throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 33
`Entered: July 21, 2021
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`KEEP TRUCKIN, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`INNOVATIVE GLOBAL SYSTEMS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`
`
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, JOHN F. HORVATH, and
`FREDERICK C. LANEY, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`LANEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`This is a Final Written Decision in an inter partes review challenging
`the patentability of claims 1–11 and 14–20 (“Challenged Claims”) of U.S.
`Patent No. 10,157,384 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’384 patent”). We have
`jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6 and enter this Decision pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons set forth below,
`we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence,
`that claims 1–11 and 14–20 are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
`II. BACKGROUND
`A. Procedural History
`Keep Truckin, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for inter partes
`review under 35 U.S.C. § 311. Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Petitioner supported its
`Petition with the Declaration of Scott Andrews. Ex. 1003.
`Innovative Global Systems, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
`Response. Paper 6. And pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, in view of the record
`at that time, we instituted an inter partes review of all Challenged Claims on
`all grounds presented in the Petition:
`
`References
`Skeen,2 Warkentin,3 Transportation
`Regulations4
`
`Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. §
`1–6, 10, 11, 14–20
`103(a)1
`
`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284,
`287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013.
`Because the ’384 patent claims priority to an application that has an
`effective filing date before this date (see Ex. 1001, code (63) (claiming
`priority to an application with an effective filing date of August 15, 2005);
`see also Pet. 14; PO Resp. 3), the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies.
`2 Skeen, US 6,832,141 B2, iss. Dec. 14, 2004 (Ex. 1009).
`3 Warkentin, US 2002/0035421 A1, pub. Mar. 21, 2002 (Ex. 1010).
`4 Transportation Regulations, Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
`Sections 390–396 (Oct. 1, 2003) (Ex. 1008).
`
`2
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. §
`8
`103(a)
`
`7, 9
`
`103(a)
`
`References
`Skeen, Warkentin, Transportation
`Regulations, Murphy5
`Skeen, Warkentin, Transportation
`Regulations, Berenz6
`
`Paper 7 (“Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”).
`After institution, Patent Owner filed a Response, Paper 16
`(“PO Resp.”), supported with the Declarations of Andrew D. Smith
`(Ex. 2006), William T. Brown (Ex. 2007), and Alan C. Lesesky (Ex. 2009).
`Petitioner filed a Reply, Paper 24 (“Reply”), supported with an additional
`Declaration of Mr. Andrews (Ex. 1034). Finally, Patent Owner filed a
`Sur-reply. Paper 27 (“Sur-reply”).
`An oral hearing was held on April 22, 2021. A copy of the transcript
`is included in the record. Paper 32 (“Tr.”).
`B. Real Parties in Interest
`Petitioner identifies Keep Truckin, Inc. as the real party-in-interest.
`Pet. 1. Patent Owner identifies Innovative Global Systems, LLC as the real
`party-in-interest. Paper 5, 2.
`C. Related Matters
`The parties agree there are several proceedings related to this matter.
`Pet. 2; Paper 5, 2. Petitioner was served with a complaint, which is
`captioned Innovative Global Systems, LLC v. Keep Truckin, Inc., Civil Case
`No. 0:19-cv-00641-MN (D. Del.), that alleges infringement of the ’384
`patent. Pet. 2. The ’384 patent was asserted also against Samsara Networks,
`Inc. in a separate district court action captioned Innovative Global Systems,
`
`
`5 Murphy, US 6,225,890 B1, iss. May 1, 2001 (Ex. 1007).
`6 Berenz, US 6,724,920 B1, iss. Apr. 20, 2004 (Ex. 1011).
`
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`LLC v. Samsara Networks, Inc., Civil Case No. 0:19-cv-01708-MN (D.
`Del.). Id. Finally, another related proceeding is the concurrently filed
`petition in Keep Truckin, Inc. v. Innovative Global Systems, LLC, IPR2020-
`00692, which challenges several claims of related U.S. Patent No. 8,032,277
`B2. Id.
`
`D. The ’384 patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’384 patent describes a system “for logging and reporting driver
`activity and vehicle operation.” Ex. 1001, 1:8–10. In particular, it describes
`a system that includes an electronic logging system with an onboard recorder
`connected to a vehicle’s data bus, which continuously monitors, obtains, and
`calculates the vehicle’s operation data. Id. at 11:4–17. This operational data
`includes mileage, engine use, time the vehicle’s engine is turned off, the
`vehicle’s speed, and the engine’s run time while the vehicle is on but not
`moving. Id. at 11:52–62, 12:61–13:9, 13:36–59. The system includes a
`transmitter, which sends vehicle operation data from the recorder to a
`portable handheld communications device. Id. at 16:54–17:5, 18:12–19.
`The ’384 patent describes using data processing software to generate a
`hours of service (“HOS”) log. Id. at 13:60–14:3. This log is generated from
`the vehicle operational data obtained from the onboard recorder that is
`continuously connected to the vehicle’s data bus, and records the vehicle
`operator’s duty status, such as whether the operator is on or off duty and
`whether an on-duty operator is driving or not driving. Id. at 13:1–24. In
`creating the log, a recorder “continuously calculates the time the driver has
`been in each duty status over the course of a day.” Id. at 13:17–19.
`Additionally, the log includes the total hours on duty for seven days, total
`hours on duty for eight days, and the driver’s changes in duty status, as well
`as the time the duty status changes occurred. Id. at 13:19–14:3. The log can
`
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`be used to determine whether a driver was in compliance with hours of
`service regulations. Id. at 13:10–13. “By continuously emitting a signal
`indicating the compliance status of the driver, [the system] provides a way
`whereby authorized federal, state or local officials can immediately check
`the status of a driver’s hours of service.” Id. at 14:42–45.
`E. Illustrative Claims
`Of the Challenged Claims, claims 1 and 14 are independent. Claims
`2–11 depend from claim 1; claims 15–20 depend from claim 14. Claim 1,
`reproduced below,7 illustrates the subject matter of the challenged claims:
`1.
`[1 preamble] An onboard electronic system for logging and
`reporting driver activity and operation data of a vehicle, said system
`comprising:
`[1a] an onboard recorder adapted for continuously connecting to a
`data bus of the vehicle to continuously monitor, obtain and
`calculate vehicle operation data comprising mileage data,
`engine use data, time the engine is turned off, speed of the
`vehicle, and time the engine remains on while the vehicle is not
`moving, and said onboard recorder comprising a processor, a
`transmitter, and a memory device for recording and storing said
`vehicle operation data;
`[1b] said transmitter adapted for transmitting said vehicle operation
`data from said onboard recorder to a portable handheld
`communication device;
`[1c] data processing software operable on the handheld
`communications device comprising a processor and a display,
`said data processing software utilized to generate a hours of
`service log using said vehicle operation data continuously
`monitored, obtained and calculated from the data bus of the
`vehicle, and to present the hours of service log in a grid form on
`the display, the hours of service log comprising a driver’s total
`hours driven today, total hours on duty today, total miles driven
`
`7 Annotation to the elements has been added to be consistent with the
`labeling used by Petitioner. See Pet. 8–9.
`
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`today, total hours on duty for seven days, total hours on duty
`for eight days, and the driver’s changes in duty status and the
`times the duty status changes occurred, whereby the driver’s
`hours of service log is applicable for comparison to a hours of
`service regulation to determine a compliance status of the
`driver; and
`[1d] a compliance signal emitted by said transmitter and indicating
`whether said onboard recorder is functioning to record vehicle
`operation data needed to generate the driver’s hours of service
`log, such that the compliance status of the driver can be
`accurately determined, and in the event of a malfunction of said
`onboard recorder, said compliance signal is adapted for
`activating a visual indicator to the driver signifying an out-of-
`compliance condition of said onboard recorder.
`Ex. 1001, 23:7–45. Independent claim 14 is identical to claim 1, except the
`preamble of claim 14 recites “incorporating” the onboard electronic system
`into “a commercial motor vehicle.” See id. at 25:1–26:6.
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`We have reviewed the parties’ respective briefs as well as the relevant
`evidence discussed in those papers. Petitioner contends the disclosures of
`Skeen, Warkentin, Transportation Regulations, Murphy, and Berenz, as a
`whole, demonstrate that the recited combinations of elements in the
`Challenged Claims would have been obvious at the time of the invention to a
`skilled artisan. Patent Owner asserts several defects and gaps exist with
`Petitioner’s contention, preventing Petitioner from establishing the
`unpatentability of the Challenged Claims. In particular, Patent Owner
`asserts Petitioner’s contention is defective because it relies on an unqualified
`expert (Mr. Andrews) and because it relies on non-analogous art (Skeen). In
`addition, Patent Owner argues that there are evidentiary gaps in Petitioner’s
`patentability challenge because none of the references, alone or in
`
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`combination, disclose claimed subject matter in claim elements [1c]/14[c]
`and [1d]/14[d]. Nor does Petitioner articulate sufficient reasoning for why a
`skilled artisan would have combined the disclosures from the references in
`the manner claimed. Patent Owner does not separately address Petitioner’s
`challenge of the dependent claims. For the reasons discussed in detail
`below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
`evidence that the Challenged Claims of the ’384 patent are unpatentable
`under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
`
`A. Principles of Law
`To prevail in its challenges to the patentability of all claims of the
`’384 patent, Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
`that the claims are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d)
`(2019). “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the
`onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is
`unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012) (requiring inter partes
`review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports
`the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion
`never shifts to patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l
`Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also In re
`Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375–78 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`(discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review).
`A claim is unpatentable for obviousness if, to one of ordinary skill in
`the pertinent art, “the differences between the subject matter sought to be
`patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
`have been obvious at the time the invention was made.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
`(2006); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`determinations including: (1) the level of ordinary skill in the art; (2) the
`scope and content of the prior art; (3) any differences between the claimed
`subject matter and the prior art; and (4) when in evidence, objective
`evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
`(1966).
`A petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by
`employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380.
`Moreover, to persuasively show obviousness, Petitioner must include an
`“articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
`conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441
`F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
`We analyze Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability in
`accordance with the above-stated principles.
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the
`understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) and, thus,
`begin with the level of ordinary skill in the art. The level of ordinary skill in
`the art is “a prism or lens through which . . . the Board views the prior art
`and the claimed invention” to prevent hindsight bias. Okajima v. Bourdeau,
`261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that the relevant level of skill in the
`art at the time of the ’384 patent (August 2005) is a person having “a
`bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or equivalent, at least two years
`of experience related to designing and/or developing on-board recording
`devices for commercial vehicles, and familiarity with the rules and
`regulations governing logging and reporting of data for drivers of motor
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`carriers.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 16); PO Resp. 4. We agree with the
`parties’ definition, which we adopt as our own, because it is consistent with
`the teachings of the ’384 patent and the prior art of record.
`Patent Owner challenges the qualifications of Petitioner’s expert to
`provide testimony regarding a POSITA in this proceeding. PO Resp. 6–12;
`Sur-reply 6–8. Although a consensus exists for the relevant background of
`an ordinarily skilled artisan in the art, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner’s
`arguments fail because they depend upon Scott Andrews’ unqualified
`opinions” and his “testimony is neither competent nor credible.” See id.
`Patent Owner, however, does not show persuasively that Mr. Andrews,
`Petitioner’s expert, is unqualified.
`Patent Owner argues that Mr. Andrews is “unqualified” because
`“[n]othing in his background, education, or training renders him qualified to
`opine on the subject matter of the Challenged Claims—systems that log and
`present data to ensure compliance with the HOS Regulations[8].” PO Resp.
`6. Patent Owner argues that Mr. Andrews “has no experience designing or
`developing systems that log and present data to ensure compliance with the
`HOS Regulations,” nor does Mr. Andrews have any other related experience
`associated with ensuring compliance with the HOS Regulations. Id. at 7–8.
`In particular, Patent Owner highlights Mr. Andrews’s lack of familiarity
`with “key aspects of the HOS Regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 395.8 and
`§ 395.15,” which are allegedly “critical in the development of the
`Challenged Claims [because] they define, in part, the problem to be solved.”
`Id. at 8–9. Patent Owner argues that, because Mr. Andrews lacks familiarity
`
`
`8 “HOS Regulations” is specifically defined by Patent Owner to mean
`“49 C.F.R. pt. 395, subpt. A.” PO Resp. vi (Glossary of Terms).
`
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`with “HOS Regulations” and because he failed to take “steps to become
`skilled in the art of HOS logging or compliance,” “Mr. Andrews cannot
`provide any competent or credible testimony about what a POSITA would
`have reviewed or would have been motivated to do.” Id. at 9–12.
`In response, Petitioner observes initially that Patent Owner’s
`argument “does not allege that Mr. Andrews lacks the level of education or
`technical experience both parties attribute to a POSITA.” Reply 2.
`Petitioner contends that this is because “Mr. Andrews has a Master’s Degree
`in electrical engineering and extensive experience designing onboard
`recording devices for commercial vehicle[s].” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–11;
`Ex. 1004 (Mr. Andrews’s curriculum vitae); Ex. 2008, 58:17–20 (“I’d say
`I’ve developed a lot of systems that are able to calculate and log the kind of
`data associated with hours of service . . . .”), 88:4–11). Petitioner points to
`Mr. Andrews’s specific experience developing “a lot of systems that are able
`to calculate and log the kind of data associated with hours of service” to
`demonstrate his familiarity with different kinds of duty statuses and
`regulations associated with logging and reporting data for drivers of motor
`carriers. Id. (citing Ex. 2008, 30:1–5, 32:21–33:9, 48:18–19, 49:6–8, 58:17–
`20, 90:6–92:2, 207:1–209:18).
`
`Petitioner characterizes Patent Owner’s argument as follows: “Mr.
`Andrews[’s] testimony cannot support Petitioner’s challenges because Mr.
`Andrews does not meet requirements beyond the definition of a POSITA on
`which both parties agreed.” Reply 2. Petitioner contends that “[t]he
`definition of a POSITA adopted by both parties . . . says nothing of
`designing or developing systems for logging and presenting data to ensure
`compliance with HOS regulations.” Id. at 3. Petitioner presses that “[t]he
`parties agreed that the only technical expertise required of a POSITA is a
`
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`IPR2020-00694
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`degree in electrical engineering, or equivalent, and experience related to
`designing or developing on-board recording devices for commercial
`vehicles, both of which Mr. Andrews clearly has.” Id.
`
`Patent Owner argues in reply that “Petitioner does not claim that Mr.
`Andrews has any experience relating to systems designed to log and record
`data to ensure compliance with an ‘hours of service regulation’ and generate
`an ‘hours of service log.’” Sur-reply 7. “This lack of experience matters,”
`Patent Owner asserts, because systems designed for this purpose “need to
`have specific functionality” and “[n]o electrical engineer could appreciate
`these issues without some experience developing or designing a system
`having the same general purpose as the one claimed in the Challenged
`Claims.” Id.
`
`As an initial matter, we note that Patent Owner did not move to
`exclude either of Mr. Andrews’s declarations (Exhibits 1003 and 1034) and
`thereby waived any argument that Mr. Andrews is not “qualified as an
`expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education [to] testify in
`the form of an opinion or otherwise” under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
`See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 (setting forth the procedure for objecting to evidence
`and filing a motion to exclude to “preserve” such objections); Paper 8, 8–10
`(listing the time periods for motions to exclude); Patent Trial and Appeal
`Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 79, available at
`https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (“A motion to
`exclude must explain why the evidence is not admissible (e.g., relevance or
`hearsay) . . . . A motion to exclude is not a vehicle for addressing the weight
`to be given evidence—arguments regarding weight should appear only in the
`merits documents.”). Thus, although Patent Owner’s arguments are framed
`in terms of whether Mr. Andrew is “qualified,” PO Resp. 6, we understand
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`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`Patent Owner’s position to be that Mr. Andrews’s testimony should be
`accorded no weight in our analysis of whether Petitioner has proven that the
`Challenged Claims would have been obvious.
`Indeed, we note that with respect to the issue of whether an expert has
`sufficient qualifications to offer admissible testimony, there is no
`requirement that the expert’s experience be a perfect match to the field of art
`at issue. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed.
`Cir. 2010). To testify as an expert, an individual does not need to be a
`person of ordinary skill in the art, but rather must be “qualified in the
`pertinent art.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356,
`1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`We find Patent Owner’s criticisms of Mr. Andrews’s qualifications in
`this proceeding are unwarranted. As Petitioner has argued, and Patent
`Owner has not disputed, Mr. Andrews’s advanced degree in electrical
`engineering and extensive experience designing onboard recording devices
`for commercial vehicles demonstrate that he has technical expertise that is
`particularly relevant to the subject matter of ’384 patent. See Ex. 1004, 3–6.
`A focus of Mr. Andrews’s experience includes “the development and
`management of technologies in support of Intelligent Transportation
`Systems” and “a strong working knowledge of the various technologies that
`comprise location-based vehicle status logging and tracking.” Ex. 1003
`¶¶ 6, 8. Mr. Andrews has experience working with “systems for logging the
`location and operational status of vehicles, and providing automated
`roadside assistance and emergency response based on relaying GPS position
`and vehicle status to a service center using wireless communications.” Id.
`¶ 7. Mr. Andrews has experience also with “work[ing] on various systems
`associated with trucking applications,” including “driver hour logging and
`
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`IPR2020-00694
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`associated parking reservation systems, and various types of navigation,
`communications, and dispatching systems.” Id. ¶ 8.
`
`Although Patent Owner appears to be correct that Mr. Andrews’s
`experience does not include working on any specific projects in which
`logging and recording data was specifically for the purpose of ensuring
`compliance with a hours of service regulation, we do not find this absence of
`first-hand knowledge to impact the weight we should give his testimony.
`Mr. Andrews has considerable technical experience related to the
`“[t]echnical [f]ield” of the ’384 patent, namely logging and reporting driver
`activity and operation data of a vehicle, which is a focus of the ’384 patent.
`See Ex. 1001, code (54), 1:5–10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 3–8; Ex. 1004; Reply 2–4
`(describing Mr. Andrews’s experience as recounted during his deposition).
`Therefore, we reject Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Andrews’s testimony
`should be given no weight because he is an “unqualified” expert.
`For similar reasons, we reject Petitioner’s arguments that the
`testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Brown, should be given no weight
`because he “does not qualify as a POSITA.” See Reply 4–5. Mr. Brown has
`education equivalent to a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and the
`requisite level of technical experience. See Sur-reply 3–6 (citing Ex. 2007
`¶¶ 13, 16, 18, 20; Ex. 1035, 18, 19:20–23, 62–66). We have considered and
`weighed both individuals’ testimony according to the strength of their
`opinions posited in the context of the record before us. As explained herein,
`we conclude that Mr. Andrews’s opinions are more credible, as they are
`consistent with the disclosures of the cited prior art references and evidence
`that he relies upon.
`
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`C. Scope and Content of the Prior Art
`Petitioner contends Skeen, Warkentin, Transportation Regulations,
`Murphy, and Berenz are all prior art references to the ’384 patent. Pet. 14–
`15. Patent Owner, however, argues Skeen is outside the scope of available
`art because it is non-analogous. PO Resp. 12–23. Therefore, we first
`address whether Skeen is within the scope of analogous art for the ’384
`patent before we discuss the subject matter disclosed by Skeen and the
`remaining references.
`
`1. Skeen Is Analogous Art
`Patent Owner states, “Petitioner’s reliance on Skeen is misplaced
`because Skeen is not analogous art.” PO Resp. 13. The “[c]riteria for
`determining whether prior art is analogous may be summarized as
`‘(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the
`problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the
`inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the
`particular problem with which the inventor is involved.’” Scientific Plastic
`Prods., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing In
`re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Petitioner contends that
`“Skeen . . . [is] in the same field of endeavor as the ’384 Patent––logging
`and reporting driver activity and vehicle operation data.” Pet. 21; see also
`Reply 6–9. Patent Owner disagrees because the field of endeavor for the
`’384 patent “is logging and presenting data for the specific purpose of
`ensuring compliance with the HOS Regulations” and “Skeen has nothing to
`do with logging and presenting data to ensure compliance with the HOS
`Regulations.” PO Resp. 14–15. Because Patent Owner does not dispute
`Skeen and the ’384 patent are within the same field of endeavor if
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`Petitioner’s characterization of the field is accurate (see id. at 13–18), the
`issue we must decide is the applicable field of endeavor of the ’384 patent.
`“To determine the applicable field of endeavor, the factfinder must
`consider ‘explanations of the invention’s subject matter in the patent
`application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of the
`claimed invention.’” Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1380
`(Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`“In [In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979)], for example, . . .
`[the] court determined the field of endeavor based on an express disclosure
`in the Background of the Invention section of the applicant’s specification.”
`Id. An indication that a reference is from the same field of endeavor exists
`when the reference discloses technology with “essentially the same function
`and structure” as the claimed technology. In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442
`(Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that the challenged prior art references were in the
`same field of endeavor because they disclosed pumps and compressors that
`had “essentially the same function and structure” as the claimed piston
`devices).
`Petitioner contends, “[t]he title of the ’384 Patent, the Challenged
`Claims, including their preambles, and the specification of the ’384 Patent
`demonstrate that the relevant field of endeavor is logging and reporting
`driver activity and operation data of a vehicle.” Reply 6. The ’384 patent is
`titled “System for Logging and Reporting Driver Activity and Operation
`Data of a Vehicle” and, in the section of the patent describing the “Technical
`Field,” it states that the disclosure “relates broadly and generally [to]
`systems, methods, and apparatus for logging and reporting driver activity
`and vehicle operation.” Ex. 1001, code (54), 1:5–10. In the “Summary of
`Exemplary Embodiments” section of the ’384 patent, a wide range of
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`IPR2020-00694
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`examples and aspects of systems that include logging and reporting driver
`activity and vehicle operation are described generally. Id. at 1:19–9:44. The
`’384 patent describes its disclosure as comprising,
`exemplary systems, methods and apparatus capable of logging
`driver activity and vehicle operating data, creating reports from
`the data containing information required to comply with [hours
`of service] regulations and IFTA fuel tax reporting, and
`emitting a signal indicating whether the driver is in-compliance
`or out-of-compliance with applicable [hours of service] laws or
`regulations.
`Id. at 10:58–63 (emphasis added). In addition, the ’384 patent discloses
`other “exemplary embodiments” of systems, methods, and apparatus capable
`of “automat[ing] at-the-pump management of vehicle fuel purchases,” as
`well as, “diagnosing and managing vehicle faults.” Id. at 10:65–11:3. Each
`of these exemplary systems share in common an electric onboard recorder
`(e.g., 200 and 901 in Figures 2, 9) that functions, inter alia, to collect driver
`activity and vehicle operation data from a vehicle. See Ex. 1001, 11:4–13:9,
`19:29–36, 21:49–55. Likewise, each independent claim preamble in the
`’384 patent (i.e., claims 1, 13, and 14) recites an “onboard electronic system
`for logging and reporting driver activity and operation data of a vehicle.” Id.
`at 23:7–8, 24:24–25, 25:1–3.
`Patent Owner does not address the description of the disclosed subject
`matter in the Specification of the ’384 patent. See PO Resp. 13–18;
`Sur-reply 1–25. Instead, Patent Owner relies exclusively on “the Challenged
`Claims repeatedly refer[ring] to logging data to create an ‘hours of service
`log’ or to comply with an ‘hours of service regulation’” to support its more
`narrow characterization of the field of art––logging and presenting data for
`the specific purpose of ensuring compliance with the HOS Regulations.
`PO Resp. 13–15. Patent Owner asserts that because “[i]nfringing the
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`Challenged Claims . . . requires creation of an ‘hours of service log’ . . . the
`field of endeavor for the ’384 Patent is limited to logging and presenting
`data for the exclusive purpose of ensuring compliance with the HOS
`Regulations.” Id. at 14. From this, Patent Owner asserts a skilled artisan
`“would have understood that logging and presenting data for purposes of
`compliance with the HOS Regulations was a distinct and unique field of
`endeavor.” Id. According to Patent Owner, “[g]iven the challenges specific
`to ensuring compliance with the HOS Regulations, [skilled artisans] in this
`field generally were not looking at art relating to general data logging in
`passenger vehicles in 2005.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶ 26; Ex. 2006
`¶¶ 31–36).
`
`We find Petitioner’s characterization of the field of endeavor more
`persuasive because it correctly captures the breadth that the ’384 patent
`states expressly was intended by the disclosure. The ’384 patent
`unambiguously states that the disclosure has a broad scope because “the
`particular arrangements disclosed are meant to be illustrative only and not
`limiting as to scope of the invention” and “many embodiments, such as
`adaptions, variations, modifications, and equivalent arrangements, will be
`implicitly disclosed by embodiments described . . . and fall within the scope
`of the present invention.” Id. at 10:17–19, 10:21–25. When considering the
`’384 patent as whole, we agree with Petitioner that the title of the ’384
`patent, the Challenged Claims, including their preambles, and the
`Specification demonstrate that the relevant field of endeavor is logging and
`reporting driver activity and operation data of a vehicle.
`
`Limiting the field of art to the specific purpose of ensuring
`compliance with the “HOS Regulations,” or 49 C.F.R. pt. 395, subpt. A (see
`PO Resp. vi), would be directly contrary to what the ’384 patent teaches.
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00694
`Patent 10,157,384 B2
`Although Patent Owner contends reciting “hours of service log” and “hours
`of service regulation” in the claims would lead a skilled artisan to such a
`conclusion, the ’384 patent supports a different conclusion. See Unwired
`Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The field
`of endeavor of a patent is not limited to the specific point of novelty, the
`narrowest possible conception of the field, or the particular focus within a
`given field.”). As explained above, the ’384 patent describes the relevant
`“field” of art more broadly. See Ex. 1001, code (54), 1:5–10. Further, the
`’384 patent states, “[a]lthough specific terms are employed herein, they are
`used in a generic and descriptive sense only and not for the purposes of
`limitation.” Ex. 1001, 10:26–28 (emphasis added). Still further, a skilled
`artisan would view the field of art broader than the one proposed by Patent
`Owner because several of the exemplary embodiments and aspects discussed
`in the ’384 patent address logging and reporting driver activity and operation
`data of a vehicle for purposes that are wholly unre

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