plastic Is Contrary to Statutory Authority and the APA
`The Board’s opinion in General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki
`
`Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (Sept. 6, 2017) (designated precedential Oct. 18,
`
`2017), set forth a framework for denying repeat IPR petitions by the same party
`
`based on discretion. Another Board panel recently applied that analysis to a
`
`second IPR filed by a different party in NetApp Inc. v. Realtime Data LLC,
`
`IPR2017-01354, Paper 16 at 10 (Nov. 4, 2017). But neither of those decisions are
`
`authorized by statute or regulation.
`
`Congress only provided the Board discretion to deny post-grant review
`
`petitions. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (applicable only to post-grant reviews when similar
`
`prior art or arguments were previously presented). But the IPR statutes do not
`
`contain any similar provision for discretionary denials of IPR petitions. 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(d). Rather, Congress tasked the Board with making a substantive evaluation
`
`of whether each IPR petition presents a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`
`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a); IPR2017-01354, Paper 16 at 9. General Plastic and NetApp
`
`exceed any Congressional authorization by allowing non-substantive denials of
`
` 1
`
`

`

`
`
`IPR petitions.
`
`Absent such authorization, the General Plastic and NetApp factors
`
`effectively amount to substantive or legislative rulemaking by adjudication, which
`
`is not permitted under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-553. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-36
`
`(1974); Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995)
`
`(Rulemaking required if rule adopted a new inconsistent position). It also violates
`
`Western Digital’s (“WDC”) due process rights because WDC had no notice that
`
`the Board would change its procedure to potentially require all parties to file any
`
`IPR Petition at the same time an earlier petition was filed by another party to avoid
`
`a discretionary dismissal under General Plastic/NetApp. Retroactively creating a
`
`new filing deadline and broadly announcing binding factors without notice violates
`
`Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking and is arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C.
`
`§§ 552-553, 706; Aqua Prod., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1319-20 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2017) (“Notice of agency rulemaking is insufficient where interested parties would
`
`have had to divine [the Agency’s] unspoken thoughts.”); Bowen v. Georgetown
`
`Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-209 (1988) (no retroactive rulemaking); SAS Inst.,
`
`Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (new claim
`
`construction after FWD not adequate notice).
`
` 2
`
`

`

`
`
`B. General Plastic Should Only Apply to Repeat Petitions by the
`Same Party; But, Even if Applied Here, Does Not Warrant Denial
`If applied at all, General Plastic should only apply to repeat petitions by the
`
`same party. NetApp is the first time any panel applied a General Plastic discretion
`
`analysis to deny a petition by a different party. To the contrary, other Board panels
`
`previously recognized a party’s right to pursue an IPR even after another petitioner
`
`filed an earlier IPR. See SAP Am. Inc. v. Clouding IP, LLC, IPR2014-00306, Paper
`
`12 at 13 (May 19, 2014) (the Board considers “each petition by a different
`
`petitioner on its own merits, in part, because a second petitioner has no control
`
`over the decision to see a review through [to] a determination on the merits if the
`
`second petitioner is not a party in that matter”); Apple Inc. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech.,
`
`IPR2017-00210, Paper 18 at 11-12 (June 30, 2017) (instituting a petition that
`
`presented different arguments from an earlier petition by a different petitioner).
`
`Further, the General Plastic factors weigh strongly in favor of institution.
`
`Factors 1 and 2 weigh strongly in favor of institution because WDC has not
`
`previously filed a petition challenging the ’802 patent. Indeed, these factors
`
`strongly favor first-time petitioners, indicating that the Board did not intend for
`
`those factors to apply to petitions filed by a different petitioner. The other factors
`
`also support institution.
`
`Factor 3 weighs in favor of institution. It purportedly was designed to avoid
`
` 3
`
`

`

`
`
`“tailor[ing]” of “arguments to address issues identified by the patent owner and/or
`
`the Board during a prior proceeding.” NetApp Inc., IPR2017-01354, Paper 16 at
`
`11. Here, SPEX suggests that WDC was aware of IPR2017-00430 (filed by
`
`Unified Patents) and IPR2017-00824 (filed by Kingston Technology Co.). Yet,
`
`SPEX has not identified a single portion of the present Petition that was tailored to
`
`address SPEX’s arguments or the institution decisions in the earlier petitions. Nor
`
`could it. The 824 IPR raised different prior art than the present Petition. IPR2017-
`
`00824, Paper 8 at 6. The 430 IPR did address one reference from the present
`
`Petition (Harari), but it did so against a wholly different set of claims in
`
`combination with a different reference. IPR2017-00430, Paper 8 at 6. The April
`
`3, 2017 status report WDC filed in the district court does not establish receipt of
`
`the patent owner preliminary responses or institution decisions from the 824 and
`
`430 IPRs because it was filed before those preliminary responses and institution
`
`decisions were filed. This factor thus weighs in favor of institution.
`
`With respect to Factor 4, SPEX concedes that the prior petitions did not
`
`include one of the prior art references (Wang) in WDC’s petition and that it was
`
`not included in WDC’s initial invalidity contentions. Moreover, the Petition was
`
`filed within the statutory period, before NetApp was issued, and before General
`
`Plastic was made precedential. See I.M.L. SLU v. WAG Acquisition, LLC,
`
`IPR2016-01657, Paper 11 at 8 (Feb. 27, 2017) (“[W]e do not penalize Petitioner
`
` 4
`
`

`

`
`
`for filing within the time allotted under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).”). This factor should
`
`not weigh against institution.
`
`Because WDC did not file multiple petitions directed to the same claims,
`
`Factor 5 should not apply. Further, WDC and SPEX were briefing claim
`
`construction in the district court during the summer of 2017. Because the Board
`
`construes claims of an expired patent (like the ’802 Patent) in IPR using the district
`
`court standard, 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), it was entirely appropriate for WDC to wait
`
`for a district court claim construction ruling before filing a Petition. But the
`
`district court ruling had not issued by WDC’s statutory deadline, so WDC filed its
`
`Petition using the SPEX’s then-proposed constructions. This explanation is
`
`reasonable, and this factor weighs in favor of institution.
`
`With respect to Factor 6, SPEX suggests that Petitioner should have filed the
`
`Petition with the 824 IPR to conserve Board resources. But the present Petition is
`
`different from the 824 Petition—different prior art, combinations, motivations to
`
`combine, expert testimony, and challenged claims. In similar situations, the Board
`
`has denied joinder. Famy Care Ltd. v. Allergan, Inc., IPR2017-00566, Paper 12 at
`
`9 (July 12, 2017). This factor weighs in favor of institution.
`
`Factor 7 also weighs in favor of institution because the 430 IPR and 824 IPR
`
`were not instituted, as SPEX agrees.
`
` 5
`
`

`

`
`
`II. THE PETITION PROPERLY STATED HOW THE CHALLENGED
`CLAIMS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)
`A petition must identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). The Petition here provided a statement of exactly how the
`
`challenged claims are to be construed for this proceeding, specifically noting that
`
`the Petition was “based on the claim constructions urged by Patent-Owner in the
`
`DCT Litigation, or as the parties agreed.” Pet. at 8. The Petition then listed, in
`
`detail, how each challenged claim is to be construed by explicitly providing
`
`SPEX’s construction or the agreed-upon constructions from the district court. Id.
`
`at 8-15. The Petition has thus met the requirements of section 42.104(b)(3).
`
`Yet, SPEX argues that WDC’s proposed claim constructions do not meet the
`
`requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). But the Petition’s compliance with
`
`section 42.104(b)(3) was already determined when the filed date was accorded
`
`under section 42.106(a). 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(a) (according a filing date when the
`
`petition “[c]omplies with section 42.104”). Had there been a deficiency, section
`
`42.106 required an opportunity for WDC to fix the lack of compliance. 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.106(b). If SPEX disagreed, it should have sought rehearing of the accorded
`
`filing date. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(1). It did not do so and thus waived any
`
`objection to the Petition’s compliance with § 42.104(b)(3).
`
`SPEX, instead, points to two panel decisions of the Board that it argues add
`
` 6
`
`

`

`
`
`subjective and formalistic requirements simply not found in the regulations or
`
`statute: (1) that Petitioner “believes” the construction is correct and should apply
`
`and (2) that Petitioner “take ownership” of the construction by explicitly
`
`“agree[ing],” “adopt[ing],” or “propos[ing]” the construction. Toyota Motor Corp.
`
`v. Blitzsafe Texas LLC, IPR2016-00422, Paper 12 at 26-27 (July 6, 2016);
`
`Carefusion Corp. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., IPR2016-01456, Paper 9 at 11 (Feb. 6,
`
`2017). There is simply no basis in statute, regulation, or the trial practice guide for
`
`requiring a subjective belief of correctness and an affirmative statement of
`
`ownership through agreement, adoption, or proposition. The rule merely requires a
`
`statement of “[h]ow the claims are to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). To
`
`the extent the Board requires these procedural hurdles to comply with its
`
`regulations, the APA requires more notice and comment.
`
`Even so, the cited portion of the Toyota decision about a subjective belief
`
`and explicit ownership was ultimately dictum because the Board decided that the
`
`Petitioner was impermissibly arguing indefiniteness of a means-plus-function term.
`
`Toyota, IPR2016-00422, Paper 12 at 27-28. In Carefusion, the basis for the
`
`Board’s decision was Petitioner’s specific statement that the patent owner’s
`
`constructions were incorrect. Carefusion, IPR2016-01456, Paper 9 at 6-7, 11
`
`(“[R]emarkably, however, Petitioner also states that it does not agree that those
`
`constructions are in fact correct.”). Neither of those situations are present here.
`
` 7
`
`

`

`
`
`The Board has evaluated and adopted claim construction positions of
`
`Petitioners that relied on district court constructions proposed for an expired patent
`
`solely “for the purposes of th[e] petition.” Visa Inc. v. Leon Stambler, IPR2014-
`
`00694, Paper 10 at 7-9 (Oct. 31, 2014); IPR2014-00694, Paper 1 at 7-10 (Apr. 25,
`
`2014). The Federal Circuit has also admonished the Board for not addressing a
`
`district court’s claim construction when directly argued by a Petitioner. Power
`
`Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Board has
`
`“obligation, in these circumstances, to evaluate [the district court’s]
`
`construction.”).
`
`Congress authorized anyone to cite at any time “statements of the patent
`
`owner filed in a proceeding before a Federal court … in which the patent owner
`
`took a position on the scope of any claim of a particular patent.” 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 301(a)(2). The purpose was to allow a patent owner’s statements about claim
`
`scope to “be considered in … inter partes and post-grant reviews for purposes of
`
`claim construction.” 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (2011) (Kyl).
`
`For these reasons, the Petition thus properly relied on SPEX’s proposed
`
`constructions from the district court.
`
`
`
`
`
` 8
`
`

`

`
`
`Date: February 20, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /Brian M. Buroker/
`
`Brian M. Buroker (Reg. No. 39,125)
`Blair A. Silver (Reg. No. 68,003)
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20036-5306
`Telephone: (202) 955-8541
`Facsimile: (202) 467-0539
`bburoker@gibsondunn.com
`bsilver@gibsondunn.com
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`
` 9
`
`

`

`
`
`Certificate of Service
`The undersigned certifies service pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e) on the
`
`Petitioner by e-mail of a copy of this Reply to the Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`
`Response to the Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 6,088,802 on
`
`the following parties:
`
`Peter Lambrianakos, plambrianakos@brownrudnick.com
`
`Alfred R. Fabricant, afabricant@brownrudnick.com
`
`Vincent J. Rubino, III, vrubino@brownrudnick.com
`
`Enrique W. Iturralde, eiturralde@brownrudnick.com, eiturralde@gmail.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /Brian M. Buroker/
`
`
`Brian M. Buroker (Reg. No. 39,125)
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20036-5306
`Telephone: 202.955.8541
`Facsimile: 202.467.0539
`bburoker@gibsondunn.com
`
`Attorney for Petitioner
`
`
`
`Date: February 20, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 10
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket