Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`Paper 36
`Entered: March 28, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`MOBILE TECH, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`INVUE SECURITY PRODUCTS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01915
`Patent 7,737,844 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, STACEY G. WHITE, and
`DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ARBES, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
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`I. BACKGROUND
`Petitioner Mobile Tech, Inc. filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”)
`requesting inter partes review of claims 1–19 of U.S. Patent No. 7,737,844
`B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’844 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). On March
`30, 2017, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–7, 12–14, and
`17–19 on two grounds of unpatentability. Paper 7 (“Dec. on Inst.”). Patent
`Owner InVue Security Products Inc. subsequently filed a Patent Owner
`Response (Paper 15, “PO Resp.”) and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 16,
`“Reply”). An oral hearing was held on November 15, 2017, and a transcript
`of the hearing is included in the record (Paper 20, “Tr.”). Patent Owner’s
`Motion to Terminate (Paper 27) also was denied. Paper 34.
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written
`Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons that
`follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
`evidence that claims 1–7, 14, and 17–19 are unpatentable, but Petitioner has
`not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 12 and 13 are
`unpatentable.
`
`
`A. The ’844 Patent1
`The ’844 patent pertains to “systems and methods for protection of
`merchandise,” in particular a “programming station for use in a security
`system wherein a smart key is programmed with a security disarm code
`(SDC) at the programming station by wireless communication, which is
`
`
`1 Cases IPR2016-00892, IPR2016-00895, IPR2016-00896, IPR2016-00898,
`IPR2016-00899, IPR2016-01241, IPR2017-00344, IPR2017-00345,
`IPR2017-01900, IPR2017-01901, IPR2018-00481, and PGR2018-00004
`involve the same parties and different patents. See Paper 21, 3–4.
`2
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`subsequently used to program the SDC code into various security devices
`adapted to be attached to items of merchandise.” Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 15–22.
`According to the ’844 patent, retail establishments used various types of
`security systems to prevent shoplifting, such as attaching a security device to
`a piece of merchandise and using a “key” “to unlock the device from the
`protected item of merchandise to enable the merchandise to be taken to a
`checkout counter, as well as to disarm an alarm contained in the security
`device.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 24–46. A problem with such systems was that the
`key could be “stolen from the retail establishment and used at the same
`establishment or at another store using the same type of security device, to
`enable a thief to disarm the security device as well as unlock it from the
`protected merchandise.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 46–51. The system disclosed in the
`’844 patent purports to solve that problem by programming an SDC that is
`“unique to a particular store” into the key using a programming station,
`“thereby preventing the key from being used at a different store than that
`from which the key is stolen,” and deactivating the SDC after a preset time
`period. Id. at col. 1, l. 62–col. 2, l. 15, col. 5, ll. 58–64.
`
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`
`Figure 1 of the ’844 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 depicts a top view of programming station 1 comprising, inter alia,
`base plate 3 on which is mounted a printed circuit board containing a logic
`control circuit, housing cover 15 (made of, for example, a rigid plastic
`material), shell 11 (made of, for example, an infrared clear plastic material),
`smart key receiving programming port 45, power on/off switch 35, key
`receiving opening 43, and light-emitting diodes (LEDs) 23A–C indicating
`the status of programming station 1. Id. at col. 3, l. 34–col. 4, l. 26.
`Programming station 1 may be secured (e.g., via bolts or screws) “in a
`secure location such as in the store manager’s office to prevent possible theft
`of the programming station.” Id. at col. 3, ll. 51–54.
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`Figure 8 of the ’844 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`
`Figure 8 depicts a side view of programming station 1, with key 38 and key
`40 having control switch or push button 55 inserted. Id. at col. 4, ll. 46–62.
`Figure 8 also depicts key 40 inserted in security device 58 attached to
`merchandise 59 by cable 61. Id. at col. 4, l. 62–col. 5, l. 9. The user first
`actuates power on/off switch 35 using key 38, then presses control switch or
`push button 55 on key 40, which initiates infrared (IR) wireless
`communication between key 40 and logic control circuit 7 within
`programming station 1. Id. at col. 4, ll. 56–60. Logic control circuit 7
`generates an SDC, stores it permanently in memory, and communicates it to
`key 40. Id. at col. 4, ll. 60–66. Key 40 then can be used to program the
`SDC into security device 58 by placing it in key receiving port 54 and
`wirelessly communicating the SDC from key 40 to security device 58. Id. at
`col. 4, ll. 62–66. The SDC may be “randomly generated the first time that
`
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`programming station 1 is actuated at a particular retail establishment and
`used to program a key 40” and also used to reprogram a key “after a timing
`circuit in the key[] has removed the previously programmed SDC
`therefrom.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 16–28. For example, a key may have “an
`internal timer which deactivates the SDC after a preset time period, for
`example 96 hours, which prevents stolen keys from being reused in the same
`store after this time period.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 58–64.
`
`
`B. Illustrative Claim
`Claim 1 of the ’844 patent recites:
`1. An apparatus for generating and retaining a security
`code for use in a security system for protecting items of
`merchandise, said apparatus comprising:
`a housing;
`a logic control circuit located within said housing, said
`control circuit including:
`a) a controller for generating the security code;
`b) a memory for storing the generated security code;
`c) a wireless communication system for interfacing
`with a programmable key used for operating a security
`device attached to an item of merchandise; and
`d) a visual display for indicating the status of the
`logic control circuit.
`
`
`C. Prior Art
`The pending grounds of unpatentability in the instant inter partes
`review are based on the following prior art:
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0003150
`A1, published Jan. 1, 2004 (Ex. 1004, “Deguchi”);
`
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`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0201449
`A1, published Oct. 14, 2004 (Ex. 1002, “Denison”);
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2005/0165806
`A1, filed Dec. 13, 2004, published July 28, 2005 (Ex. 1003,
`“Roatis”); and
`U.S. Patent No. 4,117,465, issued Sept. 26, 1978
`(Ex. 1005, “Timblin”).
`
`
`D. Pending Grounds of Unpatentability
`The instant inter partes review involves the following grounds of
`unpatentability:
`References
`Denison, Roatis,
`and Deguchi
`Denison, Timblin,
`Roatis, and Deguchi
`
`Claim(s)
`Basis
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a)2 1–7, 12, 13, and
`17–19
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 14
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Interpretation
`The Board interprets claims in an unexpired patent using the “broadest
`reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
`[they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC
`v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard). Under this standard, we interpret claim
`
`
`2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
`(2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the challenged claims
`of the ’844 patent have an effective filing date before the effective date of
`the applicable AIA amendments, we refer to the pre-AIA version of
`35 U.S.C. § 103.
`
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`terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
`usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking
`into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that
`may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
`specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “Under
`a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must be given their
`plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification
`and prosecution history.” Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1062
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). Our interpretation “‘cannot be divorced from the
`specification and the record evidence,’ and ‘must be consistent with the one
`that those skilled in the art would reach.’ A construction that is
`‘unreasonably broad’ and which does not ‘reasonably reflect the plain
`language and disclosure’ will not pass muster.” Microsoft Corp. v.
`Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted),
`overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290
`(Fed. Cir. 2017).
`For purposes of this Decision, we conclude that only the phrase “logic
`control circuit located within said housing” in claims 1 and 17 requires
`express interpretation.3 Based on the briefing submitted during trial, the
`parties dispute the phrase in two respects. First, the parties dispute the
`meaning of “logic control circuit.” Petitioner originally proposed in its
`
`
`3 In the Decision on Institution, we interpreted the phrase “invalidating the
`security code stored in the key” in claim 15. Dec. on Inst. 7–10. Because
`we did not institute a trial on claim 15, however, that term no longer requires
`interpretation. We also agree with Patent Owner that no interpretation is
`necessary for various other terms proposed by Petitioner. See Pet. 8–11;
`PO Resp. 5–6.
`
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`Petition that the term should be interpreted to mean “a ‘collection of
`computer components’ that perform the functionality recited in the claims.”
`Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s proposed interpretation is
`too broad because it omits the word “circuit,” pointing out that Petitioner’s
`declarant, Thaine H. Allison III, acknowledged that the “collection of
`components would necessarily need to be connected through a circuit.”
`PO Resp. 4 (quoting Ex. 2002, 20:11–25). During the oral hearing, Patent
`Owner agreed with an interpretation of “a collection of computer
`components that are connected through a circuit.” Tr. 23:4–16. Petitioner
`likewise states that connection through a “circuit” should be part of the
`interpretation. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 2002, 20:21–25). We agree as well.
`Claim 1 recites a “logic control circuit . . . including” a collection of
`four components: a “controller,” “memory,” “wireless communication
`system,” and “visual display.” Claim 17 recites a “logic control circuit . . .
`including” a “memory” and “communication system.” The Specification of
`the ’844 patent similarly describes a collection of components connected
`through a circuit. Programming station 1 includes “printed circuit board 5,
`which contains a logic control circuit indicated generally at 7.” Ex. 1001,
`col. 3, ll. 36–39.
`
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`
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`
`Figure 6 of the ’844 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 6 depicts logic control circuit 7, which “includes a main controller
`29,” “an SDC memory 31,” “a wireless communication circuit 33,” and
`status display 23, which “preferably consists of three LEDs 23 which are
`mounted on spacer 9 and electrically connected to circuit board 5 by
`conductors 24.” Id. at col. 3, l. 59–col. 4, l. 13. Logic control circuit 7 can
`include other components as well, such as on/off switch 35. Id. at col. 4,
`ll. 32–38. According to the ’844 patent, “[t]he particular details and
`construction of the logic control circuit can vary from that shown in the
`drawings and described . . . without affecting the main concept of the
`invention.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 27–30. Thus, we are persuaded that the
`interpretation agreed to by Patent Owner at the hearing—“a collection of
`computer components that are connected through a circuit”—is consistent
`with the language of the claims themselves and the Specification of the
`’844 patent.
`Second, the parties dispute what it means for the logic control circuit
`to be located “within” the housing. Patent Owner argues that the logic
`control circuit (including all four recited components) must be contained in a
`
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`single housing. PO Resp. 12–13. Petitioner disagrees, arguing that the logic
`control circuit need only be “at least partially within one or more housings”
`and relying on Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338
`(Fed. Cir. 2008). Reply 3–6 (emphases omitted). Upon review of the
`parties’ arguments, we agree with Patent Owner.4
`In Baldwin, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated
`
`that
`
`this court has repeatedly emphasized that an indefinite article “a”
`or “an” in patent parlance carries the meaning of “one or more”
`in open-ended claims containing
`the
`transitional phrase
`“comprising.” That “a” or “an” can mean “one or more” is best
`described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even
`a convention. The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited:
`a patentee must evince[] a clear intent to limit “a” or “an” to
`“one.” The subsequent use of definite articles “the” or “said” in
`a claim to refer back to the same claim term does not change the
`general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular
`meaning. An exception to the general rule that “a” or “an” means
`more than one only arises where the language of the claims
`themselves,
`the specification, or
`the prosecution history
`necessitate a departure from the rule.
`512 F.3d at 1342–43 (citations and quotation marks omitted; second
`alteration in original). Here, the claims recite an apparatus (claim 1) and
`programming station (claim 17) “comprising” “a housing” and “a logic
`control circuit located within said housing,” the logic control circuit
`“including” various components. Thus, by using “a” and “comprising,” the
`claims permit the device to have more than one housing (and more than one
`logic control circuit). Based on the language of the claims and the
`
`4 As explained herein, though, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments
`that the claims would have been obvious even if they require the logic
`control circuit to be contained in a single housing. See infra Section II.D.4.
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`Specification, however, we are persuaded that the claims require at least one
`logic control circuit to be within a single housing. In other words, the
`components of the recited logic control circuit cannot be distributed across
`multiple housings, as Petitioner contends. See Reply 3–6.
`The claim language specifies the relationship between two recited
`components, i.e., the logic control circuit must be located “within” the
`housing. If part of a logic control circuit was in one housing and part in
`another housing (i.e., outside the first housing), as Petitioner suggests, the
`logic control circuit could not be considered “within” a housing. This is
`consistent with the language of the dependent claims as well, which refer to
`“the housing” as a singular structure, never referring to multiple different
`housings. For example, claim 7 recites that “the housing has an internal
`chamber,” claim 8 recites that “the housing includes a base plate, a main
`housing shell,” an “internal spacer,” and a “cover plate,” and claim 12
`recites “a mechanical key activated ON/OFF switch mounted in the housing
`and operatively connected to the logic control circuit.”
`Similarly, the Specification of the ’844 patent describes and depicts
`the components of logic control circuit 7 as within a single physical housing
`(programming station 1 having an outside made up of base plate 3,
`dome-shaped housing shell 11, spacer 9, and housing cover 15, and an inside
`of internal chamber 13). Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 34–67, Figs. 1–3A. The
`Specification never describes logic control circuit 7 as being partially in one
`housing and partially in another. Rather, the Specification consistently
`refers to just one housing having all of the described components. See id.
`We also disagree with Petitioner’s argument that one component of
`the logic control circuit described in the Specification—LEDs 23—is located
`
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`partially outside the housing. See Reply 5–6. Petitioner provides on page 6
`of its Reply the following version of Figure 3 of the ’844 patent, with LEDs
`23 colored in yellow.
`
`
`
`As shown in Figure 3 above, LEDs 23 extend through openings 25 in
`housing shell 11, such that the outer bulb-shaped covers of the LEDs (which
`would permit light to shine through) constitute the outer portion of the
`housing itself at those openings. See Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 62–65, Fig. 2.
`The LEDs that emit light, as well as the electrical connections to the other
`components of the logic control circuit, are located below the outer
`bulb-shaped covers (i.e., within the housing). Thus, we are persuaded that
`the claim language and Specification of the ’844 patent demonstrate that the
`applicants meant for the singular meaning of “located within said housing”
`to apply.5
`
`
`5 Petitioner’s position also would result in the illogical result that the claims
`would cover the situation where some components of the logic control
`circuit (e.g., a “controller,” “memory,” and “wireless communication
`system” as in claim 1) are located in one housing, and other components
`(e.g., a “visual display” as in claim 1) are located in another housing in a
`different physical location but connected electrically to the first housing.
`See Tr. 12:22–13:26. We are not persuaded that that arrangement is
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`Baldwin is distinguishable from the present situation. That case
`involved the claim language “a pre-soaked fabric roll” and subsequent
`recitations of “said fabric roll,” which found antecedent basis in the original
`phrase. 512 F.3d at 1340, 1343. The Court held that neither language was
`limited to a single fabric roll because the claim language and specification
`did not show “a clear indication that the applicant departed from the general
`rule for the article ‘a.’” Id. at 1343. The claim in Baldwin did not include
`any language like the “within” phrasing present here, and the specification’s
`discussion of fabric rolls permitted contact with multiple fabric rolls. See id.
`We view the instant situation as more analogous to that of TiVo, Inc.
`v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
`claims in that case recited “wherein said Output Section assembles said
`video and audio components into an MPEG stream.” Id. at 1303. The
`appellant argued that the limitation “covers only the assembly of audio and
`video components into a single, interleaved MPEG stream,” whereas the
`appellee argued that it “also covers the assembly of each component, audio
`and video, into its own separate stream.” Id. The Court agreed with the
`appellant, distinguishing Baldwin and concluding that “the claims and
`written description . . . make clear that the singular meaning applies.” Id.
`The Court determined that the claim language “in context clearly
`indicate[d]” assembly into a single stream, particularly given the fact that,
`although the claim preamble used “comprising,” the assembly limitation
`itself did not use “comprising.” Id. at 1303–1304. Thus, the claims in
`TiVo recited the relationship of one feature to another (the video and audio
`
`
`consistent with the claim language or Specification, for the reasons
`explained herein.
`
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`components assembled “into” an MPEG stream), similar to the instant
`claims (the logic control circuit “within” the housing), which also do not use
`“comprising” in the logic control circuit limitation itself. Further, the
`specification of the patent at issue in TiVo described assembly into “a single
`stream,” id. at 1304, similar to the Specification of the ’844 patent, which
`describes a logic control circuit within a single housing.
`Accordingly, applying the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
`claims in light of the Specification, and taking into account the parties’
`arguments made during trial, we interpret “logic control circuit located
`within said housing” to mean a collection of computer components that are
`connected through a circuit and located within a single housing.
`
`
`B. Principles of Law
`To prevail in challenging claims 1–7, 12–14, and 17–19 of the
`’844 patent, Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
`that the claims are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d).
`A claim is unpatentable for obviousness if, to one of ordinary skill in the
`pertinent art, “the differences between the subject matter sought to be
`patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
`have been obvious at the time the invention was made.” KSR Int’l Co. v.
`Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). The
`question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`determinations, including “the scope and content of the prior art”;
`“differences between the prior art and the claims at issue”; and “the level of
`
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`ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”6 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
`17–18 (1966).
`A patent claim “is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that
`each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR,
`550 U.S. at 418. An obviousness determination requires finding “both ‘that
`a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the
`prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled
`artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’”
`Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359,
`1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418
`(for an obviousness analysis, “it can be important to identify a reason that
`would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to
`combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does”).
`A motivation to combine the teachings of two references can be “found
`explicitly or implicitly in market forces; design incentives; the ‘interrelated
`teachings of multiple patents’; ‘any need or problem known in the field of
`endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent’; and the
`background knowledge, creativity, and common sense of the person of
`ordinary skill.” Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed.
`Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot
`be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
`
`
`6 Additionally, secondary considerations, such as “commercial success, long
`felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
`to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to
`be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries
`may have relevancy.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Patent Owner, however,
`has not presented any such evidence.
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`articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
`conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441
`F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383
`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (a finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported
`by a ‘reasoned explanation’” (citation omitted)).
`
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Petitioner argues that “[t]he level of ordinary skill in the art [for the
`’844 patent] is evidenced by the prior art.” Pet. 13. Petitioner’s declarant,
`Mr. Allison, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
`the ’844 patent
`would have had a four year technical degree (e.g. B.S.
`engineering) with a minimum of three years of experience in
`using, provisioning, designing or creating, or supervising the
`design or creation, of . . . theft prevention devices, and other
`related security devices. Extended experience in the industry
`could substitute for a technical degree.
`A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known
`how to research the technical literature in fields relating to theft
`prevention, including in retail and other environments, as well as
`security in general. Also, a [person of ordinary skill in the art]
`may have worked as part of a multidisciplinary team and drawn
`upon not only his or her own skills, but also taken advantage of
`certain specialized skills of others in the team, e.g., to solve a
`given problem. For example, designers, engineers (e.g.,
`mechanical or electrical), and computer scientists or other
`computer programmers may have been part of a team.
`Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 20–21. Patent Owner provides a slightly different skill level,
`arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “the
`equivalent of a four-year Bachelor of Science degree in electrical
`engineering, computer engineering, or computer science,” and
`
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`“approximately two to five years of professional experience [with training]
`in electronics including microcontrollers, and embedded programming for
`microcontrollers.” PO Resp. 7.
`Neither party explains in detail why the respective proposed level of
`ordinary skill in the art should be adopted nor how the different levels affect
`the parties’ analyses. Although there are slight differences between the
`proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner and Mr. Allison
`agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a four-year technical
`degree or the equivalent and some amount of professional experience.
`Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’
`declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we
`determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a
`four-year technical degree or equivalent experience with a minimum of two
`years of professional technical experience in the field of theft prevention
`devices or related security devices. We apply this level of ordinary skill in
`the art for purposes of this Decision.
`
`D. Obviousness Ground Based on Denison, Roatis, and Deguchi
`(Claims 1–7, 12, 13, and 17–19)
`1. Denison
`Denison discloses vending machines equipped with programmable
`electronic locks. Ex. 1002 ¶ 2. As used in Denison, a “vending machine” is
`“a device that performs a money transaction, which may involve the
`insertion of cash or commercial paper, or the swiping of a credit and/or debit
`card, and may (but [is] not required to) dispense an item or items or provide
`functions in response to the money transaction,” and broadly covers
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`“machines commonly used for vending drinks and snacks, ATM stations,
`change machines, toll machines, coin-operated laundry machines, video
`arcades, etc.” Id. ¶ 36. Access to the contents of the disclosed vending
`machine is controlled by an electronic lock and electronic key. Id. ¶ 7.
`To unlock the electronic lock and open the vending machine, there must be a
`match between the code stored in the electronic key and the code stored in
`the electronic lock. Id. ¶ 42. Figure 1 of Denison is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 is a schematic view of Denison’s vending machine and electronic
`lock. Id. ¶¶ 15, 36–37. Vending machine 20 has front panel or door 22 that
`can be opened when the electronic lock is wirelessly unlocked using
`properly programmed electronic key 26. Id. ¶¶ 36–37.
`
`
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`Figure 17 of Denison is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 17 depicts external computing device 426 (e.g., a laptop computer)
`with wireless transceiver 428 and cradle 430, electronic key 410, and
`vending machine 400 with wireless transceiver 420 and electronic lock 402
`having microprocessor-based electronic lock circuit 406 and wireless
`transceiver 408. Id. ¶¶ 31, 77–78. External computing device 426 may be
`used to generate a new “access code” and wirelessly program it into the
`electronic lock “without having to open the vending machine to access a
`program switch” and also to program the access code into the electronic key.
`Id. ¶¶ 77–79, 83–85. Denison discloses that
`the external computing device 426 may optionally be used to
`program an electronic key 410 that can be used to visit and access
`the vending machine 400 through the access control transceiver
`408. To that end, the electronic key 410 is connected to the
`cradle 430, and the access code that has been programmed into
`the lock is transmitted via the cradle into the key, together with
`any other appropriate access control parameters for the key. The
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`key 410 can then be used to access the vending machine by
`communicating with the electronic lock circuit 406 via the access
`control transceiver 406 based on the newly programmed access
`code(s) and control parameters.
`Id. ¶ 85.
`
`
`2. Roatis
`Roatis discloses a system for “managing electronic keys used for
`accessing vending machines or the like and for managing audit data
`collected by the electronic keys from the vending machines.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 68.
`Figure 1 of Roatis is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 depicts personal computer 32 and cradle 36, which communicates
`wirelessly with electronic key 31 when push button 39 is pressed. Id.
`¶¶ 68–69. Cradle 36 has “a receiving place for receiving the electronic key,
`and indicators such as a ready/wait light 40,” which may be red, for
`example, when the cradle is communicating with the electronic key. Id.
`
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`¶¶ 69, 80. Personal computer 32 may display a user interface screen for
`setting parameters and programming the electronic key. Id. ¶ 80, Fig. 5B.
`
`
`3. Deguchi
`Deguchi is directed to “portable electronic devices and appliances
`with [a] built-in, integrated communication port for direct connection to a
`host device for data transfer.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 2. Figure 6B of Deguchi is
`reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 6B depicts a host device with infrared transceiver 607 and infrared
`communication interface port 605 for communicating with a portable device
`via infrared data transfer. Id. ¶¶ 39–42. Deguchi discloses that
`personal digital assistants and other portable electronic devices
`generally
`require an
`intermediary cable connection
`to
`communicate with a host device for data transfer, exchange and
`the like. With the rise in the number of different types of such
`devices, it would be desirable to provide portable electronic
`devices or appliances which have integrated communicati