`Trials@uspto.gov
`Date: December 9, 2019
`571-272-7822
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2019-01137
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
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`Before WILLIAM V. SAINDON, BRIAN J. McNAMARA
`and NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`McNAMARA, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314, 37 C.F.R. § 42.4
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`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Charter Communications, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition, Paper 2
`(“Petition” or “Pet.”), to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–53 (the
`“challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907 B1 (“the ’7907 patent”).
`35 U.S.C. § 311. We have jurisdiction under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) and
`35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be
`instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there
`is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
`least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the
`arguments and the associated evidence presented in the Petition and the
`Preliminary Response, for the reasons described below, we decline to
`institute inter partes review.
`REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
`II.
`The Petition identifies the following real parties-in-interest: Charter
`Communications, Inc.; Charter Communications Holdings, LLC; Spectrum
`Management Holding Company, LLC; Charter Communications Operating,
`LLC; and Time Warner Cable, LLC. Pet. 77. Patent Owner identifies itself
`as the real party-in-interest. Paper 5.
`
`
` RELATED MATTERS
`III.
`Identification of Related Proceedings
`A.
`The Petition states that the ’7907 patent is asserted in the following
`litigation: (1) Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P. v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., Charter
`Commc’ns Holdings, LLC, Spectrum Management Holding Co., LLC,
`Charter Commc’ns Operating, LLC, and Time Warner Cable, LLC, Case
`No. 1:18-cv02033 (D. Del.); and (2) Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P. v. Cequel
`Commc’ns, LLC D/B/A Suddenlink Commc’ns, CSC Holding, LLC D/B/A
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`Optimum-Cablevision, and Altice USA, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-01919-UNA
`(D. Del.). Pet. 77.
`Petitioner identifies the following additional petitions filed against the
`’7907 patent: IPR2019-01135 and IPR2019-01139. Id. at 77–78.
`Petitioner identifies the following petitions filed against related U.S.
`patent 6,754,907 (“the ’4907 patent”): IPR2019-01136, IPR2019-01138,
`and IPR2019-01140. Id. at 78.
`IV. THE ’7907 PATENT
`The ’7907 patent concerns a video-on-demand (VOD) system that
`replaces a conventional, immobile, fixed bandwidth set-top box that does not
`include a display with a second communications system and display, such as
`a web browser running on a portable computer. See Ex. 1001, 1:17–55.
`Figure 1 shown below is a block diagram of a configuration an operating
`environment of such a system.
`
`Figure 1 of the ’7907 patent
`As shown in Figure 1, VOD system 100 includes (i) a processing
`system 103, (ii) first communications interface 101 to first communications
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`system 111, such as optical fiber or wire cable system that drives first
`display 121, e.g., a television, and (iii) second interface 102 such as the
`Internet (in particular, the World Wide Web, or the “web”), to second
`communications system 112 that uses less bandwidth than the first
`communications system and drives second display 122, e.g., a personal
`computer with a browser. Id. at 2:28–48. The VOD system may include a
`conventional computer platform with programmed software that directs
`processing system 103 to transfer a control screen signal to second
`communications system 112 for routing to second display 122 that displays
`the control screen. Id. at 2:51–60. The control screen may include subject
`matter, e.g., a video content menu, a preview selection, an order selection, or
`display characteristics, from which a user can make selections. Id. at 3:37–
`60. When a viewer makes a selection, a corresponding signal is returned by
`the second communications system to processor 103, which responds by
`implementing the selected function, e.g., fast forwarding the video
`transferred over communications system 111 to first display 121. See id. at
`4:61–5:8.
`Figure 6 shown below illustrates a web-based system configuration.
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`Figure 6 of the ’7907 patent
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`In the configuration of Figure 6, in response to log in by browser 622,
`system 100 returns a web page from which the user can make a selection,
`e.g., to preview a video. Id. at 5:47–57. System 100 returns the video
`preview in MPEG I format to browser 622 for display. Id. at 5:52–57. After
`the video display, browser 622 transfers menu selections to system 100 for
`television 621 to display selected video content using MPEG II. Id. at 5:58–
`60. System 100 then transfers the MPEG II video to the television 621 and a
`web page to browser 622. As television 621 displays selected video content
`browser 622 transfers menu selections to system 100 for browser 622 to
`display selected content in MPEG I. See id. at 6:4–22.
`ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
`V.
`The ’7907 patent includes three independent claims —claim 1 drawn
`to a video on demand system, claim 21 drawn to a method of operating a
`video on demand system, and claim 41 drawn to a processor-readable
`storage medium. Claim 1, reproduced below with Petitioner’s paragraph
`designations, is representative of the subject matter of the ’7907 patent:
`1[Preamble]. A video-on demand system comprising:
`1[A] a first communication interface configured to transfer
`first video signals to a first communication system using a
`first bandwidth;
`1[B] a second communication interface configured to transfer
`a control screen signal and second video signals to a
`second communication system using a second bandwidth
`that is less than the first bandwidth; and
`1[C] a processing system configured to transfer the control
`screen signal to the second communication interface,
`receive a viewer control signal
`from
`the second
`communication interface, and transfer the first video
`signals to the first communication interface if the first
`communication system is indicated by the viewer control
`Signal or transfer the second video signals to the second
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`communication interface if the second communication
`system is indicated by the viewer control signal.
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`VI. ART CITED IN PETITIONER’S CHALLENGES
`Petitioner cites the following references in its challenges to
`patentability:
`Reference
`U.S. Patent No.
`7,913,278
`European Patent No.
`EP 0 872 987 A2
`WO 92/22983
`U.S. Patent No.
`6,182,094
`
`
`Designation
`Ellis
`
`Yosuke
`Browne
`Humpleman
`
`Exhibit No.
`Ex. 1008
`
`Ex. 1006
`Ex. 1007
`Ex. 1009
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`VII. ASSERTED GROUNDS
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–53 would have been unpatentable on
`the following grounds:
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–53
`1–53
`1–53
`
`Basis
`35 U.S.C. §
`Ellis, Yosuke
`103
`Ellis, Yosuke, Browne
`103
`Ellis, Yosuke, Humpleman
`103
`VIII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`Petitioner defines a person of ordinary skill as having “held bachelor’s
`degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field with at
`least five years of experience or research in interactive systems applicable to
`digital television, including VOD for cable and Internet delivery.” Pet. 12–
`13 (citing Ex. 1002, Declaration of Dr. Kevin Almeroth (“Almeroth Dec.”)
`¶¶ 44–46. Patent Owner does not offer a definition of the level of ordinary
`skill, but reserves the right to dispute Petitioner’s assessment of the level of
`ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 22. Petitioner’s undisputed definition of the
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`level of ordinary skill appears to be commensurate with the subject matter
`for the ’7907 patent. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s
`description of the level of ordinary skill.
`IX. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The Petition has been accorded a filing date of June 3, 2019. For
`petitions filed on or after November 13, 2018, we interpret claims of an
`unexpired patent using the same standard applied by U.S. district courts, as
`announced in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
`banc). See, 83 Fed. Reg. 51340, 51345 (Oct. 11, 2018) (announcing
`amendment of 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b), and 42.300(b). Under this
`standard, words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
`meaning. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1312 (“the words of a claim
`are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning”) (citations and
`internal quote marks omitted). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a
`claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary
`skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313.
`Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the
`claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the
`disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
`specification. Id. Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth
`in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In
`re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner notes that certain terms were construed by the court in
`Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., LP, Case No.
`2:12-cv-859-JD, Dkt. 162 (Aug. 15, 2014, E.D. Pa.) (“Comcast Order”).
`Petitioner states that the parties agreed on the following claim constructions:
`(1) “control screen signal” should be construed as “a signal that defines a
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`control screen” and (2) “implementing a viewer control selection” should be
`construed as “in response to the video control signal, implementing a viewer
`control selection.” Pet. 16 (citing Comcast Order at 42.)
`Petitioner identifies additional terms construed by the court, stating
`the Petitioner supports the district court’s constructions. Pet. 13–16. Patent
`Owner proposes no constructions and states that it disagrees with the district
`court’s constructions because they “violate several Federal Circuit
`principles, including, at least, reading in a negative limitation to a non-
`limiting term in the preamble.” Prelim. Resp. 22–23, n. 5. Petitioner
`contends that we need not resolve disputed claim constructions “because the
`claims read on the prior art under either Sprint’s proposed construction or
`the Comcast court’s construction.” Pet. 13. We now turn to Petitioner’s
`assertions concerning the terms construed by the Comcast court.
`“A video-on demand system” (claim 1); “operating a video-on-
`A.
`demand system” (claims 1 and 41)
`Petitioner notes that the Comcast court declined to adopt Patent
`Owner’s proposed construction, i.e., plain and ordinary meaning or
`“operating a system that provides video-on-demand” and instead construed
`“a video-on demand system” (claim 1) and “operating a video-on-demand
`system to mean “operating a video-on- demand system without the use of a
`set top box for remote control of the video-on-demand system.” Pet. 14.
`Petitioner points out the court’s finding that the ’7907 patent disparages the
`use of a set-top box for remote control and disclaims systems that include a
`set top box for that purpose. Id. Petitioner contends that the outcome of this
`proceeding is not affected by the court’s construction because the cited prior
`art does not use a set-top box for remote control. Id. at 14. Neither the
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`parties nor the court’s construction addresses what constitutes “video-on-
`demand.”
`As a general rule, preamble language is not treated as limiting. Allen
`Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`Nonetheless, the preamble may be construed as limiting “if it recites
`essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and
`vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-
`Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). A preamble is not
`regarded as limiting “when the claim body describes a structurally complete
`invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the
`structure or steps of the claimed invention.” Catalina, 289 F.3d at 809. The
`preamble has no separate limiting effect if, for example, “the preamble
`merely gives a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the
`claim that completely set forth the invention.” IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas
`Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The question
`whether we should “treat a preamble as a limitation is a determination
`‘resolved only on review of the entire . . . patent to gain an understanding of
`what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the
`claim.’” Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808 (quoting Corning Glass, 868 F.2d
`at 1257).
`As discussed below, in this case, the preamble is not merely a
`“descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim”—
`knowing that the claims are directed to a “video-on-demand” service
`breathes “life [and] meaning” into the claims, because it shows that the
`video control signal is a particular type of signal used to provide the video-
`on-demand services. IMS Tech., 206 F.3d at 1434; Catalina, 289 F.3d at
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`808. That is, the claims are not “structurally complete” without
`understanding that the control signal is a control signal of a video-on-
`demand service. Id. at 809.
`The ’7907 patent states that “the video-on demand system offers an
`individual viewer various selections from a video content library for viewing
`on demand.” Ex. 1001, 1:24–27. The ’7907 patent explains “[t]he video-
`on-demand system receives a request for the viewer to view a particular
`selection from the video content library” and “[i]n response to the request
`the video-on-demand system transfers the selected video content over a
`communication system to the viewer display.” Id. at 1:30–34. Recognizing
`set top box implementations of video-on-demand systems are not mobile and
`do not have a video display, the ’7907 patent “solves the above problems
`with a video-on-demand system that uses a second communication system
`and display” by transferring a control screen signal to the second
`communication system, and receiving a viewer control signal from the
`second communication system. See, id. at 1:45–57.
`Having reviewed the claims and the specification of the ’7907 patent,
`we determine that the phrase “video-on-demand” in the preamble is
`necessary to give life and meaning to the claim. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v.
`Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[I]f the claim
`preamble is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim, then
`the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the claim.”).
`The difference between watching television and watching a video on
`demand is a difference in kind, rendering a video-on-demand system
`different from a non-video-on-demand system. While a person watching
`television can change channels and thus in some sense selects video content,
`such video content is being distributed regardless of whether the user selects
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`it. Video-on-demand, by contrast, only is distributed when the user
`specifically selects it.1 Because of that nature, the user also has control over
`the playback of the video content, such as pausing and stopping. Although
`the dependent claims more clearly demonstrate the on-demand nature of the
`video content (e.g., with the menu and control buttons), only the preamble in
`the independent claims provides the clue as to this context.2 Thus, the
`preamble serves to provide the framework necessary to understand the body
`of the claims, and is limiting.
`“Viewer control signal”
`B.
`Petitioner notes that the court declined to adopt Patent Owner’s
`proposed construction, i.e., plain and ordinary meaning or “a signal
`reflecting viewer control” and instead construed “viewer control signal” to
`mean “a viewer control signal generated and processed without the
`involvement of a set-top box for remote control of the video-on-demand
`system.” Pet. 15. Petitioner notes that the Comcast court found the ’7907
`patent does not dispute the use of a set-top box for purposes other than
`remote control, e.g. for the purpose of decoding a video signal and
`presenting it to a television. Id. at 15, n. 3. Neither the parties nor the
`district court addresses the meaning of “viewer control signal.”
`Referring to Figure 1, the Specification states “[i]n response to viewer
`input to the control screen, the second display 122 transfers a corresponding
`
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`1 See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:17–33 (instructing that, with video-on-demand, the
`system receives a request to view a selection from the video content library,
`the video is played “[i]n response to the [user’s] request,” and the user is
`allowed “to immediately view the selected video content”).
`2 This is broadly recited in claim 12 to encompass the controls relevant to
`video-on-demand, e.g., play, pause, stop, etc. Limiting claim 1 to a video-
`on-demand system provides meaningful context.
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`viewer control signal to the second communication system 112,” the second
`communication system 112 transfers the viewer control signal to the second
`communications interface,” and “[t]he second communication interface
`transfers the [viewer] control signal to the processing system 130.” Ex.
`1001, 2:61–67. Thus, we understand the viewer control signal to be a signal
`generated in response to user input.
`“transfer . . .the [first/second] video signal” (claim 1) /
`C.
`“transferring [first/second] video signals” (claims 21, 41
`Petitioner notes that the court declined to adopt Patent Owner’s
`proposed construction, i.e., plain and ordinary meaning or “sending
`[first/second] video signal” and instead construed “transfer . . .the
`[first/second] video signal” (claim 1) / “transferring [first/second] video
`signals” to mean “in response to the viewer control signal transferring
`[first/second] video signals.” Pet. 15–16. Petitioner points out that the court
`found no disagreement as to what it means to transfer a video signal, but in
`view of the description in the ’7907 patent, found that the video signals are
`transferred in response to the viewer control signal received from the
`computer. Id. at 16. Claim 1 explicitly recites the processing system
`transfers the video signals to the first communication interface if the first
`system is indicated by the viewer control signal or the second
`communication interface if the second communication system is indicated
`by the viewer control signal, we do not perceive a need to construe this term.
`D. Control screen signal
`Petitioner proposes that “control screen signal” should be construed as
`“a signal that defines a control screen.” Pet. 16. The independent claims
`have separate steps for transferring the control screen and video content
`signals. Likewise, the ’7907 patent’s specification is replete with instances
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`describing the control screen as something other than video content. See,
`e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:37–53 (noting the distinction drawn between the control
`screen and the menu it provides to allow the viewer to watch video content);
`id. at 1:26–28 (describing various video content types), id., 1:64–2:3 (noting
`that the “video-on-demand system implements a viewer control selection
`indicated by the video control signal”) (emphasis added). As another
`example, the ’7907 patent describes the control screen as a webpage
`displaying a menu. Ex. 1001, 1:64, 2:60.
`Reviewing the claims and specification, we determine that a “control
`screen signal” provides the user with controls that allow the user to control
`video content (e.g., by choosing which content to play or to control the
`playback of the content), whereas the “video content signals” are the actual
`media (movies, television shows, etc.) that are viewed by the user and
`controlled by the control signals.3
`X. ANALYSIS
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`
`
`3 This construction is consistent with and informed by our construction of
`“video-on-demand” above.
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`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`Claim 1 As Obvious Over Ellis and Yosuke
`A.
`Ellis – Ex. 1008
`1.
`Ellis is directed to a remote interactive television program guide. Ex.
`1008, 1:19–21. Television program guides allow a user to view a list of
`television programming, instead of having to consult printed program
`guides. Id. at 1:23–36. In Ellis, the program guide is available on the
`television as well as from a remote location. Id. at 2:19–28, 32–46. Ellis
`discloses a remote access interactive television program guide implemented
`on a remote program guide access device. Ex. 1009, Abstract, 2:39–41.
`Through a remote access link users remotely access any interactive
`television program guide function or setting on the interactive television
`program guide equipment. Id. at 2:38–41, 48–49.
`Figure 2b of Ellis, reproduced below, shows an illustrative
`arrangement for the interactive television program guide equipment and
`remote program access device:
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`Figure 2b of Ellis shows that both the user television equipment 22
`and remote program guide access device 24 receive the program guide from
`interactive television distribution facility 16. Program guide distribution
`equipment 21 distributes the program guide data. Id. at 5:1–12. The
`program guide data is sent to user television equipment 22 over
`communication path 20, i.e., television channels. Id. at 5:9–12. The
`program guide data is sent to remote program guide access device 24 over
`remote access link 19 via communication device 27. Id. at 6:37–47.
`Remote program guide access device 24 connects via remote access link to
`communications device 27 of television distribution facilities 16. Id. at Fig.
`2b.
`
`Remote program guide access device 24 allows the user to interact
`with the television program guide, as well as “to access various functions of
`the interactive program guide (e.g., reminder information, parental control
`settings, favorite channel settings, user profiles, etc.).” Id. at 5:37–39
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`(describing the interactive guide), 5:55–57 (describing the other functions);
`see also id. at 12:4–55 (describing an embodiment where remote device 24
`is a PC). The user of remote program guide access device 24 may also be
`able to order pay-per-view programs, remotely view video and audio that is
`being distributed to the local television program guide or that has been
`stored on user television equipment 22, control television equipment 22
`remotely. Id. at 18:59–19:19, 20:10–16.
`Yosuke
`2.
`Yosuke discloses a system in which a client uses a browser to access
`an HTML document that includes a control code for controlling a VOD
`server. Ex. 1006, Abstract. Yosuke’s method
`comprises the steps of receiving a demand for providing
`information from a client through a network, using the world
`wide web as a system for providing a link to information on the
`Internet, and sending information to the client through a
`transmission line different from the network in response to the
`received demand for providing information from the client.
`Id. at 2:18–25. Figure 1 of Yosuke, shown below, is a block diagram of
`Yosuke’s VOD system. Id. at 2:43–45.
`
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`Figure 1 of Yosuke – Block Diagram of VOD System
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`VOD server 11 in Figure 1 of Yosuke stores information (audio and video
`data, referred to as AV data) to be provided to clients over a plurality of
`channels in response to instructions. Id. at 3: 23–29. Server controller 22 in
`server computer 12 controls VOD server 11 by sending commands through
`serial transmission line 17, e.g., an RS232C interface. Id. at 4:7–9. Server
`computer 12 and client computer 13 are connected through a network, such
`as the Internet. Id. at 3:46–48. Client computer 13 includes parallel
`input/output (PIO) controller 26 and browser 27 for accessing a WWW
`server on the Internet. Id. at 4:38–40. PIO controller 26 controls switcher
`15 at commands from WWW server 21. Id. at 4:47–49. File disk 24 stores
`HTML documents with control codes for implementing a user interface via
`WWW browser 27. When a control code for controlling VOD server 11 is
`included in an HTML document distributed via network 18 from WWW
`server 21, WWW browser 27 sends to WWW server 21 a request via
`network 18 for controlling VOD server 11. Id. at 4:55–5:2. WWW server
`21 sends the control request to server interface 23; server 23 provides an
`instruction to server controller 22 for executing the control request; server
`controller 22 sends a command to VOD server 11 through serial
`transmission line 17. Id. at 5:2–8.
`Analysis
`3.
`Petitioner asserts the “remote program guide access device in Ellis
`does not have a single use, but instead displays video-on-demand on the
`remote program guide access device and/or on the television, as well as
`controls other devices (‘personal computer’ or ‘multiple installations of user
`television equipment 22 within the home connected via an in-home
`network’).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1008, 8:51–9:7).
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`1[Preamble] A video-on demand system
`a)
`comprising
`As discussed above, we consider the preamble to give life and
`meaning to the claims of the ’7907 patent and therefore to limit the claims to
`a video-on-demand (VOD) system. As to the preamble, Petitioner contends
`that Ellis discloses a VOD system because the user may select to play a
`program in real time via the local and remote guides, or to play a stored
`program. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1008, 25:67–26:2). Petitioner further states that
`Ellis is a VOD under the Comcast court’s construction because some
`embodiments of Ellis do not require a set-top box. Id. at 26–27. Petitioner
`further argues that Ellis discloses VOD under Patent Owner’s construction
`because Ellis discloses operating a system that provides video-on-demand.
`Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1008, 2:47–60, 4:40–53, 25:4–18). Petitioner’s citations
`to Ellis refer specifically to pay-per-view programming. Ex. 1008, 4:40–53,
`25:4–18.
`There is no indication in the record before us that Ellis provides
`anything other than standard television. The program guide merely displays
`what content is going to be displayed at a given time. See Ex. 1008, 1:23–
`36. There is no indication in the record before us that the content in Ellis is
`able to be played on demand, i.e. at the time of the user chooses, and
`controlled by the user while that content is played. Thus, we do not find
`Ellis to disclose the claimed control screen signal. We acknowledge that
`Ellis allows ordering of pay-per-view programs (id. at 18:26–41) or playing
`of stored programs (id. at 25:63–26:14), but we have no evidence that
`suggests pay-per-view content has playback control, and we do not have
`evidence that playing locally recorded or stored video would have been
`understood to be video-on-demand. Reviewing the Petition, we determine
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`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`that the Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how Ellis describes the
`video-on-demand system recited in the preamble.
`As Petitioner cites Yosuke as disclosing a VOD system that provides
`video signals in response to instructions from clients made on a touch panel
`through a plurality of channels without using a set-top box for remote
`control (Pet. 27–28), we consider the teachings of Yosuke.
`1[A] a first communication interface configured to
`b)
`transfer first video signals to a first communication
`system using a first bandwidth
`As to claim element 1[A] Petitioner cites Ellis’s program guide
`distribution equipment 21 as the claimed “first communication interface”
`because it receives video signals from source main facility 12 and transfers
`those video signals to user television equipment 22 over communication
`path 20, i.e., the claimed “first communication system.” Pet. 28–29.
`Petitioner also notes that in Ellis, video television signals (the “video
`signals”) are sent to display device 45 in response to a user instructed viewer
`control signal. Id. at 30. Petitioner further notes that Yosuke discloses, in
`response to client instructions, a VOD server can transmit video signals over
`first transmission line 19 (the claimed first communications system) or
`second transmission line 18 (the claimed second communications system)
`using a high bandwidth transmission medium (the first bandwidth). Id. at
`30–31 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:26–38, 12:34–42, Fig. 1).
`1[B] a second communication interface configured
`c)
`to transfer a control screen signal and second video
`signals to a second communication system using a
`second bandwidth that is less than the first bandwidth
`As to claim element 1[B], Petitioner contends the Ellis discloses a
`control screen signal in the form of program guide information displayed on
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`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`a display screen to a user, e.g., remotely on a monitor, LCD, or other display
`device. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1008, 14:3–12, 20:67–21:3). Identifying the
`claimed “second communication interface” as including program guide
`distribution equipment 21 and communications device 27 collectively,
`Petitioner argues that Ellis’s program guide information and indicated
`program guide functions (the claimed “control screen signal”) is transferred
`via remote link 19, which Petitioner identifies as the claimed “second
`communication system,” to remote access device 24. The first and second
`communication interfaces, as annotated in the Petition, are shown side by
`side below.
`
`
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`
`
`Petitioner’s annotation of
`component in Ellis Fig. 2b
`corresponding to claimed first
`communication interface.
`
`Petitioner’s annotation of
`components 21, 27 in Ellis Fig.
`2b corresponding to claimed
`second communication interface.
`
`
`
`Pet. 29, 32. As shown on the left side of the illustration above, as to Ellis,
`Petitioner identifies the claimed first communications interface as program
`guide distribution equipment 21 sending video signals over communication
`system 20 to user television equipment 22; as shown on the right side of the
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`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`illustration above, Petitioner identifies the claimed second communication
`interface as program guide equipment 21 and communications device 27,
`collectively, sending signals over second communication system 19 to
`remote program access device 24.
`Patent Owner contends that Ellis does not disclose a control screen
`signal, as that term has been construed by agreement of the parties in the
`Comcast case, because Petitioner cites no evidence that Ellis describes any
`“signal that defines a control screen” being transferred to the alleged second
`communication system via the alleged second communication interface.
`Prelim. Resp. 35. Patent Owner argues that program guide data is
`information about t