throbber
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________
`
`UNIFIED PATENTS, INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC LUXEMBOURG S.A. & UNILOC USA,
`Patent Owner.
`__________________________________
`
`Case IPR 2018-00199
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`__________________________________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Oral Hearing Held: February 28, 2019
`__________
`
`Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, CHARLES BOUDREAU, GARTH D. BAER,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`

`

`Case IPR 2018-00199
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`DAVID L. CAVANAUGH, ESQ.
`ELLYAR Y. BARAZESH, ESQ.
`of: Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr, LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`(202) 663-6025
`david.cavanaugh@wilmerhale.com
`ellyar.barazesh@wilmerhale.com
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`BRETT MANGRUM, ESQ.
`of: Etheridge Law Group, PLLC
`2600 E. Southlake Boulevard
`Suite 120
`Southlake, Texas 76092
`(817) 470-7249
`brett@etheridgelaw.com
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday,
`February 28, 2019, commencing at 3:00 p.m. at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
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`Case IPR2018-00199
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`P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
`
`(2:58 p.m.)
`JUDGE BAER: Okay, good afternoon, everyone. We are here for a
`final hearing in IPR 2018-00199, which is between Petitioner, Unified
`Patents and -- I'm sorry. Yes, between Petitioner Unified Patents and Patent
`Owner Uniloc.
`I'm Judge Baer, and we have appearing remotely, Judge Boudreau
`and Judge Quinn, as well. Let's go ahead and get the parties' appearances,
`please, if you would. Petitioner, you can go first.
`MR. BARAZESH: Sure. My name is Ellyar Barazesh. I'm counsel
`for Petitioner. And with me is Dave Cavanaugh, as well.
`JUDGE BAER: Great. Thank you.
`MR. MANGRUM: Good afternoon again, Your Honors. This is
`Brett Mangrum and -- you going to be okay remotely? And I will be
`presenting on behalf of Uniloc.
`JUDGE BAER: Great. Thank you. Welcome, thank you all for
`coming. We appreciate you coming here.
`Okay, we set forth the procedure in our hearing notice, but just to
`remind everybody how this will go, each party will have 30 minutes of total
`argument time.
`Please keep in mind that whatever you project up on the screen,
`Judges Boudreau and Quinn will not be able to see. So, if you would refer
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`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`to the slide number you're referring to, that way we can keep the record
`clear, and that way Judges Quinn and Boudreau what slide you're talking
`about.
`
`We'll remind the parties that under no circumstances should you
`object to the other party's materials during their argument time. So, if you
`want to object, that's fine. You can do that during your own argument time.
`But please save that for your argument time.
`We noted in an email to the parties that we would make
`accommodations for a sealed portion of this hearing. And we'd actually like
`to begin the hearing with addressing the RPI issue.
`So, what we'd like to do is go ahead and excuse anyone who's not
`signed a protective order acknowledgment. So, obviously, that's just going
`to be you all over here, since Mr. Mangrum is the only one here for patent
`owner. So, where does that put you all?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Your Honor, we have all signed the
`protective order. It's our confidential information. So, that's -- I think we're
`fine.
`
`JUDGE BAER: Great. Any objection, Mr. Mangrum?
`MR. MANGRUM: Only to the extent that we haven't received any
`copy of the signed acknowledgment from opposing counsel. I have signed
`the protective order copy.
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`JUDGE BAER: And you would agree that it's going to be all their
`information anyway. Correct?
`MR. MANGRUM: Yes. And for that reason we have no objection.
`I just want to clarify the record that there's been no documentation of a
`signed acknowledgment.
`JUDGE BAER: Great. Okay. Like I said --
`MR. CAVANAUGH: I'm sorry, Your Honor. We do have a
`signed -- if the patent owner would like to see them, we have signed copies.
`JUDGE BAER: That's really up to you all. That's fine. You can
`exchange those after the hearing. So -- as I said, we'd like to start with the
`RPI issue. So, if -- Petitioner, if you would like to reserve some specific
`time -- we may get to the substance anyway, but if you would like, you're
`certainly welcome -- either party actually is welcome to reserve specific time
`to address the merits outside of the RPI, you're welcome to do that. But
`otherwise, we'll just go forward and start with the RPI issue.
`So, does that make sense? Are there any particular questions for
`Petitioner?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: No, Your Honor.
`JUDGE BAER: And from patent owner?
`MR. MANGRUM: Not from patent owner, Your Honor.
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`JUDGE BAER: Great. So, with that we are ready to begin. As I
`said, each party will have 30 minutes of time. Petitioner, do you wish to
`reserve some rebuttal time?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Yes. We'd like to -- and I'll get to the
`podium.
`JUDGE BAER: Sure.
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Your Honor, we'd like five minutes of
`rebuttal time. We anticipate, unless Your Honors have a lot of questions,
`that the RPI issue should take five or ten minutes, and then the balance of it
`we would reserve for the technical merits.
`But of course, if Your Honors have questions about the RPI issue,
`we're happy to entertain them, as long as Your Honors have questions.
`JUDGE BAER: Well, why don't we start with the RPI issue, and
`we'll just kind of go as long as it goes. If there's a point at which you'd like
`to stop and turn to different issues, you can certainly let us know.
`But we'll start with -- you said you'd like to reserve four minutes?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Five minutes.
`JUDGE BAER: Five minutes. So, we'll start with that. We'll start
`with 25 minutes and you'll get a yellow light with five minutes to go. So,
`with that, whenever you're ready.
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Very good, Your Honor. Thank you. This is
`Dave Cavanaugh with the Petitioner, Unified Patents, and I'm going to fast-
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`Case IPR2018-00199
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`forward through much of the technical discussion to the RPI issue, which is
`on slide 28 of the presentation.
`And I have a couple of preliminary comments regarding the RPI
`issue. And that RPI, as Your Honors know, has kind of spurred some
`additional, like, discovery, discussion, after the RPX-AIT case in the
`summertime, and, you know, the parties have exchanged voluntary
`discovery. And, like, we have responded to questions.
`I think, Your Honors, in view of AIT, you know, there are two
`questions Your Honors can raise. Has AIT changed the law, changed the
`standard of RPI determinations. And the answer to that is no, AIT doesn't
`articulate a new standard or a different standard. The AIT case points back
`to the trial practice guide, the governing document of practitioners and the
`PTAB, for this particular issue.
`One of the questions -- and I'll talk about what the trial practice
`guide provides with regard to the AIT case -- but the second question that I
`think Your Honors should ask and answer for this proceeding, is whether
`there's any evidence that's been proffered in this proceeding, that addresses
`the articulated standard of RPX in a way that would indicate that Unified has
`not complied with the RPI standard in designating the RPIs for this
`proceeding.
`Again, Unified's position is that that answer is no, that there is no
`evidence in the record, even with the volume of information that we
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`voluntarily provided to the Patent Owner here, Uniloc, we have provided
`information, but none of that information even remotely rises to the level of
`an RPI determination that we have not complied with the RPI responsibility.
`So, with those two preliminary comments, I'd like to address like
`foundationally, like what it is that the RPI determination or the RPI inquiry
`should enquire.
`I think, Your Honors, in a variety of different cases, and this is not
`the first case that Unified has been both challenged on RPI, but then, also,
`have addressed it in significant ways, and there's been no board, no panel,
`that has found RPI to not have been, or to be an issue with regard to Unified
`patents.
`JUDGE BAER: But can you just address the opposite of that --
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: Mr. Cavanaugh, can you cite any cases that
`have come out since the RPX versus the AIT case that have concluded that
`Unified was not obligated to identify its members as RPIs?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Yes, Your Honor. I believe there are five of
`them that have come down at the -- and I am looking at my notes to see if I
`have them.
`And I think -- why don't I ask my colleague to look at that. I
`think -- would you confirm that these are the cases?
`So, on slide 29, which you're -- kind of said, previewing where I was
`going --
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`JUDGE QUINN: But does this -- I'm sorry, I just want to clarify.
`The cases we're interested in are cases in which, like my colleague said, are
`whether Unified Patents is not obligated to list its members of RPIs. That
`decision.
`Not -- we're not looking for cases in which Unified Patents was a
`petitioner and there wasn't sufficient evidence to even raise the issue of RPI
`because there was no discovery, or things of that procedural nature. We are
`aware those exist.
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay, Your Honor. And so, your question,
`just so I understand it, is whether or not there's been a panel that has made
`the determination that Unified should name -- should not name its members
`as RPIs.
`JUDGE QUINN: Correct, based on evidence of record of your
`practices and things similar to the evidence we have seen here.
`MR. CAVANAUGH: As I stand here, I can't point to a particular
`case that has identified that particular comment.
`There may be a comment in one of the cases, but I'm not aware of
`that. But I will look once I'm off the podium, to confirm that.
`But even so, there has been a volume of discovery regarding
`Unified's practices, regarding Unified's activities with regard to its members
`and its business practices.
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`And I think that from the core principles of whether there's direction,
`funding or control, because as you go through the trial practice guide, those
`are the kinds of things that are relevant to the RPI determination.
`And, Your Honor, here in this proceeding, there is no evidence that
`any of the members have directed, or directly funded, or controlled, these
`proceedings.
`In fact, as the evidence in the record indicates,
`expressly prohibits that.
`JUDGE QUINN: Can I interrupt you there?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Sure.
`JUDGE QUINN: We -- what I'm looking for, to be honest with you,
`is, what evidence do we have that, vis-a-vis the relationship of Unified and
`its members, that aligns with what the Federal Circuit said in the AIT
`case -- Federal Circuit faulted the board for not looking deeper into that
`relationship -- and the nature of the company, itself, and that also being a
`factor.
`
`
`
`And what I'm looking for is that relationship, which the Federal
`Circuit noted that it was an equitable -- from the practical and equitable
`standpoint, who stands to benefit from the results of that tribunal?
`And so, from where I stand, your contractual obligations with your
`members may put a wall between the control issue, but it doesn't explain that
`the relationship between United and its members is such that you do not
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`Case IPR2018-00199
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`align your interests -- you do not perform actions that don't align with the
`interests of your members.
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Thank you, Your Honor, for that question. I
`want to respond in two ways. One, the AIT case does talk about a beneficial
`relationship. That -- and different than, say, what the facts were in the AIT
`case.
`
`We do not have a beneficial relationship with our members. What
`we do have are technology zones that we've divided into, and so we work
`like toward removing what we consider to be invalid patents on technology
`zones.
`
`And, you know, we don't know whether any particular activity, any
`particular filing, that we would do actually is beneficial to any one member,
`or all members, or even non-members of a technology sector.
`Because what we do is, we look at the prior art, we look at the
`claims, and we file a petition when we think the claims don't meet the
`statutory requirement of patentability.
`JUDGE QUINN: But why would you do that if it doesn't benefit
`absolutely anybody you're interested in?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: It benefits anyone with a product in a zone
`of -- within a particular technology zone, which is how Unified divides their
`business.
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`So, there is no particular benefit for any particular member. And,
`you know, we don't -- in fact, we cannot know whether or not an IPR would
`benefit a particular member, because, one, we don't talk to them about the
`particulars of the IPR, but even more fundamentally, you know, we take
`positions based on invalidity.
`We have no idea what the non-infringement positions are. We have
`no idea what the 112 issue -- I'm sorry, what claims issues might be present.
`So, all of those things are just unknowable to us. And, you know, if
`your question is whether or not there's some undifferentiated benefit to the
`industry, a particular technology sector, or the public-at-large, because a
`patent has been challenged or canceled as a result of Unified's activity, I
`think that's the business model.
`But to the extent that that gets translated into a particularized benefit
`for a particular member, or even group of members, that's just simply
`unknowable.
`JUDGE BAER: Is Unified aware --
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: And how does that distinguish the
` from the relationship between RPX
`relationship between Unified and
`and Salesforce that was at issue in the AIT case?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: I think there are a number of different
`distinctions, and I think I have a couple of slides on that. To the extent that
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`there are, you know -- the AIT case and, you know, the RPX model, is just
`very different than Unified's model.
`And, you know, we -- and this is our slide, I think, 30, now -- 20,
`yeah, 30 -- you know, we protect technology zones. We don't protect
`members.
`And that's clear from our -- the way that we do our business, the way
`we structure our business, members don't have control or an opportunity to
`control Unified, and, you know, there -- in fact, as I mentioned a moment
`ago, the contract requires them not to have any control.
`We don't work on behalf of members to resolve their litigations.
`That's a difference. And you'll see that what I'm doing is looking at some of
`the salient features in the RPX case with Salesforce, versus the -- or
`with -- in the AIT case, with how Unified structures its business with any
`particular member, including the member that may also be a party to a
`litigation here, for this patent.
`JUDGE BAER: Is Unified taking into consideration whether
`members have been sued on a particular patent when it determines what
`patents to challenge in an IPR?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: No, Your Honor. They do not.
`JUDGE BAER: Is Unified aware of what patents have been asserted
`against its members, generally?
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`MR. CAVANAUGH: Generally, I can't speak to the specifics of
`anything in particular. But in general, they do follow the industry. You
`know, the fact that a particular litigation has been filed, I think they are
`aware of litigations that are filed.
`I don't think they -- but on a particular litigation, I can't speak with
`any certainty whether this or any other litigation is the subject of
`consideration.
`I think Kevin Jakel's declaration does speak to that in terms of like
`how they understand their role and what they do to select patents associated
`with where they want to go with their IPRs.
`JUDGE QUINN: Well, actually, that declaration doesn't really
`explain how those patents are selected. It just vaguely states that they don't
`have input from the particular entities, but it doesn't describe how do you
`select patent X for an IPR, other than to mention some deterrent value to a
`technology zone, and there is no explanation as to how that value is
`determined.
`And my question to you is, is there any consideration of the litigation
`activity concerning patents in that technology zone, in order to assign a
`deterrent value?
`
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor, in this
`case or any other case. I think their selection of a patent associated with
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`determining whether or not to file an IPR, like clearly, there has to be a prior
`art search.
`Clearly, there has to be some consideration of what claims might be
`not meeting a statutory requirement for patentability, whether it's 102, 103 in
`the pre-AIA cases.
`And I think that those -- it is kind of that consideration. It's those
`determinations that govern whether or not they're going to file it.
`I think, also, they consider, you know, where that patent is in the
`technology sector. But aside from that, I'm not sure that they have any rules
`that they go by to consider whether or not to file an IPR.
`And then, clearly, I will say that they believe that once they go
`through the process and they've identified prior art, that the prior art
`challenges are going to merit kind of consideration to the board about
`validity.
`But I think that that's kind of the sine qua non of getting the Petition
`on file. Does that answer your question, Your Honor?
`JUDGE QUINN: Somewhat, but I want to ask you, then, a follow-
`up. Then, it sounds like you do your own determination, and then, entities
` do their own determination. And you're telling me it's pure
`coincidence that you would file a petition around the same time the party
`files a petition.
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` or any
`MR. CAVANAUGH: We have no knowledge of what
`other member would be doing regarding a particular, like, IPR filing.
`And, you know, just having filed a number of different IPRs, if
`there's a two- or three-day kind of sequence between it, and, you know, we
`don't know about what the other side has done.
`Like, it is just -- like the filing process of preparing -- the preparing
`process of preparing and filing an IPR takes time.
`And I can't speak to why there might have been, you know, a two- or
`three-day, or a week, or some other period of time, between filings. That's
`simply not something that I know about.
`JUDGE QUINN: Great. That's why I asked if it was pure
`coincidence. Because, if you can't tell, then it's just coincidence.
`MR. CAVANAUGH: That's right. It is -- as far as I know, it is
`coincidence. And, you know, it is, you know -- I think that that's kind of the
`dynamic that Unified's confronted with.
`I mean, they are willing to choose which patents they want to pursue.
`You know, they would like to be out in front and to file when they are
`satisfied that they have a meritorious case.
`Sometimes, it takes time once they make that determination and get
`it on file.
`But because there is no consideration from any members and there's
`no communication with any members about anything Unified does with
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`regard to the preparation and filing of IPRs, that it is any, like, coincidence,
`or any timing sequences, is just simply coincidence, or even random.
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: Is there any reason in this case not to list the
`members that would benefit as the real parties in interest in this case?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: I think Your Honor raises a very good point
`in the sense that there is no time-bar issue, which, you know, as I was going
`through, one of the ones I was going to raise going through the differences
`between what was in the AIT case and what's relevant to these particular
`facts, is there is no time-bar that we're working with.
`And, in fact, that's -- I think that it was a determination of why the
`Fed Circuit was looking in the AIT case and in some ways encouraging the
`board to look more deeply at the facts associated with the RPI determination
`there.
`
`That simply is not the case here. To the extent of whether or not
`there is any hindrance, I mean, without having a time-bar that Unified is
`working with, certainly we want to comply with the law.
`Certainly, we -- you know, our interpretation of what the law
`requires, as articulated in the trial practice guide and in other cases,
`including AIT, that we've fully satisfied what the RPI requirement is.
`But in terms of there is no reason why -- if the law was different, or
`
`if instructed otherwise, we would, you know, certainly comply with the
`law.
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`JUDGE BAER: Could I push you a little bit on the coincidence
`point? You said that you were not aware of any communications related to
`the Petition, and that it's just coincidence that this Petition relies on the same
`prior art
` -- principally, the same prior art
`
`
`of
`
`.
`Is it possible that there would be communications that you are
`unaware of? And what I'm asking is, did you principally prepare the brief?
`Are you aware of what went into this brief?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Yeah, I am aware of what went into the brief.
`And, you know, there was no communication. If I said I'm not aware of it,
`it's just -- it's a kind of reflexive, lawyerly response.
`JUDGE BAER: But you prepared this brief and you were not aware
`positions in its brief
`. Is that correct?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: That's correct, Your Honor. And, you know,
`I'm happy to go through a few more of my slides. I think I've answered
`many of the topics that I wanted to raise.
`And this -- you know, I think that we don't have an attorney-client
`relationship which, to Judge Boudreau's question earlier, that is another
`difference between us and the other case.
`And we, of course, you know, our business model, as well as our
`agreements, all prevent communication between our clients.
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`Case IPR2018-00199
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`And, you know, none of the facts here, and this is on slide 31,
`Unified's practices ensure that it retains control.
`You know, and I want to be clear that we have voluntarily produced,
`you know, a number of documents, and of the nature of the relationship of
`Unified with our members in all the IPRs that we are a part of. And that's
`what I think is key here.
`And the -- you know, I think that in the last point is probably my last
`point that I'm going to raise, Judge Boudreau, there is no time-bar, which I
`think was one of the core facts of what this was --
`JUDGE BAER: I don't disagree with you that it was a core fact.
`That seems to resonate with me, as well. I just don't know that I see that in
`the opinion.
`Where in the opinion can we tie their decision to -- how do we tie the
`Federal Circuit's decision to the fact that Salesforce was actually time-barred
`because they had already filed a petition and lost on that petition?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: I think that -- I agree with you. It's not kind
`of expressly stated perhaps in the most clean way. But I do think clear in the
`dynamic that was presented, the facts associated with the case and as it went
`up to the Fed Circuit, I think that truly was an issue.
`How to tie it into that case? I think it probably goes to like why RPI
`might be an issue, why it might be that. So, I think it answers the why
`question.
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`Case IPR2018-00199
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`Like, we don't have the same motivation as perhaps was present in
`the other case.
`JUDGE BAER: One additional question for you before you sit
`down. Are you aware, we asked you earlier, of any cases that addressed
`Unified's alleged failure to name RPI, that its decisions were being patented?
`Are you aware of other cases right now where this is an issue, where
`this issue has been briefed and argued, but there hasn't been a decision on it,
`specifically with Unified?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: I think there's a collateral case with Uniloc
`that has not yet been decided.
`JUDGE BAER: Okay.
`MR. CAVANAUGH: And there may be one or two others. And I
`can get you a list, Your Honor, if that would be helpful.
`JUDGE BAER: That'd be great. Anything further from my
`colleagues?
`JUDGE QUINN: I have one last question. It seems to me that the
`factor that doesn't bode well for you is that the interests of Unified, I mean
`the business model of Unified, is precisely to do what it's doing here, is to
`assert invalidity of the patents in the patent office. Do you have any other
`business goals that are not in that vein, and that we have not seen from your
`records?
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`Case IPR2018-00199
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`MR. CAVANAUGH: Sure. We've provided -- and part of it is in
`the record -- we provide information to members -- you know, data sets to
`members -- that are outside the course of filing IPRs.
`We also file things other than IPRs. Unified, you know, as part of
`our contract, considers whether reexamination might be a vehicle for
`challenging a patent.
`And so, I think there are a number of other things that Unified does
`that are outside the course of this IPR proceeding. This kind of PTAB
`proceeding.
`Unified's business is, you know, is evaluating and, like, challenging
`patents for technology sectors. I think that that's pretty clear for the record.
`I mean, I think that the nature of what we do, though, is to like look
`at patents for particular technology sectors or sections, or technology areas,
`and challenge those that we think are invalid. And there's plenty of cases
`that say that that's okay.
`JUDGE QUINN: I'm sorry. You said that there are plenty of cases
`that stated that's okay?
`MR. CAVANAUGH: To challenge patents that are -- like I'm not
`saying the RPI issue. To challenge patents. Like, that is the process of an
`IPR, is to challenge the validity of patents. And that's all I meant, Your
`Honor.
`
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay. Thank you.
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`Case IPR2018-00199
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`MR. CAVANAUGH: Thank you.
`JUDGE BAER: Thank you, counsel. Okay, Mr. Mangrum, would
`you like to preserve any time for a sur-rebuttal?
`MR. MANGRUM: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like to reserve five
`minutes to the extent the questioning allows.
`Just to I understand the process here, Your Honors, are we kind of
`bifurcating this hearing such that I will first present on only the RPI issue?
`JUDGE BAER: We would like you to start on the RPI issue. We
`don't have -- if you want to address the substantive issues, you're welcome
`to. But we'd like for you to start with the RPI issues, and we are not going to
`add additional time to the 30 minutes for the substantive issues. So --
`MR. MANGRUM: I will sit down, let him use his remainder of
`time, and then stand back up for my case-in-chief. I do it all at once is what
`you're saying.
`JUDGE BAER: You're welcome to reserve the five minutes and to
`come back with the five minutes, and you can sort of address what you want.
`We'd like you to start with the RPI issue, but how you divide your 25
`minutes here between the RPI issue and the substantive case is really up to
`you.
`
`MR. MANGRUM: That answers my question. Thank you, Your
`
`Honor.
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`Case IPR2018-00199
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`JUDGE BAER: Okay. All right, with that you may begin when
`you're ready.
`MR. MANGRUM: I want to clarify one thing for the record that's
`very important.
`Uniloc has not alleged that all members of Unified Patents need to be
`named here. When you look at the papers, what Uniloc's done is provided
`evidence -- quite a bit of evidence -- to show that
`, in
`particular, should have been named.
`So, the question's not, should all members be named. It's those
`parties in particular.
`JUDGE BAER: And why are they special?
`MR. MANGRUM: Well, part of the reason is we've looked at the
`contracts associated with those two parties, and there's Unified Patents
` exactly what they did
`here, is take efforts to file IPR patents. And this is exactly what they did.
`So,
` is to do exactly what they did here.
`.
`Now, as Judge Quinn mentioned, the contract is kind of careful to
`suggest there's no direct control. But that doesn't change the fact
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`Case IPR2018-00199
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`Who benefits from this? The party that's
`.
`And I want to draw Your Honors' attention to the last slide of the
`presentation, slide 38.
`JUDGE BAER: Is this your presentation or theirs?
`MR. MANGRUM: Sorry, it's our presentation.
`JUDGE BAER: Thank you.
`MR. MANGRUM: Uniloc's presentation?
`And here -- so, he's suggested -- opposing counsel suggested there
`was no evidence on record that Unified's ever singled out
`
`.
`Now, granted, the production was pretty lean. We expected there
`would have been a lot more communications here. But we did receive this,
`and this is a communication specific to this IPR.
`So, slide 38, it references Exhibit 1018. Sorry, I'm not sure if
`that's -- wait a minute. What it is, just for the record, is an email between
`. That's
`. And it specifically calls out
`Unified and
`two parties that have been sued on this patent.
`This is an email -- sorry. To suggest there's no singling out of
` is just false.
`I also want to point out the fact -- this is in our briefing -- we show a
`number of cases that Unified's filed against Uniloc. And you have to admit
`
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`Case IPR2018-00199
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`when you look at the facts, I would be surprised if there is a private patent-
`holder larger than Uniloc that has as many active patents as Uniloc does.
`So, you know, like it's hundreds -- hundreds of patents. But which
`patents are being selected by Unified to challenge? It's the ones that Uniloc
`has asserted against Unified's members.
`It's a repeated pattern. Uniloc sues a case, several months later there
`is an IPR filed. And so, to suggest that there's no bearing -- and, in fact, I
`object to the unsworn testimony that was offered here today, that Unified
`doesn't look at the -- who's sued.
`First of all, if he wants to offer that testimony, I would have deposed
`him on that point. But the facts strongly suggest otherwise, when you just
`look at the facts and look at a pattern of behavior.
`Unified -- Uniloc -- sorry, the names are so similar. Uniloc sues.
`Months later, Unified challenges.
`And we see this over and over again. Which p

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