throbber
Cas 2:18-cv-01844—GW-KS Document 633 Filed 0207120 Pagelof 22 PagelD #:44069
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`COOLEY LLP
`
`COOLEY LLP
`
`MICHAEL G. RHODES (116127)
`(rhodesmg@cooley.com)
`101 California Street, 5th Floor
`
`San Francisco, CA 9411 1-5800
`
`Telephone: (415) 693-2000
`Facsimile:
`(415) 693-2222
`
`HEIDI L. KEEFE (178960)
`(hkeefe@cooley.com)
`MARK R- WEINSTEIN (193043)
`(mweinstein@cooley.com)
`MATTHEW J. BRIGHAM (191428)
`(mbrigham@cooley.com)
`3175 Hanover Street
`
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1 130
`Telephone:
`(650) 843-5000
`Facsimile:
`(650) 849-7400
`
`Attorneys/0r Defendants
`FA C‘EBOOK, INC, WHA TSAPP INC,
`
`and INSTA GRA M, LLC
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`BLACKBERRY LIMITED,
`
`Case No. 2:18-cv-01844 GW(KSx)
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`V.
`
`FACEBOOK, INC,
`
`WHATSAPP INC ., and
`
`IN STAGRAM LLC,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT
`OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
`JUDGMENT AND MOTION To
`STRIKE
`
`The Hon. George H. Wu
`
`Hearing Date: February 20, 2020
`Time: 8:30 am.
`
`Ctrm: 9D
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`\DOOHJONUI-b—LJJMH
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`NNNNMNNNNF—F—I—I——I——I—WHJONLh-bmmh‘owwfiaJONLh-bmmh‘o
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`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K8x
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`DEFENDAN'IS‘ REPLY [SO
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY J UDGMENI'
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`001
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`Facebook’s Ex. 1026
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`IPR2019-00706
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`Facebook's Ex. 1026
`IPR2019-00706
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`001
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed 02107120 PageZof 22 PagelD #:44070
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`1.
`
`US. PATENT NO. 7,372,961
`A.
`The ’96] Patent is Not Infringed Under the Theory BlackBerrfi
`0t
`Has Asserted Throughout Thls Case, and BlackBerry Should
`Be Allowed to Change Its Theory Now ................................................. 1
`
`1
`
`The Sole Asserted ’961 Patent, Claim 2, is Invalid Under § 101 .......... 3
`B.
`II.
`US. PATENT NO. 93491205
`111. US. PATENT NO. 8,209,634 9
`A.
`Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement Should Be Granted ............. 9
`
`The Asserted Claims Are Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ................... 11
`B.
`U.S. PATENT NO. 8429236 12
`vs. PATENT NO.830171314
`
`U.S. PATENT NO. 8677250 15
`
`1V.
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K8x
`
`i
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`DEFENDANTS‘ REPLY [SO
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`002
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`Facebook’s Ex. 1026
`IPR2019-00706
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`3
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`5
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`25
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`26
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`2?
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed 02t07t20 Page30f 22 PagelD #:44071
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`Cases
`
`l 2
`
`3 4
`
`5 AIice Corp. Pty. v. CLSBanIc Int’i,
`6
`573 US. 208 (2014)................................................................................ 4, 5, 12, 15
`
`7 Ancora Techs. v. HT(.7Am.,
`8
`908 F_3d 1343 (Fed, C11: 2018) ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 5, 13
`
`9 Aptafis Pharmatech, Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,
`718 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 11
`
`10
`
`”
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`15
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc,
`788 F_3d 1371 (Fed, C11: 2015) ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 13
`
`Bascom GfobaI Internet Servs., Inc. v. A T& T MobiIity LIJC,
`827 F_3d 1341 (Fed, C11: 2016) ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 14
`
`380 Tech v. Buyseasons,
`899 F_3d 1281 (Fed, Cir_ 2018) ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 4
`
`‘6 Charchoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc,
`17
`920 F_3d 259 (Fed, Cir_ 2019) .............................................................................. 12
`
`18
`19
`
`Core WireIess Licensing SARIJ v. LG 1516303.,
`880 F_3d 1356 (Fed, Cir. 2018) ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 16
`
`20 Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Googie LLC,
`906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............................................................................. 16
`
`21
`
`22 Datamtze, LLC v. I’Iumtree Soflware, Inc,
`417 F .3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 US. 898 (2014) ............................ 8
`
`23
`
`2‘4
`25
`
`Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F_3d 1350 (Fed, Cir_ 2016) ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 4, 11
`
`26 Halltburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`27
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 13
`
`28
`
`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K8x
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`ii
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`DEFENDANTS‘ REPLY [SO
`MO'I‘ION FOR Smmuw JUDGMENT
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`003
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`Facebook’s Ex. 1026
`IPR2019-00706
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed 02l07l20 Page40f 22 PagelD #:44072
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech, Inc,
`540 F.3d 1337 ......................................................................................................... 7
`
`Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One Bank,
`792 F.3d 1363 (Fed Cir, 2015) ............................................................................. 14
`
`Intellectual Ventures I v. Capital One Fin,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed, Cir. 2017) ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 4
`
`Interval Licensing v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 8, 9
`
`Invitrogen Corp. v. (.‘lontech Labs, Inc,
`429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 14
`
`MAZ Encryption Techs. v. Blackberry,
`No. 13-304-LPS, 2016 WL 5661981 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) .............................. 5
`
`Mortg. Grader v. First Choice Loan Servs.,
`811 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 5, 13
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. ,
`572 US. 898 (2014)................................................................................................ 8
`
`Personal Web Tech. v. Google,
`No. l3-cv-13 17, 2020 WL 470189 (ND. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020) ............................... 4
`
`Saflran v. Johnson & Johnson,
`712 F.3d 549 (Fed, Cir. 2013) ........................................................................ 10, 11
`
`Sitrick v. Dreamworlcs,
`
`516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................ 5
`
`SRI In! ’l v. (.‘isco Sys,
`
`930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................................................ 5, 13
`
`In re TLI Commc ’ns LLC Patent Ling,
`323 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................. 12, 14, 15
`
`Wading Techs. Int ’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC,
`921 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 15
`DEFENDANTS‘ REPLY [SO
`MO'I‘ION FOR Smmuw JUDGMENT
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`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K8x
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`iii
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`004
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`Facebook’s Ex. 1026
`IPR2019-00706
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed 02107120 PageSof 22 PagelD #:44073
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`(continued)
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`Page
`
`TWo-Way Media v. Comcas! Cable Commc ’m‘,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 4, 5
`
`Unilac USA, Inc. v. ADP, LLC,
`772 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ....................................................................... 14
`
`Statutes
`
`3S U-S-C-§ 101 ............................................................................................ 3, 5,11,15
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`.—
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`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K8x
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`iv
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`DEFENDANTS‘ REPLY [SO
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`Facebook’s EX. 1026
`IPR2019-00706
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed 02(071’20 Page60f 22 PagelD #:44074
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`I—‘
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`Defendants submit the following reply in support of their motion for summary
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`judgment and motion to strike:
`
`l.
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,372,961
`
`A.
`
`The ’96] Patent is Not Infrin ed Under the Theory BlackBerry Has
`Asserted Throughout This
`ase, and BlackBerry Should Not Be
`Allowed to Change Its Theory Now
`
`BlackBerry does not dispute that under the only theory it advanced throughout
`
`this cas&%that the accused value for “output H(SV)” in claim 1[b] is the value stored
`
`in the global variable md—Facebook does not infringe the ’961 patent. The Court
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`should grant summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to this theory.l
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`10 Whether BlackBerry should be allowed to change its theory should be decided
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`I 1
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`separately from the issue of summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, it
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`should not be permitted to do so.
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`BlackBeITy’s opposition argues that Facebook and its expert were “mistaken”
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`in interpreting BlackBerry’s infringement theory as alleging that the value placed in
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`“global storage md” was the accused H(SV) in step 1[b].
`
`(Opp. at 2,) But this is
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`precisely what BlackBerry said, both in its infringement contentions and in the report
`
`of its expert, Dr. Rubin. For example, BlackBerry’s infringement contentions stated:
`
`
`
`(Opp, Ex, E at 21 (emphasis added); see also ECF 552 at 2 (excerpt from preliminary
`
`infringement contentions served in September 2018 including the same allegation).)
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`22 And BlackBerry’s expert report said substantially the same thing:
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`23
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`24
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`25
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`26
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`27 —
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`1 As ex lained in Defendants’ 0 position to BlackBerry’s motion to exclude Dr. Katz,
`28 Defen ants properly disclosed tIIJ'Iis non-infringement position. (See ECF 600.)
`DEFENDAN'I'S' REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR Sun-mm Jl'DGMEN'l'
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`Case No. 2:18—cv—Ul844—GW—KSx
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed OZIO'HZO PageTr‘of 22 PagelD #:44075
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`(Opp. Ex. A. ‘llSl (highlighting added).) BlackBerry’s identification of “global
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`storage md” was not a mere typo as BlackBe
`
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`’ claims. Followin and in support of
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`
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`included a block of source code that included line 533 below. which
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`[NJ
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`DJ
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`1)..42..
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`\DGOHJCN
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`
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`ECF 552-14. Katz Decl. Ex. B at 7’0-7’1. '155 citinor Rubin Re on and identi
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` ' see also, e.g., Opp. Ex. E at 23 (showing citation to code in the
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`ring
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`infringement contentions).) Dr. Rubin‘s source code citations were entirely consistent
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`with BlackBerry’s repeated and unequivocal allegation that the accused H(SV) in
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`claim l[b] is the value placed in the global variable md.
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`The crux of BlackBerry’s argument is that Facebook should have discovered
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`BlackBerry’s mistake, based on the “context” and “entirety” of its infringement
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`theory. and disregarded BlackBerry’s express allegations. But the statements quoted
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`above identifying “global storage md” as the claimed “output H(SV)” are the onlv
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`statements in BlackBegy’s contentions or expert report that actually tie the accused
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`source code to the “output HgSV)” limitation in claim 1|b|. BlackBerry and its expert
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`never cited or referred to “buf‘ as the claimed output H(SV).
`
`(Opp. Ex. E at 24
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`(including source code that includes a formula for the variable “buf‘ but no allegation
`
`that “but" is the value H(SV)); id. at 13. 24-31 (including allegations for other claim
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`limitations and no allegations that these are related to H(SV) in limitation l[b]): Opp.
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`Ex. A. “H 184-85 (cepying the infringement contentions at 24 to describe some code
`
`that includes buf, but never tying that code to the value H(SV)).) Nothing in
`DEFENDAXTS’ REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR SI'MMAR‘L' JUDGMENT
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`Case No. 2: l 3-CV-01844-GW-KSX
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844—GW-KS Document 633 Filed OZIO'HZO PageSof 22 PagelD #:44076
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`BlackBerry’s contentions or expert report called into question the explicit allegation
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`that global md is the accused H(SV). As for Facebook’s reasonable reliance on that
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`allegation in its response, Dr. Rubin acknowledged:
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`
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`(ECF 552-2, 325: 1 8-3265.)
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`BlackBerry’s attempt to shift the blame to Facebook should be rejected.
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`It was
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`BlackBerry’s responsibility as the patentee to understand what it accused and to
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`diligently investigate non-infringement positions clearly provided in discovery. As
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`explained in Facebook’s opening brief and in its opposition to BlackBerry’s motion
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`to strike relating to Dr. Katz, Facebook explicitly informed BlackBerry in its
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`interrogatory responses—months before service of its opening expert report—that the
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`code it identified for the “determining” step “operates on a value different from the
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`accused H(SV).” (ECF 552-5 at 2.)
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`The prejudice from this late change in theory is clear. Facebook and its expert
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`relied on and responded to the s ecific alle ations made by BlackBerry—which even
`Dr. Rubin acknowledgedifliCF 552-2, 325:18-32625.) Dr. Rubin
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`made his changes after service of Dr. Katz’s report and after his deposition, giving Dr.
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`Katz no opportunity to respond. If the Court were to permit BlackBerry to change its
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`infringement theory qfler the service of all expert reports, Facebook’s expert would
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`need an opportunity to provide a supplemental
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`report
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`to respond to them.
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`BlackBerry’s change simply came too late and would be too prejudicial.
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`B.
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`The Sole Asserted ’96] Patent, Claim 2, is Invalid Under § 101
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`BlackBerry argues “the claims of the ’96] Patent are directed to a specific
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`solution for generating secure cryptographic keys that overcomes the Bleichenbacher
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`\DOOHJONLh-Ib-LJJM—‘
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`OOHJQUWLLHN—‘OwOOHJONLh-b-WN—‘O
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`vulnerability.” (Opp. at 9.) But the sole asserted method claim uses only “result-
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`Cas 2:18-cv-01844—GW-KS Document 633 Filed 02i07i20 Pagerf 22 PagelD #:44077
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`based functional language” to require the generic results of “determining” whether a
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`generated random value is less than a given desired range, “accepting” that value if it
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`is less than the given range, and “providing” it to some other process to use, and
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`“rejecting” the value and starting over if it is not less than the given range.
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`(Mot. at
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`8-9-2) Such a basic concept, embodied in a method claim reciting only abstract,
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`functional results, is not patent-eligible subject matter. E.g., Eiec. Power Grp. v.
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`Alsiom SA, 830 F.3d 1350, 1351, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“lengthy” claims reciting
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`“functions” but no actual improvement in computer technology); Two- Way Media v.
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`(Tomcast Cable (.‘ommc’ns, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claim required
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`functional results, but did not “sufficiently describe how to achieve [the] results in a
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`non-abstract way”). Under Alice step 1, when the claims are properly “[s]tripped of
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`excess verbiage,” the claims are “directed to” nothing more than the abstract idea of
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`generating a random value within a desired range, no different in substance than
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`generating random values in games of chance, such as roulette or craps. Intellectual
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`Ventures I v. Capital One Fm, 850 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017); PersonaiWeb
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`Tech. v. Googfe, No. 13-cv-131?, 2020 WL 470189, at *1-5, *13 (ND. Cal. Jan. 29,
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`2020) (invalidating claims applying a cryptographic hash fill’lCtiOl’l).
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`At Alice step 2, BlackBerry mistakenly argues that Defendants “waived” any
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`argument that the ordered combination was unconventional.
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`(Opp. at 10.) But
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`Defendants’ opening brief plainly argued the “claim limitations here, whether
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`individually or as an ordered combination, merely restate the abstract
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`idea of
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`repeatedly generating random numbers until an acceptable value is obtained.” (Mot.
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`at 10 (emphasis added).) “If a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of
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`an abstract idea using conventional and well—understood techniques, the claim has not
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`been transformed” into patent-eligible subject matter. BSG Tech v. Buyseasons, 899
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`F.3d 1281, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Mot. at 9-10; ECF 552-14, Katz Decl., Ex. A,
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`2 Claim 2 generates another value like the abstract “rejecting” step of claim 1.
`DEFENDANTS‘ REPLY [SO
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`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K8x
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`.—
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`1111 61-77, 81-86, 305-312. The concepts in the asserted claim are so basic, they do not
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`distinguish the claim from the abstract idea itself.
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`(Mot. at 8.) BlackBerry itself is
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`unable to articulate any “inventive concept” in claim 2.
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`Nor does BlackBerry identify any actual “factual dispute” over A lice step 2.
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`(See Opp- at 10.) BlackBerry simply invokes “Ex. B 1111 23 8-240, 243,” but conclusory
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`expert testimony is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. E.g., Sitrick v.
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`”i Dreamworks, 516 F.3d 993, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Mortg. Grader v. First Choice
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`8
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`9
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`Loan Servs., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming grant of summary
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`judgment of § 101 invalidity despite expert declaration). Nothing recited in claim 2
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`10
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`“transform[s] the abstract idea into something more” that is patent eligible. Two- Way
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`11 Media, 874 F-3d at 1339.3
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`11.
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`U.S. Patent No. 9,349,120
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`BlackBerry has struggled throughout this litigation to explain why the visual
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`cues provided by all accused products (blue dot, bolded text, etc.), and the additional
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`physical one provided by Instagram (Vibration), do not qualify as “notifications” under
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`the ’120 patent. Every single time BlackBerry has spoken about this issue, it has
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`abandoned earlier theories and offered new explanations, and its opposition here is no
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`exception- But BlackBerry’s shifting arguments cannot change the undisputed
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`operation of the accused products and the lack of any issue of material fact.
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`BlackBerry argues that the fact that its earlier motion for summary judgment
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`failed means that Defendants’ motion should suffer the same fate.
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`(Opp. at 10-11.)
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`But BlackBerry bears the burden of establishing infringement and the record has
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`changed considerably since BlackBerry’s motion. For example, in arguing that the
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`24
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`visual cues provided by Defendants’ products were not “notifications,” BlackBerry’s
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`25 W are unavailing. EfiuSR1Int’i v. Cisco Sysg 930 F.3d 1295,
`26
`i2331(ie%f('r.43£)199)11§1?3‘313‘113tefé‘fécaret;“ET?"£3is3f(§1§1‘ilcqufitzerLi;cA"i353
`27
`Techs. v. Biackberr ,No. 133-0-4LPS, 20 6 WL 5661981, at *7)(D. Del. SQ)? 29,
`2016) (specific1mp ementation requiring “-twotable limitatlons”).
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`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K5x
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`anzmnxs-rs' REPLY 150
`MOTION mu SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`Case :18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed OZIOWZO Page 11 of 22 PagelD #144079
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`earlier motion spent several pages attempting to analogize those cues to the numeric
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`counter mentioned in the Court’s claim construction order and pointing to excerpts of
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`the prosecution history.
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`(ECF 317 at 17-21.)4 The Court rejected both arguments.
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`(ECF 468 at 50 (“BlackBerry’s reliance on portions of the intrinsic record in crafting
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`its arguments appears somewhat irrelevant, given that the bolding and blue dot in
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`Facebook Defendants’ example from the accused instrumentalities is different than
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`simply adding a numeric counter.”),) BlackBerry’s opposition here largely abandons
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`those points and relies on new arguments. And those arguments either lack any
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`evidentiary support in the record or rely on incorrect legal arguments.
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`Visual Notifications: With respect to the visual cues, BlackBerry argues that
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`they “were not intended to draw attention at the time the message is received.” (Opp.
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`at 1 1 (italics in original)_) But BlackBerry does not even argue that there is any delay
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`between the receipt of a new message and the presentation of these visual cues. The
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`parties are in full agreement that these visual cues appear simultaneously with receipt
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`of the incoming message.
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`(ECF 552-12, 116; ECF 552-1 1, 115; ECF 552-10, 116; ECF
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`540-18 Ex. 14, 161223-1622 (“Q. So at the time that the message comes in [] the
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`message chat is displayed with both the blue dot and with the blue coloring ofthe time
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`value- Correct? A. That’s correct.”).)
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`BlackBerry also makes much of the fact that Defendants’ internal documents
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`do not specifically refer to these visual cues as “notifications.” The way the visual
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`cues work is undisputed, and the Court has provided an express construction of
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`“notifications.” Whether those undisputed visual cues are described internally as
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`“notifications” is irrelevant to whether they meet the Court’s express definition.
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`BlackBerry next makes a new claim construction argumentithat the visual
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`cues provided by the accused products cannot be “notifications” because the claim
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`4 BlackBeny inaccurately states that it brou ht its motion for summary jud ment
`“after the close of fact discovery”_(0pp. at 1).
`lackBerry filed its motlon on Ju y 18,
`2019 (ECF 24?), approximately srx weeks before the close of fact discovery.
`DEFENDANTS‘ REPLY [SO
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`Case :18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed OZIOWZO Page 12 of 22 PagelD #144080
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`separately recites the ability to display a silenced message thread “in a different
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`manner” from a non-silenced thread.
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`(Opp. at 12-13.) But nothing in the Court’s
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`claim construction or the patent specification suggests that a visual notification cannot
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`be manifested as a change in the way a message thread appears in the inbox. The
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`“displayed..- in a different manner” limitation provides a way to visually distinguish
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`silenced from non-silenced threads. The visual cues provided by the accused
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`products, on the other hand, appear identically for both muted and non-muted threads.5
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`BlackBerry also argues that Dr. Rosenberg provided “credible testimony that a
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`POSITA would not consider minor visual differences such as bolded text and blue
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`dots to be notifications in light of the examples in the patent.” (Opp. at 13.) But these
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`are just legal arguments about the meaning of “notifications,” dressed up as expert
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`testimony. BlackBerry’s argument appears to be that the phrase in the Court’s
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`construction, “that would not otherwise have been noticed,” requires a cue that is more
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`shocking, jarring or otherwise more intrusive than what the accused products’ visual
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`cues provide. But the Court’s construction does not impose any such requirement.
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`The visual cues (c.g., blue dot, bolded text, etc.) clearly draw the user’s attention to
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`message conversations with new messages, and BlackBerry does not dispute that
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`without them, a user could not visually distinguish a conversation that has new
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`messages from one that does not. (ECF 552-7, 181 :16-182z9.)
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`Instagram Vibration Notifications: Even if the Court were to find factual
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`issues with respect to the visual cues, it must grant partial summary judgment with
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`respect to Instagmm BlackBerry’s opposition doubles down on the sole argument it
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`has, that the haptic vibration is not a “notification” because it occurs while the
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`5 BlackBerry also argues the inventor testified that the atent was intended to prevent
`what he callcd_“verbose” notifications.
`((gpp. at 13.)
`ut the Court has provlded an
`ex ress definltlon of “notifications” that
`r. Kalu admitted that he had never seen.
`( eefe Decl- Ex. 35, 16424-16524.) Mr. Kalu’s testimony is thus irrelevant to the
`meanin% of “notifications.” See Howmedica ()steonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech,
`Inc, 54 F.3d 133 1', 134? (Fed. Cir. 2008) F‘EIlnventor testimony as to the inventor’s
`subjective intent is irrelevant to the issue
`0 arm construction.” . DEFENDANTS‘ REPLY [SO
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`Case :18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed 02(07i20 Page 13 of 22 PagelD #144081
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`Instagram inbox is displayed on the screen.
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`BlackBerry’s argument should be rejected because, aside from having no
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`support in the claim language as explained in Defendants’ opening brief, it turns the
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`definition of “notification” into a subjective inquiry into whether or not a user would
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`be distracted by the particular visual or physical cue in question. For example,
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`BlackBeny argues that the purpose of the patent is to “prevent unwanted notifications
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`that would distract a user in situations where the user is not focused on the messaging
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`application,” and thus, “[a] haptic bump that is provided only when the application is
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`opened and navigated to the inbox would not provide such a distraction from other
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`tasks.” (Opp. at 13-14 (emphasis added).) In other words, a user who happens to be
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`staring at her lnstagram inbox is already focused on her messaging application, and
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`thus, a new message vibration does not provide a “distraction” from that task.
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`Putting aside that the concept of “distraction” is found nowhere in the Court’s
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`construction or the patent specification (which does not contain even one instance of
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`the word “distraction” or any variant of it), BlackBerry’s argument
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`is entirely
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`subjective—it would cause the definition of “notification” to turn on what a human
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`operator happens to be doing at the moment the vibration occurs.
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`If the inbox is
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`displayed but the user happens to be doing something else (or for some other reason
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`is not looking directly at her phone), then a new message vibration could certainly
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`provide “a distraction from other tasks.” (Id)
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`The Court should also reject BlackBerry’s argument because it would render
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`the claims indefinite under § 1 12. The Federal Circuit has made clear that claims are
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`indefinite when their scope turns on the subjective experience of a human operator.
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`See, c.g., IntervaI Licensing v. AOL, Inc, 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
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`Datamize, LLC‘ v. Plumtree Sofiware, Inc, 417 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
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`abrogated on other grounds Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 US. 898
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`(2014)- For example, the Federal Circuit in Interval Licensing held that the claim
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`phrase, “unobtrusive manner that does not distract a user,” was indefinite in a
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`Case :18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed OZIOWZO Page 14 onZ Page|D#:44082
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`claim directed at presenting information to a user through a computer display. The
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`Federal Circuit found the phrase “highly subjective” and cited with approval the
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`district court’s observation that “whether something distracts a user from his primary
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`interaction depends on the preferences of the particular user and the circumstances
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`under which any single user interacts with the display.” Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d
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`at 13711- The court found the phrase indefinite because it “offers no objective
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`indication of the manner in which content images are to be displayed to the user.” Id.
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`BlackBerry’s arguments about requiring “distraction” of the user urge the Court to
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`create § l 12 infirmities in the ’120 patent, by rendering the applicability of the term
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`“notification” dependent on how end users perceive the physical and visual cues
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`provided by the accused products.
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`In. U.S. Patent No. 8,209,634
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`A.
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`Summary Judgment of Non—Infringement Should Be Granted
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`BlackBerry’s opposition rests on the false premise that Defendants’ motion
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`relies on limiting “messaging correspondents” to “users.” (Opp. at 1?.)
`
`It does not.
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`The motion instead relies on the fact that BlackBerry cannot show that the accused
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`numeric character represents the number of “distinct senders” as required by the claim.
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`BlackBerry’s exposition of the claim construction process conspicuously
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`avoids the key point raised here—how is a conversation or chat itself a “distinct sender
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`of an electronic message”? As Defendants’ opening brief explained, messages within
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`a conversation or chat are sent by the individual participating users.
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`(Mot. at 22.)
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`BlackBerry does not argue that the chat or conversation itseffever sends messages.
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`BlackBerry argues that “newly received messages are sorted into separate line
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`items in the recipient’s inbox,” i.e., based on chats or conversations.
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`(Opp. at 18.)
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`But BlackBerry does not explain how the on-screen display of a chat or conversation
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`has an thin to do with how the messa es were sent—or b whom.
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`Case No. 2:18—cv—01844—GW—K8x
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`:18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed OZIOWZO Page 15 of 22 Page ID #:44083
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`
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`Finally, BlackBerry’s opposition attempts to obscure this issue by coining a
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`new phrase about sending a message “on behalfofa group conversation,” to somehow
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`suggest that a group conversation may be regarded as a distinct sender. (Opp. at 18.)
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`But BlackBerry does not dispute that
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`the individual participants of a group
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`conversation are the entities that actually send the messages. The fact that messages
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`may be associated with a group conversation does not make the group conversation
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`itself into the sender of those messages.
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`BlackBerry’s revisionism with respect to its statements to the PTAB should also
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`be rejected. BlackBerry said more than enough to confirm that its infringement theory
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`falls outside the scope of the claims. See Sqflran v. Johnson & Johnson, 712 F.3d
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`549, 559 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[A]pplicants rarely submit affirmative disclaimers along
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`the lines of ‘I hereby disclaim the following ...’ during prosecution and need not do so
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`to meet the applicable standard”). BlackBerry does not deny (a) that it expressly
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`argued to the PTAB that
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`the “1M sessions” in Canfield are not “messaging
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`correspondents,” and (b) that it cannot identify any material difference between the
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`1M sessions in Canfield and the chats and conversations in the accused products.
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`BlackBerry instead tries to recast its arguments to the PTAB as a response to
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`Defendants’ obviousness argument that there could be a one-to-one correspondence
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`between the number of 1M sessions in Canfield and the number of distinct senders
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`(i.e. for 1M sessions that only had two members).
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`(Opp. at 19-20.) But BlackBerry
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`made arguments about that issue in addition to its argument on pages 34-35 of its
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`Patent Owner Response that the IM sessions in Canfield were simply not “messaging
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`correspondents.”
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`(ECF 540-24, at 36-40.) Federal Circuit law is clear that “an
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`applicant’s argument that a prior art reference is distinguishable on a particular ground
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`Case :18-cv-01844-GW-KS Document 633 Filed 0207120 Page 16 of 22 PagelD #144084
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`can serve as a disclaimer of claim scope even if the applicant distinguishes the
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`reference on other grounds as well.” Safiran, 712 F.3d at 559 (citation omitted).
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`BlackBerry should be held to its clear statements that the “IM sessions” in Canfield—
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`which are indistinguishable from the accused conversations and chats—are not
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`“messaging correspondents.”
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`BlackBerry’s statements to the PTAB are relevant irrespective of whether they
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`rise to the level of disclaimer. See, e.g., Aptalis Pharmatech, Inc. v. Apotax Inc, 718
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`F. App’x 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (prosecution history relevant even in the absence
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`of disclaimer)- The fact that BlackBerry consistently distinguished “1M sessions”
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`from the participating “messaging correspondents” in that session further supports
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`Defendants’ argument.
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`B.
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`The Asserted Claims Are Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
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`Nothing in the patent specification suggests that counting and reporting the
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`number of messaging correspondents (i.e. distinct senders) is any less abstract than
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`simply counting the number of new or unread messages. The specificat

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