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`Nina S. Tallon, DC Bar No. 479481, appearing pro hac vice
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Phone: 202-663-6000 / Fax: 202-663-6363
`Joseph J. Mueller, MA Bar No. 647567, appearing pro hac vice,
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`Phone: 617-526-6000 / Fax: 617-526-5000
`Juanita R. Brooks, SBN 75934, brooks@fr.com
`Seth M. Sproul, SBN 217711, sproul@fr.com
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`12390 El Camino Real
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Phone: (858) 678-5070/ Fax: (858) 678-5099
`Ruffin B. Cordell, DC Bar No. 445801, pro hac vice, cordell@fr.com
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`1000 Maine Avenue, Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20024
`Phone: 202-783-5070 / Fax: 202-783-2331
`
`[Additional counsel identified on signature page]
`
`Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Apple Inc.
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 3:17-cv-1375-DMS-MDD
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`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
`APPLE INC.’S MOTION FOR
`JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`PURSUANT TO RULE 50(a)
`
`TRIAL DATE: MARCH 4, 2019
`JUDGE: HON. DANA SABRAW
`
`AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.
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`IPR2018-01334
`Intel v. Qualcomm
`INTEL 1025
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`

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`Case 3:17-cv-01375-DMS-MDD Document 672-1 Filed 03/11/19 PageID.38085 Page 2 of 29
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
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`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1
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`APPLE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS MATTER OF LAW OF
`NON-INFRINGEMENT .................................................................................1
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`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`D.
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`Legal Standards ....................................................................................1
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`Apple Is Entitled to Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’949
`Patent ....................................................................................................2
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`Apple Is Entitled to Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’490
`Patent ....................................................................................................7
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`Apple Is Entitled to Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’936
`Patent .................................................................................................. 11
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`III. APPLE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`OF NO WILLFULNESS .............................................................................. 16
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`IV. APPLE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`ON QUALCOMM’S DAMAGES CLAIMS................................................. 18
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 21
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`Case 3:17-cv-01375-DMS-MDD Document 672-1 Filed 03/11/19 PageID.38086 Page 3 of 29
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`
`Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
`No. 06-cv-2433, 2009 WL 10672071 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) .......................... 16
`
`Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`695 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 4
`
`Asetek Danmark A/S v. CMI USA Inc.,
`852 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 3
`
`Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc.,
`402 F.3d 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 2
`
`Behne v. 3M Microtouch Sys., Inc.,
`11 F. App’x 856 (9th Cir. 2001) ........................................................................... 1
`
`Carl Zeiss Vision Intern. GMBH v. Signet Armorlite, Inc.,
`No. 07-cv-0894, 2010 WL 3636180 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) ........................... 1
`
`Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C.,
`460 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................ 2
`
`CSP Techs., Inc. v. Sud-Chemie AG,
`643 Fed. Appx. 953 (Fed. Cir. 2016).................................................................... 2
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 13
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`535 U.S. 722 (2002) ............................................................................................. 2
`
`Frac Shack Inc. v. Fuel Automation Station LLC¸
`No. 16-cv-02275, 2018 WL 5792613 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2018)........................... 13
`
`Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) ....................................................................................... 15
`
`Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,
`370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004). ........................................................................... 2
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`Case 3:17-cv-01375-DMS-MDD Document 672-1 Filed 03/11/19 PageID.38087 Page 4 of 29
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`
`
`Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Mich., Inc.,
`873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ...................................................................... 5, 14
`
`Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
`No. 02-cv-2060, 2007 WL 925354 (S. D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) ............................. 14
`
`Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc.,
`690 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 1
`
`Plano Encryption Techs., LLC v. Alkami, Inc.,
`No. 2:16-cv-1032, 2017 WL 3654122 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2017) ...................... 13
`
`Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,
`970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ............................................................................ 16
`
`Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co.,
`298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 1
`
`Sleep Number Corp. v. Sizewise Rentals, LLC,
`No. ED CV 18-00356, 2018 WL 5263065 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2018) ................ 16
`
`State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc.,
`346 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .......................................................................... 16
`
`Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.,
`716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .......................................................................... 15
`
`Torres v. City of Los Angeles,
`548 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 1
`
`In re Varma,
`816 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 13
`
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 1
`
`Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc.,
`278 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................................................... 15
`
`WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
`837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 15
`
`Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc.,
`609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 17
`
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`iii
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`Case 3:17-cv-01375-DMS-MDD Document 672-1 Filed 03/11/19 PageID.38088 Page 5 of 29
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`Rules
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) ................................................................. 1, 17
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`Local Rule 5.4......................................................................................................... 23
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`Case 3:17-cv-01375-DMS-MDD Document 672-1 Filed 03/11/19 PageID.38089 Page 6 of 29
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`
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), Defendant Apple Inc.
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`(“Apple”) respectfully moves for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) that (1)
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`Apple has not infringed any claim of any asserted patent; (2) Plaintiff Qualcomm
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`Incorporated (“Qualcomm”) cannot meet its burden to show willfulness; and (3)
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`Qualcomm is not entitled to its claimed damages.
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`Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully heard
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`on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not
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`have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 50(a)(1). In evaluating whether JMOL is proper, courts in this Circuit look to
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`whether the trial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
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`party, “permits only one reasonable conclusion.” Carl Zeiss Vision Intern. GMBH v.
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`Signet Armorlite, Inc., No. 07-cv-0894, 2010 WL 3636180, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13,
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`2010) (quoting Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008));
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`see also Behne v. 3M Microtouch Sys., Inc., 11 F. App’x 856, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2001)
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`(“Judgment as a matter of law is proper if the evidence, construed in the light most
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`favorable to the non-moving party, allows only one reasonable conclusion[.]”).
`II. APPLE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS MATTER OF LAW OF
`NON-INFRINGEMENT
`A. Legal Standards
`To establish infringement, Qualcomm must prove by a preponderance of the
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`evidence that the accused products satisfy every limitation in the asserted claims. If
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`even one limitation is missing or not met as claimed, there is no literal infringement.
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`See Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also
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`Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`“To find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, any differences
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`between the claimed invention and the accused product must be insubstantial.”
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`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Prosecution
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`history estoppel “limits the broad application of the doctrine of equivalents by barring
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`an equivalents argument for subject matter relinquished when a patent claim is
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`narrowed during prosecution.” Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d
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`1349, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
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`Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002)). Prosecution history estoppel applies when the
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`applicant “mak[es] a narrowing amendment to the claim” for a reason “[]related to
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`patentability.” Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1363; see also Festo, 535 U.S. at 735; Honeywell
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`Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1141-43 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`Application of the doctrine of equivalents is also limited by the “all elements rule,”
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`which provides that the doctrine does not apply if doing so would vitiate an entire
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`claim limitation—i.e., asserting an infringement theory that would effectively
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`eliminate the claim limitation or render it meaningless. See Asyst Techs., Inc. v.
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`Emtrak, Inc., 402 F.3d 1188, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The doctrine of equivalents is
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`also limited by the disclosure-dedication doctrine, which “bars a patentee from using
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`the doctrine of equivalents to recapture claim scope that it disclosed in the
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`specification but did not literally include in the patent’s claims.” CSP Techs., Inc. v.
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`Sud-Chemie AG, 643 Fed. Appx. 953, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`B. Apple Is Entitled to Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’949
`Patent
`Qualcomm accuses Apple’s iPhone 7, 7 Plus, 8, 8 Plus, and X containing an
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`Intel baseband chipset of infringing claims 1, 2, and 8 of U.S. Patent No. 8,838,949
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`(the “’949 patent”). Qualcomm failed to introduce evidence at trial that would allow
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`a reasonable jury to conclude that Apple infringes any asserted ’949 patent claim,
`either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
`First, as Qualcomm itself has confirmed, it offered no evidence at trial on
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`asserted claim 8. Apple is thus entitled to a judgment that it does not infringe that
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`claim. (Trial Tr. at 1040:2-9 (Qualcomm’s counsel confirming no evidence presented
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`regarding claim 8); id. [Rinard] at 358:4-9 (confirming Dr. Rinard “only spoke about
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`[claims] 1 and 2”); id. at 388:13-18 (Dr. Rinard admitting he “presented [his]
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`infringement opinions with respect to two claims in the ’949 patent, claim 1 and claim
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`2” and no other claims).)
`Second, Qualcomm also admits that it offered no evidence directed to an
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`indirect infringement theory for any asserted ’949 patent claim; as such, judgment is
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`warranted in Apple’s favor on those infringement theories as well. (Id. at 1039:20-
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`1040:1 (Qualcomm’s counsel confirming no evidence presented on indirect
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`infringement); id. [Rinard] at 388:22-389:4 (Dr. Rinard admitting he did not offer
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`contributory infringement or inducement opinions for any claim).)
`Third, no reasonable jury could conclude that the accused products meet the
`requirement for the modem processor to be configured “to scatter load each received
`data segment based at least in part on the loaded image header.” Dr. Rinard admitted
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`that Segment 0 is a received segment that contains data—i.e., that it meets the plain
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`meaning of a “data segment.” (Id. at 399:19-20 (“Q. There is no dispute [Segment 0]
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`is received. A. That’s right as well.”); id. at 401:18-20 (“Q. To be very, very clear,
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`[Segment 0] is a segment that contains data, correct? A. Correct.”).) He also did not
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`offer any opinion that Segment 0 is scatter loaded at all—including based at least in
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`part on the loaded image header. (Id. at 397:23-398:5 (confirming no opinion offered
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`that Segment 0 is scatter loaded).) And, he conceded that Segment 0 is not loaded
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`into memory based on what he described as the “image header,” i.e., the combination
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`of the ELF program header table and the ELF header. (Id. at 361:12-18 (“Q. In fact,
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`neither the ELF program header table nor the ELF header specifies where Segment 0
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`will be placed in system memory, correct? A. That’s right.”); id. at 361:19-362:2 (“Q.
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`Claim 1 requires an image header, correct? A. It has to have an image header, yes.
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`Q. And the image header has to specify where the data segments are to be placed in
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`system memory, right? A. I believe you’re reading the claim correctly. . . . Q. It
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`doesn’t do that for Segment 0; we can agree on that? A. Yes.”).) Therefore, because
`the evidence confirms that Segment 0 is a received data segment that is not “scatter
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`loaded based at least in part on the loaded image header,” no reasonable jury could
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`find infringement of claims 1 or 2.
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`Dr. Rinard argued that Segment 0 is not a “data segment.” But the parties are
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`required to apply plain meaning to that term, and Dr. Rinard did not identify how that
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`plain meaning—i.e., a segment that contains data—is not met. (Dkt. 637-4
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`[Qualcomm’s Proposed Suppl. Jury Instructions] at 4; Dkt. 637-2 [Apple’s Proposed
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`Suppl. Jury Instructions] at 3.) See Asetek Danmark A/S v. CMI USA Inc., 852 F.3d
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`1352, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming instruction to apply ordinary meaning to
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`unconstrued claim terms). Therefore, no reasonable jury could accept that argument.
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`Dr. Rinard also argued that Apple infringes because claim 1 is a “comprising”
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`claim. (Trial Tr. [Rinard] at 307:11-23.) But that argument is legally wrong. The
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`fact that claim 1 uses the word “comprising” cannot be used to vitiate the requirement
`to scatter load “each received data segment” (instead, it simply means that claim 1
`can still be met if things other than data segments are received but not scatter loaded).
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`See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting
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`argument that use of “comprising” in a claim that required “a plurality of heuristic
`models” where “each heuristic module” used a predetermined algorithm could be met
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`despite “the addition of other modules that do not use different heuristic algorithms
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`because such addition would impermissibly wipe out the express limitation that
`require[d] every module to have a unique heuristic algorithm”).1
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`Dr. Rinard also offered a new opinion for the first time on cross examination
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`that Apple infringes because claims 1 and 2 supposedly only require scatter loading
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`1
`All emphases have been added unless otherwise indicated.
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`just two received data segments—regardless of how many other data segments are
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`received. (Trial Tr. [Rinard] at 398:16-399:17, 410:23-411:19, 411:25-412:5, 412:19-
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`413:7, 415:3-23.) Apple has moved to strike this new opinion because (1) it was
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`undisclosed, and (2) it would be error to allow the jury to consider that argument,
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`which is premised on a legally incorrect reading of the claim. (See Dkt. 663 [Mot. to
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`Strike].) No reasonable jury could find infringement for this reason as well.
`Fourth, Qualcomm and Dr. Rinard both admit that Qualcomm did not offer
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`any evidence concerning the doctrine of equivalents for the ’949 patent. (Trial Tr. at
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`1040:11-22 (Qualcomm’s counsel confirming no evidence presented on doctrine of
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`equivalents for ’949 patent); id. [Rinard] at 389:11-13 (“Q. You weren’t asked a single
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`question by your lawyer about the doctrine of equivalents, correct? A. That’s
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`correct.”).) Apple is therefore entitled to JMOL on Qualcomm’s doctrine of
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`equivalents theories for the ’949 patent. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co.
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`of Mich., Inc., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The evidence and argument on
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`the doctrine of equivalents cannot merely be subsumed in plaintiff’s case of literal
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`infringement.”).
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`In any event, the evidence confirms that Qualcomm’s pre-trial equivalents
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`argument under the “each received data segment” limitation is barred by prosecution
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`history estoppel. Qualcomm overcame prior art rejections by adding the limitation
`requiring scatter loading “each received data segment,” while arguing this new
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`limitation was “patentably distinguishable.” Further, Qualcomm’s argument would
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`vitiate the limitation and substantially alter the scope of the claim. Allowing the
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`claims to cover a scenario in which some data segments are not scatter loaded using
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`the claimed approach would defeat the purported efficiency gained from that
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`approach. Moreover, the evidence at trial confirmed that the function-way-result test
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`for equivalents is not met because at least the way is substantially different (loading
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`data segments in ways other than based on the image header) and the result is
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`substantially different (potential delayed loading of the executable software image
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`contrary to the patent’s claim to improve the efficiency of such loading processes).
`Finally, no reasonable jury could find that the accused products meet the
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`“image header” requirement of the asserted claims. The parties’ agreed construction
`of image header is “a header associated with the entire image that specifies where the
`data segments are to be placed.” (Trial Tr. [Rinard] at 359:9-14.) On cross
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`examination, Dr. Rinard admitted that the parties’ agreed construction of “image
`header” requires that “the image header has to specify the final designation for each
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`segment.” (Id. at 359:19-21 (“Q. And the image header has to specify the final
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`designation for each segment, correct? A. I believe that’s the correct interpretation of
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`image header, correct.”).)
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`Yet, Dr. Rinard admitted that what he alleges is the image header in the accused
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`products—the combination of the ELF Header and ELF Program Header Table—does
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`not specify where in system memory Segment 0 will be placed. (Id. at 361:12-18 (“Q.
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`In fact, neither the ELF program header table nor the ELF header specifies where
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`Segment 0 will be placed in system memory, correct? A. That’s right.”); id. at 361:19-
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`362:2 (“Q. Claim 1 requires an image header, correct? A. It has to have an image
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`header, yes. Q. And the image header has to specify where the data segments are to
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`be placed in system memory, right? A. I believe you’re reading the claim correctly.
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`… Q. It doesn’t do that for Segment 0; we can agree on that? A. Yes.”).) As discussed
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`above, Segment 0 is a “data segment”; therefore, no reasonable jury could find that
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`Apple’s accused products meet the “image header” requirement—because there is no
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`dispute that what Dr. Rinard identifies as the claimed “image header” fails to specify
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`where in system memory Segment 0 will be placed.
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`C. Apple Is Entitled to Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’490
`Patent
`Qualcomm accuses the iPhone 7, 7 Plus, 8, 8 Plus, and X containing an Intel
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`baseband chipset of infringing claim 31 of U.S. Patent No. 9,535,490 (“the ’490
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`patent”). Qualcomm failed to introduce evidence at trial that would allow a
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`reasonable jury to conclude that the accused Apple iPhones infringe the sole asserted
`’490 patent claim, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
`First, Qualcomm introduced no evidence at all regarding any purported indirect
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`infringement of the ’490 patent. Indeed, Dr. Baker expressly confirmed during cross-
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`examination that he did not present any opinions on induced or contributory
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`infringement. (Trial Tr. [Baker] at 548:12-19.) JMOL is therefore appropriate on
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`these issues.
`Second, the evidence at trial confirmed that the accused iPhones do not have
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`“an application processor configured to hold [uplink] data” as required by claim 31.
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`Rather, in the accused products, uplink data is held in memory external to the
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`application processor. Dr. Baker testified that in the accused iPhones, uplink data is
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`not stored in Apple’s A10 and A11 processor logic chip. (Id. at 554:13-16.) Instead,
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`Dr. Baker confirmed that uplink data is stored in DRAM (or dynamic random access
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`memory), which is a separate chip that is attached to the A10 and A11’s processor
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`logic chip. (Id. at 554:13-16 (“In the accused iPhones, the data is stored in
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`DRAM[.]”); id. at 554:17-555:4 (“The processor logic chip and the DRAM chips are
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`different chips.”).) As Dr. Baker further testified, Apple’s own documents confirm
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`that the DRAM memory is external to the processor logic chip. (Id. at 559:17-560:14
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`(conceding that DX-451 [Top Level Micro-Architecture Specification] describes the
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`DRAM memory as external to the processor logic chip).)
`Third, the evidence confirmed that the accused iPhones do not have a “modem
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`processor configured to hold [downlink] data.” Rather, in the accused iPhones,
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`downlink data is held in memory external to the modem processor. During cross-
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`examination, Dr. Baker conceded that in the accused iPhones, “[d]ownlink data is
`stored in the modem processor in external DRAM chips to the logic chip in the
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`modem processor[.]” (Trial Tr. [Baker] at 570:3-6; see also id. at 570:7-10
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`(conceding that in the accused iPhones, the DRAM chip is a different and separate
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`chip from the modem processor logic chip).) Based on this record, no reasonable jury
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`could find that the accused iPhones have “an application processor configured to hold
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`[uplink] data” or a “modem processor configured to hold [downlink] data.”
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`Moreover, Qualcomm’s arguments that the accused products satisfy, under the
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`doctrine of equivalents, the “[application/modem] processor configured to hold”
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`limitations of claim 31 of the ’490 patent are barred by the “all elements rule.”
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`Applying claim 31 to allow uplink and downlink data to be held anywhere on either
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`side of the PCIe communication bus in the accused iPhones would render the
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`“[application/modem] processor configured to hold”
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`language of claim 31
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`meaningless and would replace that language with just “hold.” Dr. Baker agreed that
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`claim 31 requires “an application processor configured to hold” data. (Id. at 565:17-
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`19.) By contrast, for example, claim 16 does not specify “about the memory or where
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`it’s located.” (Id. at 566:9-21.)
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`Qualcomm’s doctrine of equivalents arguments for these limitations are also
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`barred by the disclosure-dedication doctrine because the specification of the ’490
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`patent discloses two embodiments for storing data—i.e., storing data in external
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`memory “coupled to the processor” or in a “storage medium . . . integral to the
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`processor”—but Qualcomm drafted claim 31 to cover only the latter embodiment.
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`Dr. Baker confirmed that the ’490 patent describes two different ways to store data:
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`“the storage could be coupled to the processor” “or it may be integral to the
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`processor.” (Id. at 565:4-10; see also JX-7 [’490 Patent] at 17:15-19 (disclosing
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`storage medium “coupled to the processor” and storage medium “integral to the
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`processor”).) Claim 31 claims storage integral to the processor, but cannot cover
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`storage coupled to the processor under the disclosure-dedication doctrine.
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`Even if Qualcomm were not barred by the “all elements rule” or by the
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`disclosure-dedication doctrine, the evidence at trial confirmed that the accused
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`iPhones do not satisfy the “[application/modem] processor configured to hold”
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`limitation of claim 31 of the ’490 patent under the doctrine of equivalents because the
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`accused iPhones are substantially different from the claimed invention. Storing data
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`in external DRAM (as in the accused iPhones) is substantially different from storing
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`data in internal memory (as required by the claimed invention) because, for example,
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`storing data in internal memory allows for faster data access and transmission, and
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`consumes less power. As Dr. Baker confirmed, there are differences between SRAM
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`memory internal to the processor and external DRAM memory, including that SRAM
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`allows for faster access to data and consumes less power compared to DRAM. (Trial
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`Tr. [Baker] at 568:6-23.) Dr. Baker also testified that DRAM is generally less
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`expensive than SRAM per unit of storage. (Id. at 568:24-569:1.) No reasonable jury
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`could find that Qualcomm has met its burden to show infringement under the doctrine
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`of equivalents.
`Fourth, the evidence at trial showed that the accused iPhones do not transmit
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`uplink data “after transmission” of the held downlink data. Instead, as Dr. Baker
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`admitted on cross-examination, uplink and downlink data transfers overlap in the
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`accused products. (Id. at 572:5-8 (“Q. Because in the iPhones, as you’ve talked about,
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`the period when the downlink data is transmitted overlaps with the period when uplink
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`data is transmitted, correct? A. Yes.”).) Transmission of uplink data after
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`transmission of held downlink data (as required by the claimed invention) is distinct
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`from overlapping uplink and downlink data transmissions (as in the accused iPhones)
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`because the claimed invention requires sequential data transfers. (JX-7 [’490 Patent]
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`at claim 31: “wherein the modem processor is further configured [to] pull data from
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`the application processor after transmission of the modem processor to application
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`data.”) During cross-examination, both Dr. Baker and Mr. Krishna conceded that
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`claim 31 can be practiced using a half-duplex bus, which only supports sequential
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`data transfers. (Trial Tr. [Krishna] at 457:5-458:25; id. [Baker] at 575:13-22.) As
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`Mr. Krishna explained, half-duplex buses are like “a one-lane highway” that can only
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`transmit data in one direction at a time. (Id. [Krishna] at 458:16-25.) Mr. Krishna
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`was further impeached with testimony in which he admitted that Figure 5, which he
`testified illustrates the claimed invention, shows that all the downlink data is sent
`followed by all the uplink data in the same active power cycle. (Id. [Krishna] at 455:4-
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`6; id. at 460:20-461:20.) Finally, both Mr. Krishna and Dr. Baker conceded that it is
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`possible to use a PCIe bus to connect a modem processor to an application processor
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`without infringing the ’490 patent. (Id. [Krishna] at 473:14-22; id. [Baker] at 545:16-
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`19.) Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that the iPhones transmit uplink data
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`“after transmission” of the held downlink data.
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`Qualcomm’s arguments that the accused products satisfy, under the doctrine of
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`equivalents, the “after transmission” limitation of the ’490 patent are barred by
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`prosecution history estoppel. Qualcomm has not overcome the presumption of
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`estoppel because Qualcomm’s amendments and arguments during prosecution
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`required a specific scheduling technique narrowing the “after transmission” limitation
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`to exclude overlapping uplink and downlink transmissions. (JX-8 [’490 File History]
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`at 366-67, 371-74.) Qualcomm’s argument is also barred by the “all elements rule”
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`because applying claim 31 to allow the transmission of uplink data to occur before
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`the transmission of all downlink data would vitiate the uplink “after transmission” of
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`downlink limitation.
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`Even if Qualcomm were not barred by prosecution history estoppel or by the
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`“all elements rule,” the evidence at trial demonstrated that the accused iPhones do not
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`satisfy the “after transmission” limitation of claim 31 of the ’490 patent under the
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`doctrine of equivalents because the claimed invention is substantially different from
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`the accused iPhones. In the accused iPhones, the transfer of downlink data overlaps
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`with the transfer of uplink data, whereas the claimed invention requires sequential
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`data transfers. See infra at 9-10. Dr. Baker offered nothing more than a conclusory
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`opinion on the doctrine of equivalents. (Trial Tr. [Baker] at 515:21-516:10.)
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`Although Dr. Baker testified that the accused iPhones achieve the same result, he
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`failed to meaningfully explain how the accused i