`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`AUSTIN DIVISION
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC and
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
`
`Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01075-ADA
`
`Plaintiffs
`
`v.
`
`VMware, Inc.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`EX2007
`VMware v. IV
`IPR2020-00470
`
`
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 2 of 54
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
`Legal Standards ................................................................................................................ 1
`A. Claim Construction Generally ................................................................................... 1
`
`B. Means-Plus-Function Claim Construction Analysis ............................................... 2
`
`C. Indefiniteness ............................................................................................................... 2
`
`III. The Disputed Claim Terms .............................................................................................. 3
`A. The ’752 Patent ........................................................................................................... 3
`
` The ’686 and ’726 Patents .......................................................................................... 8
`
`1. “modify a resource allocation” / “modified resource allocation” / “modify[ing] [the]
`computer resources allocated to a virtual server” (’686 patent Claims 5, 6, 7) .................. 9
`
`2. “modify[ing] a resource allocation for the virtual server” / “modifying [the] computer
`resources allocated to a virtual server” (’726 patent Claims 1, 4, 5 and 8) ........................ 9
`
`3. “resource denials” (’726 patent Claims 1, 4, 5 and 8) ................................................ 10
`
`4. “resource unavailable messages” / “denied requests to modify a resource allocation” /
`“resource unavailable messages resulting from denied requests to modify a resource
`allocation” (’686 patent Claims 5, 6, 7) ............................................................................ 11
`
`5. “virtual server” (’686 patent Claims 5, 6, 7); (’726 patent Claims 1-11) ................... 12
`
`6. “quality of service guarantee” (’726 patent Claims 1 and 4) ...................................... 15
`
`7. “determining that a second physical host can accommodate the requested modified
`resource allocation” (’686 patent Claims 5, 6 and 7) ........................................................ 16
`
`8. “determination that a virtual server is overloaded” (’686 patent Claims 5, 6 and 7) . 18
`
`9. “virtual server overload signal” (’726 patent Claims 1, 4, 5 and 8) ........................... 20
`
`10. Alleged Means Plus Function Elements (’686 patent Claim 7) (’726 patent Claims 1,
`3, 5 and 7) ......................................................................................................................... 21
`
`C. The ’818 Patent ......................................................................................................... 29
`
`1. “virtual [network/storage network] interface layer of an application server” (Claims 1,
`17, 32, 42) ......................................................................................................................... 29
`
`i
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 3 of 54
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`2. “hierarchical token bucket resource allocation” / “token(s)” (Claims; 1, 17, 30, 32, 33,
`37-42) ................................................................................................................................ 31
`
`3. “enforcing . . .” / “receiv[e/ing] . . .” / “classify[ing] . . .” / “compar[e/ing] . . .” /
`“forward[ing] . . .” / “buffer[ing] . . .” (Claims; 1, 17, 30, 32, 37-39, 42) ........................ 33
`
`4. “maintain[ing] a connection over a network fabric” (Claims 1, 17, 30, 32, 42) ......... 34
`
`5. Alleged Means Plus Function Elements (Claim 17) (individually set forth in Ex. C) 36
`
`D. The ’051 Patent ......................................................................................................... 38
`
`1. “customer forwarding [table(s)/information]” (claims: 1, 3) ...................................... 38
`
`2. “virtual server(s)” (claims; 1, 3, 6) ............................................................................. 41
`
`3. “physical interface(s)” (claims; 1, 3) .......................................................................... 42
`
`4. “storing . . .” / “determining . . .” / “using . . .” (claims; 1, 3) .................................... 43
`
`IV. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 47
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`
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`
`ii
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 4 of 54
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
`483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................................ 45
`Advanced Mktg. Sys., LLC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
`2016 WL 1741396 (E.D. Tex. May 3, 2016) ......................................................................................... 22
`Aloft Media, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`570 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Tex. 2008) ....................................................................................... 24, 26, 27
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................................. 37
`Bell Commc’ns. Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns. Corp.,
`55 F.3d 615 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................................. 40
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................................ 33
`Collaborative Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`2015 WL 2250391 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2015) ...................................................................................... 23
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................... 9, 10, 14
`Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`915 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................................ 31
`CSB-Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,
`2011 WL 3240838 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2011) .......................................................................................... 23
`Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber,
`674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .............................................................................................................. 10
`Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`810 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2011) ....................................................................................... 24, 26, 27
`Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`566 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................................ 35, 46
`Fisher-Rosemount Sys. v. ABB Ltd.,
`2019 WL 6830806 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2019) ................................................................................. 21, 22
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Bitco Gen. Ins. Corp.,
`2016 WL 125594 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) .......................................................................................... 24
`Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Am. Corp.,
`649 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .............................................................................................................. 36
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................................ 19
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................................... 7
`Masco Corp. v. United States,
`303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................................ 2
`Maurice Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp.,
`2006 WL 1751779 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006) ........................................................................................ 3, 4
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co.,
`194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................................ 7
`
`iii
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`
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 5 of 54
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ................................................................................................................................. 3
`Netfuel, Inc. v. F5 Networks, Inc.,
`2017 WL 2834538 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2017) ......................................................................................... 22
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............................................................................................................. 45
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ......................................................................................................... 1, 2, 7
`Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
`182 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................................................................. 10
`Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ........................................................................................................ 35, 46
`RLIS, Inc. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc.,
`2013 WL 3772472 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2013) ............................................................................ 24, 26, 27
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................................ 3
`Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
`2017 WL 2221177 (D. Del. May 19, 2017) ........................................................................................... 22
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................................ 2
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................................. 1
`Watts v. XL Sys., Inc.,
`232 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................................ 2, 36
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................... 2, 21, 38
`Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`891 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................................. 38
`Other Authorities
`IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms, p. 1182 (6th ed. 1996) ........................... 14
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`iv
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 6 of 54
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`Per the Court’s Order Governing Proceedings – Patent Case, plaintiffs, Intellectual
`
`Ventures I LLC and Intellectual Ventures II LLC (together “IV”), respectfully submit this claim
`
`construction brief in support of their proposed constructions for the disputed terms.
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`IV alleges that VMware infringes five patents owned by IV: United States Patent Nos.
`
`7,949,752 (“the ’752 patent”); RE 44,686 (“the ’686 patent”); RE 42,726 (“the ’726 patent”); RE
`
`43,051 (“the ’051 patent”) and RE 44,818 (“the ’818 patent).1 IV’s patents teach systems and
`
`methods to virtualize data centers and enable the use of cloud computing to deliver computer
`
`services. VMware’s products and services deliver virtualization and cloud computing services to
`
`its customers.
`
`II.
`
`Legal Standards
`
`A. Claim Construction Generally
`
`In resolving claim construction disputes, the Court considers three “intrinsic” sources: (1)
`
`the claims; (2) the patent specifications; and (3) the prosecution histories. Vitronics Corp. v.
`
`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Courts may also rely on extrinsic
`
`evidence, such as dictionaries or treatises. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005). A trial court is not required to follow any set formula to construe disputed claim
`
`terms “[n]or is the court barred from considering any particular sources or required to analyze
`
`sources in any specific sequence . . .” Id. at 1324.
`
`“The claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
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`exclude.” Id. at 1312. “The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
`
`meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the
`
`
`1 References in this brief to “Ex. __” are to exhibits attached to the Declaration of Jonathan R. DeBlois (“DeBlois
`Decl.”).
`
`1
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`
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 7 of 54
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`specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
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`1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“In some cases, the ordinary
`
`meaning of the claim language… may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim
`
`construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted
`
`meaning of commonly understood words.”). There are only two exceptions to the general rule
`
`that claims are given their ordinary and customary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a
`
`definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a
`
`claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365.
`
`Extrinsic evidence may be consulted and used to construe claim terms only if such evidence does
`
`not contradict the intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322-23.
`
`B. Means-Plus-Function Claim Construction Analysis
`
`Section 112, Paragraph 62 provides that a structure may be claimed as a “means…for
`
`performing a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2002). If the claim language does not include the word “means” then there is a rebuttable
`
`presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339,
`
`1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To overcome this presumption, it must be shown that the term at issue
`
`fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure” or “function without reciting sufficient structure for
`
`performing that function.” Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`C.
`
`Indefiniteness
`
`The Patent Act requires claims to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
`
`matter regarded as the inventions. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. To satisfy this requirement, the claim
`
`must be read in light of the intrinsic evidence to determine whether it informs one of skill in the
`
`
`2 The Pre-AIA version of § 112, ¶ 6 applies to the claims in this case.
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`
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`2
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 8 of 54
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`art at the time of the invention “about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910-11 (2014). To establish that a claim
`
`is indefinite, a patent challenger must prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence.
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`III. The Disputed Claim Terms
`
`A.
`
`The ’752 Patent
`
`The ’752 patent was issued on May 24, 2011 and claims priority to an application filed
`
`on October 23, 1998. The inventions described and claimed in the ’752 patent enable the
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`delivery of highly reliable and customizable cloud and virtualization services to customers whose
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`local computing platforms can be simple enough to support only a web browser.
`
`The litigation history of the ’752 patent has particular relevance to the disputed terms
`
`now before the Court. Specifically, on July 8, 2015, IV filed a patent infringement suit against
`
`HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc. (Case No. 6:15-cv-660) (hereinafter “HCC case”) that included
`
`the ’752 patent. On August 26, 2016, Magistrate Judge Mitchell entered a Report and
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`Recommendation construing certain terms of the ’752 patent. See HCC case, Dkt.
`
`102 (hereinafter the “R&R”). Both HCC and IV filed objections to the recommended
`
`constructions, however, the case was resolved prior to a decision on the parties’ objections.
`
`In the interest of conserving Party and Court resources, IV has adopted many of the
`
`constructions set forth in Judge Mitchell’s R&R and agrees with the reasoning supporting her
`
`conclusions. While the R&R is not determinative, it is considered persuasive. See Maurice
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`Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp., 2006 WL 1751779, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006).
`
`VMware, on the other hand, agreed to adopt only one of the prior court’s constructions, and in
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`many cases proposes the very same constructions that Magistrate Judge Mitchell rejected.
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`3
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 9 of 54
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`1. “exhausted” (Claims 1, 9 and 24)
`
`IV’s Proposed Construction
`“used up to the allotted or pre-determined
`amount”
`VMware requests the Court to construe this disputed term in a manner inconsistent with
`
`VMware’s Proposed Construction
`“unavailable for reuse”
`
`the intrinsic record and contrary to the prior recommended construction from Judge Mitchell’s
`
`R&R. See Maurice Mitchell Innovations, L.P., 2006 WL 1751779, at *4 (treating the prior
`
`court’s analysis as persuasive is consistent with “the premise that a uniform treatment of claim
`
`construction is desirable”).
`
`Judge Mitchell’s logic stands true and should be followed. The intrinsic record is
`
`replete with evidence supporting IV’s proposed construction and, in contrast, nowhere
`
`unambiguously states that the disputed term is limited to being unavailable for reuse as VMware
`
`suggests. For example, the specification discloses that resource consumption by agent 22 is
`
`monitored and further consumption is halted when the amount of said resource held by agent 22
`
`is exhausted. Ex. D at 52:31-34. The disclosure goes on to say that each agent has permission to
`
`consume up to a pre-authorized amount of each service resource when performing a task. Id. at
`
`9:40-43. Further still the patent states that a service wrapper can be used to ensure that the
`
`agent 22 does not consume more than its allotted amount of any particular service resource as
`
`specified by a respective service permission. See, e.g., id. at 22:34-37, 22:47-50, 24:63-67, 25:1-
`
`6. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “exhausted” in the context of the ’752
`
`patent means “used up to the allotted or pre-determined amount.”
`
`IV’s construction also reflects the overall goal and novelty of the inventions embodied in
`
`the ’752 patent. The patent describes a customizable and virtualized solution that enables service
`
`provider customers to utilize the services made available by the provider in a way that avoids a
`
`“one size fits all” solution. In other words, it allows customers to pay for compute power, time
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`4
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 10 of 54
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`and access on an as needed basis. In this context were “exhausted” to mean “unavailable for
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`reuse” as VMware proposes, the solution would fail at the most basic level. One customer using
`
`an amount of a service and service resource would permanently make that service and service
`
`resource unavailable to subsequent customers, even after he or she has released the resource and
`
`is no longer using it. Narrowing the term in this manner is not supported by the intrinsic record.
`
`2. “consumed”/“consumption” (Claims 1, 9, 22 and 24)
`
`VMware’s Proposed Construction
`IV’s Proposed Construction
`“used”
`“used up”
`IV’s proposal of construing the disputed term as “used” reflects the patentees’ intent as
`
`extensively disclosed in the specification. IV can find only a single instance where “used”
`
`is referenced alternatively as “used up.” See Ex. D at 8:21-23. In contrast, the patent uses
`
`“consumed” and “used” interchangeably at least half a dozen times. See, e.g., id. at 12:25-30 (“.
`
`. . which may also monitor the amount of each respective service resource consumed
`
`to ensure that no particular agent uses more than an amount authorized . . .”), 16:50-55 (“. . .
`
`monitor the amount of respective service resources expended, used, or otherwise consumed by
`
`one or more agents”), 25:14-16 (“at step 818, service wrapper 26 identifies the amount of each
`
`service resource actually consumed or used to execute the instruction.”) (emphasis added).
`
`The citation in a single sentence that references “consumed” as “used up” is insufficient
`
`to support VMware’s construction, particularly in light of the widespread use of “consumed” and
`
`“used” as interchangeable. Therefore, the Court should reject VMware’s unsupported position
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`and construe the term “consumed” as “used.”
`
`3. “service” (Claims 1, 3, 9, 14 and 24)
`
`IV’s Proposed Construction
` “network functionality available to agents”
`
`
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`5
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`VMware’s Proposed Construction
`“an application that is used by an agent on
`behalf of a principal”
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 11 of 54
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`The first description of the disputed term appears in the Abstract and discloses that “an
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`agent is operable to utilize a service within the network system.” This description of the service
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`as functionality of the network system that is available to the claimed agents is consistent
`
`throughout the entire patent. In fact, there is only a single mention of one embodiment of the
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`patented invention where it’s noted that services may comprise a software application available
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`to a principal which may be used by an agent on its behalf. Ex. D at 10:17-20. Presumably it is
`
`from this lone citation which VMware attempts to read into “services” the proposed limitations
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`noted above. Such a limitation, however, is not only contrary to the basic principles of claim
`
`construction but is overwhelmingly discredited by the remaining 35 pages of description and
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`disclosure in the ’752 patent.
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`For instance, the specification describes the functionality of a service as not limited to a
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`particular form, such as an application, but rather, various network functionality made available
`
`by the operator or “service provider” to the claimed agents in order to perform an operation or
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`task. See, e.g., id. at 12:14-25 (“[i]n operation, one or more agents may be set up for each user
`
`who is a subscriber to the services offered by the operator/provider of the network system . .
`
`. [e]ach agent for a particular user performs one or more tasks on behalf of that user . . . [t]o
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`perform these tasks, each agent utilizes one or more services, during which it may consume
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`various respective service resources.”). Examples of the claimed “services” available via the
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`network system to the subscribers include “an e-mail service, a voice mail service, a
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`paging/facsimile service, an address book and calendar service, and a business news and stocks
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`information service, respectively.” Id. at 13:21-28, Fig. 2. Notably, these are not described as
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`“applications” but are said to be “sub-systems” of the network system coupled to fast Ethernet
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`hubs, and data storage and processing hardware to support the aforementioned
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`6
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 12 of 54
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`services. Id. at 13:15-20. While IV does not disagree that the disclosed services could be
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`compiled into discrete programs, it does dispute that the specification limits the claimed services
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`in such a way.
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`A further confirmation of IV’s position that the claimed “services” are not limited to
`
`applications, but in fact represent functionality of the networked system, can be found in the
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`Microsoft Computer Dictionary, p. 475 (5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter Ex. O] (emphasis added)3,
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`which defines “services” in the context of networking as “specialized, software-
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`based functionality provided by network servers.” (emphasis added). This definition is
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`consistent with the disclosures in the specification cited above and further evidences that IV’s
`
`construction should be adopted.
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`4. Means Plus Function Elements (Claims 1, 3, 4, 6) (individually set forth in Ex. B)
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`As an initial matter, VMware attempts to impermissibly narrow the identified structure
`
`for each and every functional clause in Ex. B by qualifying the corresponding structure with the
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`language “as described in” and citing cherry-picked portions of the specification thereafter. This
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`is improper. Identifying the specific structure corresponding to the claimed function is all that is
`
`required. Any further attempt to limit the corresponding structure, for example, by limiting that
`
`structure to only a single embodiment, is not allowed. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains
`
`Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Identification of corresponding structure may
`
`embrace more than the preferred embodiment.”).
`
`As one example, for the element “means for mediating an interaction between the means
`
`for using the service and the service,” both parties identify “service wrapper 26” as
`
`
`3 Although extrinsic evidence is not dispositive, contemporaneous evidence of the understanding of one of skill in
`the art is permitted to further support the intrinsic record. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18. See also Markman v.
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
`
`
`
`7
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 13 of 54
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`corresponding structure. VMware, however, further limits that structure to “as described in
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`16:22-38.” This reads out several other instances in the specification where service wrapper 26
`
`is describe as performing the claimed function. See, e.g., Ex. D at 3:20-27, 17:43-46, 18:49-54,
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`25:1-24. Accordingly, the Court should disregard VMware’s narrowing pin cites.
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`Aside from the impermissible qualifying of corresponding structure discussed above, the
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`parties only disagreement relates to clause 6 in Ex. B. IV and VMware are in agreement on the
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`claimed function of clause 6, but the structure identified by VMware is too narrow and reads out
`
`broader structure clearly linked to performance of the claimed function. For example, VMware
`
`proposes that the structure is “monitor (50),” yet monitor 50 is only a sub-part of service wrapper
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`26—proposed by IV—that collectively performs the claimed function of “monitoring an amount
`
`of the service resource used by the network-based agent.” The specification, for instance,
`
`discloses that “service wrapper 26 identifies the amount of each service resource actually
`
`consumed or used to execute the instruction . . . [then] asks agent server to decrement the amount
`
`allotted to agent 22 by the amount actually used.” Ex. D at 25:14-18. So while IV agrees that
`
`monitor 50 plays a role in performing the claimed function (as it is a sub-component of service
`
`wrapper 26), it is clear from the above citation that service wrapper 26 as a whole is also
`
`involved. Therefore, the Court should adopt IV’s proposed structure corresponding to the
`
`function of clause 6 because it properly encompasses the entire scope of the corresponding
`
`structure.
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`
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`The ’686 and ’726 Patents4
`
`While the ’686 patent issued on December 31, 2013, and the ‘726 patent issued on
`
`September 20, 2011, both claim priority to an application filed on May 11, 2000. The inventions
`
`
`4 Because the two patents share a specification, unless otherwise noted all citations in this Section are to the ’726
`patent.
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`8
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 14 of 54
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`described and claimed in the ’686 and ’726 patents relate to systems and methods for transferring
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`virtual machines from one physical server to another physical server to help avoid outages, and
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`thereby enable increased service continuity for business and consumer customers.
`
`1.
`“modify a resource allocation” / “modified resource allocation”
`/ “modify[ing] [the] computer resources allocated to a virtual server” (’686 patent
`Claims 5, 6, 7)
`2.
`“modify[ing] a resource allocation for the virtual server” / “modifying
`[the] computer resources allocated to a virtual server” (’726 patent Claims 1, 4, 5
`and 8)
`IV’s Proposed Construction
`“modif[y/ied] set of functions and features of
`a physical host(s) used in implementing tasks
`for each virtual server” / “modify[ing] a set of
`the functions and features of a physical
`host(s) used in implementing tasks for each
`virtual machine”
`IV’s proposal for construing the disputed terms should be adopted because, (a) it
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`VMWare’s Proposed Construction
`“modif[y/ied] a quality of service guarantee”
`/ “modify[ing] [the] computer resources
`allocated to a virtual server”
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`correctly identifies and incorporates the intrinsic definition of “resource/resource allocation,” and
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`(b) it accurately reflects the knowledge of one of skill in the art. VMware’s proposal, on the
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`other hand, simply reads in “quality of service guarantee” while simultaneously reading out
`
`“resource allocation.” Not only is this not helpful, but it’s contrary to black letter claim
`
`construction law, and therefore, should be rejected. See Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris
`
`Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`The disputed terms at issue here appear in seven claims across both the ’726 and ’686
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`patents. Since “modify” is well known and used in its plain meaning, the construction of the
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`“resource allocation” iterations are the real dispute. IV’s proposal takes its support directly from
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`the intrinsic record which clearly and unambiguously defines “resource” as “the set of functions
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`and features the physical host machine uses in implementing tasks for each virtual server.” Ex. F
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`at 4:28-30. By directly incorporating the specification’s definition of the disputed terms into its
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`Case 1:19-cv-01075-ADA Document 53 Filed 03/06/20 Page 15 of 54
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`proposed construction, IV’s proposal captures the true scope of the disputed terms while
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`following the well-known claim construction principals of not reading extraneous limitations
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`into the claims. See Comark Commc’ns, Inc., 156 F.3d at 1187.
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`Notably, VMware reads out “resource allocation” entirely and replaces it with “quality of
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`service guarantee,” a term found only in the preamble of two of the seven claims at issue. Even
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`were VMware arguing that the preamble of those two claims is limiting (which it is not), the
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`preamble is not necessary to breathe life into the claims, and thus cannot be limiting. Pitney
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`Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the
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`Court should reject VMware’s transparent attempt to re-write the claims and adopt IV’s
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`proposed construction for these disputed terms.
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`3.
` “resource denials” (’726 patent Claims 1, 4, 5 and 8)
`IV’s Proposed Construction
`VMWare’s Proposed Construction
`“an indication that a request by the virtual
`“an indication that a request by the virtual
`server cannot be immediately serviced”
`server for additional resources is either
`implicitly or explicitly denied”
`The Court should adopt IV’s proposed construction of the disputed term because
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`“resource denials” is broadly defined in the specification and VMware’s proposed construction is
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`merely one narrow example of a single preferred embodiment. More specifically, IV’s proposed
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`construction is a direct quotation from the