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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`JOHNS MANVILLE CORPORATION AND JOHNS MANVILLE, INC.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`KNAUF INSULATION, INC. AND KNAUF INSULATION SPRL
`
`Patent Owners
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2018-
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
`OF
`U.S. PATENT NO. 9,469,747
`
` 
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
`A. 
`Summary of Reasons for Requested Relief .......................................... 1 
`B. 
`The ’747 Patent ..................................................................................... 2 
`Overview ..................................................................................... 2 
` 
`Priority Date ................................................................................ 2 
`Prosecution History ..................................................................... 4 
` 
`IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGES ........................................................ 6 
`A. 
`Challenged Claims ................................................................................ 6 
`B. 
`Statutory Grounds for Challenges ......................................................... 6 
`PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART .......................................... 7 
` 
`  LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................... 8 
`A.  Anticipation ........................................................................................... 8 
`B. 
`Obviousness ........................................................................................... 8 
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION .......................................................................... 10 
`A. 
`“Consists Essentially Of” .................................................................... 11 
`B. 
`“Amine or Amine Reactant” ............................................................... 15 
`IDENTIFICATION OF HOW THE CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE .... 17 
`A.  Ground #1: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 Are
`Anticipated by Swift ............................................................................ 17 
`Brief Summary of Swift ............................................................ 17 
` 
`Claim 1 ...................................................................................... 18 
`Claim 4, Limitation “in which curing of the binder is carried
`out by passing the batt through at least one zone of a curing
`oven at a temperature within the range 230° C.-300° C. with an
`oven residence time in the range 30 seconds to 20 minutes” ... 25 
`Claim 7, Limitation “in which the acid precursor comprises an
`inorganic salt” ........................................................................... 26 
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`B. 
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`C. 
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`Claim 9, Limitation “in which the carbohydrate reactant of the
`binder solution consists essentially of dextrose” ...................... 26 
`Claim 16, Limitation “in which the cured binder comprises
`melanoidins” ............................................................................. 27 
`Claim 21, Limitation “in which the cured binder is substantially
`water insoluble” ........................................................................ 28 
`Claim 25, Limitation “in which the reaction of the binder upon
`curing is essentially a Maillard type reaction” ......................... 28 
`Claim 33, Limitation “in which the acid precursor comprises an
`ammonium salt” ........................................................................ 28 
`  Claim 38, Limitation “in which the glass fibre thermal
`insulation product has a thickness of greater than 15 mm and
`less than 350 mm” ..................................................................... 29 
`  Claim 39, Limitation “in which the glass fibre thermal
`insulation product has a thermal conductivity λ of less than 0.05
`W/mK and greater than 0.02 W/mK” ....................................... 29 
`  Claim 40, Limitation “further comprising compressing the
`cured bans [sic, batts] in a pack” .............................................. 30 
`Ground #2: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 Are Obvious
`over Swift. ........................................................................................... 30 
`It Would Have Been Obvious to One of Ordinary Skill in the
` 
`Art to Use MAP as a Nitrogen-Containing Reactant in the
`Binder ........................................................................................ 30 
`It Would Have Been Obvious to One of Ordinary Skill in the
`Art to Manufacture “A Glass Fibre Thermal Insulation Product
`which Comprises less than 99% by Weight and more than 80%
`by Weight Glass Fibres” As in Claim 1 .................................... 32 
`Swift Renders Claim 4 Obvious ............................................... 33 
`Swift Renders Claim 9 Obvious ............................................... 34 
` 
`Ground #3: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33, 38-40, 44 and 47-49 are
`Obvious over Swift (Ex. 1003) in view of Gogek (Ex. 1004). ........... 35 
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`Brief Summary of Gogek (Ex. 1004) ........................................ 36 
`Overarching Reasons to Combine Gogek and Swift ................ 36 
`Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 ............................... 40 
`Claim 44 .................................................................................... 43 
`Claim 47, Limitation “in which the acid precursor comprises an
`ammonium salt” ........................................................................ 49 
`Claim 48, Limitation “wherein the ammonium salt comprises
`an ammonium sulphate salt” ..................................................... 49 
`Claim 49, Limitation “wherein the ammonium salt comprises
`an ammonium phosphate salt” .................................................. 50 
`D.  Ground #4: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 are Obvious
`over Swift (Ex. 1003) in view of Worthington (Ex. 1005). ................ 50 
`Brief Summary of Worthington (Ex. 1005) .............................. 51 
` 
`Overarching Reasons to Combine Worthington and Swift ...... 51 
`Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 ............................... 53 
` 
`  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 55 
`  MANDATORY NOTICES ........................................................................... 56 
`A. 
`Real Party in Interest ........................................................................... 56 
`B. 
`Related Matters .................................................................................... 56 
`C. 
`Fee ....................................................................................................... 56 
`D. 
`Service Information ............................................................................. 57 
`E. 
`Power of Attorney ............................................................................... 57 
`F. 
`Standing ............................................................................................... 57 
`
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
`750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) .......................................................................... 12
`ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc.,
`668 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................... 25, 26
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) ........................................................................................ 11
`Ex parte Davis,
`80 U.S.P.Q. 448 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1949) ........................................................ 11
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .................................................................................................. 9
`In re Guess,
`347 Fed.Appx. 558 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2009) ...................................................... 26
`In re Herz,
`537 F.2d 549 (C.C.P.A. 1976) ................................................................ 11, 12, 13
`In re Hilmer,
`359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966) .............................................................................. 3
`Ineos USA LLC v. Berry Plastics Corp.,
`783 F.3d 865 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................ 19, 25, 26
`In re Janakirama-Rao,
`317 F.2d 951 (C.C.P.A. 1963) ...................................................................... 12, 14
`Johns Manville Corporation v. Knauf Insulation, Inc.,
`IPR No. 2015-01402 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2016) .................................................. 39
`Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co.,
`780 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 8
`Ex Parte Knauf Insulation, Inc.,
`No. 2016-006369 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2016) ....................................................... 51
`
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`Knauf Insulation, Inc. v. Rockwool Int’l A/S,
`680 Fed.Appx. 956 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2017) ..................................................... 13
`Knauf Insulation, LLC, et al. v. Johns Manville Corporation, et al.,
`Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-00111-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind.) ................................... 56
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .................................................................................. 9, 37, 52
`Ex Parte Morozumi,
`No. 2013-005195, 2015 WL 1537957 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2015) ...................... 14
`PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................... 11, 14
`Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.,
`587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 9
`In re Petering,
`301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962) .............................................................................. 8
`In re Peterson,
`315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................... 32, 34
`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc.,
`724 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 9
`Ex Parte Rastegar,
`No. 2014-009943, 2016 WL 5957910 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 12, 2016) ....................... 14
`Rockwool Int’l A/S v. Knauf Insulation GmbH,
`No. 2017-004826 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 8, 2017) ......................................................... 12
`Rockwool Int’l A/S v. Patent of Knauf Insulation LLC,
`No. 2015-001824, 2015 WL 4607935 (P.T.A.B. July 30, 2015) ....................... 13
`In re Swanson,
`540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 10
`Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc.,
`199 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 10
`
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`In re Trans Tex. Holding Corp.,
`498 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 10
`Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC,
`683 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 8
`In re Yamamoto,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) .......................................................................... 10
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ............................................................................... 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 17
`35 U.S.C. § 103 .................................................................................... 6, 7, 12, 35, 50
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ..................................................................................................... 9
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................... 5, 6
`35 U.S.C. § 119(a) ..................................................................................................... 3
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 56
`35 U.S.C. § 363 .......................................................................................................... 3
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.10(b) ................................................................................................ 57
`37 C.F.R. § 42.15 ..................................................................................................... 56
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ........................................................................................ 10, 11
`MPEP § 2111.03 III ........................................................................................... 13, 14
`MPEP § 2133.02(II) ................................................................................................... 3
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`
`
`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`
`1001
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,469,747
`
`1002
`
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 9,469,747
`
`1003
`
`U.S. Patent Application No. 2007/0027283 to Swift
`
`1004
`
`U.S. Patent No. 2,965,504 to Gogek
`
`1005
`
`U.S. Patent No. 3,513,001 to Worthington
`
`1006
`
`Declaration of Dr. Frederick Hirsekorn
`
`1007
`
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Frederick Hirsekorn
`
`1008
`
`Rockwool Int’l A/S v. Knauf Insulation GmbH,
`Appeal No. 2017-004826, at 16 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 8,
`2017)
`
`1009
`
`Excerpts from PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSES TO
`DEFENDANTS’ THIRD SET OF
`INTERROGATORIES (NO. 14) SECOND
`SUPPLEMENT, Knauf Insulation, Inc. et al. v.
`Johns Manville Corp. et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-
`00111-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind.)
`
`1010
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR
`No. 2015-01402, Final Written Decision (P.T.A.B.
`Oct. 19, 2016)
`
`iv
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`
`
`
`1011
`
`1012
`
`Knauf Insulation, Inc. v. Johns Manville Corp., Case
`No. 2017-1433, Judgment (Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2018)
`
`Ex Parte Knauf Insulation, Inc., Appeal No. 2016-
`006369 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2016)
`
`1013
`
`International Publication No. WO 2007/014236
`
`1014
`
`Rockwool Int'l A/S v. Patent of Knauf Insulation
`LLC, APPEAL 2015-001824, 2015 WL 4607935
`(P.T.A.B. July 30, 2015)
`
`1015 U.S. Patent No. 7,854,980 to Jackson et al.
`
`v
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` 
`
`Petitioners Johns Manville Corporation and Johns Manville, Inc.
`
`(collectively, “Johns Manville” or “Petitioners”) ask that the Board review the
`
`accompanying prior art and analysis, institute an inter partes review trial of Claims
`
`1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33, 38-40, 44 and 47-49 (“the Challenged Claims”) of U.S.
`
`Patent No. 9,469,747 (“the ’747 Patent”), and render a final written decision
`
`cancelling those claims as unpatentable.
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The full statement of the reasons for the relief requested is as follows:
`
`A.
`
`Summary of Reasons for Requested Relief
`
`The ’747 Patent relates to fiberglass insulation made using binders (in
`
`particular, methods of manufacturing insulation products using binders). The
`
`claimed method involves manufacturing a fiberglass insulation product having a
`
`specified concentration of glass fibres and a specified density by forming glass
`
`fibres from a molten mineral mixture, spraying a substantially formaldehyde-free
`
`binder solution onto the glass fibres, collecting the glass fibres to form a “batt,”
`
`and thermally curing the batt using a curing oven. The claimed methods specify
`
`that the binder “consists essentially of” (1) a carbohydrate reactant that comprises
`
`or yields a reducing sugar and (2) an acid precursor that provides an ionic species
`
`and “an amine or amine reactant.” The ʼ747 Patent identifies a group of suitable
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`ionic species to be provided by the acid precursor as well as other properties of the
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`disclosed binder and manufacturing methods.
`
`As evidenced by the prior art challenges presented herein, the insulation
`
`manufacturing methods, including the characteristics of the binder, disclosed and
`
`claimed in the ’747 Patent were well known in the art many years before the
`
`earliest priority date for any of the claims of the ’747 Patent. This Petition
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`demonstrates that the Challenged Claims do nothing more than recite features and
`
`properties that were well known in the prior art, and were in fact described in
`
`patents and printed publications published before the earliest priority date of any of
`
`the Challenged Claims. As a result, each of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable
`
`based on anticipation and/or obviousness in light of the prior art. Therefore,
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`institution on each of the grounds below is appropriate.
`
`B.
`
`The ’747 Patent
` Overview
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`The ’747 Patent has 2 independent claims and 49 dependent claims. Both
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`independent claims and 13 dependent claims are challenged in this petition.
`
`
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`Priority Date
`
`The ’747 Patent claims priority to three Great Britain applications, the
`
`earliest of which is European Patent Application No. GB0715100.4, filed on
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`August 3, 2007, and also claims priority to PCT Application No.
`
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`- 2 -
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`PCT/EP2008/060178, filed on August 1, 2008. However, foreign priority is not
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`relevant for the purposes of prior art analysis under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).1
`
`                                                            
`1 See Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) (“[B]ut no patent shall be granted on any
`
`application for patent for an invention which had been . . . described in a printed
`
`publication in any country more than one year before the date of the actual filing of
`
`the application in this country . . . .”); In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 871-72
`
`(C.C.P.A. 1966) (“[Pre-AIA Section 119(a)] says ‘shall have the same effect’ and
`
`then it says ‘but’ for several situations it shall not have the same effect, namely, it
`
`does not enjoy the foreign date with respect to any of the patent-defeating
`
`provisions based on publication or patenting anywhere in the world . . . more than
`
`one year before the date of actual filing in this country.”); pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §
`
`102(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention was
`
`patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country . . . more
`
`than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.”); pre-
`
`AIA 35 U.S.C. § 363 (“An international application designating the United States
`
`shall have the effect, from its international filing date … of a national application
`
`for patent … except as otherwise provided in section 102(e).”); see also MPEP §
`
`2133.02(II) (“[P]re-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) cannot be overcome by . . . foreign
`
` 
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`- 3 -
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`Accordingly, the effective priority date for the purposes of this petition is
`
`August 1, 2008. Petitioners reserve all rights to establish a later priority date in the
`
`related litigation or any other proceeding.
`
`The prior art references relied upon in this petition are prior art under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 102(b) based on the filing date of the PCT application (August 1, 2008).
`
`
`
`Prosecution History
`
`The ’747 Patent issued on October 18, 2016, from U.S. Application No.
`
`12/671,922 (“the ’922 Application”). The ’922 Application is a national stage
`
`application of PCT Application No. PCT/EP2008/060178, filed on August 1, 2008.
`
`The ’922 Application was filed with 44 claims. See Ex. 1002 at 2970-2975. Upon
`
`entry of a preliminary amendment, claims 16-23, 25-26, 28-35 and 39-40 were
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`cancelled. Id. at 2256-2258. The Examiner issued a restriction requirement due to
`
`the fact that the claims covered both an apparatus and a method for making the
`
`apparatus. Id. at 2187-2189. The Examiner also rejected claims 1, 4-9, 12, 14 and
`
`15 as obvious over U.S. Patent No. 3,867,119 to Kasuga et al. and EP 0044614.
`
`Id. at 2189-2193. In response, the Applicant elected the manufacturing claims and
`
`disputed the obviousness rejections. Id. at 2171-2177. After review, the Examiner
`
`                                                                                                                                                                                                
`priority dates. Outside the 1-year grace period, applicant is barred from obtaining
`
`any anticipated or obvious claims.”).
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`maintained the obviousness rejections and added an obviousness rejection of claim
`
`13 over Kasuga and EP 0044614, further in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,818,694 to
`
`Hindi et al. Id. at 2148-2153. The Applicant challenged those obviousness
`
`rejections via a Request for Continued Examination. Id. at 2132-2136. The
`
`Examiner maintained the rejections. Id. at 2112-2118.
`
`The Applicant then amended the claims to require that the claimed binder be
`
`thermoset, substantially formaldehyde-free, and nitrogenous polymer-containing,
`
`as well as to recite that the binder solution includes a carbohydrate reactant and an
`
`acid precursor, wherein the acid precursor provides ionic species and an amine or
`
`amine reactant. Id. at 2089. The Applicant also cancelled certain claims and
`
`added additional claims. Id. at 2089-2093. The Examiner then issued a Notice of
`
`Allowance. Id. at 2058.
`
`Following the Notice of Allowance, the Applicant submitted an Amendment
`
`after Notice of Allowance, amending the claims to specify (1) the glass fibre
`
`concentration of the insulation product, (2) the density of the insulation product,
`
`(3) that the binder solution is sprayed during manufacture, and (4) that the fibres
`
`are glass. Id. at 273-279. The Applicant made further amendments to dependent
`
`claims. Id. The Applicant also sought to add new claims. Id.
`
`In response, the Examiner rejected several of the new claims as
`
`insufficiently supported in the specification pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, but
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`- 5 -
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`allowed other claims. Id. at 148-149. The Applicant amended the claims in
`
`response to the § 112 rejections. Id. at 119-126. The Examiner then allowed all
`
`pending claims. Id. at 35.
`
`
`
`IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGES
`A. Challenged Claims
`
`Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33, 38-40, 44 and 47-49 of the ’747 Patent are
`
`challenged in this Petition.
`
`B.
`
`Statutory Grounds for Challenges
`
`Ground #1: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 are anticipated by
`
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2007/0027283 by Swift et al. (“Swift”).
`
`Swift was published on April 1, 2007. Because that date is more than one year
`
`prior to the effective U.S. filing date of the ’747 Patent (i.e., more than one year
`
`before August 1, 2008), Swift is prior art to the ’747 Patent under (pre-AIA) 35
`
`U.S.C. § 102(b).
`
`Ground # 2: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 are obvious under
`
`(pre-AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Swift.
`
`Ground # 3: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33, 38-40, 44 and 47-49 are
`
`obvious under (pre-AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Swift in view of U.S. Patent No.
`
`2,965,504 to Gogek (“Gogek”). Gogek was filed on April 1, 1958, and issued on
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`- 6 -
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`December 20, 1960. Gogek thus is prior art to the ’747 Patent under (pre-AIA) 35
`
`U.S.C. § 102(b).
`
`Ground # 4: Claims 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33 and 38-40 are obvious under
`
`(pre-AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Swift in view of U.S. Patent No. 3,513,001 to
`
`Worthington (“Worthington”). Worthington was filed on September 19, 1966, and
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`issued on May 19, 1970. Worthington thus is prior art to the ʼ747 Patent under
`
`(pre-AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
`
`The following table summarizes the grounds at issue in this Petition:
`
`ʼ747 Claims
`Ground
`Ground 1 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33
`and 38-40
`
`Ground 2 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33
`and 38-40
`
`Ground 3 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25,
`33, 38-40, 44 and 47-
`49
`
`Ground 4 1, 4, 7, 9, 16, 21, 25, 33
`and 38-40
`
`
`
`Basis
`Anticipated by Swift
`
`Obvious over Swift
`
`Obvious over Swift in view of Gogek
`
`Obvious over Swift in view of Worthington
`
` PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the earliest effective filing
`
`date of the ’747 Patent would have had a Ph.D. in Chemistry and 3-5 years of
`
`industry experience in binder development for insulating or analogous products, or
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`be someone with a Bachelor’s degree in Chemistry or Chemical Engineering and
`
`10 or more years of experience in binder development for the manufacture of
`
`insulating or analogous products. Ex. 1006 ¶ 39.
`
` LEGAL STANDARDS
`A. Anticipation
`
`An alleged invention is unpatentable if “the invention was patented or
`
`
`
`described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
`
`sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in
`
`the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (pre-AIA). A prior art reference anticipates
`
`a claim if it discloses all of the claim limitations “arranged or combined in the
`
`same way as in the claim.” Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683
`
`F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). “However, a
`
`reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the
`
`limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art,
`
`reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or
`
`combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376,
`
`1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
`
`
`
`B. Obviousness
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`An alleged invention is unpatentable for obviousness “if the differences
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`between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
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`subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
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`made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
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`pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (pre-AIA). Obviousness requires consideration of:
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`(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art
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`and the claims at issue; (3) the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the
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`pertinent art; and (4) objective indicia of non-obviousness. Graham v. John Deere
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`Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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`“Applying a flexible approach to the obviousness inquiry, the Supreme
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`Court observed that common sense can be a source of reasons to combine or
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`modify prior art references to achieve the patented invention.” Plantronics, Inc. v.
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`Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
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`Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007)). The reason or motivation to combine references
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`may be found “explicitly or implicitly in market forces; design incentives; the
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`‘interrelated teachings of multiple patents’; ‘any need or problem known in the
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`field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent’; and the
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`background knowledge, creativity and common sense of the person of ordinary
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`skill.” Id. (citing Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328-
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`29 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-21)).
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` CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), the claim terms of an unexpired patent
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`subject to inter partes review shall receive the “broadest reasonable construction in
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`light of the specification of the patent in which [they] appear[].” See also In re
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`Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Trans Tex. Holding
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`Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d
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`1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Where, however, a definition is provided by a patent
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`applicant for a specific claim term, that definition will control interpretation of the
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`term as it is used in the claim. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Indus.,
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`Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`All claim terms not specifically addressed below have been accorded their
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`broadest reasonable construction in light of the patent specification. Because the
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`standards of claim interpretation used by the Courts in patent litigation and by the
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`Board in post-grant proceedings are different, Petitioners expressly reserve the
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`right to present additional and different interpretations at a later time in the district
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`court litigation. The interpretation of the claims presented herein, either implicitly
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`or explicitly, should not be viewed as constituting, in whole or in part, Petitioners’
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`interpretation and/or construction of such claims for purposes of the associated
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`litigation. Instead, such constructions in this proceeding should be viewed solely
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`as an interpretation of the claims under the “broadest reasonable construction”
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`standard.
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`A.
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`“Consists Essentially Of”
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`“Consists essentially of” is a transition phrase used in a claim to signal that
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`the claim is partially open. PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351,
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`1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “By using the term ‘consisting essentially of,’ the drafter
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`signals that the invention necessarily includes the listed ingredients and is open to
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`unlisted ingredients that do not materially affect the basic and novel properties of
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`the invention.” Id. (citing Ex parte Davis, 80 U.S.P.Q. 448, 449-50, (Pat. Off. Bd.
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`App. 1949)).
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`Under the governing “broadest reasonable construction standard,” 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.100(b), “an applicant who has not clearly limited his claims is in a weak
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`position to assert a narrow construction.” In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551 (C.C.P.A.
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`1976) (emphasis added); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
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`2144-46 (2016) (“[C]onstruing a patent claim according to its broadest reasonable
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`construction helps to protect the public.”). Therefore, “in construing the phrase
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`‘consisting essentially of’ in [the challenged] claims, it is necessary and proper to
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`determine whether [the] specification reasonably supports a construction that
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`would” exclude unrecited ingredients disclosed in the prior art. In re Herz, 537
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`F.2d at 551. If a patent’s specification does not contain a clear indication of what
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`the alleged basic and novel characteristics actually are, then “consisting essentially
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`of” should be construed as equivalent to “comprising.” See id.; In re Janakirama-
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`Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (affirming board’s rejection of claims
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`containing “consisting essentially of” language where “no basic or novel
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`characteristic to be so affected can be deduced from the disclosure”).2
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`For example, in Rockwool Int’l A/S v. Knauf Insulation GmbH, No. 2017-
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`004826, at 16 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 8, 2017) (copy attached as Ex. 1008), where Patent
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`Owner had not “established what additional materials would be excluded by the
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`‘consisting essentially of’ language or even what the basic and novel
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`characteristics of the invention are,” the Board held that the existence of additional
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`ingredients in the prior art reference could not overcome the Examiner’s rejection
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`based on 35 U.S.C. § 103.3 In other words, the Board treated “consisting
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`                                                            
`2 See also Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569,
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`1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(finding that prior art’s inclusion of unrecited “solid
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`ammonium nitrate prills” was not excluded from claims containing “the phrase
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`‘consisting essentially of’”) (citing In re Herz, 537 F.2d at 551 and In re
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`Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d at 954).
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`3 The Rockwool decision involved the inter partes reexamination of U.S. Patent
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`No. 7,888,445 (“the ʼ445 Patent”), a patent owned by Knauf Insulation GmbH, an
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`essentially of” as “comprising” consistent with In re Herz. Accord MPEP §
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`2111.03 III (citing case law and stating that “[f]or the purposes of searching for
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`and applying prior art under 35 U.S.C. [§§] 102 and 103, absent a clear indication
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`in the specification or claims of what the basic and novel characteristics actually
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`are, ‘consisting essentially of’ will be construed as equivalent to ‘comprising.’”).
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`Similarly, in a separate inter partes reexamination concerning Knauf’s Pat.
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`No. 7,854,980—which claims a binder “consisting essentially of a carbohydrate,
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`an amine, and a polycarboxylic acid”—the Office found that “there was no clear
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`indication of what constitutes the basic and novel characteristics of the invention”
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`and therefore, the phrase “’consisting essentially of’ was once again properly
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`interpreted “to have the same meaning as ‘comprising’.” Rockwool Int'l A/S v.
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`Patent of Knauf Insulation LLC, No. 2015-001824, 2015 WL