throbber
Filed on behalf of:
`Knauf Insulation, Inc., and Knauf Insulation SPRL
`By: Joshua P. Larsen (Lead Counsel)
`joshua.larsen@btlaw.com
`James R. Sweeney II (Back-up Counsel)
`james.sweeney@btlaw.com
`Daniel J. Lueders (Back-up Counsel)
`dlueders@uspatent.com
`
`Paper No. 6
`Date: July 5, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_________________
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_________________
`
`
` JOHNS MANVILLE CORPORATION AND JOHNS MANVILLE, INC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`KNAUF INSULATION, INC., AND KNAUF INSULATION SPRL
`Patent Owners.
`
`_________________
`
`IPR2018-00863
`Patent 9,464,207
`_________________
`
`
`PATENT OWNERS’ PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
`Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
`
`Exhibit List ................................................................................................................. v
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`THE OFFICE HAS ALREADY CONSIDERED, AND REJECTED,
`THE PRIOR ART AND ARGUMENTS ADVANCED IN JM’S
`PETITION ....................................................................................................... 4
`
`JM HAS NOT SHOWN A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT IT
`WOULD PREVAIL IN PROVING THE OBVIOUSNESS OF ANY
`CHALLENGED CLAIM ..............................................................................14
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`JM Does Not Point To Any Example Of Maillard-Based Binders
`For Fiberglass Insulation In The Prior Art ..........................................14
`
`JM Misrepresents And Improperly Relies Upon Prior Federal
`Circuit And Board Decisions ..............................................................18
`
`JM Does Not Identify The Differences Between The Prior Art
`And The Claims At Issue ....................................................................23
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`JM’s Reliance On Tutin Is Unclear ..........................................25
`
`JM’s Reliance On Worthington And Gogek Is Unclear ...........26
`
`D.
`
`JM Does Not Provide A Valid Rationale To Combine Strauss,
`Tutin, And Worthington ......................................................................28
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Compatibility Does Not Mean Obvious To Combine ..............28
`
`Using Thermoset Material Is Too Broad To Explain
`Obviousness ..............................................................................30
`
`i
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`A Need For Formaldehyde-Free Binders Is Not A Reason
`To Modify Strauss Or Tutin ......................................................31
`
`The Additional Reasons Cited With Regard To Gogek Are
`Also Deficient ...........................................................................32
`
`E.
`
`Conclusion As To Lack Of Reasonable Likelihood ...........................33
`
`IV. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................34
`
`Certificate of Word Count ....................................................................................... 35
`
`Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 36
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Page(s)
`
`Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal,
`872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..................................................................... 21
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) ..................................................................................... 5
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ..................................................................................... 11, 24
`
`In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr.,
`367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..................................................................... 18
`
`In re Rijckaert,
`9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ......................................................................... 19
`
`In re Spormann,
`363 F.2d 444 (CCPA 1966) ........................................................................... 19
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007)................................................................................. 11, 24
`
`Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc.,
`882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..................................................................... 29
`
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC,
`825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................................... 5
`
`SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu,
`138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). ............................................................................ 4, 5, 6
`
`Unified Patents, Inc., v. Berman,
`IPR2016-01571, Paper 10 (December 14, 2016) (informative) .............. 12, 13
`
`
`
`iii
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................ 21
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325 .................................................................................................... 5, 13
`
`
`
`Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65 ..................................................................................................... 18
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Ex. No. Brief Description
`
`1001
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,464,207
`
`1002
`
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 9,464,207
`
`1003
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,318,990 to Strauss
`
`1004
`
`U.S. Patent Application No. 2004/0038017 by Tutin et al.
`
`1005
`
`U.S. Patent No. 3,513,001 to Worthington
`
`1006
`
`U.S. Patent No. 2,965,504 to Gogek
`
`1007
`
`Hodge JE. Chemistry of browning reactions in model systems. J
`Agric Food Chem. 1953;1(15):928–943
`
`1008
`
`Declaration of Dr. Frederick Hirsekorn
`
`1009
`
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Frederick Hirsekorn
`
`1010
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,114,210 to Hampson
`
`1011
`
`1012
`
`1013
`
`1014
`
`Excerpts of Patent Owner’s Infringement Contentions in Related
`Litigation
`
`Inter Partes Reexamination Decision in Reexamination Control
`95/000,672 and PTAB Appeal 2017-004826 (PTAB, Sept. 8, 2017)
`(regarding Patent No. 7,888,445)
`
`Ex Parte Reexamination Decision in Reexamination Control
`90/013,029 and PTAB Appeal 2016-006341 (PTAB Sept. 29, 2016)
`(regarding Patent No. 7,888,445)
`
`In Re: Knauf Insulation, Fed. Cir. Nos. 2017-1317, -1323, -1324
`(Fed. Cir. March 9, 2018)
`
`v
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`
`1015
`
`1016
`
`1017
`
`1018
`
`1019
`
`1020
`
`1021
`
`2001
`
`2002
`
`2003
`
`2004
`
`Ex Parte Reexamination Decision in Reexamination Control
`90/013,156 and PTAB Appeal 2016-006369 (PTAB Sept. 30, 2016)
`(regarding Patent No. 7,854,980)
`
`Inter Partes Reexamination Decision in Reexamination Control
`95/000,674 (PTAB July 30, 2015) (regarding Patent No. 7,854,980)
`
`Knauf Insulation, Inc. v. Rockwool Int’l A/S, 680 Fed.Appx. 956
`(Feb. 27, 2017)
`
`Ex Parte Reexamination Decision in Reexamination Control
`90/013,030 and PTAB Appeal No. 2016- 006368 (Ex. 1018) (Sept.
`29, 2016) (regarding Patent No. 7,772,347)
`
`Inter Partes Reexamination Decision, in Reexamination Control No.
`95/000,675 (Sept. 8, 2017) (regarding Patent No. 7,772,347)
`
`Final Written Decision in IPR2015-01402 (PTAB Oct. 19, 2016)
`(regarding Patent No. 8,114,210)
`
`Knauf Insulation v. Johns Manville Corp., Fed. Cir. No. 2017-1433
`(Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2018)
`
`Declaration of Kiarash Alavi in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
`Limitations on Electronic Discovery, Dkt. No. 49-1 in Knauf
`Insulation LLC v. Johns Manville Corp., Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-
`00111-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind.)
`
`Excerpt from Official Reporter’s Transcript of Hearing on Motion
`for Protective Order, September 10, 2015, Dkt. No. 68 in Knauf
`Insulation LLC v. Johns Manville Corp., Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-
`00111-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind.)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01453,
`Paper 49 (Jan. 11, 2017)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2016-00130,
`Paper 35 (May 8, 2017)
`
`vi
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`
`
`2005
`
`2006
`
`2007
`
`2008
`
`2009
`
`2010
`
`2011
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01527,
`Paper 17 (Dec. 17, 2015)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01569,
`Paper 14 (Dec. 17, 2015)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01598,
`Paper 16 (Dec. 17, 2015)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01633,
`Paper 10 (Jan. 4, 2016)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01673,
`Paper 7 (Jan. 4, 2016)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01683,
`Paper 9 (Jan. 4, 2016)
`
`Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2015-01402,
`Paper 18 (Oct. 21, 2015)
`
`2012
`
`Deposition of Dr. Frederick Hirsekorn in IPR2015-01402
`
`2013
`
`Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed., p. 1297 (2009)
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a), Patent Owners Knauf Insulation, Inc., and
`
`Knauf Insulation SPRL (collectively, “Knauf Insulation”) submit the following
`
`preliminary response to the Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No.
`
`9,464,207 (IPR2018-00863, Paper 2, hereafter “Petition”) filed by Johns Manville
`
`Corporation and Johns Manville, Inc. (collectively, “JM”).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Knauf Insulation, Inc., and JM are two of the four major companies
`
`competing in the large U.S. mineral fiber insulation business. For many decades,
`
`that business used binder chemistries containing formaldehyde. By the late 1990s,
`
`the use of formaldehyde began to be questioned for its potential adverse health
`
`effects. The industry began to seek binder chemistries that were free of
`
`formaldehyde.
`
`Like its competitors, JM engaged in extensive research efforts around that
`
`time to discover a manufacturing method for its glass mineral wool insulation
`
`products that used a binder that was free of formaldehyde. JM settled on an
`
`acrylic-based binder and introduced it to the market in the early 2000s as a
`
`“formaldehyde free” glass mineral wool insulation. In the meantime, Knauf
`
`Insulation’s scientists continued their work on formaldehyde-free glass mineral
`
`wool insulation and discovered the manufacturing methods that are the subject of a
`
`1
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`number of Knauf Insulation’s patents. Among other critical claim limitations,
`
`those Knauf Insulation patents share the hallmark that they involve the use of
`
`reducing sugars as part of the binder chemistry and result in manufacturing
`
`methods that are both formaldehyde-free and ecologically sustainable.
`
`Knauf Insulation introduced its ECOSE® insulation products based upon
`
`these manufacturing methods to great success in the industry. After seeing Knauf
`
`Insulation’s product, JM stated it was a “breakthrough” and engaged with Knauf
`
`Insulation in negotiations to license Knauf Insulation’s ECOSE® technology at
`
`issue here. Thereafter, JM retreated from its acrylic formulas and switched over to
`
`Knauf Insulation’s technology without obtaining a license. JM’s chief binder
`
`chemist admitted under oath that “JM did not begin exploring the possibility of
`
`implementing a reducing-sugar-based binder in lieu of its acrylic binder until after
`
`January 1, 2007,” after seeing Knauf Insulation’s patents. (Ex. 2001 at ¶ 4; Ex.
`
`2002 at 93:12-15 (“Q. And, in fact, the reason you started considering reducing
`
`sugars having Maillard reaction to melanoidins was only after seeing Knauf’s
`
`patents, correct? A. That is correct, after -- yes, that is correct.”).)
`
`On January 27, 2015, Knauf Insulation sued JM in the U.S. District Court
`
`for the Southern District of Indiana for infringing U.S. Patent Nos. 8,114,210;
`
`8,940,089; and D631,670 and, subsequently, U.S. Patent Nos. 9,039,827;
`
`2
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`9,040,652; 9,464,207; 9,469,747; 9,828,287; and 9,926,464. U.S. Patent No.
`
`9,464,207 (“the
`
`'207 Patent”), which claims some of Knauf Insulation’s
`
`revolutionary formaldehyde-free manufacturing methods, is at issue here. As it
`
`became clear to JM that the story of its prior failures and its copying of Knauf
`
`Insulation’s technology would not play well in court, JM adopted the strategy of
`
`trying to move the litigation to the Patent Office through inter partes reviews
`
`(“IPRs”). The present Petition is the eleventh of thirteen petitions for IPR that JM
`
`has filed to date against the patents-in-suit.
`
`JM’s IPR campaign against Knauf Insulation’s issued patents has been an
`
`almost complete failure. Of the nine JM IPR petitions decided to date by the
`
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”):
`
` Two resulted in Final Written Decisions confirming patentability (Ex.
`
`2003 (IPR2015-01453); Ex. 2004 (IPR2016-00130));
`
` Six were denied institution entirely (Ex. 2005 (IPR2015-01527); Ex.
`
`2006 (IPR2015-01569); Ex. 2007 (IPR2015-01598); Ex. 2008
`
`(IPR2015-01633); Ex. 2009 (IPR2015-01673); Ex. 2010 (IPR2015-
`
`01683)); and
`
`3
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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` One was instituted as to seven challenged claims, but denied
`
`institution as to the remaining ten challenged claims (Ex. 2011
`
`(IPR2015-01402); see also Ex. 1020)).1
`
`Now JM has brought a second round of IPRs against several of Knauf
`
`Insulation’s more recently issued patents. JM’s new IPR petitions merely repeat
`
`prior art and arguments that were considered and dismissed by both the examiners
`
`during prosecution and this Board in the prior IPRs. As JM has failed to present
`
`any new prior art or any meaningfully different arguments, the Board should
`
`exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution. Furthermore,
`
`JM’s new round of IPR petitions suffers from many of the same deficiencies as
`
`their prior petitions, and the new IPR petitions should likewise be dismissed for
`
`failure to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to any claim.
`
`II. THE OFFICE HAS ALREADY CONSIDERED, AND REJECTED,
`THE PRIOR ART AND ARGUMENTS ADVANCED IN JM’S
`PETITION
`
`Congress did not intend IPRs as a vehicle for petitioners to repeatedly rehash
`
`the same prior art and arguments already overcome by the patent owner. This
`
`intention is clear in the statute, which provides that, “[i]n determining whether to
`
`
`1 The IPR2015-01402 proceeding, including all appeals, concluded prior to the
`
`Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
`
`4
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`institute or order [an IPR] proceeding . . . , the Director may take into account
`
`whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the
`
`same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 325(d). This discretion is further codified in § 314(a), which speaks to the
`
`circumstances in which the Director “may” or “may not” institute an IPR (not
`
`“must” or “shall” institute). Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
`
`2140 (2016) (acknowledging § 314(a) imposes “no mandate to institute review”).
`
`In fashioning the IPR framework, Congress recognized the importance of including
`
`these “procedural safeguards to prevent a challenger from using the process to
`
`harass patent owners.” SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341,
`
`1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
`
`from the Congressional Record).2
`
`The Board’s ultimate discretion regarding institution remains intact after the
`
`Supreme Court’s recent decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, which accepted
`
`“that § 314(a) doesn’t require [the Director] to institute an inter partes review even
`
`after he finds the ‘reasonable likelihood’ threshold met with respect to one claim.”
`
`138 S. Ct. at 1356 (emphasis original). As Justice Ginsburg observed, under the
`
`2 Judge Newman’s construction of the IPR statute—the minority view at the
`
`Federal Circuit—was ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court majority in SAS
`
`Institute Inc. v. Iancu.
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`5
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`majority’s holding, the Board remains free to “simply deny a petition containing
`
`challenges having no ‘reasonable likelihood’ of success.” Id. at 1360 (Ginsburg,
`
`J., dissenting). Likewise, § 314(a), § 325(d), and the Supreme Court’s decision in
`
`SAS Institute explicitly permit the Board to deny any petition that contains one or
`
`more challenges based upon the same or substantially the same prior art or
`
`arguments presented in previous Office proceedings—even if the Board finds that
`
`the petition contains a meritorious challenge.
`
`JM’s Petition fails to raise a single piece of prior art that has not already
`
`been considered by the Office and found insufficient to reject the claims of the
`
`'207 Patent. Furthermore, the Petition advances substantially the same arguments
`
`that JM put forward in its original series of IPR Petitions against related Knauf
`
`Insulation patents. The Board found these arguments lacking with regard to claims
`
`similar to those issued in the '207 Patent, and the examiner refused to adopt any of
`
`JM’s deficient arguments during prosecution of the '207 Patent. Knauf Insulation
`
`should not be forced to litigate these same prior art references and arguments yet
`
`again in yet another IPR.
`
`The present Petition advances two grounds based upon a total of four prior
`
`art references. JM’s Ground #1 asserts obviousness over U.S. Patent No.
`
`5,318,990 to Strauss (Ex. 1003, “Strauss”) in view of U.S. Patent Application No.
`
`6
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`2004/0038017 by Tutin et al. (Ex. 1004, “Tutin”) and further in view of U.S.
`
`Patent No. 3,513,001 to Worthington et al. (Ex. 1005, “Worthington”). JM’s
`
`Ground #2 asserts obviousness over Strauss in view of Tutin and further in view of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 2,965,504 to Gogek et al. (Ex. 1006, “Gogek”). During the
`
`prosecution of the '207 Patent, Knauf Insulation identified each of the Strauss,
`
`Tutin, Worthington, and Gogek references to the examiner in information
`
`disclosures statements. (Ex. 1002 (Part 1) at 375-376; Ex. 1002 (Part 2) at 688,
`
`691, 697.) The examiner considered the disclosures of each of these references, as
`
`indicated by his signature on the information disclosure statement listing Gogek
`
`and his notation on the other information disclosure statement that “all references
`
`[were] considered except where lined through” (and not lining through Strauss,
`
`Tutin, or Worthington). (Id.) The examiner proceeded to use both Gogek and
`
`Tutin in several obviousness rejections of the claims that were each overcome by
`
`Knauf Insulation during prosecution of the '207 Patent. (Ex. 1002 (Part 1) at 366-
`
`370; Ex. 1002 (Part 2) at 86, 194, 297-298, 303, 305.)
`
`Knauf Insulation also submitted, and the examiner considered, copies of
`
`JM’s first round of IPR petitions and supporting evidence during prosecution of the
`
`'207 Patent. (See Ex. 1002 (Part 1) at 101, 121, 336, 376.) In these IPR Petitions,
`
`JM and its expert, Dr. Hirsekorn, argued that the Gogek reference anticipated or
`
`7
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`rendered obvious the claims of several Knauf Insulation patents with similarities to
`
`the claims of the '207 Patent. (See, e.g., Ex. 2006 at 6-8; Ex. 2009 at 6-8; Ex. 2011
`
`at 3-4.) Additionally, Knauf Insulation provided the examiner with numerous
`
`filings from several reexaminations of related Knauf Insulation patents that
`
`extensively discussed the teachings of the Worthington reference, which were
`
`considered by the examiner. (Ex. 1002 (Part 1) at 82-83, 91, 110, 121 (citing
`
`materials from reexaminations of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,772,347; 7,888,445; and
`
`7,854,980).) After reviewing Strauss, Tutin, Worthington, and Gogek, as well as
`
`JM’s arguments that the invention should be unpatentable, the examiner concluded
`
`that Gogek was the “closest prior art” but nevertheless found the claims allowable.
`
`(Ex. 1002 (Part 1) at 73.) Indeed, Gogek is far afield from the methods claimed
`
`here.3
`
`JM’s present Petition does not point to any evidence suggesting that the
`
`examiner misunderstood or overlooked any teachings of the Strauss, Tutin,
`
`Worthington, and Gogek references when he declined to reject the claims of the
`
`'207 Patent based upon that prior art. JM argues that “the Examiner did not have
`
`
`3 The examiner correctly observed that “Gogek teaches a hard refractory material
`
`and there is no suggestion that the claimed compression step would be feasible or
`
`desirable on the final product in the prior art of record.” (Ex. 1002 (Part 1) at 73.)
`
`8
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`the benefit of” later decisions of the Board addressing Gogek and Worthington.
`
`(Paper 2 at 56.) But the examiner did, in fact, review earlier Board decisions
`
`containing the same or similar analysis of these references. (See Ex. 1002 at 83,
`
`91, 110 (listing Board’s institution decision in IPR2015-01402 addressing Gogek
`
`and Board’s decisions in reexaminations addressing Worthington as having been
`
`considered by the examiner).) None of the Board’s later decisions adopted any
`
`new grounds of rejection or unpatentability based upon Gogek or Worthington that
`
`were not present in the Board’s prior decisions that were before the examiner.
`
`There is no evidence supporting JM’s supposition that the later Board decisions
`
`would have altered the examiner’s decision that the claims of the '207 Patent were
`
`patentable over Strauss, Tutin, Worthington, and Gogek.
`
`JM’s lawyers also baldly assert that “the Examiner likewise did not consider
`
`the fact that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Gogek,
`
`Strauss and Tutin because all three references relate to the benefits of
`
`formaldehyde-free binders” (Paper 2 at 57), but there is no evidence in support of
`
`this statement. Instead, the record demonstrates that the examiner would have
`
`been well aware of the alleged formaldehyde-free nature of Gogek, Strauss, and
`
`Tutin during prosecution. Knauf Insulation had submitted JM’s prior IPR petitions
`
`and evidence asserting Gogek to be formaldehyde-free (Ex. 1002 at 101, 121, 336,
`
`9
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
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`376), while Strauss and Tutin expressly teach binders that are formaldehyde-free
`
`(Ex. 1003 at 1:66 to 2:23; Ex. 1004 at ¶ [0002]). The examiner found the '207
`
`Patent’s claims patentable over JM’s asserted prior art, and JM has provided no
`
`valid reason for the Board to revisit that decision or to reach a different result in
`
`this IPR.
`
`Furthermore, the Board has already considered—and rejected—arguments
`
`substantially the same as those advanced by JM in its present Petition. In
`
`particular, during JM’s first round of IPRs, the Board found no “reasonable
`
`likelihood” that any of Knauf Insulation’s claims in three related patents could be
`
`found obvious based upon JM’s proposed combination of Gogek with U.S. Patent
`
`Publication No. 2007/0027283 to Swift (“Swift”).4 (See, e.g., Ex. 2006 at 14-18;
`
`Ex. 2009 at 14-17; Ex. 2011 at 12-14.)
`
`The Board’s institution decision in IPR2015-01402 is illustrative of those
`
`prior Board decisions. In that case, JM asserted that the subject matter of claims
`
`3–5, 7, 9, and 11–17 of U.S. Patent No. 8,114,210 (“the '210 Patent”) would have
`
`been obvious based upon the combined teachings of Swift and Gogek. The Board
`
`
`4 This Swift application is not prior art to the '207 Patent by virtue of the '207
`
`Patent’s claim of priority to that application (among others). In fact, the '207
`
`Patent is a continuation of the Swift application cited in JM’s prior IPRs and has a
`
`nearly identical written description.
`
`10
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`

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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
`Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response
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`refused to institute this ground for two reasons: (1) JM’s failure to identify any
`
`“precise difference” between the individual prior art references and the claims, as
`
`required by Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966), and (2) JM’s failure
`
`to set out “some articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the
`
`legal conclusion of obviousness,” as required by KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
`
`U.S. 398, 418 (2007).5 (Ex. 2011 at 12-14.) Ultimately, the Board was not “able
`
`to discern a reason why one skilled in the art would have combined information
`
`described by Gogek and Swift, or if combined, why the combined teachings of
`
`Gogek and Swift would have rendered obvious the subject matter of the claims
`
`challenged.” (Id. at 14.)
`
`In Ground #2 of the present Petition, JM advances essentially the same
`
`arguments as in its prior, failed IPRs but substitutes Strauss and Tutin for Swift
`
`(which JM must do because the Swift publication is not prior art to the '207
`
`Patent). But relying on Strauss and Tutin as teaching the steps of making a thermal
`
`or acoustical fiberglass insulation product, rather than relying on Swift for those
`
`teachings, does not materially change or advance JM’s arguments. According to
`
`JM, Strauss, Tutin, and Swift are all cumulative to one another, as they all
`
`
`5 As discussed further below, JM’s present Petition suffers from these same
`
`defects.
`
`11
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`

`

`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
`Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response
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`(allegedly) teach the same “‘conventional’ manufacturing steps.” (Paper 2 at 13-
`
`14, 17 (arguing that the '207 Patent, which is a continuation of Swift, contains
`
`nearly verbatim passages from Strauss).) The Board has held that adding a new
`
`prior art reference to previously presented arguments does not escape § 325(d)
`
`where that new reference is merely cumulative to the previously considered prior
`
`art. Unified Patents, Inc., v. Berman, IPR2016-01571, Paper 10 at 9-12 (December
`
`14, 2016) (informative).
`
`In the prior IPRs, JM lacked a proper analysis as to why a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art purportedly would have combined the teachings of Gogek with a
`
`“conventional” fiberglass manufacturing process and why those combined
`
`teachings purportedly would have rendered obvious the subject matter of the
`
`claims challenged. (See, e.g., Ex. 2011 at 12-14.) This Petition suffers from the
`
`same fundamental flaw. JM’s attempt to substitute the teachings of Strauss and
`
`Tutin for the teachings of the Swift publication (which teachings JM asserts to be
`
`the same) does not address this issue or change the thrust of JM’s arguments from
`
`those rejected during the earlier IPRs.
`
`Similarly, with respect to Ground #1, JM merely replaces the Gogek
`
`reference with the cumulative Worthington reference. JM’s Petition cites
`
`Worthington as allegedly teaching or suggesting the exact same limitations of
`
`12
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`

`

`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
`Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response
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`claim 1 for which it cites Gogek: namely, limitations [1c], [1d], [1e], [1l], and
`
`[1m]. (Compare Paper 2 at 26-28, 31-33 with id. at 57-61.) As noted above,
`
`simply exchanging a previously used prior art reference for a new, but cumulative,
`
`prior art reference does not materially change the argument for purposes of
`
`§ 325(d). Unified Patents, IPR2016-01571, Paper 10 at 9-12. Nor does JM
`
`present any unique argument as to why one skilled in the art would have combined
`
`the teachings of Worthington with those of Strauss and Tutin beyond the
`
`arguments presented with respect to Gogek. (Compare Paper 2 at 21-23 with id. at
`
`53-55 (arguing for obviousness, as to each ground, based upon references
`
`disclosing formaldehyde-free, thermoset binders).)
`
`In summary, JM’s Petition relies solely on prior art that was already
`
`considered by the examiner of the '207 Patent and arguments that are substantially
`
`the same as arguments previously dismissed by the examiner and the Board. Re-
`
`litigating these issues would be a waste of the Board’s resources and the parties’
`
`time and money. As such, the Board should reject JM’s Petition because “the
`
`same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to
`
`the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The multi-patent infringement jury trial between
`
`Knauf Insulation and JM will proceed, with or without this IPR, and no meaningful
`
`net efficiencies would be gained by institution.
`
`13
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
`Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response
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`III. JM HAS NOT SHOWN A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT
`IT WOULD PREVAIL IN PROVING THE OBVIOUSNESS OF
`ANY CHALLENGED CLAIM
`
`A.
`
`JM Does Not Point To Any Example Of Maillard-Based
`Binders For Fiberglass Insulation In The Prior Art
`
`Throughout the Petition, JM repeatedly alleges that Maillard-based polymers
`
`were “commonly known” to be suitable for binding fiberglass insulation. (See,
`
`e.g., Paper 2 at 22.) Nevertheless, JM fails to provide a modicum of evidence to
`
`support this allegation, other than its declarant’s similarly unsupported opinion
`
`prepared in connection with this proceeding. In making its arguments, JM
`
`frequently misrepresents the content of the prior art:
`
`
`
`“[T]he use of such Maillard reactants as binder reactants was
`
`well-known in the art, and described in detail in, e.g., the Worthington and
`
`Gogek references.” (Paper 2 at 14-15.) Neither Worthington nor Gogek
`
`mentions Maillard chemistry or its resulting products (melanoidins).
`
`
`
`“It was commonly known in the art that Maillard reactions
`
`produce water-insoluble polymers that would be suitable for binding
`
`applications such as fiberglass insulation.” (Paper 2 at 22 (citing Ex. 1008
`
`at 95); id. at 54 (citing Ex. 1008 at ¶ 236).) Neither JM nor Dr. Hirsekorn
`
`point to any prior art teaching or even suggesting this alleged “common
`
`knowledge.”
`
`14
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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
`Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response
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`
`
`“Indeed, a skilled artisan would have known that the purpose of
`
`using the specific binder ingredients disclosed in Worthington would be to
`
`create a cured binder in which nitrogen-containing polymers bind the glass
`
`fibers together into a mat.” (Paper 2 at 33 (citing Ex. 1008 at ¶ 118).)
`
`Worthington says nothing regarding “nitrogen-containing polymers” or use
`
`of its binders to bind glass fibers together (into a mat or otherwise).
`
`
`
`“Gogek teaches a thermoset binder as well through the
`
`disclosure of Maillard reactants in a binder solution.” (Paper 2 at 54 (citing
`
`Ex. 1006 at 2:25-27).) Gogek never mentions Maillard chemistry and
`
`teaches incineration of the alleged “Maillard reactants”—not curing of those
`
`reactants into a thermoset binder. (Ex. 2012 at 16:23 to 17:12.)
`
`
`
`“Gogek also teaches that the cured binder is ‘thermost’ [sic]
`
`because it contains melanoidins.” (Paper 2 at 61 (citing Ex. 1008 at ¶ 259).)
`
`Gogek never mentions melanoidins and, once again, teaches incineration of
`
`the alleged “Maillard reactants”—not curing of those reactants into a
`
`thermoset binder. (Ex. 2012 at 16:23 to 17:12.)
`
`
`
`“[T]he Maillard reaction between the reactants in the binder
`
`disclosed in Gogek will produce nitrogen-containing polymers, as a natural
`
`and inherent result of any Maillard reaction.” (Paper 2 at 61 (citing Ex.
`
`15
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`

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`IPR2018-00863 (Patent 9,464,207)
`Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response
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`1008 at ¶ 260).) Gogek never mentions any Maillard reaction, and JM has
`
`provided no evidence that a

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