throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 10
`Date: May 6, 2020
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-00101
`Patent 8,495,359 B2
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before THOMAS L. GIANNETTI, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
` INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) filed a Petition for
`inter partes review (Paper 2, “Pet.”) of claims 1–15 of U.S. Patent No.
`8,495,359 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’359 patent”). Patent Owner Uniloc 2017 LLC
`(“Uniloc”) filed a Preliminary Response (“Prelim. Resp.”). Paper 8.
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`We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information
`presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
`1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).
`Applying that standard, we do not institute an inter partes review, for the
`reasons explained below.
`
` BACKGROUND
`
`A. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`The parties identify the following proceeding as relating to the ’359
`patent: Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 8:19-cv-007831 (D.C.
`Cal. filed April 29, 2019). Pet. vi; Paper 6, 2.
`
`B.
`
`REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
`
`Microsoft identifies only itself as the real party in interest. Pet. vi.
`Uniloc does not challenge that identification, and also only identifies itself
`as the real party in interest. Paper 6, 2.
`
`C.
`
`THE ’359 PATENT (EX. 1001)
`
`The ’359 patent relates to a system in which one computing device
`(the originator) sends an electronic communication to a recipient computing
`device, after encrypting the message using a key provided by a gateway
`server. Ex. 1001, 33–41.
`
`
`1 Uniloc incorrectly lists the docket number as 8:19-cv-00873. Paper 6, 2.
`
`2
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`
`Figure 3B of the patent, reproduced below, depicts an embodiment of
`the invention:
`
`
`Figure 3B is a flowchart for a process (310) in which the gateway server
`interacts with the originator and receiver of the message. Ex. 1001, 6:60–61.
`Initially, in step 311, the gateway server receives and stores the network
`addresses and device identifiers of the devices it serves in the network. Id. at
`6:61–64. Each device identifier “is generated by a process which operates on
`data indicative of the computing device’s configuration and hardware,” and
`“has a very high probability (e.g., greater than 99.999%) of being unique to
`the target device.” Id. at 4:3–5, 15–16.
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`In step 313, the gateway server receives, from the originator, a request
`for an encryption key associated with the recipient device. Id. at 6:64–65. In
`step 315, if the intended recipient computer exists within the gateway
`server’s database, the gateway server generates an encryption key unique to
`the intended recipient. Id. at 6:64–7:1. In step 317, the gateway server then
`sends the encryption key to the originator. Id. at 7:10–13. The originator uses
`the key to encrypt the message, and then sends the secure message over the
`network to the recipient computer. Id. at 6:56–59.
`When the recipient computer receives the encrypted message, it
`generates its own encryption key using its stored device identifier, and uses
`that key to decrypt the message. Ex. 1001, 7:20–23. The recipient computer
`“may also take the additional step of querying the server to determine if the
`computer purporting to send the secure communication, i.e., the sending
`computer, did, in fact, request the encryption key.” Id. at 7:32–36; see also
`7:13–15 (“[T[he server . . . may provide confirmations to the receiving
`computer that the sending computer requested and was sent the encryption
`key.”). According to the ’359 patent, “[s]uch confirmation aids in building
`trust that the communication actually originated from the sending
`computer.” Id. at 7:15–17.
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`D. CHALLENGED CLAIMS AND ASSERTED GROUND OF
`UNPATENTABILITY
`
`[1.2]
`
`Microsoft’s sole ground for the inter partes review is summarized in
`the following table:
`35 U.S.C. § References
`Claims Challenged
`1032
`Olkin,3 Kim4
`1–15
`Pet. 2. Microsoft argues that claims 1–15 of the ’359 patent are unpatentable
`as obvious over Olkin in view of Kim. See Pet. 2, 11–40.
`Independent claim 1, which follows, exemplifies the invention:
`[1.1] 1. A system for securing an electronic communication, the
`system comprising:
`a gateway server configured to:
`receive and store a device identifier and a
`network address from a first computing
`device, wherein the device identifier is
`generated by the first computing device
`from a combination of user-configurable and
`non-user-configurable parameters of the first
`computing device and uniquely identifies
`the first computing device, and wherein the
`network address is associated with the first
`computing device;
`receive from a second computing device the
`network address for the first computing
`device and an encryption key request;
`derive an encryption key from the device
`identifier for the first computing device;
`
`2 Because the filing date of the ’359 patent is before March 16, 2013, we
`apply the version of 35 U.S.C. § 103 that existed prior to the Leahy–Smith
`America Invents Act. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 293
`(2011).
`3 Olkin et al., US 7,376,835 B2, issued May 20, 2008 (Ex. 1003) (“Olkin”).
`4 Kim et al., US 2009/0055648 A1, published Feb. 26, 2009 (Ex. 1004)
`(“Kim”).
`
`
`
`[1.3]
`
`[1.4]
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`[1.5]
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`send the encryption key to the second
`computing device, and
`confirm to the first computing device that the
`encryption key was requested by the second
`computing device and was sent to the
`second computing device.
`Ex. 1001, 8:40–60 (Microsoft’s reference numbers added). Claims 6 and 11
`are also independent. See id. at 9:6–24, 10:1–23. Claims 2–5 depend from
`claim 1, claims 7–10 depend from claim 6, and claims 12–15 depend from
`claim 11. See id. at 8:61–10:35.
`Microsoft relies on the declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D, Ex. 1008.
`Uniloc does not presently contest Dr. Houh’s qualification to provide expert
`testimony on the subject matter of his declaration, and we have considered
`his testimony for the purpose of this decision. Uniloc did not provide a
`rebuttal expert at this stage of the proceeding.
`
`[1.6]
`
` ANALYSIS
`
`Microsoft’s sole ground for seeking inter partes review of the ’359
`patent is that claims 1–15 would have been obvious over Olkin in view of
`Kim. See Pet. 2. A claim is unpatentable for obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art
`are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
`time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
`which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
`398, 406 (2007). We typically consider “whether there was an apparent
`reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent
`at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
`A sufficient ground for obviousness in a petition must “articulate specific
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`reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of
`obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418); see also 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3)
`(2018); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2), 42.104(b)(4) (2019).
`The obviousness inquiry requires an analysis of underlying factual
`considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level
`of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-
`obviousness (i.e., secondary considerations) that may be in evidence.5 See
`Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`Based on the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and in
`light of Uniloc’s Preliminary Response, we are unable to conclude that
`Microsoft has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on its
`obviousness ground, for the reasons discussed below.
`
`A.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the
`invention is one of the factual considerations relevant to obviousness. See
`Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. It is also pertinent to interpreting the patent claims,
`see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
`banc). To assess the level of ordinary skill, we construct a hypothetical
`“person of ordinary skill in the art,” from whose vantage point we assess
`obviousness and claim interpretation. See In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357
`
`5 Because neither party has presented evidence of objective indicia of
`obviousness or non-obviousness, we do not address this consideration in our
`decision. See Pet. 40 (stating that Microsoft is unaware of any secondary
`considerations of non-obviousness).
`
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`(Fed. Cir. 1998). This legal construct “presumes that all prior art references
`in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”
`Id. (citing In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
`Citing testimony of Dr. Houh, Microsoft argues that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in computer
`science, electrical and/or computer engineering, or equivalent training, and
`two years of experience in computer networking and information security.”
`Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 43 (Dr. Houh’s testimony to that effect)). For the
`purpose of its Preliminary Response, Uniloc does not dispute Microsoft’s
`assertion. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11.
`We find that Microsoft’s proposed level of ordinary skill is consistent
`with the teachings of the ’359 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v.
`Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art
`itself may provide evidence as to the appropriate level of ordinary skill).
`Therefore, we adopt Microsoft’s uncontested formulation as the level of
`ordinary skill for this decision.
`
`B.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`The Board interprets patent claims using the same claim construction
`standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil action under 35
`U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under this standard, we
`generally give claim terms their “ordinary and customary meaning . . . as
`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history
`pertaining to the patent.” Id. The ordinary and customary meaning is the
`meaning the claim language would have to a person of ordinary skill at the
`
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`time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the
`specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.
`Microsoft contends that the claims of the ’359 patent “do not require
`proposed constructions that differ from the claim language in order for the
`Board to compare the prior art to the claims.” Pet. 9. Likewise, Uniloc
`“contends that no claim terms require specific construction to resolve the
`unpatentability issues presented” in the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10.
`In light of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we agree with the
`parties that it is unnecessary to expressly construe any claim terms for our
`determination of whether to institute an inter partes review. See Nidec Motor
`Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to
`the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc.
`v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Nevertheless,
`our interpretation of the ’359 patent claims is informed by the disclosure and
`prosecution history, and we will discuss our interpretation of pertinent claim
`terms in the context of our analysis in the section below.
`
`A. COMPARISON OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS WITH THE PRIOR ART
`
`1.
`
`Overview of Olkin
`
`Olkin describes a communication system for sending and receiving
`email messages and other communications via transactions with a “key
`server.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003, 21:27–43, 21:57–58); Prelim. Resp. 12
`(citing Ex. 1003, 8:44–56).
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`Olkin’s Figure 11, reproduced below, illustrates an example of such a
`system:
`
`
`
`Figure 11 is a block diagram with four basic components: communication
`originator 314, communication recipient 316, key server 320, and
`authentication authority 318. Ex. 1003, 26:38–41. Originator 314 and
`Recipient 316 will at some point independently authenticate themselves with
`authentication authority 318, and receive authentication assertion 322, which
`they will use to authenticate themselves with key server 320. Id. at 26:42–
`55.
`
`Olkin’s system uses “conversation keys.” Pet. 12. These are
`symmetric keys that “flow[] from a single source to one or more
`destinations.” Ex. 1003, 21:48–50. When originator 314 wishes to obtain a
`conversation key in order to send secure messages to one or more recipients
`including recipient 316, it contacts key server 320 and provides it with
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`authentication assertion 322 and attributes 326 for intended communication
`324. Id. at 26:56–60. These attributes 326 may include a list of intended
`recipients 316 for the communication. Id. at 26:60–62. Key server 320
`confirms the originator’s authentication assertion 322 and creates “a key 330
`suitable to encrypt the communication 324,” which it sends back to
`originator 314 for use in encrypting the communication. Id. at 63–67.
`Alternatively to having key server 320 create and send an encryption
`key to the originator at its request, originator 314 “can instead send the key
`330 to the key server 320 and ask it to associate that key 330 with a resource
`ID 328”; the originator can then use its own key to encrypt future
`communications within the system. See id. at 27:1–3; see also id. at 22:37–
`38 (the key server either “creates the keys . . . or it can receive them from
`source participants.”).
`When recipient 316 receives an encrypted message from originator
`314, recipient 316 can ask key server 320 (using its authentication assertion
`322 and resource ID 328) for a key for decrypting the message. Ex. 1003,
`27:15–21. Key server 320 verifies authentication assertion 322 and also
`checks that recipient 316 “is an intended one for the communication 324 that
`the resource ID 328 specifies, using the list of intended recipients 316 that
`the originator 314 previously provided in the attributes 326.” Id. at 27:21–
`26. Key server 320 then sends the key to recipient 316 for use in decrypting
`the communication. Id. at 27:30–31.
`
`2.
`
`Overview of Kim
`
`Kim describes a scheme for “identity based encryption (IBE).” Ex.
`1004 ¶ 23. The scheme allows “any string to be used as a valid public key.”
`
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`Id. ¶ 24. The key may therefore include a string representing an identity,
`such as an email address, of the intended recipient. Id.
`In an exemplary embodiment, an intended recipient of a
`communication transmits “seed information” to an originating device, which
`may include information about the device’s hardware, as well as user
`credentials. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 31–33. The originating device generates a public
`encryption key for encrypting its communications, using the predetermined
`seed information and the user credentials. Id. ¶ 31. To decrypt these
`messages, the recipient device generates and keeps a “secret key based on
`the seed information and the credential according to the IBE scheme.” Id.
`¶ 34.
`
`3.
`
`Claim 1
`
`(a) Microsoft’s Arguments
`
`Microsoft asserts that the combination of Olkin and Kim teaches
`every limitation of claim 1, and that it would have been obvious to combine
`the two references in the way recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–29. According
`to Microsoft, Olkin discloses “conversation keys,” but does not explain how
`they are generated. Pet 12–13. Therefore, Microsoft argues that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have naturally looked to Kim, which discloses
`details of generating keys meeting the limitations of claim 1. Id. at 13–14.
`The preamble (1.1) recites “[a] system for securing an electronic
`communication.” Ex. 1001, 8:40. This system includes three devices: a
`“gateway server,” a “first computing device” (the recipient), and a “second
`computing device (the originator). See Ex. 1001, 8:40–53; see also Prelim.
`Resp. 3–4 (explaining that the first computing device is the recipient, and the
`
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`second computing device is the originator). As recited in the claim, the
`gateway server is “configured to” perform a series of steps. Ex. 1001, 8:42.
`Microsoft identifies these three devices in Olkin’s Figure 11 and supporting
`text. See Pet. 15–16.
`Limitations 1.2 and 1.3 recite steps in which the gateway server does
`the following: (1.2) generates a “device identifier” based on user-
`configurable and non-user-configurable parameters, and (1.3) receives an
`“encryption key request” from the second computing device (the originator).
`See Ex. 1001, 8:43–53. Microsoft argues that a combination of Olkin and
`Kim meets limitation 1.2, and that Olkin alone teaches limitation 1.3. Id. at
`15–23.6
`Limitation 1.4 requires that the gateway server be configured to
`“derive an encryption key from the device identifier for the first computing
`device.” Ex. 1001, 8:54–55. Microsoft concedes that Olkin does not
`explicitly disclose deriving an encryption key from a device identifier, but
`argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand this
`limitation to be taught by the combination of Olkin and Kim.” Pet. 24.
`According to Microsoft, “Kim teaches that an encryption key can be
`generated using seed information (which includes non-configurable
`information . . .) plus personal information (configurable).” Id. (emphasis
`omitted). Thus, Microsoft argues that “using the teachings of Kim, a [person
`of ordinary skill in the art] implementing Olkin would use both configurable
`
`
`6 In its Preliminary Response, Uniloc does not specifically dispute
`Microsoft’s contentions for the preamble 1.1 and limitations 1.2–1.3. See
`Prelim. Resp. 21–30 (arguing only with respect to limitations 1.4–1.6).
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`and non-configurable data to generate an encryption key.” Id. at 25 (citing
`Ex. 1008 ¶ 66).
`Limitation 1.5 requires that the gateway server be configured to “send
`the encryption key to the second computing device.” Ex. 1001, 8:56.
`Microsoft argues that “Olkin satisfies this limitation” because as shown in
`Olkin’s Figure 11 (reproduced above), “the generated encryption key is sent
`back to the originator (the second computing device).” Pet. 26 (quoting Ex.
`1003, 26:63–67) (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 67).
`Limitation 1.6 requires that the gateway server be configured to
`“confirm to the first computing device that the encryption key was requested
`by the second computing device and was sent to the second computing
`device.” Ex. 1001, 8:58–60. Microsoft argues that “Olkin in combination
`with Kim satisfies this limitation.” Pet. 26. According to Microsoft, the
`recited confirmation step takes place in Olkin’s disclosure when the
`recipient device obtains a key from the key server. Pet. 27 (quoting Ex.
`1003, 27:15–30). Microsoft contends that when the recipient asks for a key
`to decrypt a message from the originator, “[t]he key server checks that the
`recipient was intended to receive the message by using the list previously
`provided by the originator (the second computing device).” Id. (citing Ex.
`1003, 27:22–26). Thus, according to Microsoft, “by sending the key to the
`recipient, the key server (gateway server) is confirming that the encryption
`key was originally requested by and sent to the originator.” Id. (citing Ex.
`1003, 27:21–30; Ex. 1008 ¶ 69). Microsoft notes that Olkin’s key server
`performs checks to verify that the communication is authorized, and “[i]f all
`the checks do not pass, the key server would not send the encrypted key
`
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`back to the recipient for decryption.” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1003, 27:21–30;
`Ex. 1008 ¶ 71).
`
`(b) Discussion
`
`Among other arguments, Uniloc contends that the combination of
`Olkin and Kim fails to satisfy the confirmation step recited in limitation 1.6.
`See Prelim. Resp. 25–30. According to Uniloc, Olkin only teaches that key
`server 320 provides a decryption key to recipient 316, but “[t]here exists no
`disclosure within the entirety of Olkin that the key server 320 confirms in
`any manner with the recipient 316 that the key 330 was provided to the
`originator 314.” Id. at 28. Uniloc argues that Microsoft’s argument that
`confirmation takes place when key server 320 provides the recipient a key
`“is conclusory in that it attempts to read into the disclosure of Olkin that
`which was never intended to be taught or suggested by Olkin.” Id. at 29.
`Uniloc also contends that Olkin does not implicitly teach a confirmation
`step, because “sending the key to the recipient does not implicitly identify
`any of a myriad of operations that could have possibly been performed by
`either of the originator and/or the key server.” Id.
`We agree with Uniloc that Olkin does not explicitly or implicitly
`disclose that its key server is configured to confirm to the recipient device
`“that the encryption key was requested by the [originator] and was sent to
`the [originator].” Ex. 1001, 8:58–60.
`First, the mere fact that Olkin’s key server gives a key to the recipient
`for decrypting a message does not necessarily mean that the key server sent
`the originator an encryption key at its request. Although, in one embodiment,
`Olkin’s key server provides a key upon request from an originator, Olkin
`also teaches that originator 314 “can instead send the key 330 to the key
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`server 320 and ask it to associate that key 330 with a resource ID 328,”
`which the originator can then use to encrypt future communications. Ex.
`1003, 27:1–3; see also id. at 22:37–38 (the key server either “creates the
`keys . . . or it can receive them from source participants.”). In this latter case,
`originator 314 need never have requested an encryption key, and key server
`320 need never have sent an encryption key back to the originator. Thus, the
`mere fact that Olkin’s key server performs all checks and successfully
`provides a key to the recipient for decrypting a message does not necessarily
`mean that “the encryption key was requested by the second computing
`device and was sent to the second computing device,” as claim 1 requires.
`Ex. 1001, 8:58–60.
`Second, even if a recipient in Olkin’s system were able to reliably
`infer, from the key server’s actions in sending it a key, that the key server
`had sent an encryption key to the message originator at the originator’s
`request, the specification of the ’359 patent, and its prosecution history, do
`not support Microsoft’s theory that such an inference may constitute the act
`of “confirm[ing]” as recited in limitation 1.6. Claim 1 recites “a gateway
`server configured to” perform the confirmation step. Ex. 1001, 8:42, 58–60.
`Thus, it is the gateway server—not the recipient—that must be configured to
`perform the confirmation step in its entirety. The confirmation step must be
`more than simply an inference that the recipient makes based on its
`understanding of how the key server typically operates.
`The prosecution history of the ’359 patent supports this understanding
`that the “confirm” step is an independent affirmative action by the gateway
`server, and more than simply an inference by the recipient. During
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`prosecution, the inventor added limitation 1.6 to distinguish over a prior art
`reference. Ex. 1002, 45–46. According to the inventor’s counsel,
`a recipient computing device may receive a communication that
`contains the correct encryption key, but for security purposes
`the recipient computing device may wish to verify that the
`sending computing device was originally authorized to receive
`the encryption key and in fact obtained the encryption key
`legitimately via the trusted gateway server. The confirmation
`step is therefore an independent verification step for
`authenticating the communication.
`Ex. 1002, 46 (emphasis added).
`Finally, Microsoft has not sufficiently explained why a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have modified Olkin’s system by adding an
`independent verification step. Olkin uses “conversation keys,” which are
`associated with a flow of messages “from a single source to one or more
`destinations.” Ex. 1003, 21:48–50. In Olkin’s system, the originator sends
`the messages to members of a recipient list, but the intended recipients on
`that list need not be authenticated before, or even after, the originator sends
`the message. See Ex. 1003, 9:55–60 (an intended recipient need not be
`registered with the system when the originator requests the key); id. at 10:3–
`7 (alternatively, the security server “need not be concerned with whether the
`receivers . . are registered”). Microsoft has not adequately explained why, in
`Olkin’s system, where messages may be broadcast to multiple recipients
`before those recipients are even registered, a person of ordinary skill in the
`art would have had reason to independently verify to the recipients that the
`originator asked for, and was sent, an encryption key.
`For the above reasons, we determine that Microsoft has not
`adequately shown that Olkin teaches or suggests limitation 1.6 of claim 1.
`Microsoft does not point to any passage in Kim that would supply the
`
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`
`

`

`IPR2020-00101
`Patent 8,495,359 B2
`
`missing teaching. See Pet. 26–29. Nor do Microsoft’s arguments regarding
`limitations 1.1–1.5 demonstrate that the combination of Olkin and Kim
`teaches limitation 1.6. See id. at 11–26. Thus, we determine that Microsoft
`has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that
`claim 1 would have been obvious over Olkin in combination with Kim.
`
`4.
`
`Claim 2–15
`
`Like claim 1, independent claims 6 and 11 both include a
`“confirmation” step similar to limitation 1.6. See Ex. 1001, 9:22–24
`(“confirming to the first computing device that the encryption key was
`requested by the second computing device and was sent to the second
`computing device”); see id. at 10:16–18 (“querying, by the recipient
`computing device, the gateway server for confirmation that the sending
`computing device requested the first encryption key”). Microsoft’s argument
`regarding limitation 1.6 is identical to the argument for the corresponding
`limitation in claim 6, see Pet. 26–29, and substantially the same as the
`argument for the corresponding limitation in claim 11, see id. at 35–37.
`The remaining claims 2–5, 7–10, and 12–15 depend from claims 1, 6,
`or 11, and thus include the “confirmation” step of the base claims.
`Microsoft’s analysis only addresses the added limitations of each dependent
`claim, and does not provide further argument or evidence relevant to
`limitation 1.6 or the corresponding limitations in claims 6 and 11. See Pet.
`29–32, 38–40.
`Thus, for the same reasons given above as to claim 1, we determine
`that Microsoft has not sufficiently shown that claims 2–15 would have been
`obvious over Olkin in combination with Kim. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071,
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00101
`Patent 8,495,359 B2
`
`1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Dependent claims are nonobvious under section 103
`if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”)
`
`B.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the
`Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in proving that at least
`one challenged claim of the ’359 patent is unpatentable. Therefore, we deny
`the Petition.
`
` ORDER
`
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.
`
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00101
`Patent 8,495,359 B2
`
`For PETITIONER:
`
`Todd M. Siegel
`Andrew M. Mason
`Robert F. Scotti
`Joseph T. Jakubek
`KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP
`todd.siegel@klarquist.com
`andrew.mason@klarquist.com
`robert.scotti@klarquist.com
`joseph.jakubek@klarquist.com
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Ryan Loveless
`Brett Mangrum
`James Etheridge
`Jeffrey Huang
`ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP
`ryan@etheridgelaw.com
`brett@etheridgelaw.com
`jim@etheridgelaw.com
`jeff@etheridgelaw.com
`
`
`
`
`20
`
`

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