IPR2018-01093
`U.S. Patent 7,944,353 B2
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`APPLE, INC.
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`Petitioner
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`v.
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`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
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`Patent Owner.
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`IPR2018-01093
`PATENT 7,944,353 B2
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`PATENT OWNER SUR-REPLY
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`1
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`U.S. Patent 7,944,353 B2
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`APPLE, INC.
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`Petitioner
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`v.
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`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
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`Patent Owner.
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`IPR2018-01093
`PATENT 7,944,353 B2
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`PATENT OWNER SUR-REPLY
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`1
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`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`IPR2018-01093
`U.S. Patent 7,944,353 B2
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`Table of Contents
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`2.
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 3
`PETITIONER’S REPLY UNDERSCORES DEFICIENCIES
`OF THE PETITION .................................................................................. 3
`A.
`Claim 1 ............................................................................................ 3
`1.
`Petitioner’s reliance on Lemelson’s “medical
`alert” remains deficient. ....................................................... 3
`Petitioner’s alternative reliance on Lemelson’s so-
`called audio event is deficient. ............................................. 9
`Dependent Claims 6, 7, and 8 ....................................................... 13
`B.
`Independent Claim 12 ................................................................... 14
`C.
`Claims 13 and 14 .......................................................................... 17
`D.
`Claim 16 ........................................................................................ 17
`E.
`Claim 18 ........................................................................................ 20
`F.
`G. Dependent Claims 19 and 20 ........................................................ 21
`APPLE DOES NOT DENY THE EXISTENCE OF A
`LICENSE ................................................................................................ 22
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 24
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`IPR2018-01093
`U.S. Patent 7,944,353 B2
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`Uniloc 2017 LLC (“Uniloc” or “Patent Owner”) submits this Sur-Reply to
`Petition IPR2018-01093 for Inter Partes Review (“Pet.” or “Petition”) of United
`States Patent No. 7,944,353 B2 (“the ’353 Patent” or “EX1001”) filed by Apple, Inc.
`(“Petitioner”).
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`II.
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`PETITIONER’S REPLY UNDERSCORES DEFICIENCIES OF THE
`PETITION
`A. Claim 1
`Petitioner’s Reply underscores the deficiencies of the Petition concerning the
`ordered process set forth in claim 1, which among other requirements includes the
`following ordered steps:
`(1) “repeatedly analyzing the input data to determine an event context”,
`(2) “assessing a criticality of the determined event context”, and
`(3) “responsive to the assessment of criticality, determining a reporting response.”
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`1. Petitioner’s reliance on Lemelson’s “medical alert” remains
`deficient.
`For the requirement “determin[ing] an event context”, Petitioner confirms in
`its Reply that it relies on Lemelson’s alleged teaching of “analyzing a user’s
`biometrics or medical history data to determine an abnormal medical condition.”
`Reply (Paper 13) at 2 (citing Paper 8 at 15-17). For the distinct claim requirement of
`“assessing a criticality of the determined event context”, Petitioner further confirms
`its reliance on the alleged teaching in Lemelson that “the computer detects a variance
`of predefined degree between the person’s current and normal medical conditions.”
`Id. (citing Paper 8 at 17-18).
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`Petitioner has the burden of proof, yet it points to nothing in Lemelson
`expressly disclosing that determining an abnormal medical condition is an inquiry
`that is separate from, and antecedent to, detecting a variance of a predefined degree.
`The passages in Lemelson Petitioner points to in its Reply do not support, and rather
`refute, Petitioner’s contrived interpretation. See Reply at 3.
`First, Petitioner offers a single block quotation from Lemelson, reproduced in
`its fuller context below, which expressly refutes Petitioner’s theory:
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`The warning unit carried by the person further includes a medical
`monitoring system that monitors and generates signals defining
`selected current medical conditions of the person wearing the
`warning unit. The portable warning unit computer controller
`memory includes data defining abnormal medical conditions.
`The computer is programmed to compare the signals generated
`by the medical monitoring system to the data stored in memory
`defining abnormal medical conditions. If a variance of
`predefined degree exists between the person’s current and
`normal medical conditions, the computer generates and causes
`the transmission circuit to transmit signals defining the variance
`to the command control center. … The command control center
`determines the severity of the emergency and dispatches the
`proper emergency assistance.
`EX1003, Lemelson at 4:29-49; see also Reply at 4 (offering a partial quotation of
`the same); Paper 12 (Response) at 6-8 (further explaining why this passage refutes
`Petitioner’s theory).
`The above passage does not disclose determining an abnormal medication
`condition exists, and only thereafter separately accessing whether there is a variance
`of a predefined degree. On the contrary, the passage reveals that an abnormal
`medication condition is itself detected as “a variance of a predefined degree between
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`U.S. Patent 7,944,353 B2
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`the person’s current and normal medical conditions.” Id. No other condition is
`disclosed for detecting an abnormal medical condition; and Petitioner provides no
`basis to conclude otherwise.
`Second, Petitioner also fails to prove its theory in pointing to a distinct passage
`of Lemelson stating that “[i]f the system detects abnormal medical signs for an
`individual and the individual is in need of medical attention, an emergency
`transmission is made.” Reply at 4 (quoting EX1003, Lemelson at 7:42-54). This
`single “if” clause does not expressly require Petitioner’s contrived interpretation—
`i.e., that determining an abnormal medical condition as an inquiry that is separate
`from and antecedent to detecting a variance of a predefined degree. Indeed, the “if”
`clause makes no mention of detecting a variance of a predefined degree.
`This latter “if” clause also does not support an inherency theory. Id. In the
`absence of any explicit description in Lemelson of how the “if” clause is executed,
`a plausible interpretation is that certain abnormal medications are predefined as
`being of sufficient variance that they necessitate medical attention. See EX1003,
`Lemelson at 4:29-49. It follows that detecting the existence of such a condition (i.e.,
`a variance predefined as necessitating medical attention) does not expressly or
`inherently disclose the distinct steps of “determine[ing] an event context” and, only
`thereafter, and as a distinct step, “assessing a criticality of the [previously]
`determined event.”
`Finally, Petitioner retreats from its own interpretation of Lemelson and points,
`instead, to Lemelson’s “severity” determination executed remotely by a command
`and control center only after it receives what Petitioner characterizes as a reported
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`event. Reply at 5. According to Petitioner, even if Lemelson discloses that an
`abnormal medication condition is itself only detected as a variance of a predefined
`degree between the person’s current and normal medical conditions (and it does),
`Lemelson still renders this claim language obvious merely by stating “[t]he
`command control center determines the severity of the emergency and dispatches
`the proper emergency assistance.” Reply at 5 (citing Pet. 1, 35 as discussing
`EX1003, Lemelson at 4:43-49) (emphasis added).
`Petitioner overlooks the explicit and ordered interrelation of process steps set
`forth in claim 1. The statement Petitioner identifies from Lemelson merely lists two
`processes, separated by an “and” conjunction. See EX1003, Lemelson at 4:43-49
`(“[t]he command control center determines the severity of the emergency and
`dispatches the proper emergency assistance”) (emphasis added). Claim 1, by
`contrast, does not merely recite two processes separated by an “and” conjunction.
`Rather, claim 1 expressly requires an explicit interrelationship recited as “responsive
`to the assessment of criticality, determining a reporting response.” Multiple
`deficiencies arise from Petitioner’s alternative theory.
`First, Petitioner fails to explain, much less prove, that Lemelson’s ambiguous
`reference to dispatching emergency assistance must be responsive to a determined
`severity of the emergency, as required under Petitioner’s incorrect mapping. The
`explicit interrelationship “responsive to the assessment of criticality” cannot be
`rendered obvious merely by pointing to an ambiguous statement in Lemelson that
`lists two processes without expressing the claimed interrelationship. To hold
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`otherwise would reduce the claimed interrelationship (“responsive to the assessment
`of criticality”) to a nullity.
`It is also significant that Lemelson does not expressly state the command and
`control center itself determines the dispatching, much less that it does so responsive
`to (and hence only after) a determined severity. On the contrary, Lemelson uses the
`word “determines” only in connection with the “severity” clause and not in
`connection with the distinct “dispatching” clause. Nothing in the record establishes
`inherency of the claimed interrelationship recited as “responsive to the assessment
`of criticality”; and Petitioner does not even advance an inherency argument.
`Second, an independent deficiency arises from what exactly must be
`determined “responsive to the assessment of criticality”—i.e., “a reporting
`response”. It is significant that the word “response” is modified by the qualifier
`“reporting response.” This qualifier, when read in light of the teachings of the ’353
`patent, clarifies the nature of the “response” itself and confirms the “response” does
`not merely refer to any transmission from any element in general. Claim 1 further
`requires a specific order: the “reporting response” is determined only after “the
`assessment of criticality.”
`This claim language and the corresponding description in the ’353 patent
`reflect a fundamental distinction between Lemelson and the claim language. The
`’353 patent consistently and repeated discloses that the computer implementing the
`various antecedent steps of claim 1, including determining an event context and
`accessing criticality, uses those steps to determine the “reporting response”—i.e., in
`terms of whether the response should be reported in the first place and what to
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`include within the response if reported. Implementing these steps at the computer
`that receives and analyzes the input data to determine an event context enables
`efficiently filtering out certain events deemed not critical enough to report in the
`first place. See, e.g., ’353 patent at 7:33-48. This thematic concept is expressly
`invoked in claim 1 at least by using the qualifier “reporting” to modify the
`“response” limitation. This thematic concept is further reflected by the remainder of
`claim 1 (including the preamble) and the additional context introduced in certain
`dependent claims.1
`By way of contrast, Lemelson inefficiently determines its “severity” at a
`remote and centralized location only after receiving what Petitioner acknowledges
`are the reported events. Petitioner and its declarant concede this point: “Lemelson
`expressly states that the command center is used to ‘keep track’ of many warning
`units within a geographic region, which would necessarily involve receiving
`reported events from a plurality of reporting subsystems.” Pet. 53 (citations omitted,
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` Claim 13, for example, recites “a public safety subsystem interfaced to the analysis
`subsystem and the reporting subsystem, the public safety subsystem enabled to
`receive reported events and broadcast an alert.” This confirms the understanding that
`a “reporting response” is generated locally and reported to a centralized location, as
`opposed to being generated remotely and simply dispatched (i.e., not reported). In
`addressing claim 14, Petitioner argues the particular configuration in Lemelson
`“would necessarily involve [the command and control center] receiving reported
`events from a plurality of reporting subsystems.” Pet. 53.
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`emphasis added). Thus, according to Petitioner, Lemelson reports all events to the
`command and control center regardless of their severity.
`Petitioner attempts to inoculate this distinction of Lemelson by pointing to
`certain teachings of the ’353 patent. Reply at 5 (citing EX1001, ’353 patent at 2:6-
`10 and 8:9-15). The cited passages of the ’353 patent, however, do not determine the
`“reporting response” at a centralized location remote from where the “repeatedly
`analyzing” and “assessing” occur, much less doing so before the claimed “the
`assessment of criticality”. On the contrary, the ’353 patent confirms in the cited
`passages and elsewhere that it is the local and aptly-named reporting subsystem 330
`that determines the “reporting response”, which includes determining whether or not
`to report the response in the first place. See, e.g.,’353 patent at 2:6-10 and 8:9-15.
`The ’353 further confirms, including in those same passages, that the public safety
`subsystem 340 merely receives a previously determined “reporting response” and
`routes the same onward. Id. The reception and routing reflect actions that all occur
`at remote location only sometime after executing all the steps set forth in claim 1.
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`2. Petitioner’s alternative reliance on Lemelson’s so-called audio
`event is deficient.
`Petitioner’s Reply faults Uniloc for allegedly failing to address “[t]wo
`separate mappings of Lemelson’s assessing criticality for audio events.” Reply at
`13. According to Petitioner, the “first” alleged mapping points to a “fuzzy logic
`degree of danger” determined by the central command center only after it receives
`a reported audio event; and the “second” mapping points to a “fuzzy logic degree of
`danger” executed instead (and in a different context) at the portable warning unit.
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`Petitioner neglects to mention that the Petition itself does not purport to rely
`on what Petition refers to as the “first” mapping. Indeed, in addressing what
`Petitioner refers to as the so-called “first” alleged mapping for “audio events”, the
`Reply offers no citation to an alleged corresponding argument in the Petition.
`Petitioner should not be allowed to rely upon a new and admittedly different
`mapping not set forth in the Petition itself; and Uniloc objects to its inclusion in this
`trial. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring petitions to identify “with particularity … the
`grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based”); Wasica Finance GmbH v.
`Continental Automotive Systems, Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286-87 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“It
`is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the
`requirement that the initial petition identify with particularity the evidence that
`supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.”) (quoting Intelligent Bio-Sys.,
`Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which
`quotes, in part, 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d
`1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e find no support for the PTO’s position that the
`Board is free to adopt arguments on behalf of petitioners that could have been, but
`were not, raised by the petitioner during an IPR.”).
`Even if Petitioner is permitted to advance in its Reply a new and admittedly
`different mapping not set forth in the Petition, notwithstanding contrary authority
`proscribing this practice, this new mapping is deficient for reasons articulated above.
`See §II.A.1, supra. For example, this new theory relies on an alleged criticality
`assessment executed remotely by a command and control center only after it receives
`what Petitioner refers to as the “reported event”. Id.
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`Before addressing the so-called “second” mapping identified it Petitioner’s
`Reply, it is important to recognize that Lemelson identifies only the command and
`control center as calculating the “fuzzy logic degree of danger” arising from an audio
`event reported by the portable wearing unit. EX1003, Lemelson at 4:67-5:9.
`Lemelson is explicit in disclosing that the warning unit does not perform this “fuzzy
`logic” calculation for “loud noises, riot sounds, gunshots, and other such noises.” Id.
`Rather, “[i]f such noises are detected, the warning unit alerts the central command
`center” and, only thereafter, “[t]he command control center receives the transmitted
`signals from the portable warning unit and [the command control center] uses fuzzy
`logic to define the emergency condition . . . [and] the fuzzy logic degree of danger
`and the current geographic location of the user.” Id. at 5:1-9.
`This purposeful division of tasks in Lemelson is very specific in the context
`of audio events. It would make no sense to duplicate calculating the “fuzzy logic
`degree of danger” for an audio event at both the command and control center and
`the portable warning unit. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. Petitioner also does
`not dispute the “fuzzy logic degree of danger” described in this passage of Lemelson
`(EX1003, 4:67-5:9) is calculated only by the command and control center and only
`after having first received from the portable wearing unit what Petitioner refers to as
`the reported event.
`Petitioner’s Reply provides citation to the Petition only in addressing what
`Petitioner newly refers to in its Reply as the so-called “second” mapping for an audio
`event. Reply at 7 (citing Pet. 31). The cited portion of the Petition points to the
`following statement of Lemelson: “[t]he computer controller of the portable warning
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`unit’s expert system comprises fuzzy logic inference rules and a fuzzy logic
`controller to compute a degree of danger index for the person carrying the portable
`warning unit.” Pet. 31 (citing EX1003, Lemelson at 5:26-28); see also Reply at 7
`(citing the same). Unlike the description of the “fuzzy logic” executed by the
`command and control center, this distinct and separate passage in Lemelson makes
`no mention of executing “fuzzy logic” addressing the specific context of an audio
`event. See Paper 12, Response at 8-11 (addressing the same).
`Petitioner provides no explanation for how this distinct passage of Lemelson
`maps onto the claim language, apart from Petitioner’s erroneous understanding that
`it must somehow pertain to an audio event (which Lemelson itself expressly refutes).
`See Response, Paper 12 at 10-11. This passage is also deficient in that it makes no
`reference to the antecedent steps set forth in the claim language and therefore cannot
`possibly satisfy
`the claim
`language directed
`to
`the explicit order and
`interrelationships between those steps (e.g., “assessing a criticality of the
`[previously] determined event context”). Id. Presumably this is why Petitioner and
`its declarant impermissibly attempt to rewrite this distinct passage of Lemelson as
`describing, instead, how Lemelson’s system responds to an audio event.
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`For at least the forgoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated in Uniloc’s
`Response, Petitioner fails to prove obviousness of independent claim 1 (and hence
`all challenged claims depending therefrom).
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`B. Dependent Claims 6, 7, and 8
`Petitioner betrays in its Reply a fundamental misunderstanding of a plain
`reading of the claim language set forth in dependent claims 6-8. These claims are
`reproduced below:
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`6. The method of claim 1, wherein the assessing a criticality
`comprises determining whether the event data meets a
`threshold setting, the threshold setting being part of a
`configuration data.
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`7. The method of claim 6, wherein responsive to the event data
`meeting a threshold setting, filtering the event data based on
`a configuration setting.
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`8. The method of claim 7, wherein the filtering comprises
`inhibiting the reporting response.
` Uniloc observed the following in its Response:
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`The Petition relies on a combination of Lemelson and Zhou that,
`according to Petitioner, reports a response only if it meets a
`threshold (e.g., only if temperature is greater than or equal to
`100° F and heart rate is greater than or equal to 90). Pet. 46; see
`also id. at 2 (arguing that under the proposed combination, “alerts
`are sent only when a user’s heart-rate is above a user-defined
`threshold”) (underlining added). This fails to disclose, and
`indeed teaches away from, “filtering the event data” “responsive
`to the event data meeting a threshold setting,” as recited in
`dependent claims 6 and 7 (emphasis added).
`Paper 12, Response at 11 (emphasis original). In its Reply, Petitioner does not
`dispute that the above characterization of the Petition is factually correct. Petitioner
`only attempts to defend its untenable theory based on an equally untenable claim
`construction argument.
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`Petitioner argues that the “filtering” step of claim 6 cannot be considered
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`responsive to the event meeting a threshold setting ostensibly because this would
`conflate certain limitations. See Paper 13, Reply at 11. A plain reading of the claim
`language refutes Petitioner’s construction.
`Dependent claim 6 expressly recites a prerequisite condition to which the
`“filtering” step must be responsive—i.e., “responsive to the event data meeting a
`threshold setting.” This may be fairly characterized as describing when (i.e., under
`what condition) the filtering is performed. The limitation that follows, recited as
`“filtering the event data based on a configuration setting” is directed to how the
`claimed “filtering” is performed (i.e., “based on a configuration setting”). This
`correct interpretation does not conflate these limitations but rather simply restates
`what the claim language expressly and unambiguously requires.
`The combination proposed in the Petition turns this claim language on its head
`by suggesting it is satisfied if alerts are sent (i.e., not filtered) on condition that a
`user-defined threshold is met. Paper 12, Response at 11 (citing Pet. at 2 and 46). As
`explained in Uniloc’s response, Petitioner’s mapping fails to disclose, and indeed
`teaches away from, the explicit and unambiguous claim language. Id.
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`For at least the forgoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated in Uniloc’s
`Response, Petitioner fails to prove obviousness of dependent claims 6-8.
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`C.
`Independent Claim 12
`Uniloc explained in its Response that Claim 12 requires that the “reporting
`subsystem” not only “receives the event context” from the “analysis subsystem” but
`also is “communicatively coupled to the analysis subsystem”. Paper 12, Response
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`at 12-13. A plain reading of this clear and unambiguous language confirms that these
`distinct subsystems cannot be considered “communicatively coupled” simply
`because one ultimately receives “an event context determined by” the other. Id.
`Rather, in this specific context, “communicatively coupled” must refer to a direct
`interconnection. Id. To hold otherwise would subsume “communicatively coupled”
`within the separate requirement that the “reporting subsystem . . . receives the event
`context determined by the analysis subsystem.” Id.
`This plain reading of the claim language reflects the teachings of the ’353
`patent offered in describing Figure 3, copied and highlighted in pertinent part below.
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`EX1001, ’353 patent, at Figure 3; see also id. at 7:17-18 (“the analysis subsystem
`320 reports to the reporting subsystem 330.”). As shown in the portion of Figure 3
`reproduced above, the analysis subsystem 320 is illustrated as being directly
`interconnected with the reporting subsystem 330.
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`The Petition points to Lemelson’s “medical monitor” as allegedly disclosing
`the analysis subsystem and Lemelson’s “transmit/receive (TX/RX) radio 48 and
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`antenna system 50 of FIG. 2” as allegedly disclosing the reporting subsystem. Pet.
`at 51-52. Lemelson does not disclose a direct interconnection between these
`components; and Petitioner does not argue otherwise. This deficiency is perhaps
`best shown by Figure 2 of Lemelson, copied in part below.
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`EX1003, Lemelson at Figure 2.
`Petitioner does not address this deficiency in the Reply. Instead, Petitioner
`doubles-down on its argument that the additional “commutatively coupled”
`limitation is satisfied ostensibly because “the transceiver/antenna must receive the
`data in order to communicate the data.” Paper 13, Reply at 13. Petitioner cannot be
`correct for the reasons disclosed in Uniloc’s Response and summarized above.
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`For at least the forgoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated in Uniloc’s
`Response, Petitioner fails to prove obviousness of independent claim 12 (and hence
`all challenged claims depending therefrom).
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`D. Claims 13 and 14
`In its Reply, Petitioner falsely asserts that the Petition addresses the specific
`claim language of claim 13 when addressing claim 14. Not so.
`Dependent claim 13 is copied below:
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`13. The system of claim 12, further comprising a public safety
`subsystem interfaced to the analysis subsystem and the
`reporting subsystem, the public safety subsystem enabled to
`receive reported events and broadcast an alert.
`Among other limitations, dependent claim 13 requires that “a public safety
`subsystem” must be “interfaced” not only to “the reporting subsystem” but also to
`“the analysis subsystem.” In addition to this “interfaced” requirement explicitly
`identifying two distinct subsystems, claim 13 further requires that the “public safety
`subsystem” must be “enabled to receive reported events and broadcast an alert.”
`The Petition makes no mention of these specific limitations, apart from
`simply quoting the claim language. The Reply likewise ignores these missing
`limitations; and the Reply fails to identify any argument or evidence set forth in the
`Petition that purportedly addresses these explicit requirements. Petitioner clearly
`falls short of meeting its burden of proof.
`For at least the forgoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated in Uniloc’s
`Response, Petitioner fails to prove obviousness of claim 13. Claim 14 depends from
`claim 13 (and claim 12) and therefore is tainted at least by the same deficiencies.
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`E. Claim 16
`Petitioner’s Reply suggests that the Petition properly relied exclusively on the
`analysis of claim 9 when addressing claim 16. Paper 13, Reply at 14. The analysis
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`of claim 9 set forth in the Petition, however, does not even purport to address
`limitations specific to claim 16. For example, claim 16 expressly requires that it
`must be “the reporting subsystem [that] configures an alarm based on the event
`context and broadcasts the alarm notice.” See Pet. 47-49. Because the couplet
`“reporting subsystem” does not appear in Petitioner’s analysis of claim 9,
`Petitioner’s ambiguous and explained reference to that analysis is unavailing. Id.
`The Board need not and indeed should not guess as to what Petitioner might
`have argued had it addressed each limitation of claim 16, including the requirements
`directed to the “reporting subsystem” in particular. Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1381
`(“[W]e find no support for the PTO’s position that the Board is free to adopt
`arguments on behalf of petitioners that could have been, but were not, raised by the
`petitioner during an IPR.”). In any event, Petitioner’s analysis of claim 9 is deficient
`even if one were to speculate how it might by applied to claim 16.
`Although
`the Petition (e.g., at pp. 51-52) points
`to Lemelsons’s
`transmit/receive radio and antenna as allegedly constituting the “reporting
`subsystem” recited in independent claim 12, the Petition provides no evidence and
`rational underpinning to support a conclusion that Lemelson’s transmit/receive
`radio and antenna also “configures an alarm based on the event context”, as recited
`in claim 16. On the contrary, Petitioner offers the new and ambiguous argument in
`its Reply that unspecified “additional processing components create and populate
`the alarm message, thereby configuring the alarm, which is subsequently broadcast
`by the transceiver/antenna.” Paper 13, Reply at 16.
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`
`Petitioner’s untimely argument cannot withstand scrutiny. For example,
`Petitioner’s new citation in its Reply to Lemelson at 4:29-47 is unavailing to claim
`16. Id. That passage in Lemelson addresses functionality of the “medical monitoring
`system”, which the Petition relies upon as allegedly mapping onto the distinct
`“analysis subsystem”. Pet. 51. Lemelson’s “medical monitoring” cannot reasonably
`be relied upon as satisfying both the “analysis subsystem” and the expressly
`distinguished “reporting subsystem”; and Petitioner does not expressly allege
`otherwise, much less prove such a proposition. Accordingly, the new argument and
`evidence Petitioner attempts to advance in its Reply to salvage the failed analysis of
`claim 16 only underscores its deficiencies.
`Petitioner next incorrectly suggests that Uniloc failed to defend its
`construction for the “broadcast” term. Paper 13, Reply at 16. But Uniloc did not
`offer a construction for the “broadcasting” term. Rather, Uniloc simply observed
`that Petitioner appears to have inconsistently applied differing constructions for that
`term. Petitioner concedes in its Reply that “Petitioner has mapped one-to-many
`communications elsewhere in the Petition”. Paper 13, Reply at 16. Petitioner then
`argues that not “all ‘broadcasting’ requires such communications.” Id. Petitioner
`fails to explain why the same word “broadcasting” should be construed to have
`different requirements in the claims in which it is recited.
`Petitioner argues that even if the “broadcasting” term should be consistently
`interpreted across all claims as requiring a one-to-many communication, Lemelson
`discloses this in the paragraph reproduced below:
`
`19
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01093
`U.S. Patent 7,944,353 B2
`The reporting subsystem 330 may also broadcast an alert through
`a public safety subsystem 340. The public safety subsystem 340
`may be configured to receive alerts from the reporting subsystem
`330. It may also be configured to receive alerts from disparate or
`alternate reporting subsystems. The received alerts may be
`analyzed and distributed through an infrastructure to the
`appropriate personnel.
`Paper 13, Reply at 18 (quoting EX1003, Lemelson at 8:9-15) (boldface omitted).
`Nothing in the above block quotation expressly or inherently requires a one-to-many
`communication.
`Petitioner’s unexplained reference to Zhou’s PD 300 is also unavailing to a
`one-to-many interpretation for the “broadcasting” term. Id. The Board and Uniloc
`should not be required to guess as to how Zhou’s PD 300 might fit into Petitioner’s
`theory. Petitioner fails to elaborate, for example, on how the alleged disclosure in
`Zhou that different technologies may be used to reach a single individual constitutes
`a one-to-many communication. See Pet. 48 (quoting EX1004, Zhou at 16:3-13).
`For at least the forgoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated in Uniloc’s
`Response, Petitioner fails to prove obviousness of claim 16.
`
`F. Claim 18
`While Petitioner is required to address all claim language, to simplify issues
`for the Board, Uniloc focused on deficiencies in the Petition arising from the claim
`language “a prioritizing mechanism that grades the urgency of the received reported
`event”, as recited in independent claim 18. Paper 12, Response at 15-16. At a
`minimum, Petitioner and its declarant gloss over the requirement that this limitation
`is directed to a “prioritizing mechanism”. In addition to this explicit prioritizing
`
`20
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01093
`U.S. Patent
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