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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`SONOS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`IMPLICIT, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: June 17, 2019
`____________
`
`
`
`Before MICHELLE N. WORMMEESTER, SHEILA F. McSHANE, and
`NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
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`
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`RORY P. SHEA, ESQUIRE
`COLE B. RICHTER, ESQUIRE
`Lee Sullivan Shea & Smith, LLP
`224 N Desplaines Street
`Suite 250
`Chicago, IL 60661
`(312) 754-9606
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`KIRK VOSS, ESQUIRE
`The Davis Firm, PC
`213 N. Fredonia Street, Suite 230
`Longview, Texas 75601
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Monday, June 17,
`
`2019, commencing at 1:00 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`USPTO Madison Building, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
` JUDGE McSHANE: You may be seated. Thank you.
`Just bear with us one minute. Thank you.
` Okay. Good morning or good afternoon rather
`everyone. We're here to conduct an oral hearing in the Sonos
`v. Implicit case. It's IPR 2018-00766 and 2018-00767. We are
`going to hear both these cases in a combined manner at this
`hearing. Can we have appearances please? Petitioner?
` MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor. Rory Shea from Lee
`Sullivan Shea & Smith, LLP on behalf of Petitioner Sonos, Inc.
`Also with me is Cole Richter from Lee Sullivan firm as well.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Thank you, Mr. Shea.
` And for Patent Owner?
` MR. VOSS: Kirk Voss, Davis Firm, on behalf of
`Implicit, Patent Owner.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Thank you. Okay. We included
`the general order of arguments for today's hearing in the
`trial order. To briefly review what we're going to do is
`Petitioner will have -- will present its case. You will have
`one hour to do so. You may reserve rebuttal time. Patent
`Owner will then argue its opposition. You'll have one hour
`total as well and you may reserve surrebuttal time. Then
`we're going to have Petitioner's rebuttal and Patent Owner's
`surrebuttal.
` A couple of reminders. If you're using
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`demonstratives or if you're referring to demonstratives, which
`you likely probably will be, if you could call out the sheet
`number, the page number for that demonstrative it would be
`greatly appreciated. It will help the reporter keep the
`record correct and also Judge Khan is here remotely and it
`will help him to be able to follow the slides. He doesn't see
`a real -- I don't believe Judge Khan sees a real time of the
`slides. He's got a slide deck on his computer. So please try
`to remember the callouts. I know it's difficult particularly
`when you get in the heat of the moment. So thank you for
`that.
` And if you could please remember, use the
`microphone at the podium. Again, Judge Khan needs to hear it
`and, again, it helps the court reporter. And also, when the
`other party is on their feet please don't interrupt them with
`objections. When you get up for your argument time you can
`present your objections. Understood or no?
` MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Okay. Thank you. And with
`that we may proceed. Petitioner, Mr. Shea, when you're ready.
` MR. SHEA: Thank you, Your Honor.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Do you reserve rebuttal time?
` MR. SHEA: Yes, I'm going to reserve 20 minutes for
`rebuttal time, Your Honor.
` JUDGE McSHANE: What I'm going to do, Mr. Shea,
`is I'm going to just run this clock which you should be able
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`to see here, I think, somewhere. Do you see the clock?
` MR. SHEA: The only clock I see is back here.
` JUDGE McSHANE: All right. Well, let me start
`it. Let me see how we go. And I'll keep track and when
`you're done I'll just note how much rebuttal time you have
`remaining. Okay?
` MR. SHEA: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Thank you.
` MR. SHEA: Good morning, Your Honors. Sonos' IPR
`petitions in this case establish that every challenged claim
`of Implicit's patents were unpatentable. Specifically the IPR
`petition for the 791 Patent established that Janevski
` anticipates every claim of that patent and the
`petition for the 252 Patent establishes that Janevski in
`combination with one of the clock sync references or any of
`the clock sync references establishes unpatentability of every
`challenged claim of the 252 Patent. And I apologize. I'm
`looking at Slide 2 right now on the screen which highlights
`that issue.
` Sonos -- both those petitions rely on expert
`declarations, and we're looking at Slide 3 now, from Dr. Roman
`Chertov who provided testimony that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art, how they would interpret the
`disclosure of the prior art and the claims in this case and he
`concluded that every challenged claim of both patents was
`unpatentable.
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` Now looking at Slide 5, in response to that
`evidence and argument that Sonos' petition presented, Implicit
`fails to present any of its own evidence with respect to the
`prior art here. Instead that's all they've done with respect
`to the teachings of Janevski or Sonos' obviousness case is
`presented attorney argument to try to rebut that. But the
`problem with that is the Federal Circuit has said that you
`can't -- attorney argument alone is not evidence. You need to
`rebut admitted evidence with other evidence. Implicit hasn't
`done that here. And so for that reason alone we think that
`you can disregard the arguments they're trying to make with
`respect to Janevski, with respect to Dr. Chertov's testimony
`on Janevski as nothing more than attorney argument with no
`evidentiary support.
` Now turning to the specifics of those arguments, if
`you were to go further their primary argument with respect to
`the disclosures of Janevski is that it doesn't teach the
`device time limitations of the claims.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Excuse me. Go ahead.
` MR. SHEA: So their primary argument is that it
`doesn't teach the device time limitations of the claims and
`I'm looking at Slide 6 here which is an excerpt from their
`brief on that. But that's not correct. Our petition, Sonos'
`petition for the 791 Patent in particular, which is really
`where this issue is relevant, walked through and explained
`that the Janevski reference, it discloses the synchronization
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`of PVRs which are personal video recorders and those personal
`video recorders have something called a video timer and the
`video timer outputs something called a time count. And Dr.
`Chertov evaluated that portion -- excuse me. My apologies.
`So let me take one step back.
` On Slide 7, as set forth in our petitions, what a
`device time is in the context of the 791 Patent is it's a time
`indicated by a clock of a rendering device. That's -- or in
`the parlance of the specification, a designed clock of the
`rendering device. That is what a device time is here. And as
`I noted, Janevski discloses that each of the PVRs has a video
`timer that outputs a time count. Dr. Chertov reviewed the
`disclosure of Janevski from the perspective of a person of
`ordinary skill in the art. And looking at Slide 9 here, this
`is an excerpt from Dr. Chertov's declaration on that issue
`and he concludes that a video timer amounts to a clock of a
`PVR and that the time count output by that video timer amounts
`to the claims device time.
` That evidence is unrebutted. Dr. Chertov's
`evidence on that is unrebutted. The only thing you can find
`in Implicit's papers is attorney argument on that without any
`support on the record at all. And their main argument is that
`a timer -- the reason that Janevski doesn't disclose device
`time is because a timer isn't a clock. Again, no support for
`that other than their arguments.
` In contrast, not only has Sonos submitted the
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`declaration of Mr. Chertov on that issue, Sonos has also
`submitted now additional evidence to rebut their argument
`regarding the timer. And so what I'm looking at here is Slide
`12 of our demonstratives and what you can see here is this is
`a dictionary definition for the term clock and you can see at
`the top there the definition tells you it's a device for
`measuring and indicating time. That's exactly what the video
`timer in Janevski does, it measures and indicates time.
`That's clear from the disclosure of Janevski.
` If you go to the bottom excerpt there, again from
`the dictionary definition, this is a list of synonyms that
`that dictionary definition includes for clock and what do you
`find there but the word timer is one of the first few synonyms
`that gets listed.
` So because of that, based on all of that evidence
`that Sonos has submitted and no evidence from Implicit we
`believe that Implicit's challenge to the disclosure of device
`time in Janevski must fail.
` Now Implicit does make a few other arguments
`regarding the disclosure of Janevski. Almost all of those
`arguments flow directly from their position on device time
`whether it's time domain or master device time. They're all
`premised on this same plot argument that a video timer is not
`a clock and that the time count is not a device time. So all
`of those arguments are going to fail for those same reasons
`and I'm not going to -- I was not --
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` JUDGE McSHANE: Counsel, on the issue of
`rendering time, what's your position on how that term should
`be interpreted?
` MR. SHEA: Yeah. So that's a good question, Your
`Honor. So rendering time as set forth in our papers, I think
`in both briefs as well as Dr. Chertov's two declarations,
`rendering time is a time measure of the amount of content that
`has already been rendered by the device and that's something -
`that language comes almost verbatim from the specification of
`the 791 Patent, either patent.
` I think what you may be alluding to perhaps is that
`there was something raised in Implicit's sur-reply about some
`alleged inconsistency about our interpretation of that and I
`can tell you that's certainly not the case and I could
`actually flip to that now if you --
` JUDGE McSHANE: Well, let me ask you this. So
`the units of rendering time would be directly read as
`something like a millisecond or something like that from --
` MR. SHEA: Yeah.
` JUDGE MCSHANE: -- as disclosed in Janevski?
` MR. SHEA: Yes, that's right, Your Honor. It's a
`representation of time of some form whether that's in seconds,
`minute -- you know, second, minute, hour, millisecond. In the
`791 Patent they show it in seconds. They show that it's 15
`seconds is the one illustrative example in column two of the
`791 Patent that they show. And Janevski is smaller. I mean
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`it's -- you know, both these references -- I mean
`realistically both references talk in terms of things like
`seconds or higher. I think in practice the types of devices
`you're dealing with it's unlikely that -- you know, I think
`it's probably --
` JUDGE McSHANE: No. No. I understand. Yeah.
` MR. SHEA: -- more like milliseconds like you're
`saying.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Yeah. Okay. Thank you.
` MR. SHEA: But in terms of the disclosure. But I
`want to -- so maybe I could just quickly -- given that you've
`raised the rendering time issue maybe I can just briefly
`address this alleged inconsistency because I just -- I think
`we can clear it up pretty quickly.
` So Cole, can we go to Slide 34? So this is from
`their -- Slide 34 shows an excerpt from Implicit's sur-reply
`and what they're trying to say is that what we said about
`rendering time in our reply brief and in particular what Dr.
`Chertov said was inconsistent because in his latest
`declaration he found that the Implicit source code doesn't
`have rendering time because there's not a time measure of the
`amount of content rendered.
` What they're trying to tell you is that he used
`some broader definition of rendering time in his opening
`declaration. It's just simply not the case. So if you look
`at Slide 36 on the top here we've got from Dr. Chertov's
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`declaration what he sets forth, what rendering time
`construction he's using. It specifically says a time measure
`of the amount of content that has already been rendered by the
`rendering device.
` And then in paragraph 103 of that declaration --
`and this is representative. There's a couple other paragraphs
`like this. He directly quotes from a portion, a statement
`right out of Janevski that says that they represent and track
`the amount of content rendered in terms of the time or frame
`into the program. And so that's a direct quote from the
`Janevski reference. And so Dr. Chertov in his declaration,
`he directly quoted to that and then he concluded that that
`disclosure because it says time into the program amounts to
`the claimed rendering time.
` Now here's what Implicit tried to say in their sur-
`reply, how they tried to present this. Again, on top you've
`got what Dr. Chertov just said. This is the same -- and
`excuse me, this is Slide 37. The top passage is the same one
`we just looked at where Dr. Chertov is directly quoting from
`the Janevski reference.
` The bottom -- in Implicit's sur-reply -- first of
`all they say Dr. Chertov contended that, quote/unquote, the
`timer framed into the program and they quote it as if it's
`coming from Dr. Chertov, that that his quote, it's not.
`That's a quote from Janevski. And then they emphasize frame
`into the program which is their emphasis, not Dr. Chertov's.
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` So this concept that because Dr. Chertov directly
`quoted a passage from the specification of Janevski that that
`somehow meant he was taking the position that a frame into the
`program was a rendering time is just simply not the case. Nor
`would he need to because the statement says time into the
`program which is exactly what a rendering time is.
` So I think that issue -- I mean I think they're
`just trying to create an inconsistency where there isn't one
`on that issue, Your Honor. But other than that, other than
`that issue on rendering time I think the parties -- there's no
`dispute -- Implicit hasn't disputed that Janevski certainly
`discloses rendering time by time into the program.
` So then maybe one last -- I'll just briefly address
`it because I don't know how much my counterpart is going to
`get into it but in their patent owner response they did take a
`pass at challenging the obviousness, the prima facie
`obviousness case that we set forth in our IPR petitions as
`well and that suffers from many of the same problems that any
`of their other challenges to our IPR petitions suffer from.
`They don't have any evidence at all. It's purely attorney
`argument.
` In contrast, we've got -- Dr. Chertov --
` So Cole, if we can maybe go to Slide 22.
` Dr. Chertov spent nearly 20 pages of his
`declaration on the 252 Patent carefully walking through the
`evaluation and analysis of the reasons why a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine
`here and the suggestions and the different bases for that. In
`addition to Dr. Chertov's own declaration the Janevski
`reference itself includes an express suggestion to use other
`clock synchronization mechanisms as possibilities for the time
`synchronization in that reference and one of them is the
`(inaudible) paper itself which is one of the synchronization
`references that we're relying on.
` So we believe that there is just -- between the
`Janevski disclosure itself and as well as Dr. Chertov's
`careful analysis of the obviousness issue we think that we
`certainly have met our burden of establishing that there is a
`prima facie case of obviousness and they haven't presented
`their own expert, they haven't presented any evidence to rebut
`that. I should pause. I mean they've taken a run at some
`objective evidence and I think during our call Your Honor said
`maybe we don't -- we won't get into that here. But as set
`forth --
` JUDGE McSHANE: Well, if you choose you can get
`into it.
` MR. SHEA: Yeah.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Yeah.
` MR. SHEA: No, that's okay. I don't think I need
`to.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Okay.
` MR. SHEA: I mean I will stand on our -- we're
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`comfortable standing on our briefs on that. I think that
`objective evidence falls far short of what it would need to be
`to overturn the prima facie case of obviousness here. And so
`for that reason and the other reasons I've mentioned we submit
`that Sonos' IPR petitions on both patents have certainly met
`the burden of showing that every claim of Implicit's patents
`are unpatentable.
` So with that you know what I'd like to turn to now
`which I think is really -- seems to be Implicit's real defense
`here is that they can antedate the Janevski reference so they
`can swear behind that.
` And so Cole, if we could go to 38.
` As we set forth in our reply brief, I think there
`are a number of different reasons, each of which is
`independent, that they're swear behind defense fails and so
`that's one thing I want to be clear is I think -- I'm going to
`walk through a couple different reasons why we believe the
`swear behind defense is insufficient. Any one of these I
`think standing alone means that that swear behind defense
`cannot stand and I think there's a number of different
`problems with that.
` So I want to start with the legal problems with it.
`There are -- so as you're aware, just to frame the issue and
`make sure we're all on the same page, their contention is that
`Janevski, which was filed December 11th of 2001, is not prior
`art because they conceived of and reduced to practice the
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`claimed inventions, every claim of the claimed inventions
`before that date. And to support that defense they rely
`solely on the testimony and documents of one person, Mr.
`Balassanian (phonetic) who is the first named inventor on both
`patents. He's -- and plus its founder. He's their sole
`member and he's their manager. That's it. They've got one
`source of their swear behind evidence here and it's Mr.
`Balassanian. And that's really in my mind the biggest problem
`amongst a number of problems here.
` And so Cole, maybe we can go to Slide 48.
` Because their swear behind defense depends solely
`on Mr. Balassanian it fails to meet the requirement of
`independent corroboration for a swear behind and that
`independent corroboration is well established in the law and
`what that means -- and I think that the case on Slide 48 here
`on the bottom which is the Cooper v. Goldfarb case is
`that for evidence -- to have independent corroboration you
`have to have evidence of corroboration that must not depend
`solely on the inventor himself. Or the Apator
`case, which I'm going to get into in more detail, puts it in
`terms of you need something in addition to the testimony and
`documents of the inventor. And that's what's missing here.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Well, yeah. Counsel, on this
`one under rule of reason we can consider evidentiary documents
`under that, correct?
` MR. SHEA: That's absolutely correct, Your Honor.
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` JUDGE MCSHANE: Okay.
` MR. SHEA: But I think what's critical and it's
`actually -- I think this slide gets to it really nicely -- is
`that the cases say again and again even under a rule of reason
`analysis the evidence still has to be independent. There is
`still a requirement that you show some level of independent
`corroboration even under a rule of reason and I think the
`Cooper case says that. Many, many of the more recent cases we
`cited in our brief says that too is that the rule of reason
`exists and you've got to look at the evidence as a whole,
`that's true, but nevertheless that does not obviate the need
`that you have to have some level of independent corroboration
`and I think that's really the critical piece that's missing
`here.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Well, Counsel, if there is
`documents -- if there are documents, okay, and I understand
`you have a motion to exclude many of those documents, okay,
`and if you choose to address that, that's fine. But documents
`in and of themselves, okay, can you give me a case that says
`that the documents -- if the documents are in evidence, okay,
`that they cannot serve as -- under the rule of reason that
`they cannot serve as well as evidence to be considered under
`rule of reason?
` MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor. So I think the Apator
`case is actually where I would start on that. And so the
`Apator case which is a 2018 Federal Circuit case -- and in
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`fact I think I have a slide here. This is -- for everybody,
`this is Slide 50, but I just want to talk through it a little
`bit.
` The Apator case, that case involved the situation,
`a very similar factual situation. You had an inventor's
`declaration that cited to documents that were coming from that
`inventor and those documents -- there was a --
` JUDGE McSHANE: Excuse me one second. That's
`Slide 50, yes or no?
` MR. SHEA: Yeah, that's Slide 50, Your Honor.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Okay.
` MR. SHEA: So actually -- I mean maybe we could
`just walk through it with the chart we've set forth. You had
`a patent owner attempting to swear behind 18 days before a
`prior art's filing date. Similarly here we got somebody who -
`- the dates are relatively close, right, and I know that's
`something Implicit raises but not particularly relevant to the
`analysis I don't think.
` In this -- what they did in Apator is they put
`forth an inventor declaration that's cited to several
`different documents that came from the inventor and that
`included emails, drawings, a presentation, an image file. The
`inventor said under the rule of reason that that was
`sufficient. They had evidence of corroboration. But what the
`Federal Circuit said is, no, they don't, and the problem is
`that evidence, all that -- the emails, the presentation, the
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`image file, the drawings, those were coming from the inventor.
`So they were akin to an unwitnessed lab notebook is what they
`analogized to in that case and they found that that evidence
`is not sufficiently independent. You need something outside
`of the inventor. So that's one aspect of that case.
` The other thing I'll note about that case which is
`also factually very similar to what we're dealing with here is
`that they note there that another problem is that the
`documents that were coming from the inventor files, not only
`are they coming from the inventor, they don't -- you need the
`inventor's testimony to tie them back to the testimony about
`reduction to practice and conception.
` So it creates this circular nature where you've got
`an inventor testifying about prior invention. He's pointing
`to his own documents that allegedly support it but he needs to
`fill gaps in those documents in order to tie it all together
`and that's -- so the Federal Circuit pointed that out as well
`and they said the documents only provide corroboration with
`help from the inventor's own testimony. That's exactly what
`we've got going on here.
` The documents that come from Mr. Balassanian's
`files, he needs to come in and explain how those documents --
`he needs to fill gaps in those documents to explain how they
`provide support for this and that's exactly the circular
`nature that these courts don't -- have repeatedly dismissed.
` So for Apator, both on the issue you raised, Your
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`Honor, which is that they looked at files and they said
`because those were coming from the inventor they are not
`sufficiently independent and then they additionally took issue
`with the circular nature of that.
` Now, in addition to Apator, I think there are
`certainly other cases we cited to in our brief that get at
`that. I think ABB, for instance, that's a case of the Board
`here, but the ABB, Inc. v. ROY-G-BIV Corp case which was a
`2014 PTAB case, that case, very similar facts to the
`situation here. They had an inventor. The patent owner was
`submitting a declaration of inventor and that inventor was the
`founder, the chief. He was the whole company and the lead
`inventor and he tried to submit that declaration along with
`cited evidence from his files and, again, that PTAB
`case found that was not good enough.
` And in fact that case, the ABB case -- and I
`apologize, I don't have a slide on that one that I can show
`you -- but that case the Board actually walked through five
`different cases to address the issue of whether documents
`coming from an inventor's own records could be good enough and
`they concluded after that analysis that they could not. That
`if all you've got is documents and testimony from the inventor
`and nothing from any other source outside of that that that
`cannot meet the independent corroboration standard.
` And so I think -- I think if you were to ask me
`those are the two cases I would start with. I can look at my
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`notes. I think we have others that were cited in our brief as
`well.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Yeah, we'll review those.
` MR. SHEA: Okay.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Yeah, you can --
` MR. SHEA: Okay.
` JUDGE McSHANE: Thank you.
` MR. SHEA: So, yeah, so I think -- you know, that
`to me is it and this circular problem I think is a big problem
`and that's something that a lot of other cases get into this,
`this kind of -- if you look at these documents they don't tell
`you that Mr. Balassanian was the one that conceived of these
`inventions. They don't -- these documents don't tell you that
`demonstrations actually occurred. None of that is in these
`documents. They need Mr. Balassanian to come in and fill
`those gaps but then by filling those gaps he's just
`corroborating his testimony with his own testimony and that's
`what the cases like Apator, the NTP case cited in our brief,
`and a number of Board cases have repeatedly found is that when
`you get into this circular corroboration that that's
`problematic.
` So I think, Your Honor -- let me just make sure
`that I've addressed everything I wanted to. I think that I
`have on the independent corroboration. Oh, you had raised --
`you had raised the motion to exclude so I did want to touch on
`that briefly. I think there's a lot of overlap in the
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`positions for both. What the motion to exclude is premised on
`is some Board cases, the two that we cited in our motion to
`exclude, actually even took it a step further on this
`independent corroboration issue and said if you don't have
`independent evidence of authenticity then those documents
`can't even come into evidence in the first instance.
` And so, you know, those Board cases -- I'm not here
`necessarily to suggest those are precedential in terms of that
`standard of law, but if Your Honors were to follow that logic
`which is based on the more general logic of independent
`corroboration then we believe that the documents from Dr.,
`excuse me, Mr. Balassanian's files probably should not come
`into evidence even in the first instance.
` Ultimately whether it's their excluded because they
`don't have independent evidence of authenticity or whether
`they come into evidence I don't think it really matters
`because regardless of whether they're in evidence or not
`they're not independent from the perspective that they're
`coming from Mr. Balassanian and require his testimony to fill
`the gaps. So --
` JUDGE MCSHANE: Right. Well, on the issue of
`the motion to exclude and the authentication, now,
`Petitioner's papers in their response they indicated that they
`had turned over native files in some form. They allege that
`they have a document management or, you know, had a document
`management system that logged the documents in and out and
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`IPR2018-00766 (Patent 7,391,791 B2)
`IPR2018-00767 (Patent 8,942,252 B2)
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`kept a record of that logging and that's extensively in the
`evidence, at least scree
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