Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 149 Filed 05/01/20 Page 1 of 100 PageID #: 23454
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
` CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-CV-546-JRG
`
`CANON, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`TCL ELECTRONICS HOLDINGS LTD.,
`TCL CORPORATION,
`SHENZHEN TCL NEW
`TECHNOLOGIES CO. CO. LTD.,
`TCL KING ELECTRICAL
`APPLIANCES
`(HUIZHOU) CO., LTD.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Before the Court is Plaintiff Canon Inc.’s Claim Construction Opening Brief. (Dkt. No.
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`91.) Also before the Court are Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 92),
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`and Plaintiff Canon Inc.’s Claim Construction Reply Brief. (Dkt. No. 96.)
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`The Court held a claim construction hearing on March 18, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 109.) The
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`Parties subsequently submitted supplemental claim construction briefing. (Dkt. Nos. 118, 122,
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`126, 130.) Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by the parties at the hearing
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`and in their claim construction briefing, the Court issues this Claim Construction Order.
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`CANON EXHIBIT 2012
`Roku, Inc. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha
`IPR2020-00343
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`Table of Contents
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`I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 3
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 3
`III. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS ........................................................................ 8
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ..................................................................... 9
`A. The ‘130 Patent ..................................................................................................................... 9
`1.
`“periodically repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming
`content” ........................................................................................................................ 10
`“internet broadcasting content” ..................................................................................... 14
`2.
`“a television broadcast program transmitted through a broadcast signal” .................... 17
`3.
`“buffering” terms .......................................................................................................... 21
`4.
`“a control unit for controlling …” ................................................................................ 24
`5.
`B. The ‘767, ‘986, and ‘206 Patents ........................................................................................ 31
`6.
`“USB mass storage class” and “USB imaging class” ................................................... 33
`7.
`“logically disconnect” terms ......................................................................................... 36
`8.
`“continue,” “end,” and “stop” the display .................................................................... 41
`9.
`“a connection unit configured to connect …” and “a communication unit
`configured to communicate …” ................................................................................... 45
`“a detection unit configured to detect …” .................................................................... 53
`10.
`“a control unit configured to control …” ...................................................................... 57
`11.
`“a display control unit configured to display …” ......................................................... 63
`12.
`C. The ‘413 Patent ................................................................................................................... 68
`13.
`“attribute of [a/the] remote control device” .................................................................. 69
`14.
`“evaluating a degree of suitability”............................................................................... 72
`15.
`“operation device” ........................................................................................................ 77
`16.
`“operation form” ........................................................................................................... 80
`17.
`“an acquiring unit which acquires…” ........................................................................... 84
`18.
`“a determining unit which determines…” .................................................................... 89
`19.
`“a controlling unit which displays …”.......................................................................... 96
`V. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................... 100
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Canon (“Plaintiff” or “Canon”) brings suit alleging infringement by Defendants
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`TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd., TCL Corporation, Shenzhen TCL New Technologies Co. Ltd.,
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`and TCL King Electrical Appliances (Huizhou) Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Defendants”) of the
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`following five patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,810,130 (“the ‘130 patent”); 8,078,767 (“the ‘767
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`patent”); 8,346,986 (“the ‘986 patent”); 8,713,206 (“the ‘206 patent”); and 7,746,413 (“the ‘413
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`patent”). An introduction to each of these patents is discussed in the analysis section below.
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`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
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`It is understood that “[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which
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`the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the protected
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`invention.” Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview
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`Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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`
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`“In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic
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`evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background
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`science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva Pharms.
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`USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (citation omitted). “In cases where those
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`subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that
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`extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings’ of claim construction that we
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`discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.”
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`Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
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`
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`To ascertain the meaning of claims, courts look to three primary sources: the claims, the
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`specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must
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`contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make
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`and use the invention. Id. A patent’s claims must be read in view of the specification, of which
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`they are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of dictionary,
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`which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. “One purpose for
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`examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims.”
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`Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`
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`Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of
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`the patentee’s invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
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`Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own
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`lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the
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`specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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`Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
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`embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim
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`language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc.,
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`34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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`
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`This Court’s claim construction analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit’s
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`decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips,
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`the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In
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`particular, the court reiterated that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee
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`is entitled the right to exclude.” Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
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`Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To that end, the words used in a claim
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`are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and customary
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`meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent
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`application.” Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law flows naturally from the recognition that
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`inventors are usually persons who are skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are
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`addressed to, and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id.
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`
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`Despite the importance of claim terms, Phillips made clear that “the person of ordinary
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`skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
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`which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
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`specification.” Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of
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`particular terms, those terms are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.” Id. at 1315
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`(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as being
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`the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314–17. As the Supreme Court stated long
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`ago, “in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive portions
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`of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the
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`language employed in the claims.” Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In addressing the role of
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`the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier observations from Renishaw
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`PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998):
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`Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
`confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
`intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim
`language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
`will be, in the end, the correct construction.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the specification
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`plays in the claim construction process.
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`
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`The prosecution history also continues to play an important role in claim interpretation.
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`Like the specification, the prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the
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`United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Because
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`the file history, however, “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant,”
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`it may lack the clarity of the specification and thus be less useful in claim construction proceedings.
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`Id. Nevertheless, the prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that is relevant to the determination
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`of how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention during
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`prosecution by narrowing the scope of the claims. Id.; see Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys.,
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`Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “a patentee’s statements during
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`prosecution, whether relied on by the examiner or not, are relevant to claim interpretation”).
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`
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`Phillips rejected any claim construction approach that sacrificed the intrinsic record in
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`favor of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony. The en banc court
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`condemned the suggestion made by Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193
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`(Fed. Cir. 2002), that a court should discern the ordinary meaning of the claim terms (through
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`dictionaries or otherwise) before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–24. According to Phillips, reliance on dictionary definitions at the
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`expense of the specification had the effect of “focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of
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`words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.” Id. at 1321.
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`Phillips emphasized that the patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only
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`the invented subject matter. Id.
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`
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`Phillips does not preclude all uses of dictionaries in claim construction proceedings.
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`Instead, the court assigned dictionaries a role subordinate to the intrinsic record. In doing so, the
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`court emphasized that claim construction issues are not resolved by any magic formula. The court
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`did not impose any particular sequence of steps for a court to follow when it considers disputed
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`claim language. Id. at 1323–25. Rather, Phillips held that a court must attach the appropriate
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`weight to the intrinsic sources offered in support of a proposed claim construction, bearing in mind
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`the general rule that the claims measure the scope of the patent grant.
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`The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
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`patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
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`in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
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`Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim
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`indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the
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`construer of patent claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by
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`Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. 2120. “Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
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`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in
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`relevant portion). Section 112, Paragraph 6, provides that a structure may be claimed as a “means
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`. . . for performing a specified function” and that an act may be claimed as a “step for performing
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`a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`However, § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable
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`presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes “means” or “step for” terms
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`and that it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. The
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`presumption stands or falls according to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand
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`the claim with the functional language, in the context of the entire specification, to denote
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`sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function. Id. at 1349; see also Media
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`Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Robert
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`Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`When it applies, § 112, ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the structure,
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`materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and
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`equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a means-plus-function limitation
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`involves multiple steps. “The first step . . . is a determination of the function of the means-plus-
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`function limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311
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`(Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he next step is to determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the
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`specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. A “structure disclosed in the specification is
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`‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates
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`that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id. The focus of the “corresponding structure”
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`inquiry is not merely whether a structure is capable of performing the recited function, but rather
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`whether the corresponding structure is “clearly linked or associated with the [recited] function.”
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`Id. The corresponding structure “must include all structure that actually performs the recited
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`function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit “incorporation of structure from the written
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`description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function.” Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great
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`Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`III. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS
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`In their December 30, 2019 P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement
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`(Dkt. No. 87), and their March 4, 2020 Joint Claim Construction Chart Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(d)
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`(Dkt. No. 100), the parties submitted the following agreements:
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`TERM
`
`AGREED CONSTRUCTION
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`“latest”
`(the ‘130 patent)
`“predetermined [first/second] period”
`(the ‘767, ‘986, and’ 206 patents)
`“displaying an operation screen related to
`the determined operation form displayed”
`/
`“which displays an operation screen related
`to the operation form which is determined
`by the determining unit displayed”
`(the ‘413 patent)
`“outside”
`(the ‘413 patent)
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`“most recent”
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`Plain and ordinary meaning, which is “a period
`of time determined beforehand”
`“displaying an operation screen related to the
`determined operation form”
`/
`“which displays an operation screen related to
`the operation form which is determined by the
`determining unit”
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`“a location not in the remote control device or
`the device displaying the operation screen”
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`Accordingly, the Court adopts the constructions agreed to by the parties as listed above.
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`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`
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`The parties’ positions and the Court’s analysis as to the disputed terms are presented below,
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`and are grouped based on the relevant patent(s).
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`A. The ‘130 Patent
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`The ‘130 patent, titled “Method and Apparatus of Power Management for Moving Image-
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`Streaming Content,” was filed on September 29, 2003, and claims priority to an earlier patent
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`application filed on October 8, 2002. The ‘130 patent issued on October 5, 2010.
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`The ‘130 patent relates generally to viewing conventional television broadcasts and internet
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`streaming broadcasts on a television or similar display. (See, e.g., ‘130 patent col. 1, l. 8- col. 2, l.
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`55.) In particular, the object of the stated invention is to receive internet streaming broadcast at a
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`higher speed to make the user feel as comfortable as watching a conventional television broadcast.
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`(See id.) The Abstract of the ‘130 patent states:
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`Provided is a receiving apparatus for receiving streaming contents which is capable
`of receiving contents at a higher speed. The receiving apparatus receives and
`accumulates the streaming contents periodically during a power off state or while
`other contents are being audiovisually enjoyed.
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`Claim 1 of the ‘130 patent recites:
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`A receiving apparatus for receiving a moving image-streaming content through an
`internet, the moving image-streaming content being internet broadcasting content,
`said apparatus comprising:
`
`a receiving unit for receiving a moving image-streaming content which is internet
`broadcasting content by an access through the internet to a URL of the streaming
`content;
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`a memory unit for storing URL information of the moving image-streaming content
`received by the receiving unit;
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`a display unit for displaying on a display screen the moving image-streaming
`content received by the receiving unit; an operation unit for receiving an operation
`of turning off and turning on a power source for supplying power;
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`a buffering unit for buffering the moving image-streaming content received by the
`receiving unit; and
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`a control unit for (1) controlling, responsive to the receiving by the operation unit
`of the operation of turning off the power source, to read out the URL information
`stored in the memory unit, and (2) controlling, while the power source is in an off
`state, to periodically repeat accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming
`content which had been displayed before the turning off the power source, so as to
`receive by the receiving unit and to buffer in the buffering unit the latest moving
`image-streaming content, and (3) controlling, responsive to the receiving by the
`operation unit of the operation of turning on the power source, to read out from the
`buffering unit the latest buffered moving image-streaming content and to start the
`displaying on the display screen of the latest buffered moving image-streaming
`content.
`
`1.
`
`“periodically repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming
`content”
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Proposed Construction
`“repeat[ing] accessing for a period of time of
`a URL of the moving-image streaming
`content”
`
`Defendants’
`Proposed Construction
`“repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the
`moving-image streaming content at regular
`intervals”
`
`The term “periodically repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming
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`content” appears in claims 1, 2, 5, and 7 of the ‘130 patent.
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`(1) The Parties’ Positions
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`
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`Plaintiff contends that the phrase “periodically repeating accessing” refers to the repeated
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`accessing of a URL “for a period of time” based on the intrinsic support. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 91,
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`at 3.) In particular, during the period of time set for outputting signals, repeated accessing of a
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`URL will take place until the period of time elapses. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the specification
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`(relying on FIG. 4) is clear that a timer starts a timer operation and a period of time is set for the
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`timer to output timing signals, which is used to initiate the repeated accessing of a URL. (Id. at
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`3 – 5.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ inclusion of the word “regular intervals” has no support
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`in the intrinsic record. (Id. at 5 – 6.)
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`Defendants contend that a construction of “at regular intervals” is based on the intrinsic
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`support and a plain meaning of the term “periodically.” (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 92 at 3-4.) Defendants
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`argue that a plain meaning of the term–evidenced by dictionary definitions–requires “regular
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`intervals.” (Id. at 3.) Defendants argue that the term “periodically” is used according to its plain
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`meaning in the specification. (Id.) Defendants argue that the specification teaches repeated
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`accessing is performed at regular intervals, i.e., each time a set time on the timer is reached. (Id.
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`at 4.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s construction contradicts the specification and by
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`requiring the system to access the streaming content while the timer is running, but ceasing access
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`of the content once the timer has expired. (Id.) Defendants argue that under Plaintiff’s
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`construction, once the “period of time” expires, no more repeated accessing and buffering occurs.
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`(Id.)
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`In its Reply, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ position would require “indeterminate
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`buffering capacity,” whereas the specification teaches managing “periodic buffering using limited,
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`allocated buffering capacity.” (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 96 at 3.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants rely
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`on “cherry-picked” dictionary definitions in contrast to the intrinsic support to include the
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`unnecessary “regular intervals” limitation. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’
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`construction would cause repeated accessing at every minute until and unless the power on is
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`detected. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff argues that under its construction, the specific way in which “repeated
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`accessing” occurs is immaterial so long as such accessing occurs during a period of time. (Id. at
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`5.)
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`
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`(2) Analysis
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`The parties’ dispute is whether the phrase “periodically repeating accessing” is “for a
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`period of time” or “at regular intervals.” The disputed term appears in claims 1, 2, 5, and 7 of the
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`‘130 patent. A portion of claim 1 is reproduced below, in relevant part:
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`a control unit for … controlling, while the power source is in an off state, to
`periodically repeat accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming content
`which had been displayed before the turning off the power source, so as to receive
`by the receiving unit and to buffer in the buffering unit the latest moving image-
`streaming content…
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`The claim language is clear that the control unit controls periodically repeat accessing a
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`URL while the power source is in an off state. The claim language, by itself, does not necessarily
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`require “regular” periods or intervals of access.
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`The parties rely mostly on the specification in support of their constructions. In particular,
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`both parties point to FIG. 4 in the patent and the related specification disclosure as being supportive
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`of their constructions. In relation to FIG. 4, the specification teaches that during a power off state,
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`the controller instructs the timer to start the timer operation and sets a period for outputting a timing
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`signal during the power off state. (See, e.g., ‘130 patent, col. 9, ll. 43-49; col. 13, ll. 28-58; see
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`also FIG. 4.) Likewise, the specification teaches that while the power source for the receiving
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`apparatus is in an off state, the timer outputs the timing signal at the set period and according to
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`the timing signal periodically repeats receiving data:
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`Further, while the power source 125 for the receiving apparatus 100 is in an off
`state, the timer 117 outputs the timing signal at the set period (step S123). The
`controller of Internet connection 116 controls the Internet connector 105 according
`to the timing signal, and periodically repeats in a background the operation for
`receiving the data of the streaming contents that are audiovisually enjoyed
`immediately before the power off and storing the data into the data buffer 106.
`Accordingly, the latest data is constantly accumulated in the data buffer 106. The
`above operations are normally performed because the main power source 126 is in
`an on state.
`
`(‘130 patent, col 10, ll. 6-17 (emphasis added).) It is clear that a period is set for outputting a
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`timing signal, and that based on the timing signal the controller periodically repeats accessing a
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`URL.
`
`
`
`Overall, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ arguments. Defendants primarily rely
`
`on extrinsic dictionary definitions for the “regular” limitation in their proposed construction. The
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`Court finds no support in the intrinsic record for the limitation of “regular” intervals. Even if there
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`was support in the specification for Defendants’ construction, at best such support would be non-
`
`limited embodiments that should not be imported into the claim language.
`
`On balance, the Court finds that the term “periodically repeat accessing” is appropriately
`
`construed as “repeat[ing] accessing at intervals of time.” The Court finds that, as a whole, the
`
`specification supports that the “periodically repeat accessing” limitation is a limitation that the
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`repeat accessing occur at interval(s) of time. Further, the Court notes that during the claim
`
`construction hearing, Plaintiff conceded that the “periodically repeat accessing” may be done at
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`intervals, but that they were not required to be regular. (Dkt. No. 116 at 110:18-24.)
`
`
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`The Court hereby construes the term “periodically repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the
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`moving image-streaming content” to mean “repeat[ing] accessing at intervals of time of a
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`URL of the moving image-streaming content.”
`
`2.
`
`“internet broadcasting content”
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Proposed Construction
`“content obtainable over the Internet by more
`than one user”
`
`Defendants’
`Proposed Construction
`“internet content simultaneously transmitted
`to a plurality of recipients”
`
`
`The disputed term “internet broadcasting content” appears in claims 1, 2, 5, and 7 of the
`
`‘130 patent.
`
`(1) The Parties’ Positions
`
`
`
`Plaintiff contends that its construction is consistent with the intrinsic evidence. (See, e.g.,
`
`Dkt. No. 91 at 1-2.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ construction relies on dictionary definitions
`
`in contrast to the intrinsic evidence and excludes preferred embodiments. (Id.) Plaintiff argues
`
`that the specification distinguishes conventional television broadcasts from internet content
`
`broadcasting. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ “simultaneous transmission” language
`
`is equated to a “push” type transmission found in conventional television broadcasts, and thus
`
`excludes preferred embodiments of “pulling” streaming broadcasts. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff argues
`
`that Defendants’ construction attempts to construe “internet broadcast” in the conventional
`
`television context and not in the internet context as taught by the specification. (Id.)
`
`
`
`Defendants contend that their construction gives meaning to all words of the term and is
`
`consistent with the intrinsic evidence. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 92 at 5.) Defendants argue that
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`Plaintiff’s construction reads “broadcasting” out of the claim limitation. (Id.) Defendants argue
`
`that multiple dictionaries define “broadcast” to require “simultaneous transmission” to a plurality
`
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`of recipients. (Id.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s construction improperly conflates “internet
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`broadcasting content” to mean any content obtainable over the internet. (Id.) Defendants argue
`
`that how the content is accessed is different than the core meaning of the “broadcast” term, and
`
`whether the content is pushed to or pulled by the user does not change the inherent meaning of
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`“broadcast.” (Id. at 6.)
`
`
`
`In its Reply, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ construction contradicts the intrinsic
`
`evidence. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 96 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that the specification distinguishes
`
`conventional television broadcasts from internet content broadcasting. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that
`
`there is no intrinsic evidence that limits the “internet broadcasting” term to “simultaneous
`
`transmission.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff argues that the specification treats conventional broadcasting
`
`as a “push” type transmission and internet broadcasting as a “pull” type transmission. (Id.)
`
`Because internet broadcasting is a “pull” transmission, Plaintiff argues that