(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
` Paper 21
`Entered: November 19, 2018
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SEVEN NETWORKS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`____________
`
`Before THU A. DANG, JONI Y. CHANG, and
`JACQUELINE T. HARLOW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`
`Page 1 of 45
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`

`

`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Google LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes
`review of claims 33, 35, 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, and 48 (“the challenged claims”)
`of U.S. Patent No. 9,516,127 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’127 patent”). Paper 2
`(“Pet.”). The SEVEN Networks, LLC and CF SVN LLC (collectively,
`“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`Pursuant to our prior authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply (Papers 16, 17,
`“Reply”) to the Patent Owner Preliminary Response as to the issue of
`whether Petitioner had named all of the real parties in interest, and Patent
`Owner file a Sur-Reply (Papers 18, 19, “Sur-Reply”). 1 The parties also filed
`Motions to Seal (Papers 15, 20) the un-redacted versions of their papers
`(Papers 16, 18) and certain exhibits and have agreed to the Revised
`Protective Order (Paper 15, Appendix A).
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted
`unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
`least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated
`below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner
`would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We hereby
`institute inter partes review of all the challenged claims on all the grounds of
`unpatentability asserted in the Petition.
`
`1 Both parties filed un-redacted and redacted versions of their papers. Our
`citations correspond to the un-redacted version of each paper.
`2
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’127 patent is involved in Google LLC v.
`SEVEN Networks, LLC, Case No. 3:17-cv-04600 (N.D. Cal.). Pet. 62; Paper
`11, 1. The parties also list other related proceedings. Paper 11(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:21)(cid:17)
`
`B. The ’127 Patent
`The ’127 patent claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No.
`61/805,070, which was filed on March 25, 2013. Ex. 1001 at [54], [60].
`The ’127 patent discloses a system and method “for tracking resources used
`by triggers such as alarms and timers that are used by mobile applications to
`schedule tasks and intelligently manipulating the timing of the triggers to
`optimize usage of resources.” Id. at Abstract.
`Figure 1A-1 of the ’127 patent is reproduced below.
`
`3
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`Figure 1A-1 of the ’127 patent illustrates an example resource
`utilization tracking and intelligent alarm management of triggers across
`multiple applications on a mobile device. Id. (cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:237)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:44)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:70)(cid:88)(cid:79)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:15)(cid:3)
`Figure 1A-1 shows intelligent alarm manipulator and resource tracker
`module 114 having intelligent alarm manager 115 and resource utilization
`tracker 116. Id. Applications 101, 105, and 107 are applications of a mobile
`device, which can set alarms for different times to perform different tasks.
`Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:237)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)Alarms A1, A2, and A3 are intercepted and/or tracked by
`intelligent alarm manger 115, and they use resources 102, including battery
`109, network 111, and CPU 113. Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:237)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:17) Resource utilization
`tracker 116 tracks or monitors the usage of various resources by alarms A1,
`A2, and A3, or tasks triggered by the alarms. Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:237)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:41)(cid:82)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:72)(cid:91)(cid:68)(cid:80)(cid:83)(cid:79)(cid:72)(cid:15)(cid:3)
`assuming that alarm A1 wakes up the mobile device from the sleep mode,
`when alarm A1 is triggered, the mobile device’s battery/power resource and
`CPU resource can be utilized. Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:237)(cid:22)(cid:28)(cid:17)
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 33 and 42 are independent.
`Claims 35, 38, and 41 depend from claim 33. Claims 44, 45, and 48 depend
`from clam 42. Claim 33 is illustrative:
`33. A mobile device, comprising:
`a memory;
`a processor in communication with the memory and configured
`to execute instructions stored in the memory to:
`
`4
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`PUBLIC VERSION - Entered January 14, 2019 - Paper 28
`
`IPR2018-01052
`
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`receive a selection fiom a user whether to optimize traffic of
`a first application executing in a back ground of the mobile
`device;
`
`optimize background traffic of the first application;
`
`receive a selection from a user whether to enter a power save
`mode, where the power save mode is based on a battery level
`of the mobile device;
`
`upon selection to enter the power save mode, adjust a timing
`of activities of a second application executing in the
`background of the mobile device to reduce usage of at least
`one resource ofthe mobile device;
`
`exit the power save mode, wherein the power save mode is
`exited based on a battery level or in response to the user
`directing the mobile device to exit the power save mode.
`
`Ex. 1001, 25:63—26:15.
`
`D. PriorArtRelied Upon
`
`Petitioner relies upon the references listed below (Pet. 4—6).
`
`Reference
`
`Giaretta
`
`US 9,264,868 B2, issued Feb. 16, 2016 (filed Nov. 3, 2011)
`
`1004
`
`Backholm US 2012/0023190 A1 , published Jan. 26, 2012
`
`Lee
`
`US 2012/0272230 A1 , published Oct. 25, 2012
`
`Hackborn US 8,280,456 B2, issued Oct. 2, 2012
`
`1009
`
`1010
`
`Page 5 of 45
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`PUBLIC VERSION - Entered January 14, 2019 - Paper 28
`
`IPR2018—01052
`
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`E. Asserfed Grounds ofUnpatenfabi 1113/
`
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 3—4)2:
`
`References
`
`Giaretta, Lee, and Hackbom
`
`33, 38, 41, 42, 44, and 48
`
`§ 103
`
`Backholm
`
`35 and 45
`
`§ 103
`
`Backholm and Hackbom
`
`33, 38, 41, 42, 44, and 48
`
`§ 103
`
`Giaretta andLee
`
`§ 103
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Whether Peri ti onerIdentifiea' All Real Parties in Interest under § 312
`
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), a petitioner is required to identify all of
`
`the real parties in interest (“RPI”) in each interpartes review (“IPR”)
`
`2 The relevant post-grant review provisions of the America Invents Act
`(“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (201 1), took effect on March 16,
`2013. 125 Stat. at 293, 311. The earliest possible effective filing date of the
`’ 127 patent is March 25, 2013. Therefore, our citations to Title 35 are to its
`post AIA version. Section 4(c) of the AIA re-designated 35 U.S.C .
`§§ 112(1), (2) as 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 (a), (b), respectively, effective September
`16, 2012. 125 Stat. at 296—297.
`
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`proceeding. We generally accept a petitioner’s initial identification of the
`RPIs unless the patent owner presents some evidence to support its argument
`that an unnamed party should be included as an RPI. See Worlds Inc. v.
`Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that “an IPR
`petitioner’s initial identification of the real parties in interest should be
`accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner,” and that “a patent
`owner must produce some evidence to support its argument that a particular
`third party should be named a real party in interest”). Furthermore, the
`petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that it has identified
`all of the RPIs. Cf. id. (cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:237)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:55)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:69)(cid:88)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:71)(cid:82)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:81)(cid:82)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:86)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:73)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:82)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)
`owner. Id. (cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:237)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:17)(cid:3)
`Here, Petitioner identifies Google LLC (“Google”) as the sole RPI.
`Pet. 62. Patent Owner, however, argues that the Petition should be denied
`for failing to identify Google’s parent companies—namely, Alphabet, Inc.
`(“Alphabet”) and XXVI Holdings, Inc. (“XXVI”)—as well as Samsung
`Electronics Co., Ltd. and/or Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
`(cid:11)(cid:70)(cid:82)(cid:79)(cid:79)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:179)(cid:54)(cid:68)(cid:80)(cid:86)(cid:88)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:180)(cid:12)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:51)(cid:44)(cid:86)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:80)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:21)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:70)(cid:70)(cid:82)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:82)(cid:3)
`Patent Owner, the failure to identify all RPIs “is a fatal and incurable error
`when, as here, the § 315(b)’s one-year ban has elapsed.” Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:237)(cid:23)(cid:17)
`At the outset, Patent Owner incorrectly conflates § 312(a)(2) with
`§ 315(b) by applying § 312(a)(2) as part of the timeliness inquiry under
`§ 315(b). These statutory provisions “entail distinct, independent inquiries.”
`Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1364 (Fed.
`Cir. 2018) (Judge Reyna’s concurring opinion) (“AIT”). As the U.S. Court
`7
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has noted, it “is incorrect” to “conflate[]
`‘real party in interest’ as used in § 312(a)(2) and § 315(b), and claim[] that
`‘§ 312(a)(2) is part and parcel of the timeliness inquiry under § 315.’” Wi-Fi
`One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en
`banc) (“Wi-Fi En Banc”). “For example, if a petition fails to identify all real
`parties in interest under § 312(a)(2), the Director can, and does, allow the
`petitioner to add a real party in interest.” Id. “In contrast, if a petition is not
`filed within a year after a real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is
`served with a complaint, it is time-barred by § 315(b), and the petition
`cannot be rectified and in no event can IPR be instituted.” Id.
`Here, Google is not time-barred from filing its Petition under
`§ 315(b). Google was served on May 18, 2017, with a complaint alleging
`infringement of the ’127 patent. Ex. 2003, 2. The Petition was timely filed
`by Google within one year from May 18, 2017. Paper 3, 1. Moreover, none
`of the allegedly unnamed parties was served on or before May 18, 2017,
`with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’127 patent. Neither Alphabet
`nor XXVI are defendants in the related district court infringement action.
`Ex. 1040 ¶ 11; Ex. 2003. Samsung was served with a complaint on May 19,
`2017. Thus, even if the allegedly unnamed parties were RPIs, the Petition
`would not be time-barred under § 315(b) if they were included.
`In short, the dispositive issues here are whether at least one of the
`unnamed parties qualifies as an RPI under § 312(a)(2), and if so, whether it
`would be appropriate to permit Google to add that party. In this proceeding,
`however, it is not necessary for us to decide the privity issue under § 315(b),
`8
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`which “is more expansive, encompassing parties that do not necessarily need
`to be identified in the petition as a ‘real party-in-interest.’” Office Patent
`Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”), 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012).
`
`1. Principles of Law Regarding “Real Party in Interest”
`“Whether a party who is not a named participant in a given
`proceeding nonetheless constitutes a ‘real party-in-interest’ . . . to that
`proceeding is a highly fact-dependent question” with no “bright line test,”
`and is assessed “on a case-by-case basis.” TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759
`(citing Taylor v. Sturgell(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:17)(cid:54)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:237)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:12)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:36)(cid:3)(cid:38)(cid:75)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:79)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:79)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:3)
`Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &
`Procedure (“Wright & Miller”) §§ 4449, 4451). “Courts invoke the terms
`‘real party-in-interest’ . . . to describe relationships and considerations
`sufficient to justify applying conventional principles of estoppel and
`preclusion.” Id. at 48,760. The use of familiar common law terms indicates
`that “Congress intended to adopt common law principles to govern the
`scope” of the statute. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887 F.3d 1329,
`1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Wi-Fi Remand”).
`“To decide whether a party other than the petitioner is the real party in
`interest, the Board seeks to determine whether some party other than the
`petitioner is the ‘party or parties at whose behest the petition has been
`filed.’” Id. at 1336 (citing TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759) (emphasis added);
`see also AIT, 897 F.3d at 1351 (noting that one of the questions lying at the
`heart of determining whether an unnamed party is an RPI is “whether a
`petition has been filed at a nonparty’s ‘behest’”). “Acommon consideration
`9
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a
`party’s participation in a proceeding.”3 TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759
`(emphasis added) (citing Wright & Miller § 4451). “Aparty that funds and
`directs and controls an IPR or post-grant review proceeding constitutes a
`real party-in-interest, even if that party is not a privy of the petitioner.”
`Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1336 (emphasis added) (citation and internal
`markings omitted). Also, several relevant factors for determining whether a
`party is an RPI include the party’s relationship with the petitioner, the
`party’s relationship to the petition, and the nature of the entity filing the
`petition. TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,760; see AIT, 897 F.3d at 1351.
`There is no bright-line test for determining the necessary quantity or
`degree of participation in the proceeding to qualify as a real party-in-interest.
`TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759 (citing Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d
`751, 759 (1st Cir. 1994)). An unnamed party’s participation may be overt or
`covert, and the evidence may be circumstantial, but the evidence, as a whole,
`must show that the unnamed party possessed effective control from a
`practical standpoint. Gonzalez, 27 F.3d at 759. This inquiry is not based on
`isolated facts, but rather must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id.
`
`3 We address this common consideration in our Decision because Patent
`Owner argues that Alphabet or XXVI controlled or could have controlled
`(cid:82)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:82)(cid:82)(cid:74)(cid:79)(cid:72)(cid:182)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:70)(cid:76)(cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:83)(cid:85)(cid:82)(cid:70)(cid:72)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:80)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:3)
`Sur-(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:83)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:24)(cid:17)
`
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`2. Whether Alphabet or XXVI is a Real Party in Interest
`Petitioner maintains that Google is the sole RPI in this proceeding.
`See generally Reply. Petitioner asserts that Google alone funded, controlled,
`and has the ability to control the instant proceeding, and that neither
`Alphabet nor XXVI had control or has the ability to control this proceeding.
`(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:83)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:237)(cid:24)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:237)(cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:70)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:71)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:79)(cid:83)(cid:75)(cid:68)(cid:69)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:59)(cid:59)(cid:57)(cid:44)(cid:3)(cid:179)(cid:75)(cid:68)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:81)(cid:82)(cid:3)
`involvement or influence over this IPR,” as Google’s counsel alone decided
`to file this Petition and directed the preparation of the Petition. Id.
`Based on the evidence in the present record, we are persuaded by
`Petitioner’s showing. For instance, Petitioner presents testimony from
`Mr. Joseph Shear, a member of
`
`
`
`Ex. 1040 ¶ 2. Mr. Shear testifies that
`
`Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Shear also
`testifies that “[n]o Alphabet or XXVI officer, director, or employee was
`consulted regarding the preparation of this IPR petition or the decision to file
`this IPR petition,” and that “
`
`.” Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:136)(cid:136)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:237)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:70)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:91)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:22)(cid:12)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)
`Patent Owner does not rebut this testimony at this time. Nor is there
`any other evidence in this record that suggests the instant Petition has been
`filed at the behest of Alphabet or XXVI. Alphabet and XXVI are not named
`defendants in the related district court infringement action concerning the
`11
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`’127 patent. Ex. 1040 ¶ 11; Ex. 2003.
`
`Ex. 1040 ¶ 14. Moreover, neither Alphabet nor XXVI has intervened in the
`infringement action. Id. ¶ 15. As discussed above, the evidence of record
`shows that Google independently controls and funds the Petition and this
`proceeding. Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:136)(cid:136)(cid:3)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:25)(cid:237)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:17)
`Upon consideration of the entirety of the present record, we are
`persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently for purposes of this
`Decision that Alphabet and XXVI are not RPIs to the instant proceeding.
`We now address Patent Owner’s contentions in turn.
`First, Patent Owner argues that the “Board has regularly found that
`pa(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:70)(cid:82)(cid:85)(cid:83)(cid:82)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:88)(cid:81)(cid:81)(cid:68)(cid:80)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:51)(cid:44)(cid:86)(cid:17)(cid:180)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:80)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)7; Sur-(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:83)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)
`Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s argument in the Reply “is contrary
`to law,” because it is based on “the specific relationship between the parent
`and the ‘proceeding.’” Sur-Re(cid:83)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:22)(cid:237)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:90)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:70)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:86)(cid:72)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:3)(cid:37)(cid:82)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:3)
`decisions and the Federal Circuit’s AIT decision for support. Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:3)
`(cid:51)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:80)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:237)(cid:25)(cid:17)
`However, in making this argument, Patent Owner conflates the RPI
`inquiry with the privity inquiry by focusing mainly on the relationship
`between the unnamed parties and Google. To be clear, the existence of a
`parent-subsidiary relationship, by itself, is insufficient proof that the parent
`company is an RPI to the subsidiary’s proceeding. TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. at
`48,759 (citing Taylor(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:17)(cid:54)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:237)(cid:28)(cid:24)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:58)(cid:85)(cid:76)(cid:74)(cid:75)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:48)(cid:76)(cid:79)(cid:79)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:134)(cid:134) 4449, 4451)
`(noting that whether an unnamed party is an RPI “to that proceeding is a
`12
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`highly fact-dependent question” with no “bright line test”). Prior Board
`decisions make clear that the RPI inquiry focuses on “the relationship
`between a party and a proceeding,” and that the relationship between a party
`and the petitioner alone is not determinative. Aruze Gaming Macau, Ltd. v.
`MGT Gaming, Inc., Case IPR2014-(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:86)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:83)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:237)(cid:20)(cid:20)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:12)(cid:3)
`(PTAB Feb. 20, 2015) (reviewing prior Board decisions establishing a
`non-party as an RPI and explaining that in each, “central to the Board’s
`determination was that a party other than the named petitioner was
`controlling, or capable of controlling, the proceeding before the Board”).
`Aruze Gaming is cited approvingly in Judge Reyna’s concurrence in AIT,
`897 F.3d at 1365 n.7 (noting that the Board in Aruze correctly recognized
`that “[t]he parties’ briefs comingle their analyses of the issues of RPI and
`privity” and “[t]he two terms describe distinct concepts”); TPG, 77 Fed.
`Reg. at 48,760 (identifying several “[r]elevant factors”).
`As Petitioner notes (Reply 3 n.1), even in a privity analysis, the
`Supreme Court in Taylor rejected the argument that “[p]reclusion is in order
`. . . whenever ‘the relationship between a party and non-party is ‘close
`enough’ to bring the second litigant within the judgment.” Taylor, 553 U.S.
`at 898. The Court held in Taylor that a broader doctrine of nonparty
`preclusion, termed “virtual representation,” was inconsistent with common
`law and risked violating due process. Id(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:237)(cid:28)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)
`Patent Owner also overextends the reasoning of AIT. An RPI analysis
`requires more than determining whether an unnamed party benefits
`generally from the filing of a petition and has a relationship with the
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`petitioner. Id. at 901 (Taylor makes clear that nonparty preclusion cannot be
`based on mere “identity of interests and some kind of relationship between
`parties and nonparties.”); Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1341 (“Wi-Fi’s
`evidence showed that Broadcom’s interests as to the issue of infringement
`were generally aligned with those of its customers,” but “there is no
`evidentiary support for Wi-Fi’s theory that Broadcom was acting at the
`behest or on behalf of the D-Link defendants.”); Unified Patents, Inc. v.
`Realtime Adaptive Streaming, LLC, Case IPR2018-(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:86)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:83)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:237)(cid:20)(cid:24)(cid:3)
`(Paper 29) (PTAB Oct. 11, 2018).
`Notably, the RPI analysis in AIT turned on considerations not present
`here. AIT not only involved finding that RPX was a for-profit company that
`files IPR petitions to benefit its clients, but also proceeded deeper to find
`extensive and specific ties between RPX and the unnamed party as they
`relate to the particular proceeding. AIT, 897 F.3d (cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:24)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:81)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:78)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:15)(cid:3)
`the unnamed party in AIT was accused of patent infringement, and had a
`series of communications with RPX related to the specific infringement
`action and post-grant filings challenging the asserted patent, as well as paid
`RPX “a very significant payment shortly before the IPR petitions . . . were
`filed.” Id. (cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:44)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:86)(cid:75)(cid:82)(cid:85)(cid:87)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:90)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:71)(cid:82)(cid:3)(cid:81)(cid:82)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:74)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:90)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:90)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:182)(cid:86)(cid:3)
`analysis that an unnamed party is an RPI if the unnamed party benefits
`generally from the filing of a petition and has a relationship with the
`petitioner. As in AIT, an RPI analysis must proceeded deeper to find
`specific ties between the petitioner and the unnamed party as they relate to
`the particular proceeding.
`
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`(cid:51)(cid:56)(cid:37)(cid:47)(cid:44)(cid:38)(cid:3)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:54)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:45)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:27)
`
`IPR2018-01052
`Patent 9,516,127 B2
`
`For these reasons, the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary
`relationship between Alphabet or XXVI and Petitioner in this case is
`insufficient to establish that Alphabet or XXVI is an RPI to the instant
`proceeding.
`Second, Patent Owner argues that “[a]ctive, actual control is not
`required” because Alphabet is an “involved and controlling” parent, and
`(cid:42)(cid:82)(cid:82)(cid:74)(cid:79)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:81)(cid:82)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:51)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:80)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:26)(cid:237)(cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:30)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:88)(cid:85)-(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:83)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:237)(cid:24)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)
`Patent Owner contends that because Google is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
`Alphabet, Alphabet controls 100% of Google and authorizes Google’s
`budget and plans, as well as holds its management responsible for their
`performance. Id. According to Patent Owner, Alphabet and Google are
`essentially a single entity, blurring