`
`Filed on behalf of Petitioners by:
`
`Elisabeth H. Hunt, Reg. No. 67,336
`
`Richard F. Giunta, Reg. No. 36,149
`
`Gregory S. Nieberg, Reg. No. 57,063
`
`Anant K. Saraswat, Reg. No. 76,050
`
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`
`Boston, MA 02210
`
`(617) 646-8000 Phone
`
`(617) 646-8646 Fax
`
`Paper No. __
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`
`GOOGLE LLC, SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS INC., and
`LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`PARUS HOLDINGS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_____________
`
`Case No. IPR2020-00846
`Patent No. 7,076,431
`_____________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO PATENT OWNER RESPONSE1
`
`
`
`
`1 Emphases in this paper are added unless otherwise indicated, and internal
`quotations, citations, and original alterations are omitted.
`
`
`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
`I.
`II. GROUNDS 1-4: KOVATCH IS PRIOR ART ................................................ 1
`A. The POR’s Conclusory Allegation of Antedating Kovatch Should
`Be Rejected .................................................................................................. 2
`B. If Considered, the Declarations’ Arguments Fail to Demonstrate
`Reduction to Practice ................................................................................... 5
`1. The Inventor’s Testimony Lacks Independent Corroboration .............. 6
`2. Parus’s Evidence Meets Neither Reduction-to-Practice Prong ............ 8
`a. Prong 1: No Evidence Demonstrates an Embodiment
`Meeting All Limitations of Any Challenged Claim ..................... 9
`i. No Evidence Demonstrates a Constructed
`Embodiment Having a Computer Meeting All
`Claimed Limitations ............................................................. 9
`ii. No Evidence Demonstrates a Constructed
`Embodiment Met Limitations [1pre], [1.h]-[1.k] ............... 10
`iii. No Evidence Demonstrates an Embodiment Meeting
`Claim 9’s Additional Limitations ....................................... 11
`iv. No Evidence Demonstrates an Embodiment Meeting
`Claim 14’s Additional Limitations ..................................... 12
`b. Prong 2: No Evidence Demonstrates a Working
`Embodiment ................................................................................ 13
`3. The Alleged Reduction-to-Practice Dates Are Uncorroborated ......... 15
`III. GROUNDS 1-4: PARUS’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE
`KOVATCH/NEAL COMBINATION ARE MERITLESS ............................ 16
`A. POR Section IV.B Fails to Address the Petition’s Combination .............. 16
`1. “First” Argument ................................................................................. 16
`2. “Second” Argument ............................................................................ 17
`3. “Third” Argument ............................................................................... 19
`4. “Final[]” Argument ............................................................................. 20
`
`i
`
`

`

`
`
`B. Parus’s Arguments Regarding Motivation to Combine Fail ..................... 21
`1. Parus’s “Speeding Up” Arguments Are Nonresponsive and
`Wrong .................................................................................................. 21
`2. Parus’s Fault Tolerance Arguments Are Nonresponsive and
`Wrong .................................................................................................. 23
`IV. GROUNDS 3-4: PARUS’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING
`DESIMONE ARE MERITLESS ..................................................................... 25
`V. GROUND 5: KURGANOV-262 IS PRIOR ART TO CLAIM 9
`WHICH LACKS WRITTEN DESCRIPTION ............................................... 25
`VI. GROUND 6: IF INTERPRETED NARROWLY, CLAIM 14 LACKS
`WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND KURGANOV-262 IS PRIOR ART ......... 28
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`ABB v. Roy-G-Biv,
`IPR2013-00062, Paper 84 (Apr. 11, 2014) ............................................................ 6
`Alexsam v. Gap,
`621 F. App’x 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ....................................................................... 13
`Apator Miitors v. Kamstrup,
`887 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............................................................................. 8
`Apple v. Yu,
`IPR2019-01258, Paper 29 (Jan. 5, 2021) ............................................................... 8
`Aspex Eyewear v. Marchon Eyewear,
`672 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 11
`Bradium Techs. v. Iancu,
`923 F.3d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 17
`Cisco Systems v. C-Cation Techs.,
`IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (Aug. 29, 2014) ............................................................ 4
`Cooper v. Goldfarb,
`154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .............................................................................. 6
`DePuy Spine v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
`567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 19
`Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe,
`323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 27
`Ex Parte Kwon,
`Appeal 2015-008271 (Sep. 28, 2016) .................................................................. 19
`Ex Parte Rans,
`Appeal 2020-000512 (Jun. 4, 2020) ..................................................................... 11
`Foursquare Labs v. Mimzi,
`IPR2019-01287, Paper 34 (Jan. 13, 2021) .........................................................6, 8
`
`iii
`
`

`

`
`
`Gen. Access Sols. v. Sprint Spectrum,
`811 F. App’x 654 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................ 1, 2, 3, 4
`In re Beattie,
`974 F.2d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ............................................................................ 25
`In re Fulton,
`391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 19
`In re Keller,
`642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981) .............................................................................. 17
`In re Steed,
`802 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................................. 8
`Int’l Bus. Machines v. Intellectual Ventures II,
`IPR2015-01323, Paper 15 (Feb. 2, 2016) ............................................................. 16
`Jiangu SmartSens Tech. Co. v. OmniVision Tech’s,
`IPR2019-01263, Paper 48 (Dec. 18, 2020) ........................................................4, 5
`Kenexa Brassring v. Taleo,
`751 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D. Del. 2010) ....................................................................... 8
`Manning v. Paradis,
`296 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 13
`Medichem v. Rolabo,
`437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ....................................................................... 6, 22
`Microsoft v. Surfcast,
`IPR2013-00292, Paper 93 (Oct. 14, 2014) ............................................................. 7
`Newkirk v. Lulejian,
`825 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ............................................................................ 13
`Phillips v. AWH,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 28
`Raytheon v. Sony,
`727 F. App’x 662 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ......................................................................... 8
`
`iv
`
`

`

`
`
`Sprint Spectrum v. Gen. Access Sols.,
`IPR2017-01885, Paper 57 (Mar. 7, 2019) .............................................................. 3
`Tyco Fire Prods. v. Victaulic,
`IPR2016-00279, Paper 40 (June 12, 2017) .......................................................... 26
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................ 27
`REGULATIONS
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) ................................................................................................ 4
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65 ..................................................................................................... 26
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`
`
`LISTING OF EXHIBITS
`
`Exhibit Description
`1001
`U.S. Patent 7,076,431 (“’431 patent”)
`1002
`Declaration of Stuart J. Lipoff (“Lipoff”)
`1003
`Curriculum Vitae of Stuart J. Lipoff
`1004
`U.S. Patent Publication 2001/0047262 (“Kurganov-262”)
`1005
`PCT Publication WO2001/050453 (“Kovatch”)
`1006
`U.S. Provisional Application 60/174,371 (“Kovatch-Provisional”)
`1007
`U.S. Patent 6,324,534 (“Neal”)
`1008
`U.S. Patent 6,418,433 (“Chakrabarti”)
`1009
`U.S. Patent 5,787,470 (“DeSimone”)
`1010
`U.S. Patent 5,855,020
`1011
`U.S. Patent 6,085,160
`1012
`U.S. Patent 6,434,524
`1013
`McGraw-Hill Electronics Dictionary (6th ed. 1997) (“McGraw-Hill”)
`1014
`American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1996)
`1015
`Dictionary of Computing (4th ed. 2002)
`1016
`Scheduling Order (Dkt. 85), Parus v. Apple Inc., 6:19-cv-00432-ADA
`(consolidated cases) (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2020)
`Parus Holding’s Inc.’s First Amended Complaint for Patent
`Infringement, Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc., 6:19-cv-00432-ADA
`(W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2019)
`Parus Holding’s Inc.’s First Amended Complaint for Patent
`Infringement, Parus Holdings Inc. v. Google LLC, 6:19-cv-00433-
`ADA (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2019)
`Parus Holding’s Inc.’s First Amended Complaint for Patent
`Infringement, Parus Holdings Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. et al., 6:19-
`cv-00437-ADA (W.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2019)
`Parus Holding’s Inc.’s First Amended Complaint for Patent
`Infringement, Parus Holdings Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et
`al., 6:19-cv-00438-ADA (W.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2019)
`U.S. Patent 9,451,084 (“’084 patent”)
`U.S. Provisional Application 60/180,344
`U.S. Provisional Application 60/233,068
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 09/776,996
`(U.S. Patent 6,721,705)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 10/821,690
`(U.S. Patent 7,076,431)
`
`1017
`
`1018
`
`1019
`
`1020
`
`1021
`1022
`1023
`1024
`
`1025
`
`vi
`
`

`

`
`
`1026
`
`1027
`
`1028
`
`1029
`
`1030
`
`1031
`
`1032
`
`1033
`
`1034
`
`1035
`
`1036
`
`1037
`
`1038
`
`1039
`
`1040
`
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 11/409,703
`(U.S. Patent 7,386,455)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 12/030,556
`(U.S. Patent 7,881,941)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 12/973,475
`(U.S. Patent 8,185,402)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 13/462,819
`(U.S. Patent 9,451,084)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 15/269,776
`(U.S. Patent 10,096,320)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent Application 16/155,523
`(pending)
`Order Granting Defendant LG’s Motion to Transfer Venue Under 28
`U.S.C. § 1404, Parus Holdings Inc. v. LG Elecs. Inc. & LG Elecs.
`U.S.A., Inc., 6:19-CV-00437-ADA (Aug. 6, 2020)
`Lauren A. Watt & Graham C. Phero, Success of Motions to Stay
`Rising, But Why?, https://www.sternekessler.com/news-
`insights/publications/success-motions-stay-rising-why (Feb. 2020)
`(last checked Aug. 25, 2020)
`Order Regarding Court Operation Under the Exigent Circumstances
`Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (C.J. Garcia) (Mar. 13, 2020)
`Supplemental Order Regarding Court Operation Under the Exigent
`Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (C.J. Garcia)
`(Apr. 15, 2020)
`Supplemental Order Regarding Court Operation Under the Exigent
`Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (C.J. Garcia)
`(May 8, 2020)
`Supplemental Order Regarding Court Operation Under the Exigent
`Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (C.J. Garcia)
`(June 18, 2020)
`Supplemental Order Regarding Court Operation Under the Exigent
`Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (C.J. Garcia)
`(July 2, 2020)
`Supplemental Order Regarding Court Operation Under the Exigent
`Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (C.J. Garcia)
`(Aug. 6, 2020)
`PACER Docket Activity Report (Criminal Matters) for the United
`Stated District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin and Waco
`Divisions (01/01/2000-08/28/2020) (last checked Aug. 28, 2020)
`
`vii
`
`

`

`
`
`1041
`
`1042
`
`1043
`
`1044
`
`1045
`
`1046
`
`1047
`
`1048
`1049
`
`1050
`
`1051
`
`1052
`
`1053
`1054
`1055
`
`1056
`
`1057
`
`Open Civil Matters Before J. Albright (W.D. Tex.) Not On Appeal,
`Lex Machina, https://law.lexmachina.com (last checked Aug. 31,
`2020)
`Open Civil Matters Before J. Albright (W.D. Tex.) Not On Appeal
`Filed Before 07-22-2019, Lex Machina, https://law.lexmachina.com
`(last checked Aug. 31, 2020)
`Open Patent Matters Before J. Albright (W.D. Tex.) Not On Appeal,
`Lex Machina, https://law.lexmachina.com (last checked Aug. 31,
`2020)
`Open Patent Matters Before J. Albright (W.D. Tex.) Not On Appeal
`Filed Before 07-22-2019, Lex Machina, https://law.lexmachina.com
`(last checked Aug. 31, 2020)
`Judge Albright’s Standing Sample Order Governing Proceedings –
`Patent Case (OGP Version v3.0) (W.D. Tex.)
`MV3 Partners LLC v. Roku, Inc., 6:18-cv-00308-ADA, Docket
`Summary (W.D. Tex.) (last checked Aug. 31, 2020)
`Scott McKeown, District Court Trial Dates Tend to Slip After PTAB
`Discretionary Denials, https://www.patentspostgrant.com/district-
`court-trial-dates-tend-to-slip-after-ptab-discretionary-denials/ (July 24,
`2020) (last checked Aug. 25, 2020)
`E-mail from Bill Trac (Aug. 31, 2020)
`Transcript of January 5, 2021, Deposition of Stuart J. Lipoff (“Lipoff-
`Depo.”)
`Transcript of March 10, 2021, Deposition of Alexander Kurganov
`(“Kurganov-Depo.”)
`Transcript of March 23, 2021, Deposition of Benedict Occhiogrosso
`(“Occhiogrosso-Depo.”)
`Transcript of March 25, 2021, Deposition of Paul K. Mulka (“Mulka-
`Depo.”)
`Declaration of Martin Walker (“Walker-Decl.”)
`Curriculum Vitae of Martin Walker
`Gookin, D., C for Dummies, Vol. 1, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc.,
`1996, pages 9-14, 84-93, 278-289, 495, 499, 509
`Kernighan, B. and Ritchie, D., The C Programming Language, Second
`Edition, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 1988, pages 5-13
`Reply Declaration of Stuart J. Lipoff (“Lipoff-Reply-Decl.”)
`
`
`viii
`
`

`

`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`The Petition established the challenged claims’ unpatentability over
`
`Kovatch-based Grounds 1-4 and Kurganov-262-based Grounds 5-6. Parus’s POR
`
`fails to remove Kovatch or Kurganov-262 as prior art. Infra §§ II, V-VI. Parus’s
`
`other arguments, all limited to Grounds 1-4, fail. Infra §§ III-IV.
`
`II. GROUNDS 1-4: KOVATCH IS PRIOR ART
`The Board should reject Parus’s assertion that Kovatch is not prior art,
`
`because Parus failed its burden to “present a case” that the inventors conceived and
`
`reduced to practice early enough to antedate Kovatch. Gen. Access Sols. v. Sprint
`
`Spectrum, 811 F. App’x 654, 657-58 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“GAS”). Infra § II.A.
`
`Parus’s POR alleges in conclusory fashion that “source code, documents,
`
`and testimony” show prior conception and reduction to practice, but does not even
`
`identify particular exhibits where the “source code” and unidentified “documents”
`
`can be found, and never explains the relevance of any evidence or how it maps to
`
`any challenged claim. POR, 31-32. Parus improperly seeks to make its antedating
`
`case in pages of block-cited argument provided in non-word-count-limited
`
`declarations which cannot be incorporated by reference into the POR. The Board
`
`and Federal Circuit have made clear that such a purported showing “fail[s] to meet
`
`[patentee’s] burden” to antedate a reference. GAS at 658-69.
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
`Even if the Board were to “play archeologist with the record” (GAS at 657)
`
`and wade through all Parus’s exhibits to sort out what the evidence does and does
`
`not show, and even if the Board considered the arguments in Parus’s declarations,
`
`Parus’s showing is fatally deficient and fails Parus’s burden of production in
`
`antedating Kovatch. Infra § II.B.
`
`A. The POR’s Conclusory Allegation of Antedating Kovatch Should
`Be Rejected
`As Parus acknowledges, antedating requires proof of prior conception and
`
`reduction to practice of the claimed subject matter. POR, 30-31. The POR spends
`
`only two paragraphs alleging conception and reduction to practice of extensive
`
`“claimed subject matter”—including eighteen challenged claims covering “the
`
`’431 and ’084 inventions”—before Kovatch’s date. POR, 31-32. The rest of
`
`pages 32-34 alleges diligence until an alternative later date, but says nothing
`
`further about what was allegedly conceived or reduced to practice.
`
`The two paragraphs make only the barest conclusory allegation that Parus’s
`
`inventors conceived “the claimed subject matter while working on…upgrades to
`
`the Webley Assistant,” and that this is “shown through Alexander Kurganov’s
`
`testimony, which is corroborated by the time-stamped source code, emails,
`
`documents, and the testimony of Paul Mulka and Benedict Occhiogrosso.” POR,
`
`31-32. The POR provides declarants’ names but does not otherwise cite a single
`
`piece of evidence to support the fact-intensive inquiry into what was conceived.
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`
`The reduction-to-practice allegation is even worse—a single sentence baldly
`
`alleges “[t]he evidence produced in Mr. Kurganov’s declaration, along with the
`
`accompanying exhibits, demonstrate that the enhancements to the Webley
`
`Assistant reduced the…inventions to practice.” POR, 32. The POR does not even
`
`identify the “evidence produced in Mr. Kurganov’s declaration,” let alone explain
`
`how or why it allegedly establishes reduction to practice.
`
`The POR improperly asks Petitioners and the Board to sift through 1,300+
`
`pages of exhibits to assess whether the evidence could support Parus’s conclusory
`
`allegations in ways the POR nowhere explains. GAS at 657 (Board should not be
`
`“forced to play archeologist with the record” on antedation assertion).
`
`Parus’s “conclusory assertions” mirror those in GAS, “which merely directed
`
`the Board to the arguments and evidence set forth in another document,” and
`
`which the Board and Federal Circuit found were “insufficient to meet GAS’s
`
`burden of establishing prior conception.” GAS at 656, 658-59 (affirming Board’s
`
`refusal to consider inventor declaration and claim chart, where POR alleged prior
`
`conception was “demonstrated in his Declaration, and the claim chart attached”);
`
`Sprint Spectrum v. Gen. Access Sols., IPR2017-01885, Paper 57 at 10-14 (Mar. 7,
`
`2019).
`
`The POR’s conception and reduction-to-practice allegations also fail to
`
`mention the requirements of even a single challenged claim, let alone map the
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`
`(unidentified) evidence to every limitation to demonstrate that what was allegedly
`
`conceived and reduced to practice establishes prior invention of what is claimed.
`
`To the extent Parus alleges those arguments are made in the declarations,
`
`incorporation by reference therefrom is prohibited. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).
`
`Parus’s attempted incorporation of 23,000+ words of analysis/argument from
`
`multiple declarations and their 100+ pages of claim charts seeks to circumvent the
`
`POR’s word-count limit, violating the Board’s rules enacted to “eliminate” such
`
`“abuses.” Cisco Systems v. C-Cation Techs., IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 at 9-10
`
`(Aug. 29, 2014) (informative); GAS at 658 (forcing Board “to turn to a declaration
`
`by [inventor], and further…claim chart attached as an exhibit…is precisely what
`
`the rule against incorporation by reference was intended to prevent”).
`
`A patent owner’s burden to antedate a reference cannot be met by non-
`
`specific reference to inventor testimony. GAS at 658-59; Jiangu SmartSens Tech.
`
`Co. v. OmniVision Tech’s, IPR2019-01263, Paper 48 at 24-27 (Dec. 18, 2020)
`
`(“Jiangu”) (rejecting antedating allegation having no “analysis of the claims or
`
`how their limitations are met” and “no discussion of [inventor’s declaration’s]
`
`analysis…in the [POR] itself”).
`
`The Board should not consider the Kurganov declaration (including its claim
`
`charts) or the forty-eight block-cited paragraphs (POR, 32, citing ¶¶ 44-91) of the
`
`Occhiogrosso declaration, and should reject the POR’s conclusory allegation that
`
`4
`
`

`

`
`
`Kovatch is not prior art. Any more specific arguments relevant to antedating
`
`Kovatch were waived by being omitted from the POR (Paper 10 at 8), and should
`
`not be considered if Parus attempts to belatedly make them in sur-reply. Jiangu at
`
`27 (“We do not consider waiting until the Sur-Reply to provide the evidence and
`
`argument required for Patent Owner’s antedation claim to be proper procedure” in
`
`IPR.).
`
`Finally, given that the POR devoted no words to any specific
`
`argument/analysis, consideration of the declarations’ lengthy arguments and claim
`
`charts would severely and unfairly prejudice Petitioners who have only this 5,600-
`
`word-limited Reply to respond.
`
`B.
`
`If Considered, the Declarations’ Arguments Fail to Demonstrate
`Reduction to Practice
`Parus alleges the challenged claims were actually reduced to practice, by
`
`12/31/1999 (before Kovatch) or 01/07/2000 (after Kovatch, with diligence). POR,
`
`32. If the declarations’ arguments were considered, they fail to establish reduction
`
`to practice by either date for multiple independent reasons.
`
`Petitioners do not have space in this 5,600-word-limited Reply to address all
`
`deficiencies in the reduction-to-practice evidence and arguments in Parus’s
`
`declarations for all challenged claims, but identify several fatal deficiencies below.
`
`5
`
`

`

`
`
`1.
`
`The Inventor’s Testimony Lacks Independent
`Corroboration
`“[T]o establish an actual reduction to practice, an inventor’s testimony must
`
`be corroborated by independent evidence.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321,
`
`1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998). To be “independent of the inventor,” corroboration
`
`evidence must be “more than the inventor’s own records.” ABB v. Roy-G-Biv,
`
`IPR2013-00062, Paper 84 at 9-12 (Apr. 11, 2014) (citing Medichem v. Rolabo, 437
`
`F.3d 1157, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“purpose of corroboration…is to prevent
`
`fraud”)); Foursquare Labs v. Mimzi, IPR2019-01287, Paper 34 at 29-30 (Jan. 13,
`
`2021) (“Foursquare”).
`
`Mr. Kurganov’s (inventor) testimony alleges reduction to practice via the
`
`“upgraded Webley Assistant” (POR, 31)—the WA-II. Ex. 2020 (“Kurganov-
`
`Decl.”), ¶ 20. The alleged corroboration is source-code exhibits authored by the
`
`inventors and admittedly provided by Mr. Kurganov himself. Ex. 1050
`
`(“Kurganov-Depo.”), 51, 56-58, 69-70. Mr. Kurganov admitted those source-code
`
`files were “editable” while in his possession after being retrieved “at some point”
`
`from the source-control system. Kurganov-Depo., 66-67.
`
`6
`
`

`

`
`
`No non-inventor witness authenticated the source-code exhibits alleged to
`
`show reduction to practice of multiple independent claim limitations.2 Kurganov-
`
`Decl., ¶¶ 33-71; Ex. 2027 (“Kurganov-Chart”), 5-36. Microsoft v. Surfcast,
`
`IPR2013-00292, Paper 93 at 16-17 (Oct. 14, 2014) (“Inventor testimony is not
`
`sufficient to authenticate a document offered to corroborate the inventor’s
`
`testimony.”). Mr. Mulka’s declaration only alleges the inventors “work[ed] full
`
`time,” and does not purport to corroborate reduction to practice.3 Ex. 2060, ¶ 6.
`
`Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony is not independent corroboration; he had no
`
`
`2 Petitioners objected to these exhibits as lacking “evidence regarding the[ir] origin
`
`or preservation” or “establish[ing] that each is a true and correct copy” (Paper 15 at
`
`1), and Parus served no supplemental evidence.
`
`3 Parus’s counsel misused Mr. Mulka’s deposition redirect to try to fill this
`
`evidentiary gap by asking whether he was “involved with pulling source code…to
`
`support Mr. Kurganov's declaration,” despite Mr. Mulka offering no direct
`
`testimony on Mr. Kurganov’s declaration and not being questioned about it during
`
`cross-examination. This tactic failed because Mr. Mulka did not identify or
`
`authenticate any specific exhibit in the form/version submitted with the POR. Ex.
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`1052 (“Mulka-Depo.”), 55.
`
`7
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`

`

`
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`personal knowledge regarding WA-II, and relied only on Mr. Kurganov’s
`
`testimony and documents. Ex. 1051 (“Occhiogrosso-Depo.”), 64-67.
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`Because the only purported reduction-to-practice evidence for the allegedly
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`novel claimed features is “testimony from the purported inventor and his own
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`documents,” there is “no independent corroboration of the testimony,” so Kovatch
`
`cannot be antedated. Foursquare at 29-30; Kenexa Brassring v. Taleo, 751 F.
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`Supp. 2d 735, 760-61 (D. Del. 2010) (timestamped source-code files written by
`
`inventor were “akin to an unwitnessed inventor’s notebook,” “fail[ing] to provide
`
`sufficient independent corroboration”); Apple v. Yu, IPR2019-01258, Paper 29 at
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`47 (Jan. 5, 2021) (“document…authenticated only by the testimony of the
`
`inventors” is insufficient corroboration) (citing Apator Miitors v. Kamstrup, 887
`
`F.3d 1293, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
`
`2.
`
`Parus’s Evidence Meets Neither Reduction-to-Practice
`Prong
`Actual reduction to practice is a two-prong test. The patentee must show
`
`(1) that an embodiment was constructed that meets every claim element, and
`
`(2) that the embodiment worked—i.e., operated for its intended purpose. Raytheon
`
`v. Sony, 727 F. App’x 662, 668 (Fed. Cir. 2018); In re Steed, 802 F.3d 1311, 1316
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (patentee must show “the embodiment relied upon…actually
`
`worked for its intended purpose”). Parus’s evidence shows neither.
`
`8
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`

`

`
`
`a.
`
`Prong 1: No Evidence Demonstrates an Embodiment
`Meeting All Limitations of Any Challenged Claim
`No Evidence Demonstrates a Constructed
`Embodiment Having a Computer Meeting All
`Claimed Limitations
`Limitations [1.a]-[1.d] recite “a computer” connected to specific devices.
`
`i.
`
`Mr. Kurganov alleged this computer was embodied in a “UNIX cluster…server[]”
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`located somewhere other than Webley’s office. Kurganov-Decl., ¶ 29; Kurganov-
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`Chart, 9; Kurganov-Depo., 20, 23-25. Limitations [1.e]-[1.k] require the same
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`computer to have various functionalities; yet for those limitations Mr. Kurganov
`
`relied on source-code files he admitted at deposition were on a different computer
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`“probably” inside Webley’s office. Kurganov-Decl., ¶¶ 39-71; Kurganov-Chart,
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`20-36; Kurganov-Depo., 52-53, 69.
`
`No evidence purports to show that the source code alleged to meet [1.e]-
`
`[1.k] was ever compiled to generate an executable binary program that was run on
`
`the server alleged to meet the claimed “computer,” so Parus failed to even allege—
`
`let alone prove—that an embodiment meeting all limitations [1.a]-[1.k] was
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`constructed. Ex. 1053 (“Walker-Decl.”), ¶¶ 12-18. Mr. Kurganov admitted
`
`source code had to be converted to a binary program “somewhere else,” and then
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`the binary program could be “deployed to the production servers” to be run.
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`Kurganov-Depo., 26-28. Mr. Kurganov testified that the prior-version WA-I
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`software (which he admits did not meet the challenged claims) was deployed on
`
`9
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`

`

`
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`the production server (Kurganov-Decl., ¶ 14; Kurganov-Depo., 24-29), but no
`
`evidence demonstrates that the WA-II software alleged to meet the claims was
`
`deployed on that production server or any other computer at any time, let alone
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`early enough to antedate Kovatch.
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`Additionally, Mr. Kurganov relied on multiple source-code files having
`
`different version numbers and dates, and admits the claimed functionality would
`
`only be met if all were used together. Kurganov-Depo., 30-31. No evidence
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`corroborates that all these files, in the versions submitted as exhibits, could be or
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`ever were used together on the same computer. Walker-Decl., ¶¶ 19-21.
`
`ii.
`
`No Evidence Demonstrates a Constructed
`Embodiment Met Limitations [1pre], [1.h]-[1.k]
`Parus’s expert testified that limitations [1pre], [1.h]-[1.k] are only met if the
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`WA-II program calls (executes) the getWeather function, but the getWeather
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`function call was “commented out” of the source code. Occhiogrosso-Depo., 69-
`
`82, 95-99; Kurganov-Decl., ¶¶ 63-64; Kurganov-Chart, 29. Both sides’ experts
`
`agree this means the getWeather function call—like non-functional notes the
`
`inventors wrote in “comments”—would be ignored (skipped over) by any compiler
`
`that converted the source code to an executable program, so the getWeather
`
`function call would not be present in any program run by a computer. Walker-
`
`Decl., ¶¶ 22-23 (citing Exs. 1055-1056); Occhiogrosso-Depo., 96-100 (“The
`
`machine language that would result in a call to getWeather function would not be
`
`10
`
`

`

`
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`produced.”) (“Q…. [N]o call to the getWeather function will be present…?
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`A. That’s accurate.”).
`
`Mr. Kurganov admitted the source code must be compiled into a binary
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`program for execution, and only the binary program would be deployed on the
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`server alleged to meet the claimed “computer.” Kurganov-Depo., 23-28; supra
`
`§ II.B.2.a.i. The alleged WA-II embodiment did not meet limitations [1pre], [1.h]-
`
`[1.k], because even if the binary program was deployed, the server was not
`
`“configured to retrieve said instruction set” ([1.h]), to “access…web sites” ([1.i]-
`
`[1.j]), or to “retrieve[] information” ([1.j]-[1.k]). The server was not programmed
`
`to call the getWeather function alleged to perform those functionalities, because
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`the compiler removed the commented getWeather function call in generating the
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`binary program. Occhiogrosso-Depo., 99-100; Walker-Decl., ¶ 24; Ex parte Rans,
`
`Appeal 2020-000512, at 7-9 (Jun. 4, 2020) (“configured to” is narrower than
`
`“capable of,” and requires CPU “actually programmed to” perform claimed
`
`function) (emphasis original) (citing Aspex Eyewear v. Marchon Eyewear, 672
`
`F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
`
`iii. No Evidence Demonstrates an Embodiment
`Meeting Claim 9’s Additional Limitations
`Mr. Kurganov alleges claim 9 was met using url.pl (Ex. 2042) (Kurganov-
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`Decl., ¶ 79; Kurganov-Chart, 46), but nothing in that code “periodically search[es]
`
`said internet to identify new web sites” or “add[s] said new web sites to said
`
`11
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`

`

`
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`plurality of web sites” as claimed. url.pl only retrieves a single webpage from a
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`URL input to the program. Walker-Decl., ¶¶ 26-30.
`
`Parus’s expert admitted he relied only on Mr. Kurganov’s say-so that url.pl
`
`would be used in some way to meet claim 9, and that he saw nothing in url.pl itself
`
`that demonstrated that use. Occhiogrosso-Depo., 107-111. Mr. Kurganov’s
`
`testimony that claim 9 was reduced to practice is uncorroborated and contradicted
`
`by the source-code evidence.
`
`iv. No Evidence Demonstrates an Embodiment
`Meeting Claim 14’s Additional Limitations
`For claim 14, Mr. Kurganov relies on an email (Ex. 2057) (Kurganov-Decl.,
`
`¶ 82; Kurganov-Chart, 49-51) that “propose[s]” a script that could create a “table,”
`
`but does not show that any database meeting claim 14’s limitations was ever
`
`actually constructed or “operatively connected to” the server alleged to meet the
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`“computer” as claimed. Walker-Decl., ¶¶ 31-32.
`
`Parus’s expert provided no analysis of Ex. 2057. Ex. 2059 (“Occhiogrosso-
`
`Decl.”), ¶ 69. At deposition, he acknowledged that no other evidence corroborated
`
`reduction to practice of claim 14 and disavowed his declaration’s statements to the
`
`contrary. Occhiogrosso-Depo., 112-113. Mr. Kurganov’s testimony is thus
`
`uncorroborated and insufficient to show claim 14 was reduced to practice.
`
`12
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`

`

`
`
`b.
`
`Prong 2: No Evidence Demonstrates a Working
`Embodiment
`Parus’s declarations also fail the second reduction-to-practice prong for two
`
`independent reasons. First, they do not even try to show that WA-II worked for its
`
`intended purpose of “retrieving information from websites” (POR, 31). Manning
`
`v. Paradis, 296 F.3d 1098, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“preamble…may define the
`
`intended purpose of the invention”). No evidence purports to show that WA-II
`
`ever actually retrieved information from websites. Reduction to practice “requires
`
`more than theoretical capability.” Alexsam v. Gap, 621 F. App’x 983, 993 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2015) (reduction-to-practice argument failed where no “documents” showed
`
`that embodiment “was tested…, let alone…successful”) (citing Newkirk v.
`
`Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Existence of source code does
`
`not show that it worked. Kurganov-Depo., 59-62 (som