Paper 11
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Date: December 20, 2019
`571-272-7822
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2019-01139
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before WILLIAM V. SAINDON, BRIAN J. McNAMARA
`and NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`McNAMARA, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Date: December 20, 2019
`571-272-7822
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2019-01139
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before WILLIAM V. SAINDON, BRIAN J. McNAMARA
`and NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`McNAMARA, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2019-01139
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Charter Communications, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition, Paper 2
`(“Petition” or “Pet.”), to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–53 (the
`“challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,757,907 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’7907
`patent”). 35 U.S.C. § 311. Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Response
`(Paper 8) that has been expunged (Paper 10) and a Corrected Preliminary
`Response to correct clerical errors (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 314,
`which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the
`information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and the
`associated evidence presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response,
`for the reasons described below, we decline to institute inter partes review.
`REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
`II.
`The Petition identifies the following real parties-in-interest: Charter
`Communications, Inc.; Charter Communications Holdings, LLC; Spectrum
`Management Holding Company, LLC; Charter Communications Operating,
`LLC; and Time Warner Cable, LLC. Pet. 84. Patent Owner identifies itself
`as the real party-in-interest. Paper 3.
` RELATED MATTERS
`III.
`Identification of Related Proceedings
`A.
`The Petition states that the ’7907 patent is asserted in the following
`litigation: (1) Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P. v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., Charter
`Commc’ns Holdings, LLC, Spectrum Management Holding Co., LLC,
`Charter Commc’ns Operating, LLC, and Time Warner Cable, LLC, Case
`No. 1:18-cv02033 (D. Del.); and (2) Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P. v. Cequel
`
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`IPR2019-01139
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`Commc’ns, LLC D/B/A Suddenlink Commc’ns, CSC Holding, LLC D/B/A
`Optimum-Cablevision, and Altice USA, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-01919-UNA
`(D. Del.). Pet. 84–85.
`Petitioner identifies the following additional petitions filed against the
`’7907 patent: IPR2019-01135 and IPR2019-01137. Id.
`Petitioner identifies the following petitions filed against related U.S.
`patent 6,754,907 (“the ’4907 patent”): IPR2019-01136, IPR2019-01138,
`and IPR2019-01140). Pet. 84–85.
`IV. THE ’7907 PATENT
`The ’7907 patent concerns a video-on-demand (VOD) system that
`replaces a conventional, immobile, fixed bandwidth set-top box that does not
`include a display with a second communications system and display, such as
`a web browser running on a portable computer. See Ex. 1001, 1:17–55.
`Figure 1 shown below is a block diagram of a configuration an operating
`environment of such a system.
`
`Figure 1 of the ’7907 patent
`
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`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`As shown in Figure 1, VOD system 100 includes (i) a processing
`system 103, (ii) first communications interface 101 to first communications
`system 111, such as optical fiber or wire cable system that drives first
`display 121, e.g., a television, and (iii) second interface 102 such as the
`Internet (in particular, the World Wide Web, or the “web”), to second
`communications system 112 that uses less bandwidth than the first
`communications system and drives second display 122, e.g., a personal
`computer with a browser. Id. at 2:28–48. The VOD system may include a
`conventional computer platform with programmed software that directs
`processing system 103 to transfer a control screen signal to second
`communications system 112 for routing to second display 122 that displays
`the control screen. Id. at 2:51–60. The control screen may include subject
`matter, e.g., a video content menu, a preview selection, an order selection, or
`display characteristics, from which a user can make selections. Id. at 3:37–
`61. When a viewer makes a selection, a corresponding signal is returned by
`the second communications system to processor 103, which responds by
`implementing the selected function, e.g., fast forwarding the video
`transferred over communications system 111 to first display 121. See id. at
`4:61–5:8.
`Figure 6 shown below illustrates a web-based system configuration.
`
`Figure 6 of the ’7907 patent
`
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`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`In the configuration of Figure 6, in response to log in by browser 622,
`system 100 returns a web page from which the user can make a selection,
`e.g., to preview a video. Id. at 5:34–50. System 100 returns the video
`preview in MPEG I format to browser 622 for display. Id. at 5:52–57. After
`the video display, browser 622 transfers menu selections to system 100 for
`television 621 to display selected video content using MPEG II. Id. at 5:58–
`60. System 100 then transfers the MPEG II video to the television 621 and a
`web page to browser 622. Id. at 5:60–63. As television 621 displays
`selected video content browser 622 transfers menu selections to system 100
`for browser 622 to display selected content in MPEG I. See id. at 6:4–22.
`ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
`V.
`The ’7907 patent includes three independent claims —claim 1 drawn
`to a video on demand system, claim 21 drawn to a method of operating a
`video on demand system, and claim 41 drawn to a processor-readable
`storage medium. Claim 1, reproduced below with Petitioner’s paragraph
`designations, is representative of the subject matter of the ’7907 patent:
`1[Preamble]. A video-on demand system comprising:
`1[A] a first communication interface configured to transfer
`first video signals to a first communication system using a
`first bandwidth;
`1[B] a second communication interface configured to transfer
`a control screen signal and second video signals to a
`second communication system using a second bandwidth
`that is less than the first bandwidth; and
`1[C] a processing system configured to transfer the control
`screen signal to the second communication interface,
`receive a viewer control signal from
`the second
`communication interface, and transfer the first video
`signals to the first communication interface if the first
`communication system is indicated by the viewer control
`signal or transfer the second video signals to the second
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`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`communication interface if the second communication
`system is indicated by the viewer control signal.
`Id. at 6:41–58.
`VI. ART CITED IN PETITIONER’S CHALLENGES
`Petitioner cites the following references in its challenges to
`patentability:
`Reference
`European Patent No.
`EP 0 872 987 A2
`U.S. Patent No.
`7,913,278
`U.S. Patent No.
`6,182,094
`
`
`Exhibit No.
`Ex. 1006
`
`Ex. 1008
`
`Ex. 1009
`
`Designation
`Yosuke
`
`Ellis
`
`Humpleman
`
`VII. ASSERTED GROUNDS
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–53 would have been unpatentable on
`the following grounds:
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–53
`1–53
`1–53
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`Humpleman
`Humpleman, Yosuke
`Humpleman, Ellis
`
`35 U.S.C. §
`102
`103
`103
`
`VIII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`Petitioner defines a person of ordinary skill as having “held [a]
`bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related
`field with at least five years of experience or research in interactive systems
`applicable to digital television, including VOD for cable and Internet
`delivery.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002, Declaration of Dr. Kevin Almeroth
`(“Almeroth Dec.”) ¶ 46. Patent Owner does not offer a definition of the
`level of ordinary skill, but reserves the right to dispute Petitioner’s
`assessment of the level of ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 16. Petitioner’s
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`undisputed definition of the level of ordinary skill appears to be
`commensurate with the subject matter for the ’7907 patent, for purposes of
`this Decision we apply Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill.
`IX. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The Petition has been accorded a filing date of May 30, 2019. For
`petitions filed on or after November 13, 2018, we interpret claims of an
`unexpired patent using the same standard applied by U.S. district courts, as
`announced in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
`banc). See 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,345 (Oct. 11, 2018) (announcing
`amendment of 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b), and 42.300(b). Under this
`standard, words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
`meaning. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (“the words of a claim are generally
`given their ordinary and customary meaning”) (citations and internal quote
`marks omitted). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is
`the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art
`in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. The person of
`ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the
`context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the
`context of the entire patent, including the specification. Id. Any special
`definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with
`reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
`1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner notes that certain terms were construed by the court in
`Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., LP, Case No.
`2:12-cv-859-JD, Dkt. 162 (Aug. 15, 2014, E.D. Pa.) (Ex, 1010, “Comcast
`Order”). Petitioner states that the parties agreed on the following claim
`constructions: (1) “control screen signal” should be construed as “a signal
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`that defines a control screen” and (2) “implementing a viewer control
`selection” should be construed as “in response to the video control signal,
`implementing a viewer control selection.” Pet. 16 (citing Comcast Order at
`42.)
`
`Petitioner identifies additional terms construed by the Comcast court,
`stating that Petitioner supports the district court’s constructions. Pet. 14–16.
`Patent Owner proposes no constructions and states that it disagrees with the
`district court’s constructions because, according to Patent Owner, the
`constructions “violate several Federal Circuit principles, including, at least,
`reading in a negative limitation to a non-limiting term in the preamble.”
`Prelim. Resp. 16–17 n.4. Petitioner contends that we need not resolve
`disputed claim constructions “because the claims read on the prior art under
`either Sprint’s proposed construction or the Comcast court’s construction.”
`Pet. 13. We now turn to the parties’ assertions concerning the terms
`construed by the Comcast court.
`“A video-on demand system” (claim 1); “operating a video-on-
`A.
`demand system” (claims 1 and 41)
`Petitioner notes that the Comcast court declined to adopt Patent
`Owner’s proposed construction, i.e., plain and ordinary meaning or
`“operating a system that provides video-on-demand,” and instead construed
`“a video-on demand system” (claim 1) and “operating a video-on-demand
`system” to mean “operating a video-on-demand system without the use of a
`set top box for remote control of the video-on-demand system.” Pet. 14.
`Petitioner points out the court’s finding that the ’7907 patent disparages the
`use of a set-top box for remote control and disclaims systems that include a
`set top box for that purpose. Id. Petitioner contends that the outcome of this
`proceeding is not affected by the court’s construction because the cited prior
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`art does not use a set-top box for remote control. Id. Neither the parties nor
`the court’s construction addresses what constitutes “video-on-demand.”
`As a general rule, preamble language is not treated as limiting. Allen
`Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`Nonetheless, the preamble may be construed as limiting “if it recites
`essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and
`vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-
`Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). A preamble is not
`regarded as limiting “when the claim body describes a structurally complete
`invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the
`structure or steps of the claimed invention.” Catalina, 289 F.3d at 809. The
`preamble has no separate limiting effect if, for example, “the preamble
`merely gives a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the
`claim that completely set forth the invention.” IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas
`Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The question
`whether we should “treat a preamble as a limitation is a determination
`‘resolved only on review of the entire[ ] . . . patent to gain an understanding
`of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the
`claim.’” Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808 (quoting Corning Glass Works v.
`Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
`As discussed below, in this case, the preamble is not merely a
`“descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim”—
`knowing that the claims are directed to a “video-on-demand” service
`breathes “life [and] meaning” into the claims, because it shows that the
`video control signal is a particular type of signal used to provide the video-
`on-demand services. See IMS Tech., 206 F.3d at 1434; Catalina, 289 F.3d at
`
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`808. That is, the claims are not “structurally complete” without
`understanding that the control signal is a control signal of a video-on-
`demand service. See id. at 809.
`The ’7907 patent states that “[t]he video-on demand system offers an
`individual viewer various selections from a video content library for viewing
`on demand.” Ex. 1001, 1:24–27. The ’7907 patent explains “[t]he video-
`on-demand system receives a request from the viewer to view a particular
`selection from the video content library” and “[i]n response to the request
`the video-on-demand system transfers the selected video content over a
`communication system to the viewer’s display.” Id. at 1:29–34.
`Recognizing set top box implementations of video-on-demand systems are
`not mobile and do not have a video display, the ’7907 patent “solves the
`above problems with a video-on-demand system that uses a second
`communications system and display” by transferring a control screen signal
`to the second communication system, and receiving a viewer control signal
`from the second communication system. See id. at 1:45–57.
`Having reviewed the claims and the specification of the ’7907 patent,
`we determine that the phrase “video-on-demand” in the preamble is
`necessary to give life and meaning to the claim. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v.
`Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d at 1305 (“[I]f the claim preamble is
`‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim, then the claim
`preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the claim.”). The
`difference between watching television and watching a video on demand is a
`difference in kind, rendering a video-on-demand system different from a
`non-video-on-demand system. While a person watching television can
`change channels and thus in some sense selects video content, such video
`content is being distributed regardless of whether the user selects it. Video-
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`on-demand, by contrast, only is distributed when the user specifically selects
`it.1 Because of that nature, the user also has control over the playback of the
`video content, such as pausing and stopping. Although the dependent claims
`more clearly demonstrate the on-demand nature of the video content (e.g.,
`with the menu and control buttons), only the preamble in the independent
`claims provides the clue as to this context.2 Thus, the preamble serves to
`provide the framework necessary to understand the body of the claims, and
`is limiting.
`“Viewer control signal”
`B.
`Petitioner notes that the district court declined to adopt Patent
`Owner’s proposed construction, i.e., plain and ordinary meaning or “a signal
`reflecting viewer control” and instead construed “view control signal” to
`mean “a viewer control signal generated and processed without the
`involvement of a set-top box for remote control of the video-on-demand
`system.” Pet. 14–15. Petitioner notes that the Comcast court found the
`’7907 patent does not disparage the use of a set-top box for purposes other
`than remote control, e.g. for the purpose of decoding a video signal and
`presenting it to a television. Id. at 15 n.3.
`Referring to Figure 1, the Specification states “[i]n response to viewer
`input to the control screen, the second display 122 transfers a corresponding
`viewer control signal to the second communication system 112,” the “second
`
`
`1 See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:17–33 (instructing that, with video-on-demand, the
`system receives a request to view a selection from the video content library,
`the video is played “[i]n response to the [user’s] request,” and the user is
`allowed “to immediately view [the] selected video content”).
`2 This is broadly recited in claim 12 to encompass the controls relevant to
`video-on-demand, e.g., play, pause, stop, etc. Limiting claim 1 to a video-
`on-demand system provides meaningful context.
`
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`communication system 112 transfers the viewer control signal to the second
`communications interface,” and “[t]he second communication interface 102
`transfers the [viewer] control signal to the processing system 103.” Ex.
`1001, 2:61–67. Thus, we understand the viewer control signal to be a signal
`generated in response to user input.
`“transfer . . .the [first/second] video signal” (claim 1) /
`C.
`“transferring [first/second] video signals” (claims 21, 41)
`Petitioner notes that the court declined to adopt Patent Owner’s
`proposed construction, i.e., plain and ordinary meaning or “sending
`[first/second] video signal” and instead construed “transfer . . . the
`[first/second] video signal” (claim 1) / “transferring [first/second] video
`signals” to mean “in response to the viewer control signal transferring
`[first/second] video signals.” Pet. 15 (alteration in original). Petitioner
`points out that the court found no disagreement as to what it means to
`transfer a video signal, but in view of the description in the ’7907 patent,
`found that the video signals are transferred in response to the viewer control
`signal received from the computer. Id. Claim 1 explicitly recites the
`processing system transfers the video signals to the first communication
`interface if the first system is indicated by the viewer control signal or the
`second communication interface if the second communication system is
`indicated by the viewer control signal, we do not perceive a need to construe
`this term.
`D. Control screen signal
`Petitioner proposes that “control screen signal” should be construed as
`“a signal that defines a control screen.” Pet. 16. The independent claims
`recite steps for transferring the control screen and video content signals. The
`’7907 patent’s specification is replete with instances describing the control
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`screen as something other than video content. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:37–53
`(noting the distinction drawn between the control screen and the menu it
`provides to allow the viewer to watch video content); 1:26–28 (describing
`various video content types), 1:64–2:3 (noting that the “video-on-demand
`system implements a viewer the control menu selections”) (emphasis added).
`As another example, the ’7907 patent describes the control screen as a
`webpage displaying a menu. Id. at 1:64, 2:60.
`Reviewing the claims and specification, we determine that a “control
`screen signal” provides the user with controls that allow the user to control
`video content (e.g., by choosing which content to play or to control the
`playback of the content), whereas the “video content signals” are the actual
`media (movies, television shows, etc.) that are viewed by the user and
`controlled by the control signals.3
`X. ANALYSIS
`To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged
`as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net
`MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
`Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
`2001). Each element of the challenged claim must be found, either
`expressly or inherently, in the single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros.,
`Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). While the
`elements must be arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim,
`“the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of
`terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
`
`
`3 This construction is consistent with and informed by our construction of
`“video-on-demand” above.
`
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`2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Thus, the dispositive
`question is whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or
`infer from a prior art reference that every claim element is disclosed in that
`reference. Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Inst. at Harbor–
`UCLA Med. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Still further, “it
`is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but
`also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
`expected to draw therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`Claim 1 as Anticipated by Humpleman
`A.
`Humpleman – Ex. 1009
`
`Humpleman discloses a method and system for generating a program
`guide for a home network that includes a first multimedia device associated
`with the home network. Ex. 1009, Abstract, 2:31–35. Information about
`multimedia material on the first device is identified and used to generate an
`HTML page stored in an accessible area of the first device. Id. at Abstract,
`2:35–39. A second, browser based home device may be connected to the
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`home network to receive the HTML page and render it for display to a user.
`Id. at Abstract, 2:40–47.
`Figure 1 of Humpleman is reproduced below.
`
`
`
`Figure 1 of Humpleman
`In Figure 1 of Humpleman, shown above, in home network 100
`digital television (DTV) 102 typically behaves as a client and home devices
`digital video cassette recorder (DVCR) 110, digital video device (DVD)
`108, digital satellite services network interface unit (DSS-NIU) 104, and
`security system 120 behave as servers communicating over 1394 serial bus
`114. Ex. 1009, 6:35–37. Each home device is associated with HTML files
`that control and command functions associated with a particular home
`device. See id. at 5:27–6:37. Acting as a client, DVT 102 receives the
`HTML files associated with the servers. Id. at 6:43–47. The HTML files
`enable browser based DTV 102 to display graphically the command and
`control information to a user for any home device, without having to know
`the details of the particular home device. Id. at 6:55–64.
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`Any home device that can act as a client, i.e., a home device that can
`display HTML files on its display unit, may be designated as a session
`server. Ex. 1009, 18:45–48. A session server includes a software agent
`called a “session manager.” Id. at 18:48–49. A session manager provides
`the primary interface between the user and the home network by generating
`a session page that allows users to command and control home devices
`connected to the network to provide services, such as movie playback and
`television program recording. See id. at 14:5–39. Each home device has a
`control application that handles its communication with the session manager.
`Id. at, 19:34–41.
`
`
`Analysis
`1[Preamble]
`a)
`Petitioner contends, to the extent the preamble of claim 1 is limiting,
`Humpleman discloses the claimed video-on-demand system. Pet. 18–24
`Characterizing Humpleman as a home network of multimedia devices, e.g.,
`a DVD, a digital TV (DTV), or a personal computer, Petitioner states each
`home device has a HTML program guide file listing multimedia material
`available on the device. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1009, 1:16–18, 4:20–25, 5:39–
`67, 23:1–4, Figs. 6–8, 10–11). Noting Humpleman’s remote user interface
`allows a user to know what content is available on a networked device or a
`group of networked devices and to select the content, Petitioner argues
`Humpleman is a video-on-demand system “because it allows a user to
`choose from various selections from a video content library for viewing on-
`demand on devices throughout the home network.” Id. at 19–20 (citing Ex.
`1009, 22:22–65).
`Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how Humpleman describes
`the video-on-demand system required by all of the claims. Humpleman
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`16
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`IPR2019-01139
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`describes playing a DVD, but viewing DVDs is not video on demand. As
`we have construed the term, a video-on-demand system allows a user to
`select from a library of content, and a DVD is merely the user playing a
`video in a video player. Although DVDs allow control, such as pausing, we
`do not understand playing a DVD to be the type of selecting from a video
`content library required by video-on-demand systems. Petitioner provides
`no persuasive explanation to the contrary.
`1[A] a first communication interface configured to
`b)
`transfer first video signals to a first communication system
`using a first bandwidth.
`Petitioner identifies the “control application” associated with each of
`Humpleman’s home devices as corresponding to the claimed communication
`interface, thus the first control application associated with a first home
`device corresponds to the claimed first communication interface. Pet. 24–
`25. Petitioner notes that each of the control applications communicates with
`the hardware of the home device and handles communication between the
`home device and the home network. Id. at 26–27. Petitioner identifies the
`communication mediums that connect each of Humpleman’s home devices
`to the home network as a claimed communication system, thus the
`communication medium that connects the first home device to the home
`network corresponds to the claimed “first communication system.” Id. at 27.
`Petitioner notes that Humpleman discloses hard wired communications
`mediums (such as a 1394 serial bus and Ethernet) and wireless
`communications mediums (such as ATM[asynchronous transfer mode]). Id.
`at 27 (citing Ex. 1009, 5:27–38). Petitioner identifies Humpleman’s 1394
`serial bus as the claimed first communication system operating at a first
`bandwidth. Id. at 27–28. According to Petitioner, in Humpelman the
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`17
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`IPR2019-01139
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`control application of a first home device (a first communication interface) is
`configured to transfer first video signals, without a set-top box, such that
`first video signals transferred over the network are directed by the control
`application on the receiving device. Id. at 26–27.
`The Patent Owner Preliminary Response does not respond explicitly
`to Petitioner’s contentions concerning claim element 1[A].
`1[B] a second communication interface configured
`c)
`to transfer a control screen signal and second video
`signals to a second communication system using a second
`bandwidth that is less than the first bandwidth
`Noting that every device has a control application associated with it,
`Petitioner identifies the control application associated with a second home
`device as the claimed “second communication interface.” Pet. 29–30.
`Citing the session page shown in Figure 11, Petitioner argues that
`Humpleman discloses the second communication interface is configured to
`transfer a control signal because in Humplman a screen generated on a
`browser based home device and defined by a control screen signal is sent by
`the session manager to the second home device. Id. at 30. Petitioner notes
`that this control screen provides a human interface for the home network that
`graphically displays HTML pages with control and command information,
`allowing users to control home devices over the network. Id. at 30 (citing
`Ex. 1009, 5:55–67, 6:50–53, 6:55–57, 15:40–43, 17:37–43, 22:32–41).
`Petitioner states that Humpleman also discloses the second
`communication interface is configured to transfer second video signals, as
`claimed, because Humpleman discloses a session manager can direct the
`control application in a second home device storing a recorded TV show to
`broadcast the TV show as a stream over the network under the direction of
`control application. Pet. 31.
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`IPR2019-01139
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`As discussed above, Petitioner identifies the communication medium
`required to connect each of Humpleman’s home devices to the home
`network as a claimed communication system. Pet. 27–28, 32. As to the
`second communication system, Petitioner notes that data must pass through
`the second communication medium in order to be exchanged with the home
`network. Id. at 32. According to Petitioner, Humpleman’s wireless bus is a
`second communications system using a second bandwidth that is less than
`the first bandwidth, as claimed. Id. at 31–33.
`Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s mapping of claim element 1[B] to
`Humpleman assumes that the session manager is located somewhere other
`than the second home device, such that the session manager communicates
`with the second home device over the home network. Prelim. Resp. 22
`(citing Pet. 30–31). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s mapping of
`Humpleman to claim element 1[B] requires the control screen signal to be
`transferred in a direction opposite to that claimed. Id. at 20. Patent Owner
`contends that Petitioner asserts the control screen signal is received by the
`alleged second communication interface (the control application of the
`second communication device) from the second communication system (the
`medium connecting the second communication device to the network)—but
`claim element 1[B] requires the opposite transfer, i.e., claim element 1[B]
`recites a second communication interface configured to transfer a control
`screen signal to a second communication system. Id. at 20–21.
`Patent Owner explains that Petitioner asserts a control screen signal is
`sent by the session manager to the second home device via the home
`network to be received by the second communication interface (the control
`application of the second home device) that directs all data communication
`between the network and the second home device. Prelim. Resp. 22 (citing
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`19
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`IPR2019-01139
`Patent 6,757,907 B1
`Pet. 30–31). As noted by Patent Owner, before the control screen signal can
`reach the control application of the second home device (the alleged second
`communication interface), the control screen signal must pass
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