UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_____________________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_____________________________________________
`
`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P.,
`
`Patent Owner
`
`_____________________________________________
`
`Case IPR2019-01139
`Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`______________________________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Introduction ....................................................................................................11
`
`Relevant Factual Background ........................................................................33
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The ’7907 Patent .................................................................................33
`
`The ’7907 Claims ................................................................................55
`
`III. The Asserted Grounds ...................................................................................66
`
`A. Humpleman .........................................................................................77
`
`B. Yosuke .............................................................................................1212
`
`C.
`
`Ellis ..................................................................................................1414
`
`IV. Level of Ordinary Skill ..............................................................................1616
`
`V.
`
`Claim Construction ....................................................................................1616
`
`VI. Petitioner Fails to Show a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing on Any
`Claim ..........................................................................................................1717
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standard .................................................................................1717
`
`B. Humpleman Does Not Anticipate the Challenged Claims
`(Ground 1) .......................................................................................1919
`
`
`
`Humpleman does not teach transferring a control screen signal
`as Element [B] requires. ........................................................2020
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`c)
`
`Under Petitioner’s primary mapping, Element [B] is not
`satisfied. ......................................................................2020
`
`Petitioner’s mapping assumes an incorrect location of the
`alleged processing system, and Humpleman—read
`correctly—does not anticipate the ’7907 claims. .......2222
`
`Element [B] is not satisfied under Petitioner’s alternative
`mapping either. ...........................................................2525
`
`
`
`ii
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Humpleman does not teach “a processing system configured to
`. . . receive a viewer control signal from the second
`communication interface,” as Element [C] requires. ............2727
`
`Humpleman’s session manager cannot transfer video signals to
`a first or second communication interface based on indications
`in a viewer control signal and therefore does not satisfy
`Element [C]. ..........................................................................2828
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`c)
`
`Humpleman does not disclose that the alleged processing
`system transfers video signals as disclosed in Element
`[C]. ..............................................................................2929
`
`Humpleman does not disclose that video signals are
`transferred to the alleged first or second communication
`interfaces. ....................................................................3030
`
`Under Petitioner’s alternative mapping, Humpleman still
`fails to disclose Element [C] for the same reasons. ....3232
`
`
`
`Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it
`would prevail on Ground 1 for any claim. ............................3333
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`The Challenged Claims Would Not Have Been Obvious over
`Humpleman and Yosuke (Ground 2). .............................................3333
`
`The Challenged Claims Would Not Have Been Obvious over
`Humpleman and Ellis (Ground 3) ...................................................3434
`
`VII. The Board Should Exercise Discretion to Deny Institution on Multiple
`Parallel Proceedings...................................................................................3535
`
`VIII. Conclusion .................................................................................................3636
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd.,
`829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 18
`
`In re Nuvasive,
`841 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 18
`
`In re Robertson,
`169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ............................................................................ 27
`
`Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 18
`
`Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 18
`
`Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.,
`520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 18
`
`PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`848 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 18
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 16
`
`Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
`655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 18
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a) ................................................................................................... 18
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ................................................................................................... 18
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) .............................................................................................. 16
`
`
`
`iv
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`US. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... 18
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... 18
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) ............................................................................................... 18
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) ............................................................................................... 18
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`Petitioner Charter Communications, Inc. fails to demonstrate a reasonable
`
`likelihood of prevailing on any ground asserted against any challenged claim in its
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907 (the “’7907 patent”).
`
`Accordingly, Patent Owner Sprint Communications Company L.P. respectfully
`
`requests that the Board deny institution of the Petition.
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success on any of its three
`
`asserted grounds of unpatentability. Each ground relies on the Humpleman reference
`
`alone or in combination with one other reference: anticipation based on Humpleman
`
`(Ground 1), obviousness based on Humpleman and Yosuke (Ground 2), and
`
`obviousness based on Humpleman and Ellis (Ground 3). Petitioner advanced the
`
`same grounds and substantially the same arguments in IPR2019-01140, which
`
`challenged U.S. Patent No. 6,754,907. The Board recently denied institution of that
`
`Petition. (IPR2019-01140 at Paper 9). This Petition should be denied for the same
`
`reasons.
`
`Petitioner cannot show that Humpleman anticipates the claims of the ’7907
`
`patent. First, Petitioner contends that Humpleman discloses a control signal received
`
`by a second communication interface from a second communication system, but the
`
`claims require “a second communication interface configured to transfer . . . a
`
`control screen signal to the second communication system.” Second, Humpleman
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`
`
`1
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`does not teach a processing system configured to . . . receive a viewer control signal
`
`from the second communication interface” as Element [C] requires. Any viewer
`
`control signals in Humpleman are generated by user inputs to the session manager
`
`itself (the alleged processing system) and are not transferred anywhere. Third,
`
`Humpleman does not disclose that the alleged processing system transfers video
`
`signals to the alleged communication interfaces as further required by Element [C].
`
`For each of these three independent reasons, Humpleman does not anticipate the
`
`claims of the ’7907 patent.
`
`Petitioner attempts to combine Humpleman with two other prior art
`
`references. In Ground 2, Petitioner combines Humpleman with Yosuke for issues
`
`relevant to the preamble of independent claims 1, 21, and 41, the bandwidth
`
`limitations of those claims, and certain dependent claims. But Petitioner relies only
`
`on Humpleman for the limitations discussed above. Therefore Yosuke does not cure
`
`Humpleman’s fatal deficiencies. In Ground 3, Petitioner combines Humpleman with
`
`Ellis, but only for issues relevant to the preamble of independent claims 1, 21, and
`
`41 and certain dependent claims. Petitioner explicitly relies on Humpleman for all
`
`independent claim elements, and Ellis cannot cure Humpleman’s fatal deficiencies.
`
`Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show any likelihood of prevailing on Grounds 2 and
`
`3 for at least the same reasons as Ground 1.
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`
`II. Relevant Factual Background
`
`A. The ’7907 Patent
`
`The ’7907 patent generally relates to a video-on-demand system. (EX1001,
`
`1:19-21.) In an embodiment, the video-on-demand system includes a first
`
`communication interface 101 and a second communication interface 102 each
`
`communicating with processing system 103 of video-on-demand system 100:
`
`(EX1001, FIG. 1; see also id. 2:31-34)
`
`
`
`Additionally, the first communication interface is coupled to a first
`
`communication system, such as a cable video distribution system, which, in turn, is
`
`coupled to a first display, such as a television:
`
`
`
`3
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`(EX1001, FIG. 6; see also id. 2:34-36; 2:42-47)
`
`
`
`The second communication interface is coupled to a second communication
`
`system, such as the Internet, which, in turn, is coupled to a second display, such as
`
`a computer with a browser. (EX1001, FIG. 1, 2:37-38, 2:44-48.) The second
`
`communication system uses a bandwidth that is less than the bandwidth the first
`
`communication system uses for the transmission of video. (EX1001, 2:37-40.)
`
`The processing system generates and transfers a control screen signal to the
`
`second communication interface. (EX1001, 2:52-54.) The second communication
`
`interface transfers the control screen signal to the second communication system and
`
`to the second display, which displays the control screen to the viewer. (EX1001,
`
`
`
`4
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`2:54-59.) The control screen could be, for example, “a web page that includes a video
`
`display control menu comprising play, stop, pause, rewind, and fast forward” or it
`
`“could include a video content selection menu.” (EX1001, 1:64-2:2.) The viewer of
`
`the second display chooses a selection from the control screen, such as ordering
`
`specific video content. (EX1001, 4:20-23.)
`
`The display transfers the corresponding viewer control signal (which indicates
`
`either the first or second communication system) to the second communication
`
`system, the second communication interface, and the processing system. (EX1001,
`
`4:20-28.) The processing system then transfers the selected video content as video
`
`signals to communication interface indicated by the viewer control signal. (EX1001,
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`4:38-52.)
`
`B.
`
`The ’7907 Claims
`
`The ’7907 patent has fifty-three claims. Claims 1, 21, and 41 of the ’7907
`
`patent are independent. Petitioner devotes the Petition to an analysis of Claim 1,
`
`maintaining that Claims 21 and 41 are “very similar” to Claim 1 and are unpatentable
`
`for the “same reasons” as Claim 1. (Pet., 54-55, 68, 83.) Claim 1 recites:
`
`1. A video-on demand system comprising:
`
`[A] a first communication interface configured to transfer
`
`first video signals to a first communication system
`
`using a first bandwidth;
`
`
`
`5
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`
`[B] a second communication interface configured to
`
`transfer a control screen signal and second video
`
`signals to a second communication system using a
`
`second bandwidth
`
`that
`
`is
`
`less
`
`than
`
`the first
`
`bandwidth; and
`
`[C] a processing system configured to transfer the control
`
`screen signal to the second communication interface,
`
`receive a viewer control signal from the second
`
`communication interface, and transfer the first video
`
`signals to the first communication interface if the first
`
`communication system is indicated by the viewer
`
`control signal or transfer the second video signals to
`
`the second communication interface if the second
`
`communication system is indicated by the viewer
`
`control signal.
`
`(EX1001, 6:42-58.)
`
`III. The Asserted Grounds
`
`As shown below, Petitioner advances three grounds of challenge based on
`
`four references in various combinations:
`
`Ground Claims Basis References
`
`1
`
`1-53
`
`§102 Humpleman1
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 6,182,094 (EX1009).
`
`
`
`6
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`
`2
`
`3
`
`1-53
`
`§103 Humpleman and Yosuke2
`
`1-53
`
`§103 Humpleman and Ellis3
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`Set forth below are summaries of the relevant teachings from each of these
`
`references.
`
`A. Humpleman
`
`Humpleman is directed to a method and system for generating a program
`
`guide for a home network and controlling a plurality of devices physically connected
`
`to that network. (EX1009, 2:20-28, 5:27-38.) The system may include several home
`
`devices, namely DTV 102, DVD 108, DVCR 110, DSS-NIU 104, and security
`
`system 120, connected to the home network via 1394 serial bus 114 or a wireless
`
`bus:
`
`
`2 European Patent Application EP 0 872 987 A2 (EX1006).
`
`3 U.S. Patent No. 7,913,278 (EX1008).
`
`
`
`7
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`
`
`
`
`
`(EX1009, FIG. 1; see also id., 5:29-38, 6:31-34)
`
`“A client server relationship exists among the attached devices [] [w]ith the
`
`DTV 102 typically behaving as the client and home devices DVCR 110, DVD 108,
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`DSS-NIU 104 and security system 120 behaving as servers.” (EX1009, 6:34-37.)
`
`Any home device with a display screen, such as DTV 102, can serve as a session
`
`server. (EX1009, 18:45-48, 5:55-62.) A session server is a device that contains a
`
`session manager, a screen, its own HTML files, i.e. graphical user interfaces, and a
`
`
`
`8
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`browser. (EX1009, 18:48-51.) The session manager acts as the primary interface
`
`between the user and the home network, assisting the user in interacting with the
`
`network and controlling the home devices connected to the network:
`
`(EX1009, FIG. 9; see also id. 9:22-26)
`
`
`
`Each home device includes one or more HTML files, i.e. graphical user
`
`interfaces, defining its control and command functions, which it sends to DTV 102.
`
`(EX1009, 6:38-55.) “The browser based DTV 102 . . . graphically displays the
`
`respective control and command information on its viewable display.” (EX1009,
`
`6:43-47.) In particular, upon receiving a home device’s HTML file, DTV’s session
`
`manager generates and displays a session page to the user. (EX1009, 18:52-56.)
`
`
`
`9
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`By selecting an icon on the display, DTV is prompted to send a command to
`
`a home device to perform the requested function and in this way the user can control
`
`a home device from DTV’s display:
`
`(EX1009, FIG. 3A; see also id., 7:18-23)
`
`
`
`For example, when a user selects “Dad’s TV” and “Jim’s DVD” device
`
`buttons, DTV 102’s session manager displays the graphical user interface, i.e.
`
`HTML file, transmitted from each of Dad’s TV and Jim’s DVD:
`
`
`
`10
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`
`(EX1009, FIG. 11)
`
`
`
`When the user presses the play button for Jim’s DVD, the session manager
`
`sends a command over the 1394 serial bus to DVCR, and in particular DVCR’s
`
`control application, which, in turn, causes the DVCR hardware to play the video
`
`signal on a particular isochronous stream. (EX1009, 20:16-19, 19:35-38.) The
`
`session manager also commands DTV 752 to “display the information that is being
`
`broadcast on the particular stream over the home network.” (EX1009, 14:30-33.)
`
`“[T]he control application is a device-specific packet of Java code that
`
`
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`11
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`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`communicates with the hardware of the respective home device, thereby controlling
`
`that home device.” (EX1009, 19:41-44.)
`
`Humpleman further discloses that optionally, Internet Proxy 1104 “is used to
`
`provide an interface between the home network 1100 and the Internet 1102” and that
`
`this allows a user to remotely control home devices via a device external to the home.
`
`(EX1009, 20:42-51.) For example, Humpleman discloses directing a DVCR to
`
`record particular television programming using the interface provided by the Internet
`
`Proxy. (EX1009, 20:46-51).
`
`B. Yosuke
`
` Yosuke is directed to a video-on-demand (“VOD”) system that allows a user
`
`to control, through the Internet, a video-on-demand server’s transmission of
`
`information to the user’s television over a standard cable television network.
`
`(EX1006, 2:9-17, 11:48-53, 12:34-42.) As a result, dedicated software for
`
`controlling a VOD server through the user’s television is not necessary. (EX1006,
`
`11:46-48.) In fact, Yosuke teaches that there is no need for a means of
`
`communication between a user’s television and a VOD server. (EX1006, 11:48-55.)
`
`The VOD system includes VOD server 11 for storing video-on-demand
`
`content and server computer 12 for controlling VOD server 11. (EX1006, 3:26-30.)
`
`The system also includes a client computer 13 connected to server computer 12 via
`
`
`
`12
`
`

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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`network 18, such as the Internet, and switcher 15/display 16 connected to VOD
`
`server 11 through separate network 19, such as a standard cable television network:
`
`
`
`(EX1006, FIG. 1; see also id. 3:30-56, 12:36-39)
`
`Client computer 13 sends server computer 12 a request over the Internet to
`
`play, for example, a video clip. (EX1006, 8:28-8:55.) In response, server computer
`
`12 sends a command to VOD server 11 to play the clip on a specific output channel
`
`of standard cable television network 19; Yosuke teaches that these clips are not sent
`
`over network 18 (the Internet) to client computer 13. (EX1006, Abstract, 2:9-17,
`
`8:55-9:1, 12:34-42.) Because a user can use Internet communications to control the
`
`transmission of information between a VOD server and user’s television over a
`
`standard television cable network, a communication means between a user’s
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`television and the VOD server, including the use of dedicated software, is no longer
`
`necessary. (EX1006, 11:41-55.)
`
`C. Ellis
`
`Ellis is directed to an interactive television program guide with remote access.
`
`Main facility 12 transmits program guide data, such as “program times, channels,
`
`titles, and descriptions,” from program guide data source 14, to interactive television
`
`program guide equipment 17 over communications link 18:
`
`(EX1008, FIG. 1; see also id., 4:40-47, 4:30-33)
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`In an embodiment illustrated by FIG. 2d, interactive television program guide
`
`equipment 17 is connected to remote program access device 24 via remote access
`
`link 19 to provide a user with remote access to program guide functions:
`
`(EX1008, FIG. 2d; see also id., Abstract)
`
`
`
`Interactive television program guide equipment 17 includes television
`
`distribution facility 16, such as a cable system headend. (EX1008, 4:57-65.)
`
`Program guide distribution equipment 21 (which includes program guide server
`
`25) and communications device 27 are located within television distribution
`
`facility 16. (EX1008, 4:57-62.)
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`
`IV. Level of Ordinary Skill
`
`Petitioner provides a definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`(“POSITA”). (Pet., 13.) While Patent Owner reserves the right to dispute Petitioner’s
`
`definition if trial is instituted, Petitioner’s arguments fail even under its proposed
`
`definition of a POSITA.
`
`V. Claim Construction
`
`For inter partes review, the claim terms should be given the ordinary meaning
`
`the terms would have to a POSITA in view of the specification and file history on
`
`the effective filing date. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), as amended by 83 Fed. Reg.
`
`51340, 51358 (Oct. 11, 2018); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-1313
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). For purposes of the arguments in this paper, Patent Owner
`
`does not propose any claim constructions. Omission of any construction for any term
`
`is not acquiescence to any construction positions expressly or impliedly advanced in
`
`the Petition, and Patent Owner reserves the right to advance constructions and
`
`supporting arguments in future papers. 4
`
`
`4 While the art fails under all proposed constructions, Sprint disputes the claim
`
`constructions the district court adopted in the Comcast Cable Communications, LLC
`
`v. Sprint Communications Company, L.P. litigation (Case No. 2:12cv859, Doc. 162
`
`(Aug. 15, 2014)). Those constructions violate several Federal Circuit principles,
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`
`VI. Petitioner Fails to Show a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing on Any
`Claim
`
`A. Legal Standard
`
`The Board may not institute inter partes review unless it determines “there is
`
`a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of
`
`the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
`
`To show anticipation, Petitioner must prove that a single prior art reference
`
`“not only disclose[s] all elements of the claim within the four corners of the
`
`document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net
`
`MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting
`
`Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
`
`To prevail on the asserted obviousness grounds, Petitioner must prove that the
`
`cited references disclose all the limitations of the claims and “that a relevant skilled
`
`artisan would have had a motivation to combine [them] to produce the claimed . . .
`
`inventions with a reasonable expectation of success.” PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v.
`
`Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner bears the burden of
`
`proving unpatentability and must “articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence
`
`of record,” to do so; “mere conclusory statements” will not suffice. In re Magnum
`
`
`including, at least, reading in a negative limitation to a non-limiting term in the
`
`preamble.
`
`
`
`17
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`

`

`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
`
`Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Nor may Petitioner
`
`“simply retrace[] the path of the inventor with hindsight, discount[] the number and
`
`complexity of the alternatives, and conclude[] that the invention . . . was obvious.”
`
`Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2008). Rather, Petitioner must meet its burden “without any hint of hindsight.” Star
`
`Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere
`
`to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence
`
`that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc.
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`v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35
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`U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). In addition, petitioners must identify “where each element of
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`the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). A petition that fails to identify required information should
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`not be considered, see 35 U.S.C. § 312(a), and, even if it is, such a petition cannot
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`succeed because the petitioner cannot later identify new evidence or structures as
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`claim elements. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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`(“[P]etitioners [have an obligation] to make their case in their petition to institute.”);
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`see also In re Nuvasive, 841 F.3d 966, 972-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that
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`Patent Owner lacked opportunity to respond when Petitioner identified structure for
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`the first time in its Reply).
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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`
`B. Humpleman Does Not Anticipate the Challenged Claims (Ground
`1)
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`Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on
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`Ground 1—anticipation based on Humpleman. Petitioner’s mapping of Humpleman
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`is fundamentally different from the claims of the ’7907 patent.
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`Petitioner contends that Humpleman teaches a second communication
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`interface receiving a control screen signal from a second communication system,
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`which is exactly backwards from the claim requirement. (Pet., 30.) Petitioner
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`therefore fails to show that Humpleman discloses “a second communication
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`interface configured to transfer a control screen signal . . . to a second
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`communication system,” as Element [B] of claim 1 requires.
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`Humpleman also does not disclose “a processing system configured to . . .
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`receive the viewer control signal from the second communication interface” as
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`Element [C] requires. Rather, any viewer control signals in Humpleman are
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`generated within the alleged processing system (Humpleman’s session manager), in
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`response to user inputs directly to the session manager; they are not transferred
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`anywhere.
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`Furthermore, Humpleman’s “session manager” is not “configured to . . .
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`transfer the first video signals to the first communication interface if the first
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`communication system is indicated by the viewer control signal . . . or transfer the
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`second video signals to the second communication interface if the second
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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`communication system is indicated by the viewer control signal,” as Element [C]
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`requires. Humpleman does not disclose that the alleged processing system transfers
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`first/second video signals as taught by Element [C] to a first or second
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`communication interface. Humpleman also does not disclose that video signals are
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`transferred to the alleged communication interfaces.
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`For each of these three, independently sufficient reasons, Petitioner fails to
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`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on Ground 1.
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` Humpleman does not teach transferring a control screen signal as
`Element [B] requires.
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`Humpleman does not disclose “a second communication interface configured
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`to transfer a control screen signal . . . to a second communication system” as Element
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`[B] requires. Under Petitioner’s primary theory, the alleged control screen signal is
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`transferred in the opposite direction from what is claimed. To the extent Petitioner
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`relies on alternative mappings of the claim elements onto Humpleman, these
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`likewise fail to show a second communication interface configured to transfer a
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`control screen signal in the manner claimed.
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`a)
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`Under Petitioner’s primary mapping, Element [B] is
`not satisfied.
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`According to Petitioner, the alleged control screen signal is received by the
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`alleged second communication interface from the second communication system.
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`This is the exact opposite of Element [B]’s requirement: “a second communication
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`IPR2019-01139
`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`interface configured to transfer a control screen signal . . . to a second
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`communication system.”
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`Humpleman discloses various home devices, e.g., “digital video device
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`(‘DVD’) 108” and “digital video cassette recorder (‘DVCR’) 110,” as well as a
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`“browser based [digital TV (‘DTV’)] 102.” (EX1009, 5:47-53, 6:51.) These devices
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`may be connected to a home network, such as “1394 serial bus 114.” (Id., 5:40-41,
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`FIG. 1.)
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`According to Petitioner, each of the home devices has a single “control
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`application” that communicates with a “session manager” (the alleged processing
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`system). (Pet., 20-21, 26, 36-37.) Allegedly, the control application of the first home
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`device is the first communication interface, and the control application of the second
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`home device is the second communication interface. (Id., 25, 28.) For the second
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`communication system, Petitioner identifies either the home network (see id., 26
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`(identifying “wireless network”) or a “communication system that connects a second
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`home device to the home network” (id., 32).5 Petitioner identifies session page
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`902—depicted in Figure 11 of Humpleman—as a control screen and argues that a
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`signal defining this screen is a control screen signal. (Id., 29-30.)
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`5 Regardless which is Petitioner’s true contention, Humpleman does not disclose
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`limitation [B] for the same reasons.
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`Critically, Petitioner asserts that this alleged control screen signal is sent “by
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`the session manager to . . . the second home device” via the home network. (Id., 30
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`(underline added).) According to Petitioner, it is received by the alleged second
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`communication interface (the control application), which allegedly “directs all data
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`communications between the network and the second home device.” (Id., 31.)
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`Before it can reach the control application on the second home device, however, the
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`signal “must pass through the second communication system.” (Id. at 32.)
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`Accordingly, the alleged control screen signal is transferred in the wrong direction
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`for the claims: from the alleged second communication system to the second
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`communication interface.
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`Petitioner therefore does not show that Humpleman meets the requirements
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`of Element [B] and fails to show that Humpleman anticipates the ’7907 claims.
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`b)
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`Petitioner’s mapping assumes an incorrect location of
`the alleged processing system, and Humpleman—read
`correctly—does not anticipate the ’7907 claims.
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`The Petition fails to allege where the session manager is operating.
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`Nevertheless, as discussed above, Petitioner’s mapping for Element [B] assumes that
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`the session manager is located somewhere other than the second home device, such
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`that the session manager communicates with the second home device over the home
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`network. (Pet. 30-31.) If Petitioner’s assumption is correct, Humpleman does not
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`anticipate Element [B] for the reasons explained above. But, if the control screen is
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907
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`displayed by the second home device, as Petitioner alleges (see id.), the session
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`manager would also be on the second home device. In that case, Humpleman does
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`not anticipate Element [B] for a different reason—any control screen signal
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`transferred by the session manager to the second home device remains within the
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`second home device and is not transferred to the alleged second communication
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`system.
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`Humpleman’s session manager is a “software agent” that “provides the
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`primary interface between the user and the home network.” (EX1009, 9:22-26, 14:5-
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`6.) Humpleman discloses that the session manager is located on a home device that,
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`like DTV 102, has a display screen and can display HTML files to provide a “human