`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 12
` Entered: November 18, 2020
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, STACEY G. WHITE, and
`SHELDON M. MCGEE, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MCKONE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Patent Owner’s Request on Rehearing of Decision on Institution
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Background and Summary
`A.
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes
`review of claims 1–7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 18–21, and 25–30 of U.S. Patent
`No. 7,076,431 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’431 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Parus
`Holdings, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response to the
`Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Pursuant to our authorization
`(Ex. 1033), Petitioner filed a Reply, Paper 7 (“Reply”), and Patent Owner
`filed a Sur-reply, Paper 8 (“Sur-reply”).
`Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, Reply, and
`Sur-reply, we instituted an inter partes review of the ’431 patent. Paper 9
`(“Dec.”), 1. In doing so, we rejected arguments by Patent Owner that we
`should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), NHK Spring Co. v.
`Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12,
`2018) (precedential), and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper
`11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), to deny the petition in light of a
`trial scheduled in Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:19-cv-00432
`(W.D. Tex.1) (“the Texas case”). Dec. 8–22.
`Patent Owner asks us to reconsider our decision not to exercise our
`discretion to deny the Petition in light of alleged “new facts that have arisen
`since the Board’s Decision, which decidedly tilt the Fintiv factors in favor of
`denying institution in light of the earlier trial in the Parallel Proceeding in
`the District Court for the Western District of Texas.” Paper 11 (“Req.”), 1.
`For the reasons given below, we decline to modify our Decision.
`
`
`1 We refer to the United States District Court for the Western District of
`Texas, Waco Division, as “the Texas court” in this Decision.
`
`2
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`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
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`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Legal Background
`When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for
`an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). An abuse of
`discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous
`interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial
`evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing
`relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281
`(Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
`2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The
`burden of showing that the Institution Decision should be modified is on
`Patent Owner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`(2019). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the
`party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
`matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.
`Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc.
`v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is
`permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”); 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314(a). The Board has held that the advanced state of a parallel district
`court action is a factor that may weigh in favor of denying a petition under
`§ 314(a). See NHK Spring, Paper 8 at 20; Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
`Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 58 & n.2 (Nov. 2019). We consider the
`following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits
`support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial
`date in the parallel proceeding”:
`1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that
`one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted;
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`3
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`3.
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`4.
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`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`2.
`proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s
`projected statutory deadline for a final written decision;
`investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the
`parties;
`overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the
`parallel proceeding;
`5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel
`proceeding are the same party; and
`other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of
`discretion, including the merits.
`Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic
`view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by
`denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.
`
`
`6.
`
`Patent Owner’s Arguments
`B.
`Patent Owner does not argue that we misapprehended or overlooked
`any argument or evidence that it presented previously. Rather, Patent Owner
`argues that we should re-evaluate our Decision in light of “new facts” that
`have arisen in the Texas court after our Decision. Req. 1–2. In particular,
`Patent Owner argues that
`(1) Petitioner has moved for, and Patent Owner has opposed, a stay in
`the Texas court, which should impact our evaluation of Fintiv
`factor 1; and
`(2) Petitioner and Patent Owner have indicated that they are available
`for trial in July 2021, and
`(3) the Texas court has resumed conducting jury trials, which,
`together, should impact our evaluation of Fintiv factors 2 and 5
`by removing any doubt that a trial in the Texas court will
`happen in July 2021. Id.
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`4
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`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`Fintiv Factor 1: Whether the court granted a stay or
`1.
`evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is
`instituted
`Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner requested a stay in the Texas
`court on October 1, 2020, and that Patent Owner opposed the request on the
`next day. Req. 5. Patent Owner argues that a decision from the Texas court
`on the motion to stay is imminent and that, given its prior rulings “in exactly
`the same circumstances,” the Texas court will deny the motion. Id.
`Patent Owner did not make this argument in its Preliminary Response
`or Sur-reply; thus, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked it. For
`that reason alone, Patent Owner’s new argument is improper and
`insufficient. Nevertheless, even if we were to consider the argument, it
`would not be persuasive.
`In the Decision, we made clear that it would improper for us to
`speculate as to how the Texas court might rule on a motion to stay.
`Dec. 10–11 (citing Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal
`Group – Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 7 (PTAB June 16,
`2020) (informative); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at
`12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”)). On that basis, we
`determined that this Fintiv factor was neutral as to whether we should
`exercise our discretion to deny the Petition. Id.
`The circumstances have not changed materially in the Texas court.
`Although a motion to stay has been filed, the Texas court has not ruled on it.
`Accordingly, Patent Owner still asks us to speculate as to how the Texas
`court might rule. We decline to speculate, and instead determine that this
`factor remains neutral. See Sand Revolution, Paper 24 at 7; Fintiv II,
`Paper 15 at 12.
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`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`2.
`Fintiv Factor 2: Proximity of the court’s trial date to the
`Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision
`/ Fintiv Factor 5: Whether the petitioner and the defendant in
`the parallel proceeding are the same party
`The Texas court’s scheduling order sets a “Predicted Jury
`Selection/Trial” for July 12–30, 2021. Ex. 1032, 2. As to Fintiv factor 2, we
`determined that there was “substantial uncertainty in the Texas court’s
`‘Predicted Jury Selection/Trial’ date given the ongoing pandemic, the fact
`that the scheduled trial date is 10 months from now and much can change
`during this time, and the Western District of Texas’s general orders
`continuing trials.” Dec. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1035). Thus, we decided,
`“[w]hether the Texas court’s trial takes place before, contemporaneously
`with, or after our final written decision statutory deadline involves
`substantial speculation,” and “this factor is, at best, neutral to whether we
`should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” Id. at 13. As to Fintiv
`factor 5, we explained that “[t]his fact could weigh either in favor of, or
`against, exercising discretion to deny institution, depending on which
`tribunal was likely to address the challenged patent first,” a matter on which
`we declined to speculate and, accordingly, we determined the factor to be
`neutral. Id. at 19–20.
`Patent Owner argues that, after pre-institution briefing, the Texas
`court held a Markman hearing, during which the Texas court stated that the
`Texas case would have a trial during the latter half of July 2021, and
`requested that the parties provide their availability. Req. 4 (citing Ex. 2017,
`52–53). According to Patent Owner, after our Decision, both Petitioner and
`Patent Owner indicated to the Texas court that they are available for a trial
`between July 12–23. Id. (citing Ex. 2018). Patent Owner further argues that
`“jury trials are now going forward in the Western District of Texas,” and the
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`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`Texas court “is hearing a patent case this week.” Id. (citing Ex. 2019). In
`light of these developments, Patent Owner argues, “[t]here is thus no reason
`to doubt that the district court trial will go forward in July 2021.” Id. Patent
`Owner concludes that Fintiv factors 2 and 5 “now weigh heavily against
`institution.” Id. at 4–5.
`Patent Owner did not make this argument in its Preliminary Response
`or Sur-reply; thus, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked it. For
`that reason alone, Patent Owner’s new argument is improper and
`insufficient. Nevertheless, even if we were to consider the argument, it
`would not be persuasive.
`We do not view the circumstances to have changed materially. At the
`Markman hearing, the Texas court reiterated “the goal of the Court . . . to get
`the case tried in July,” and indicated that it was “not going to pick a date
`right now,” but that it was “looking at setting trial in this case somewhere
`between July 12th and the end of July [2021].” Ex. 2017, 52:16–20, 53:9–
`10. The Texas court then asked counsel for Petitioner and several other
`defendants in the Texas case and related cases to consult their calendars and
`suggest dates for the trial. Id. at 52:20–53:13. Petitioner, Patent Owner, and
`two other defendants later informed the Texas court that they could be
`available for trial between July 12 and either July 23 or July 31, 2021.
`Ex. 2018. Another defendant indicated that it could be available after
`August 9, 2021. Id. The record does not indicate that the Texas court has
`set a trial date as of yet. Thus, while the Texas court might still have a
`“goal” of a July 2021 trial, the Texas court does not look to have calendared
`such a trial.
`Fintiv factor 2 looks at the proximity of the trial date to the date of our
`final decision to assess the weight to be accorded a trial date set earlier than
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`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`the expected final written decision date. This proximity inquiry is a proxy
`for the likelihood that the trial court will reach a decision on validity issues
`before the Board reaches a final written decision. A trial set to occur soon
`after the institution decision is fairly likely to happen prior to the Board’s
`final decision, even if the trial date were postponed due to intervening
`circumstances. Here, however, the trial still is predicted to be scheduled for
`approximately two months before our final written decision is due. Even
`considering the allegedly changed circumstances raised by Patent Owner,
`there is at least some persuasive evidence that delays are possible. In these
`circumstances, the efficiency and system integrity concerns that animate the
`Fintiv analysis are not as strong—all other things being equal. Accordingly,
`even if we were to consider Patent Owner’s new arguments, this factor still
`would be, at best, neutral to whether we should exercise our discretion to
`deny the Petition. For the same reasons, our analysis of Fintiv factor 5 also
`would remain unchanged.
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner has not demonstrated that we
`misapprehended or overlooked its arguments or abused our discretion in
`instituting a trial of the ’431 patent.
`
`
`IV. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`ORDERED Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.
`
`
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`8
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`IPR2020-00686
`Patent 7,076,431 B2
`FOR PETITIONER:
`Jennifer Bailey
`Adam Seitz
`ERISE IP, P.A.
`jennifer.bailey@eriseip.com
`adam.seitz@eriseip.com
`
`FOR PATENT OWNER:
`
`Michael McNamara
`Michael Renaud
`William Meunier
`MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY & POPEO, P.C.
`mmcnamara@mintz.com
`mtrenaud@mintz.com
`wameunier@mintz.com
`
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