`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
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`IPR 2018-01279
`Patent 7,844,037 B2
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`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: November 20, 2019
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`Before DANIEL N. FISHMAN, MICHELLE N. WORMMEESTER, and
`SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`IPR 2018-01279
`Patent 7,844,037 B2
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`APPEARANCES:
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`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
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`KARL RENNER, ESQUIRE
`DAN SMITH, ESQUIRE
`Fish & Richardson, P.C.
`1000 Maine Avenue, SW Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20024
`renner@fr.com
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`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
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`BRIAN W. OAKS, ESQUIRE
`PUNEET KOHLI, ESQUIR
`Baker Botts, LLP
`1500 San Jacinto Center
`98 San Jacinto Boulevard
`Austin, Texas 78701-4078
`brian.oaks@bakerbotts.com
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`ALSO APPEARING:
`DAVID GREENFIELD
`MIKE TAVEIRA
`Qualcomm Incorporated
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`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Wednesday,
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`November 20, 2019, commencing at 9:28 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`Patent 7,844,037 B2
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
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`THE USHER: All rise.
`JUDGE WORMMEESTER: Good morning. We have our final
`hearing in Case IPR2018-01279, Apple, Inc., v. Qualcomm Incorporated,
`which concerns U.S. Patent Number 7,844,037.
`I'm Judge Wormmeester. Judges Howard and Fishman are appearing
`remotely. Let's get the parties' appearances, please. Who do we have for
`Petitioner?
`MR. RENNER: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honors. Karl
`Renner for Apple; and I'm joined by Dan Smith, who is one of our
`principals. In terms of the hearing, if we could reserve 20 minutes.
`JUDGE WORMMEESTER: Twenty minutes, okay.
`MR. RENNER: Thank you. Your Honor, may I approach with a
`copy of the --?
`JUDGE WORMMEESTER: Sure. And who will be presenting
`today?
`MR. RENNER: Both Mr. Smith and myself.
`JUDGE WORMMEESTER: Okay. Thank you.
`MR. OAKS: Good morning, Your Honors. Brian Oaks for Patent
`Owner, Qualcomm, with me also is my colleague from Baker Botts, Puneet
`Kohli. And also from the client, Qualcomm, we have David Greenfield and
`Mike Taveira. Thank you, Your Honors.
`JUDGE WORMMEESTER: Thank you. And did you want to
`reserve time? Or you can tell me later.
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`MR. OAKS: Yeah. I would like to reserve 10 minutes when I start,
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`yes.
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`JUDGE WORMMEESTER: Ten minutes?
`MR. OAKS: Yes.
`JUDGE WORMMEESTER: Welcome. We set forth today's
`procedure in our Trial Order, but just to remind everyone the way this will
`work. Each party will have 60 minutes to present arguments. Petitioner has
`the burden and will go first, and may reserve time for rebuttal, which I
`understand is 20 minutes. Patent Owner will then have the opportunity to
`present its response, and may also reserve time for sur-rebuttal, which I
`understand is 10 minutes.
`Please remember that Judges Howard and Fishman will be unable to
`hear you unless you speak into the microphone. And when referring to any
`demonstratives please state the slide numbers so they can follow along.
`Please also remember that the demonstratives you submitted are not part of
`the record. The record of the hearing will be the transcript.
`We will give you a warning when you're reaching the end of your
`argument time. Are there any questions before we proceed? Okay. I've set
`the clock for 40 minutes, and you'll get a five-minute warning. Pardon?
`Okay. When you're ready.
`MR. RENNER: Your Honors, again, Karl Renner on behalf of Apple.
`In this case the dispute is centered on just a few issues. So if you can turn to
`slide 2, please?
`With respect to the original claims we'll address three issues in
`particular, the first two issues deal with claim construction, and the first of
`those deal with the prompting limitation, the second being a composing
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`limitation. Qualcomm proposes an unjust narrowing of prompting, and they
`ask you to inject limitations that are not recited by the claims, but are
`undisclosed -- and that aren't disclosed by the specification as it relates to the
`embodiments relied upon.
`The composing limitation is where Qualcomm, they seek a
`construction that defies the plain meaning of the term, as well as the
`terminology that they chose to include in their dependent claims that depend
`upon the claim limitation.
`And finally, the third limitation on the original claims deals with the
`mapping of the limitations. Here, we'll talk about how the challenged claims
`are fully satisfied with the Makela and the Moran combinations, as those
`were set forth by Apple, and it's important to understand the combination
`that Apple put forth. Not the straw man that was put up against by
`Qualcomm.
`Slide 3, please. Now, Mr. Smith will be talking about the original
`claims and the issues I just mentioned, and I'll follow him by talking about
`the substitute claims today. And in those we'll also have three limitations,
`the three issues that we're talking about. One will be the impermissible
`broadening of the claimed terms through the substitution, or the amendments
`that are offered.
`The second will be responsiveness, and this will be talked about in
`two dimensions, one is the burden that the motion party, the motion party,
`Qualcomm, carries and their inability to satisfy that burden, as well as their
`lacking attempt to do so in the original motion to amend.
`Finally, we'll talk about the advanced combination here too, and in
`this case we'll talk not only about the combination that was put forth by
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`Apple, we'll talk about the approach that was taken in rebuffing it, by
`looking at the specific references rather than the combination itself, and it's a
`particular approach that Your Honors had mentioned in the institution
`decision, rightly, as inappropriate.
`And with that, I'll hand it over to my colleague, Dan Smith, and he'll
`take us through the original claims. Dan?
`MR. SMITH: Thank you, Karl. Good morning, Your Honors. As
`Karl mentioned, I'll be discussing the original claims today. So, claim
`construction is the main issue in this case, and two terms are central, with
`the term "prompting", and the term "composing" in the original claims.
`So, Patent Owner asked Your Honors to construe each of these terms
`inconsistent with the intrinsic record. With respect to prompting, Patent
`Owner attempts to inject several unrecited limitations into the claim, and
`with respect to composing, Patent Owner attempts to read words out of the
`claim language.
`So to address each of these terms, we'll remain centered on one of
`bedrock principles of claim construction. The name of the game is the
`claim. Simply that the claims mean what they say. Patent Owner chose the
`claim language during prosecution and should not be permitted to now
`utilize claim construction to avoid that chosen claim language.
`The next slide, please. Let me skip to it. So, we'll address the
`prompting limitation first. This is slide 14, I apologize. So, as shown in the
`slide, the claim recites simply, prompting the user of the first computing
`device.
`The next slide, please? We have slide 15. So, Patent Owner proposes
`construing this unambiguous claim language to mean displaying a symbol or
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`message to a user of the first computing device that's indicative of an option.
`So, this construction is problematic for several reasons.
`The next slide, please? Most glaringly, the construction imports
`several unrecited limitations into the unambiguous claim language of claim
`1. The claim recites -- or the proposed construction recites displaying a
`symbol or message, those concepts do not appear in the language of claim 1,
`as well recites that the displayed symbol or message should be indicative of
`an option, another concept that is not present in the claim language of claim
`1.
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`The next slide, please? This is slide 18. So the 037 specification also
`does not include any mention of displaying a symbol or message indicative
`of an option. There is no disclosure in the 037 specification that describes
`prompting in this way. In fact, the 037 specification describes embodiments
`in which the prompt need not include a visual indication that's displayed.
`For example, the patent describes, this is column 9, lines 5 through 7,
`describes that a call notification may present options as to whether the user
`can answer the call, decline the call, and/or message reply to the call. And
`elsewhere, column 5, line 5, the patent describes that call notification -- that
`that call notification can be a non-visual indication such as a vibration.
`So, the claim should not be narrowed as Patent Owner proposes,
`because doing so would read embodiments out -- read embodiments in the
`specification out of the claims, for example, those embodiments we just
`discussed.
`The next slide, please? This is slide 20. So on the record before us
`we have two competing dictionary definitions of prompt. We have an IEEE
`definition from the year 2000 presented by Patent Owner, and a Newton's
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`Telecom dictionary definition from 2005, presented by Petitioner. So, at
`best for Qualcomm, the presented IEEE dictionary is irrelevant. It's not
`contemporaneous with the 037 Patent as it was published four years before
`the critical date of 2005, and thus it's not indicative of the plain meaning the
`term "prompting" would have had to a POSITA as of the critical date.
`JUDGE HOWARD: Is there any evidence in the record that the
`definition of "prompting" changed over that time period?
`MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I think that the -- that the difference
`between the two definitions, between the definition presented by Patent
`Owner that was from the year 2000, and the definition presented by
`Petitioner from the year 2005, at least indicates that there was some change
`in the definition over that time, with respect --
`JUDGE HOWARD: What about the fact that Patent Owner gave a
`Newton's dictionary from 2000, so the same time period as the IEEE, and it
`shows that based on the Newton's dictionary, the definition didn’t changed
`between 2000 and 2005.
`MR. SMITH: That's correct, Your Honor.
`JUDGE HOWARD: Excuse me. Doesn’t that seem to imply that the
`definition, that's remained the same, it's just that the different dictionaries
`have different interpretations?
`MR. SMITH: That's correct, Your Honor. And I think that ever if the
`dictionary definition hadn't changed, I think neither of those dictionary
`definitions, either the IEEE definition, or either of the two Newton's
`definitions supports the claim construction presented by Qualcomm, because
`none of the three dictionary definitions say anything about the prompt being
`indicative of an option. The other main difference between the Newton's
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`definition and the IEEE definitions would be that Newton's is inclusive with
`respect to non-visual prompts such as -- I believe, you know, and the first
`line says that the prompts can be visual or audible.
`But with respect to the -- I don't want to, you know, avoid your
`question. With respect to the changing of the definitions, I would offer that
`Qualcomm has not presented the IEEE definition from 2005. They chose to,
`you know, instead present an older version of the Newton's definition to
`show that that definition has not changed. Is it possible that the IEEE
`definition changed from 2000 to 2005? We don't know. But I think that,
`you know, more importantly, you know, I think that neither of those
`definitions -- one of three definitions, you know, supports the proposed
`claim construction.
`Does that answer your question, Your Honor; or at least attempted to
`answer your question, Your Honor?
`JUDGE HOWARD: Yes.
`MR. SMITH: Thanks. Okay. Can we go to the next slide, please?
`So, the extrinsic evidence, in this case also includes testimony from
`Petitioner's expert, Dr. Cooperstock on this point. During his deposition Dr.
`Cooperstock provided the example of the MS-DOS or UNIX shell command
`prompt. So, that command prompt is the -- you know, whenever you boot
`up MS-DOS, you know, the text with the blinking cursor after it that
`indicates that the system is ready for user input.
`Crucially, that type -- that prompt does not indicate any -- you know,
`clearly the user has many different commands that they can enter in that --
`you know, at that prompt. The prompt itself does not indicate what those
`commands are, or therefore does not indicate what options the user has with
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`respect to entering input at that point. So, thus the extrinsic evidence, like
`the intrinsic evidence, doesn’t support the Patent Owner's construction.
`The next slide, please? This is slide 21 of our demonstratives. Let me
`back up this real quick. I just wanted to, for the remote Judges, I just want
`to let you know that the cite for what we're showing on the screen here, it's
`at Exhibit 2025, which is the Cooperstock deposition transcript, page 41,
`lines 9 through 18.
`The next slide, please? So, this is slide 21 of our demonstratives. So,
`in this proceeding, Patent Owner first in its preliminary response proposed
`that prompting meant presenting reply options. In the institution decision,
`the Board found that construction was too limiting. Undeterred by that
`decision, the Patent Owner presented an even narrower construction of
`prompting in its Patent Owner response. This over-limiting claim
`construction should be rejected similarly to the prior construction from the
`POPR.
`The next slide, please? So, our next issue is -- our next claim
`construction is really to determine composing, and here, rather than trying to
`import limitations in the claim, the Patent Owner attempts to rewrite the
`plain language of the claim so that the user is required to compose the
`message -- let me back up -- so that only the user is required to compose the
`message, rather than the computing device as recited in the claim language.
`The next slide, the next slide, please? So, Qualcomm proposes to
`construe composing a message -- this is slide 24 of out demonstratives by
`the way -- Qualcomm proposes to construe composing a message as
`providing message content manually for a message. This is clearly
`inconsistent with the language of claim 1, in that the user -- in that
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`Qualcomm is attempting to mandate that the user and only the user is
`performing a composition.
`The next slide, please? Slide 25; so as you can see on this slide, the
`claim recites the first computing device is instructed to handle the incoming
`call by composing a message. Throughout its briefing, and even at its slides
`today, the Patent Owner downplays and fails to address this language. The
`Patent Owner, instead, appears to pretend that there is some mention of the
`user in this portion of the claim, you know, saying that the first computing
`device handles the incoming call by allowing the user to compose the
`message; I think is one, one paraphrase that's used.
`But again, the claim should be interpreted to mean what they say. I
`mean this language is fully considered, it's clear that the device -- that the
`claim is reciting that the device composes the message, and there's no
`justification got limiting the claim to only cover message content provided
`by the user as Qualcomm is proposing.
`JUDGE HOWARD: I understand your argument with regard to the
`manually part of the limitation that are -- the manually part of Qualcomm's
`construction. In the briefing did you address the rest of their construction?
`Or shall we just -- if we thought the rest was correct to remove the word
`"manually"?
`MR. SMITH: Thank you for that question, Your Honor. Let me see.
`I think that if -- I think that if -- removing the term "manually" would --
`manually certainly is the, you know, the most problematic component of that
`construction. You know, I think removing the term "manually" would
`change the construction such that it doesn’t require only the user to provide
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`the content. I think that -- yeah, I think that -- you know, that that would
`remove, you know, most of our concerns with this construction.
`JUDGE FISHMAN: This is Judge Fishman. Just sort of a related
`twist on the same question.
`MR. SMITH: Mm-hmm.
`JUDGE FISHMAN: But your original petition, if I understand, did
`not proffer a construction of either of these terms, prompt or composed,
`rather your reply is responding to the Patent Owner response. But I don't --
`I'm not sure that I understand your reply to be proffering your own proposed
`construction.
`MR. SMITH: That's correct, Your Honor.
`JUDGE FISHMAN: Okay. Your construction would be the plain
`meaning?
`MR. SMITH: Yes. Our contention is that the claim language is not
`ambiguous with respect to either of these terms, and so, yeah, our proffered
`construction would be simply the plain meaning.
`JUDGE FISHMAN: Okay.
`MR. SMITH: Can you go to the next slide? So, leaving the claim
`construction for now. We're on slide 27 now. The third issue that we're
`going to discuss this morning is the combination of Makela and Moran,
`which was shown or rendered the original claims obvious in the petition, and
`we are going to address some arguments that Patent Owner has presented
`with respect to that, that combination.
`The next slide, please? On slide 28. So, the combination of Makela
`and Moran involves the automatic extraction of the caller's phone number
`from inbound call signaling, as taught by Makela. It involves sending a
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`reply message to that caller's phone number, as also taught by Makela. The
`only feature that we're relying on Moran for is to show that an SMS message
`that's sent to a particular phone number is addressed to that particular phone
`number.
`That's to, you know, the claim recites, you know, automatically
`addressing the message and, you know, we just wanted to button up the fact
`that, you know, if you are sending a message, an SMS message to a
`particular phone number you’ve, in fact, addressed that message to that
`phone number.
`Incidentally we also -- we also argue that based only on the teaching
`of Makela, that a POSITA would have understood that -- you know, would
`have understood that fact that, you know, sending an SMS message to a
`particular phone involves addressing it.
`The next slide, please? So, the Patent Owner mischaracterizes our
`description of the combination, they attempt to attack our combination by
`basically ignoring our description of it in the petition, and they argue that
`other unincorporated features from Moran teach away from the combination,
`I believe that the exact feature is the use of third-party services in Moran.
`But Moran's description of this addressing functionality, and that's in that
`which he calls conventional, it's not related to the utilization of third-party
`services.
`And so, you know, our contention is that that teaching is not -- you
`know, because it's not related to -- you know, to the functionality that we are
`incorporating, and is not related to the combination as we've described it,
`that it isn't functional as a teaching away.
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`Even if we were to include that functionality, that Patent Owner has
`not shown that Makela would have rejected such -- you know, such third-
`party services. I believe the argument is simply a conclusory statement that
`Makela teaches away from such third-party services.
`So, I think, you know, our -- in summary on this point the -- you
`know, we've shown that the combination of Makela and Moran was, you
`know, a POSITA would have been motivated to perform it. We've, you
`know, provided a description of it, and thus, you know, Patent Owner's
`arguments which ignore that description are not persuasive.
`The next slide, please? We'll go back one, if you don't mind. So, this
`is slide 33 I'm on. So, to sum up with respect to the original claims, when
`the claims are interpreted to mean what they say, and the petition arguments
`are fully considered as written, it's clear that the original claims of the 037
`are unpatentable. And with that, I'm going to yield to my colleague, Karl
`Renner, to discuss the substitute claims.
`MR. RENNER: Okay. We're on slide 34, Your Honors. And turning
`to the substitute claims as Mr. Smith indicates. I'll begin by addressing how
`the substitute claims offered by the contingent motion to amend, they omit
`limitations and therefore impermissibly broaden.
`If we can go to slide 37, please; we'll see a comparison between the
`original claim 1, and the substitute claim 26. And this is the first of two
`slides, the overall comparison of the language in these two claims. Before
`we get into them, I'll just mention that context matters here, and it's really
`important in this case, sometimes it's not so, but in this case the notion of a
`contingent motion to amend is rather important.
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`And what we see here is the original claim must be unpatentable in
`order for the contingency to kick in, and therefore for substitute claims 26 to
`even be considered. The original claim is said by Qualcomm, to distinguish
`the prior art, if the composing step, as you’ve seen, is interpreted that it's
`performed by a user, absolutely the composing step being performed by the
`user, Qualcomm doesn’t make an argument that the claim is distinguishing
`the art.
`So, if the claim is instead unpatentable, and that is if it's performed, if
`the composing is performed by the device, that would be where we have
`unpatentability of the original claim that we would be in the contingency
`world, you would look at this claim as a substitute, and what you find, is that
`it omits that very limitation, the language is crafted specifically to do so.
`So, what we have as an impermissible broadening amendment, and it's
`an important construct here, so it ends up that the only way get to this claim
`is by violating the very rule that requires it to not impermissibly broaden the
`claim.
`Slide 38 shows another comparison of claim limitations. Between the
`original claim and the substitute claim 26, in here in the unhighlighted
`portion of the claim you can see some of the language is sustained perfectly,
`it's automatically addressing the message to the second computing device.
`That language is unchanged.
`So, we focus on the highlighted language instead, and what we find is
`a problem, that the highlighted language deals with the limitations on the
`condition precedent, and some of those are removed. In the original claim
`on the left we see there's two limitations, your prior responsiveness and
`specific, they say that, you're automatically addressing that functionality,
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`that must be responsive to, and I quote "Responsive to two different
`conditions." The first of the conditions, it's got to be responsive to receiving
`the incoming call, the second is it's going to be responsive to entry of user
`input by the user.
`The substitute claim on the right on the other hand, uses language
`while not answering the incoming call. And it replaces that nonresponsive --
`it replaces the responsive language with nonresponsive temporal limitations
`here. The word "while", the temporal, unlike the original claim 1, it needs
`not necessarily be responsive to any condition, much less the two that are
`specifically articulated here. And we see that showing up in two different
`ways as problematic for purposes of broadening.
`The first here with the fact that the timing itself, which is there, some
`timing of course articulated in the substitute claim 26, but the timing that's
`required there, is actually not the same as the time that's required by the
`original claim 1. Looking past the responsiveness we see the timing is off,
`by reciting "while" the substitute claims arguably require addressing to
`occur after receiving an incoming call, and we'll grant that.
`But the substitute claims are otherwise silent on when that function
`occurs, the addressing could occur for instance after presentation, or the
`reply options, and after receiving the incoming call. It could occur after
`receiving the incoming call, and after the selection of the reply options that
`are available.
`And in my view, it could occur after the entry of the user input, but it
`doesn’t need to, and that's the problem. Nothing in substitute claim 26
`requires that the addressing follow any of these events other than the
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`incoming call being received, and most notably, they don't need to follow
`the user entry or user input. So, the addressing --
`JUDGE HOWARD: Does the fact that it's automatically addressing
`the message imply that the message at least had to have been created in a
`way that, at least implicitly going to add in that it's responsive to receiving
`the incoming call, and the entering of the user input?
`MR. RENNER: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm glad you raised it, we
`were about to go there. So that message is the hook, the antecedent basis, if
`you will, for the message. Where do we find that, is the question. And if we
`only found that term as the product of the user entry of information, we'd be
`having a different conversation perhaps. But we don't.
`We find that all the way back, and to claim element 26(d), which is
`the presentation of the reply options. So, this claim element, this last claim
`element if listed, when it calls back to the message, and I think you're
`astutely recognizing it, it does indeed go back to the message, but we don't
`know which "the message" we're talking about. In fact, we know that it
`could be as early as the reply options being displayed.
`And as a consequence, the answer to your question, Your Honor, will
`be just no. It need not be the case that the user entry of the user information
`has to input, has to happen prior to this step, this step just happens to be
`listed last, and we noted this well-established case law in Federal Circuit that
`tells us the ordering of the claims, but for there being some sort of indication
`of an order, doesn’t imply that there exists an order among method steps,
`and here there is no such indication, because the only possibility with the
`antecedent basis, and that reaches farther back.
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`Without further questions on the broadening of -- as it relates to this
`particular timing issue, the second of the issues I mentioned for timing -- for
`our broadening, becomes apparently you look at the responsive to nature of
`the original claim language is no longer present. The substitute claims they
`required addressing while not answering an incoming call. But they say
`nothing of the nexus to the receipt of that call, or to the user entry of the user
`input.
`It's purely (inaudible) requirement as we've mentioned, the claim
`doesn’t otherwise replace, responsive to, and to illustrate that same issue that
`we just got done talking about, we see that nothing in the claim requires that
`the last steps here follow, even follow the user entry or user input.
`If it doesn’t follow it certainly can't be said to be necessarily
`responsive to it. Even if it did follow it, being responsive to something is
`different than simply following it in time, and there's nothing in this claim
`that requires this limitation to actually be responsive to that user entry or
`user input.
`But here we can see, we look, again, back into the claim, and we look
`again back at 26(d) because we see that when Qualcomm wanted to have
`"responsive to" as a requirement it not only said so in the original claims
`which now have that removed on this element, it continued to articulate
`those in the new substitute claims, in 26(d) as it relates to the displaying
`limitation. Qualcomm actually offers that "responsive to" is a limitation.
`And so its absence here is remarkable, and telling.
`Slide 39, please. As substitute claims, now we're going to continue
`with responsiveness, but now we're going to talk about responsiveness as an
`actual limitation of the requirement, if you will.
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`Slide 40, please. Because distinct in the requirement that claims don't
`broaden when they're in substitute amended claims, we also note that they
`cannot be offered if they're not responsive, and we see recited in the record
`the BlackBerry Mobile Media case as an example of a circumstance where a
`Patent Owner had deleted claim limitations, offered no indication of why the
`deletion of those terms was responsive, and as a consequence failed to meet
`their burden to demonstrate responsiveness.
`Here, too, there's been no comment in the motion to amend, and the
`motion to amend itself, there's no offer of responsiveness. It's not good
`enough to be silent here, it's actually a burden carried by the Patent Owner.
`And the Lectrosonics case confirms that burden, despite the fact that it
`recognizes, that not all amendments have to address prior art, some could
`address 112 for instance, but they all have to address something in the record
`and be responsive to -- of legitimate concern on 112 or prior art.
`It not being addressed in the motion to amend, we later see that
`Qualcomm reference is the Lectrosonics case containing the suspicion to
`bear out responsiveness with respect to some of the claims, or some of the
`elements, and we know that's not true. That would open the record to a
`tremendous amount of inquiry, and these are compact proceedings, and that's
`not, we believe, the holding in Lectrosonics in any event.
`Slide 42, please. Lastly, we'll talk about the prior art here, as
`foreshadowed in slide 43 -- 42, sorry, 42. In addressing the prior art
`Qualcomm looks past the combination that's offered here for the substitute
`claims, and they speak to the specific references that are offered as opposed
`to the combination of those references. They criticize as you can see, as
`clipped here, they criticize the -- it's Pirskanen -- I consistently have a
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`problem pronouncing that word -- Pirskanen reference, they criticize it
`specifically as having a few failings, but they
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