UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
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`MOBILE TECH, INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`INVUE SECURITY PRODUCTS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_____________
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`Case IPR2018-01138
`Patent 9,659,472 B2
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held August 29, 2019
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`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, STACEY G. WHITE, and
`DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
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`MOBILE TECH, INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
`
`INVUE SECURITY PRODUCTS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_____________
`
`Case IPR2018-01138
`Patent 9,659,472 B2
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held August 29, 2019
`_____________
`
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, STACEY G. WHITE, and
`DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`Case IPR2018-01138
`Patent 9,659,472 B2
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`APPEARANCES:
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`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`ALAN NORMAN, ESQ.
`ANTHONY BLUM, ESQ.
`DAVID JINKINS, ESQ.
`of:Thompson Coburn LLP
`One US Bank Plaza
`St. Louis, MO 63101
`(314) 552 6000
`anorman@thompsoncoburn.com
`ablum@thompsocoburn.com
`djinkins@thompsoncoburn.com
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`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
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`GREGORY J. CARLIN, ESQ.
`Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC
`999 Peachtree Street NE
`Suite 1300
`Atlanta, Georgia 30309
`(404) 645-7700
`gcarlin@mcciplaw.com
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`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday,
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`August 29, 2019, commencing at 1:00 p.m. at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 207 South Houston Street, Suite 159, Dallas, Texas
`75202.
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`Case IPR2018-01138
`Patent 9,659,472 B2
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
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`(1:00 p.m.)
`JUDGE WHITE: You may be seated. All right.
`Good afternoon. It's good to see everyone again.
`MR. NORMAN: Good afternoon.
`JUDGE WHITE: This is the oral hearing for IPR
`2018-01138, between Petitioner Mobile Tech Incorporated and
`Patent Owner InVue Security Products, concerning U.S. Patent
`Number 9,659,472 B2. I'm Judge White and with me today is
`Judge Galligan, and via the magic of video conference we have
`Judge Arbes in Alexandria.
`So let us begin with appearances. For Petitioner?
`MR. NORMAN: Alan Norman of Thompson
`Coburn on behalf of Petitioner Mobile Tech, Inc. With me is
`Anthony Blum and David Jinkins as well.
`JUDGE WHITE: And for the Patent Owner?
`MR. CARLIN: Gregory Carlin on behalf of
`Patent Owner InVue Security Products.
`JUDGE WHITE: Good afternoon, gentlemen.
`Good to see you again.
`MR. CARLIN: Likewise.
`JUDGE WHITE: So I -- I know you know the
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`drill, but we'll go over it again, just to make sure everything is
`clear on the record.
`We have a few administrative reminders. We
`have one Judge that is appearing remotely, so please make sure
`the little green light is on your microphone or else he will not
`be able to hear you when you're speaking. Also, Judge Arbes
`will not be able to see what is -- what is on your -- what is on
`the screen, so refer to page numbers and such in your
`demonstrative so he can find everything. We have everything
`electronically, so just make sure you're clear so the record is
`clear and Judge Arbes can also follow along.
`So for today's hearing, we have 30 minutes of total
`time per side to present arguments on the challenge claims.
`Petitioner, how much time would you like to reserve for
`rebuttal?
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`MR. NORMAN: Ten minutes, please.
`JUDGE WHITE: And Patent Owner, you also
`have 30 minutes and you can reserve some time for sur-rebuttal.
`How much time would you like to reserve?
`MR. CARLIN: Five minutes, please.
`JUDGE WHITE: Okay. I'll give you a warning
`when you're getting close to your time.
`As far as objections, we ask that you not interrupt
`the other party during their time. If you have any objections,
`just save it for your time to get up and present and let us know
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`what those objections are. Let's see, demonstrative -- does
`anybody have a paper copy of a demonstrative that they would
`like to share?
`MR. NORMAN: Yes, Your Honor. May I
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`approach?
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`JUDGE WHITE: Yes, you may.
`MR. CARLIN: Thanks.
`JUDGE WHITE: Before we get going, I wanted
`to bring up the fact that I'm sure everyone's aware there have
`been some intervening events since the briefs were completed
`in this proceeding. We've had decisions come out from the
`Federal Circuit, decisions come out from this panel, and I don't
`know if the parties have had a chance to meet and confer to
`discuss the impact of those proceedings on this particular case.
`Have you had a chance to meet and confer on that?
`MR. NORMAN: We -- we sent an email a few
`days ago, but Patent Owner did not want to discuss it.
`JUDGE WHITE: Okay. Well, at this time what
`I'm going to do is I'm just going to order you guys to have a
`conversation and meet and confer after this hearing at some
`point. And I want you to file a statement by September 10th;
`September 10th of this year, letting us know if you have
`reached any agreements as far as the application of estoppel to
`any of the issues in this proceeding.
`Let us know what
`your agreements and disagreements may be by September 10th
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`in a joint statement that you would file with -- with us here at
`the Board. And then after we've reviewed that, we'll take a
`look and see if we need to do any additional briefing on
`collateral estoppel. So we'll give you a chance to let us know
`what your thoughts are and then we'll -- we'll go from there as
`far as whether we need to do any other briefing.
`Do I have any questions? Okay.
`Well, Petitioner, you may begin when ready.
`MR. NORMAN: May it please the Board, please
`go to slide 2. Many issues were briefed, but collateral estoppel
`resolves most of the issues.
`Slide 3, the Board entered final written decisions
`in 12 IPRs related to the '472 patent.
`Slide 4, the Federal Circuit affirmed as to eight of
`those IPRs. The Board applied collateral estoppel in the '481
`IPR, and noted the Federal Circuit affirmances. InVue did not
`appeal the IPR for the '844 patent and dismissed its appeal for
`the '110 patent.
`Slide 5, please. The Board and/or Federal Circuit
`already decided many issues. It -- it decided combining
`Rothbaum and Denison is obvious, using physical ports with
`the Rothbaum-Denison combination is obvious. The security
`code of Rothbaum-Denison is unique to a retail store and
`unique to a programming station. The combination discloses
`single security code and real parties-in-interest were correctly
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`named.
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`Slide 6, please. Collateral estoppel applies to the
`port limitations of the '472 patent. The port limitations require
`inserting an end of the programmable key within a port or the
`port to encircle the key.
`Slide 7. In the final written decision of the '481
`IPR, the Board concluded that estoppel applies to the following
`limitations: The end of the key is configured to be inserted
`within the port of the security device and within a port of the
`housing of the programming station, a port encircling the end of
`a key inserted therein. Because all of the port issues in the '472
`patent have already been decided, estoppel applies.
`Slide 8, please. The limitations added by Claim
`36 of the '472 patent are nearly identical to the limitations
`added by Claim 21 of the '452 patent. Both require the alarm
`is configured to be activated when the security code stored by
`the key does not match the security code stored by the security
`device. The Board found Claim 21 of the '452 patent obvious
`over Rothbaum and Denison, because the issues are the same,
`collateral estoppel applies to Claim 36 of the '472 patent.
`Slide 9. The limitations added by Claim 37 of the
`'472 patent are nearly identical to the limitations added by
`Claim 22 of the '452 patent. Those require the single security
`code is configured to be invalidated when the security code of
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`the key does not match the security code of the security device.
`The Board found Claim 22 of the '452 patent obvious over
`Rothbaum and Denison, because the issues are the same,
`collateral estoppel applies to Claim 37 of the '472 patent.
`Slide 10, please. Claims 10 and 26 of the '472
`patent both require invalidation of the security code in the key
`after a predetermined period of ti -- I mean, after a period of
`time.
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`Slide 11. As to Claims 10 and 26, InVue contests
`only one aspect of MTI's invalidity position, in particular, that it
`would have been obvious to invalidate Denison's code by either
`use of a flag or setting the security to null.
`Slide 12. In the '481 IPR for Claim 22, the Board
`adopted Petitioner's analysis regarding Claim 22, that it would
`have been obvious to invalidate Denison's code by either use of
`a flag or setting the security code to null, once the operational
`limits are exceeded. And that time limit is an operational limit
`identified by Denison.
`So thus, collateral estoppel applies to Claims 10
`and 26 of the '472 patent.
`Slide 13. Claims 6, 35 and 40 of the '472 patent
`require the key to arm the security device using the security
`code. Claim 35 of the '247 patent requires arming the security
`device upon a match of the security code generated by the
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`programming station with the security code of the security
`device.
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`Slide 14. In the 899 IPR, the Board adopted
`Petitioner's analysis regarding Claim 35. Petitioner's analysis
`regarding Claim 35 of the '247 patent was that in the modified
`Rothbaum system, the security device would be armed based
`upon a matching of security codes in the security device and the
`programmable key.
`Because the issues are the same, collateral estoppel
`applies to Claims 6, 35 and 40. All right.
`Turning to
`slide 15, we're switching issues now; the Rothbaum-Denison
`combination satisfies the usable in only a single retail store
`limitation.
`Slide 16. It seems there are three possible
`interpretations of the phrase usable in only a single retail store.
`Interpretation 1, capable of being used in one retail
`store and incapable of being used in any other retail store.
`Interpretation 2, capable of being used in one retail
`store, but could also be used in multiple stores.
`Interpretation 3, used or intended to be used in one
`retail store to the exclusion of all other retail stores.
`Regardless of claim construction, the modified
`Rothbaum system meets this limitation, because the modified
`Rothbaum system includes the same features disclosed in the
`'472 patent.
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`Slide 17, please. In the District Court action,
`InVue appears to have adopted Interpretation 2, but it's unclear
`which interpretation InVue is asserting in this IPR.
`Regardless, to be consistent with Vitronics, the phrase should
`not be construed in a manner that would exclude the
`embodiment disclosed in the '472 patent.
`Slide 18. The claims are invalid even with the
`narrowest construction, Interpretation 1, encompassing the
`embodiments of the '472 patent. The modified Rothbaum
`system has the same safeguards as the '472 patent. Its keys
`have operational limits such as time limits or number of use
`limits, just as the '472 patent. Each store with the modified
`Rothbaum system has a unique security code, just as with the
`'472 patent. This prevents the modified Rothbaum system
`from being used in other stores to the same extent as that of the
`'472 patent.
`Slide 19. In the related PGR, the Board found
`'112 support because the '472 patent discloses the SDC is
`unique to a particular retail store to the key's programming is
`only valid for a certain period of time, and three, the
`programming station is to be kept in a secure location with
`restricted access.
`So these are all true in the modified Rothbaum system as well.
`So slide 20, please. InVue argues Denison limits
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`the operation of its keys to specific vending machines, not
`specific locations or vending machines. But InVue's argument
`is barred by collateral estoppel because the Board rejected the
`argument, in particular, the Board rea --
`Oh, let's go to slide 21, please. So in particular,
`the Board rejected InVue's argument in the 895 IPR. Contrary
`to Invue's argument, the modified Rothbaum system is not a
`vending machine, it's the -- the key of Denison is in the
`modified Rothbaum system, but it's a security device. The --
`so it's a modified Rothbaum.
`The Board found --
`JUDGE ARBES: Excuse me. Counsel, can I ask
`a question about that? What was the relevant claim language
`in the 895 case that you are citing to argue collateral estoppel
`here?
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`MR. NORMAN: Well, it -- what it -- the -- it's
`not the -- well, the claim language is in the 895 IPR, as in all of
`the IPRs, I mean in all of the patents I should say, we're talking
`about a security system that's usable at a retail store. And what
`InVue's argument was is well, they aren't to be combined. This
`all goes with the combination of the Rothbaum-Denison system
`to begin with.
`We're not dealing with a vending machine.
`Rather, we're -- we're taking the Rothbaum system, which is
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`going to be usable in a retail store, and you know, a security
`device, and we're taking the security code. So also, the other
`particular limitation that we found is the Board found that the
`security code is unique to a retail store.
`JUDGE WHITE: So is that difference in
`language, usable versus unique, implicate any other issues?
`Because is there -- is there a distinction between something
`that's usable in only one store and saying that it's unique to one
`store?
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`MR. NORMAN: It seems to me unique is more
`narrow than usable in one store, because you have something
`you can use it in just one store, even though you can use it in
`multiple stores. If you have it unique to one store though, it
`can't be used in other stores because once it's used in other
`stores, it's no longer unique to the one store.
`So the difference is unique is actually narrower
`than usable.
`JUDGE ARBES: But Counsel, the claim is not
`usable in one store, it's usable in only a single retail store.
`MR. NORMAN: Correct. So it is usable in only
`a single retail store. It doesn't say -- now, I mean, mind you,
`we are still looking at the possible different interpretations and -
`- and I think what we're talking about is Interpretation 2 at the
`moment. Our position is that however this is going to be
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`defined though, whichever -- however we're defining usable in
`only a single retail store, that it's going to be -- it's going to
`need to be interpreted to be consistent with Vitronics, so that it
`doesn't exclude the embodiment disclosed in the '472 patent.
`The '472 patent has different safeguards that are
`applied, and those are going to be a timeout feature on the key.
`And the whole point is that timeout feature on a key is a feature
`that's disclosed in Denison. So it's going to be in the
`combination of the Rothbaum-Denison system.
`JUDGE ARBES: I guess, Counsel, the question I
`have, I understand your position on the merits of this argument,
`what I'm having difficulty understanding is why collateral
`estoppel bars the argument by Patent Owner as you say on slide
`20 there.
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`MR. NORMAN: Yeah, it -- the -- it's only the
`argument that Denison -- that where there -- the only thing
`that's barred is that saying Denison or the combination that the
`Rothbaum-Denison combination is limited to vending machines
`and vending -- because their whole argument is Denison
`discloses keys that are usable that can be used in multiple
`stores.
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`But what I'm saying is the Board has already found
`that it would be obvious with the Rothbaum-Denison
`combination to make the -- the security code, to make the
`system, unique to a particular retail store. And so why I'm
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`saying what's been decided is that the Denison combination is
`not limited to -- is not limited to a vending machine.
`JUDGE ARBES: Okay. So just to make sure I
`understand your position, you're not saying that Patent Owner is
`barred from disputing that the references teach this limitation of
`claim 1, a single security code usable in only a single retail
`store?
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`MR. NORMAN: Correct.
`JUDGE ARBES: Okay.
`JUDGE WHITE: You have about five minutes
`left in your time.
`MR. NORMAN: Okay. Thank you.
`Let's go to -- tell you what, let's go to -- let's go to
`slide 22. So the only safeguards disclosed in the '472 patent to
`prevent use of the security code in other stores are present in the
`modified -- yeah, in the modified Rothbaum system.
`As the Board found, and as shown in the figure on
`slide 22, Denison teaches deactivating the key after any
`operating limit is exceeded, including a number of days. So
`the Board found that the key of a modified Rothbaum system is
`only valid for a certain period of time, just as the Board --
`Slide 23, please. Just as the Board found that the
`'472 patent discloses that the programming station is to be kept
`in a secure location, Thaine Allison testified the same is true
`with a modified Rothbaum system. And the testimony of Mr.
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`Allison was unrebutted. Thus, the modified Rothbaum system
`has all of the safeguards disclosed in the '472 patent. As such,
`even under Interpretation 1, the narrow interpretation, the claim
`is invalid.
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`Slide 24, please. Interpretations 2 and 3 are
`broader than Interpretation 1. Since the claims are invalid
`under Interpretation 1, they necessarily are invalid under these
`broader interpretations also.
`Go to slide 25. And this takes us to our final
`issue. We now turn to the obviousness of Claim 25.
`Slide 26, please. Claim 25 requires that the
`programming station cannot generate more than one security
`code to be used by the key at a time. This claim is broad
`enough to encompass a programming station that is capable of
`generating one and only one security code throughout its
`lifetime.
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`InVue argues Claim 25 does not require generation
`of one and only one security code throughout its lifetime --
`throughout the lifetime of the programming station. Of course,
`that's not our position. Although Claim 25 doesn't require it,
`the claim encompasses it.
`If a programming station cannot generate more
`than one security code throughout its lifetime, it cannot
`generate more than one security code to be used by the key at a
`time. Thaine Allison explained why it would have been
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`obvious for a person of skill in the art to modify the modified
`Rothbaum system in this manner.
`Slide 27, please.
`JUDGE WHITE: Counselor, one of the criticisms
`that Patent Owner has for this particular argument is they say
`that it rests on testimony that is not properly supported by facts,
`that it's just Mr. Allison talking without giving any other
`support. What do you point to as things that Mr. Allison is
`providing in support for his analysis here?
`MR. NORMAN: So what we're really talking
`about is really just a -- well, a capability of something, you
`know, and so we're just really talking about programming
`something. And Mr. Allison provides the rationale why
`someone would program it in this particular way. And the --
`and that's what we have up on the slide here, he's providing the
`rationale.
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`There is no requirement as I'll get to on slide 28,
`but there's not going to be any requirement beyond the
`providing of the testimony. And by the way, this is going to be
`unrebutted.
`So Mr. Allison explained that by allowing the
`software to generate a code only once, that would prevent codes
`within a store from changing, which a person of skill in the art
`would have understood would have been beneficial to many
`store owners and managers. That way, it would never be
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`necessary to reprogram an entire store.
`He explained that reprogramming an entire store is
`time consuming and costly, especially for a store with a large
`inventory.
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`We go to slide 28, Mr. Allison's testimony as to
`Claim 25 is unrebutted. InVue did not cross-examine Mr.
`Allison on this point. It presented no contrary expert
`testimony. InVue did not even present attorney argument
`saying Mr. Allison is incorrect. Instead, InVue incorrectly
`argues that an obviousness finding requires every limitation to
`be found in a prior art patent or printed publication.
`As the Federal Circuit ruled in the Nike v. Adidas
`case, a claimed invention may be obvious even when the prior
`art does not teach each claim limitation, so long as the record
`contains some reason why one of skill in the art would modify
`the prior art to obtain the claimed invention.
`Mr. Allison's testimony provides the reasons for
`modifying the Rothbaum-Denison combination to meet the
`limitations of Claim 25. And that testimony is unrebutted.
`For at least these reasons, Claim 25 is invalid, and
`I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal.
`JUDGE ARBES: Counsel, can I ask one more
`question before you do?
`MR. NORMAN: Yes.
`JUDGE ARBES: Can you describe the -- the
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`exact modification that you're talking about here? On slide 26,
`Mr. Allison, the testimony that you've cited there says it would
`have -- a person of skill in the art would have been motivated to
`and would have found it obvious to modify the modified
`Rothbaum system in this manner. What exactly is the
`modification that you're proposing there?
`MR. NORMAN: So really, the only modification
`is the programming station generates one code. That code
`cannot be changed. So it's going to have -- the programming
`station is always going to have that code. If someone wants
`new keys, they could take the key, bring it to the programming
`station, and it would apply the one code on it. And by having -
`- having the programming station generate just one code, that
`means there is not going to be ever a situation where you're
`going to have to reprogram all of the security devices in a store.
`So you may have hundreds of security devices in a
`store and there are going to be -- at least what Mr. Allison is
`saying is there are going to be situations where there are going
`to be customers that are not going to want a system in which the
`chan -- the code could be changed, because by changing the
`code, that could present a whole lot of work.
`And so that's the rationale that Mr. Allison
`provided. Thank you.
`MR. CARLIN: Thank you, Your Honors, for
`having us here today. I'm probably going to skip over
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`recitation of some of the basics just because we're all painfully
`familiar with the facts. But I'm going to jump right to the
`limitation of usable in only a single retail store.
`As you know, these -- this limitation is in all of the
`claims because it's in all of the independent claims, and this sort
`of contributed to our reluctance on the estoppel issue, just
`because this limitation is in all of the claims, which makes
`estoppel kind of tough to line up, because it says usable in only
`a single retail store, and doesn't say unique to a single retail
`store, and it has the phrase only and usable.
`MTI's Interpretation 1 that they have proffered,
`they say Denison's electronic key includes the same safeguards
`as the key in the '472 patent, and thus, a POSA would have used
`the Denison safeguards to verify the access code is usable in
`only a single retail store.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: Counsel, can I just back
`up real quick? So you just mentioned that the -- it doesn't say -
`- the limitation claim 1 doesn't say unique to the single retail
`store, unique to the retail store, and that -- that's in Claim 12, a
`dependent claim, wherein the single security code is unique to
`the single retail store in programming station. So can you
`respond to Petitioner's argument that that would be a narrower
`limitation that if met would then render the -- the broader
`limitation in Claim 1 --
`MR. CARLIN: Yeah, I think there's separate
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`branches in the tree in that something can be unique and that
`contributes to non-usability, but the -- if something's not usable,
`that means if you -- if you're usable in that single retail store, it
`means it's approved for that use, but wouldn't function
`somewhere else. In this case, it might be that it -- it is -- the
`security code is invalidated if you take it somewhere else and it
`doesn't match. In only a single retail store means an exclusion
`of all other retail stores.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: All right. Thank you.
`MR. CARLIN: You're welcome. Denison limits
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`the --
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`JUDGE WHITE: I might need a little bit more
`clarification.
`MR. CARLIN: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WHITE: I'm just trying to work out in
`my mind the circumstance where something could be unique to
`a retail store, but it would not meet this limitation. So are you
`saying that if the code is invalidated, it would be unique but not
`usable? Is that what you're --
`MR. CARLIN: Yes. I -- and I think I've got --
`let me see. If it's unique, it might still be approved for use in
`other retail stores, even if it is unique to a first retail store, a
`second retail store might recognize it. And in fact, in Denison
`you have -- keys can have multiple codes, it might work in
`different locations because they access vending machines that
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`are in different locations.
`JUDGE WHITE: So they would be unique to
`
`what then?
`
`MR. CARLIN: They would be unique to
`something, in this case perhaps a particular vending machines,
`but not to a location, and still be usable in different retail
`locations.
`
`JUDGE WHITE: If it's unique, though, would
`you be able to use it elsewhere if it's unique to that one
`particular location?
`MR. CARLIN: If another system allows it to be
`used, even if it's a unique number, if no other retail location has
`the number 5, but the other retail locations don't -- don't put it
`into their system or their keys, but if they see the number 5 and
`they still allow it to be used, then it could be unique to that
`location but usable somewhere else.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: So is the --
`MR. CARLIN: Here, the system limits the --
`limits it somehow and in that case of that dependent claim,
`limits it because it recognizes that it's not a -- it's not an
`approved number because it's unique to someplace else.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: In the '472 patent, what --
`what in the 4 -- I guess I should rephrase. What in the '472
`patent describes the limitation of the subject matter of usable in
`only a single retail store? And for some background, I mean
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`the -- because in other cases we talked about how there -- you
`know, there's no GPS tracker on this thing to make sure you
`don't leave geographically, what -- I mean, if you take the
`security device to another retail store it would work there, so it -
`- it's sort of -- I'm try -- I'm having trouble wrapping my head
`around the limitation, because it's really not a -- it -- it's almost
`like a negative limitation on other locations.
`MR. CARLIN: Right.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: Does that make sense?
`So if you could explain what we're looking for in the spec to
`kind of guide our interpretation.
`MR. CARLIN: Yeah. I think the way it works
`really is that that system is just systematically limited to that
`use in that store.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: So it --
`MR. CARLIN: Is the way it's described
`contextually.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: So it's not really the code
`then, it's the system?
`MR. CARLIN: Yeah. And that's kind of what I
`was trying to say.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: Okay.
`MR. CARLIN: But perhaps inelegantly.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: Because the claim says the
`-- the security code usable only in a single retail store. It
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`sounds like the system described in the patent may be more the
`system and maybe not the usable, but the code itself is not the
`issue.
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`MR. CARLIN: Yeah. I think the combination of
`the two, because the system with that code that approves that
`code is limited to that store, then the -- excuse me, I'm getting a
`little dry mouth -- then the key with that unique code would be
`limited to there.
`JUDGE GALLIGAN: Okay. Thank you.
`MR. CARLIN: You're welcome. I'm going to
`skip over this and just go to single security code in Claim 25.
`InVue no longer contests MTI's proposed construction of a
`programming station that provides or is configured to provide,
`one security code at a time for single security code.
`However, we think no estoppel applies to Claim
`25, which expressly recites InVue's proposed construction here
`but the programming station cannot generate more than one
`security code for use at the time. MTI seems to agree that
`Claim 25 is different because InVue's now relinquished
`interpretation would render dependent claim 25 superfluous
`according to their own petition.
`Claim -- MTI relies solely, and this is slide 8, MTI
`relies solely on Allison's -- a POSA would have understood the
`benefit under certain circumstances to provide a programming
`station able to generate one and only one, security code or
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`access code throughout its lifetime. However, Claim 25 does
`not require generation one and only one security code
`throughout the lifetime of the programming station. Claim 25
`uses the term at one time and thus, allows a single security code
`to be replaced with a different single security code through use
`of a magic key.
`You can see how the magic key works in figure
`12B, and I'm on slide 9 right now. Unfortunately, it's a little
`blurry out there.
`JUDGE ARBES: Counsel, can I ask one question
`before you move on to the figure?
`MR. CARLIN: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE ARBES: Your third point on slide 8,
`why does the language "at one time" imply some requirement
`as to what happens at another time? Why does it require
`something to happen at that more than one time?
`MR. CARLIN: I'm not sure I follow. S
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