Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 1 of 37 PageID #: 1246
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`VOCALIFE LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and
`AMAZON.COM, LLC,
`
`Defendants.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00123-JRG
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PLAINTIFF VOCALIFE LLC’S
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025
`IPR Petition - US RE47,049
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 1 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 2 of 37 PageID #: 1247
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page(s)
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................. 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`GOVERNING LAW ............................................................................................... 1
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART .................................................... 1
`
`PATENT BACKGROUND AND TECHNOLOGY .......................................................... 1
`
`DISPUTED TERMS ........................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`J.
`
`K.
`
`L.
`
`“determining a delay . . . wherein said determination of said delay
`enables beamforming” (Claims 1 and 20) (No. 1) .................................................. 2
`
`“digital signal processor”(Claims 1 and 20) (No. 2) ............................................... 4
`
`“for said array of sound sensors in a plurality of configurations” (Claims
`1 and 20) (No. 3) ..................................................................................................... 7
`
`“origin of said array of said sound sensors”(Claims 1, 19, and 20) (No. 4) ........... 8
`
`“steering directivity pattern”(Claims 1 and 20) (No. 5) ....................................... 10
`
`“target sound signal”(Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 19, and 20) (No. 6) ................................. 12
`
`“target sound source” (Claims 1–3 and 20) (No. 7) .............................................. 14
`
`“when said target sound source that emits said target sound signal is in a
`three dimensional plane”(Claim 20) (No. 8) and “when said target sound
`source that emits said target sound signal is in a two dimensional plane”
`(Claim 1) (No. 9)................................................................................................... 15
`
`Order of Steps (Claims 1 and 20) (No. 10) ........................................................... 18
`
`“sound source localization unit” (Claims 1, 2, and 20) (No. 11) .......................... 20
`
`“an auditory transform based noise reduction algorithm” (Claim 7) (No.
`12) ......................................................................................................................... 24
`
`“adaptive beamforming” (Claims 1, 3, 6, 8, and 20) (No. 13) .............................. 26
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 30
`
`i
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 2 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 3 of 37 PageID #: 1248
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
`725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................17
`
`AGIS Software Dev., LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc.,
`No. 2:17-CV-513-JRG, 2018 WL 4908169 (E.D. Tex., Oct. 10, 2018) ....................................1
`
`Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`318 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003)....................................................................................18, 19, 20
`
`Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................21
`
`Cloud Farm Assoc. LP v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc.,
`674 Fed. Appx. 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .....................................................................................11
`
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..........................................................................................13, 24
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`561 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir.2009)....................................................................................................3
`
`Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R. L. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`No. 2:14-cv-0911-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 6956722 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2015) .............................5
`
`CSC Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................21
`
`E2E Processing, Inc. v. Cabela’s Inc.,
`No. 2:14-cv-35-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 4051423 (E.D. Tex. July 2, 2015) ..........................22, 23
`
`Genband USA LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Ltd.,
`No. 2:14-CV-33-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 1518007 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2015) ........................11, 13
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................7, 30
`
`Howemedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.,
`540 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................7
`
`Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. T-Mobile US, Inc.,
`No. 2:16-cv-00052-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 1376436 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2017) ........................22
`
`ii
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 3 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 4 of 37 PageID #: 1249
`
`Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
`256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................18
`
`Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp.,
`62 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1995)..................................................................................................29
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)......................................................................................19, 24, 28
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................12, 16
`
`Omega Eng’g v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................3, 9, 17
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
`No. 6:11-cv-474, 2014 WL 1575719 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2014) ..............................................2
`
`Rambus Inc. v. Rea,
`731 F.3d 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................10
`
`SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc.,
`727 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..........................................................................................13, 15
`
`Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Intern., Inc.,
`622 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................11
`
`SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
`775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985)................................................................................................30
`
`Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O.,
`806 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................8
`
`TEK Global, S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc.,
`920 F.3d 777,785 (Fed. Cir. 2019).....................................................................................21, 22
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................3
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)................................................................................................27
`
`Vitronics Corp. v Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)........................................................................................4, 14, 15
`
`iii
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 4 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 5 of 37 PageID #: 1250
`
`Whirlpool Corp. v. TST Water, LLC,
`No. 2:15-cv-1528-JRG, 2016 WL 3959811 (E.D. Tex. July 22, 2016)...................................13
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................21
`
`
`
`iv
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 5 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 6 of 37 PageID #: 1251
`
`Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(a) and the Court’s Amended Docket Control Order of January 6,
`
`2020 (Dkt. 64), Plaintiff Vocalife LLC (“Vocalife”) hereby submits its Opening Claim
`
`Construction Brief regarding U.S. Patent No. RE47,049 (the “’049 Patent,” Ex. A).
`
`I.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`A.
`
`GOVERNING LAW
`
`The governing legal standards relating to claim construction are described in the Court’s
`
`opinion in AGIS Software Dev., LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 2:17-CV-513-JRG, 2018
`
`WL 4908169, at *3–5 (E.D. Tex., Oct. 10, 2018), and are incorporated herein by reference.
`
`B.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`The ’049 Patent describes systems and methods for use in a microphone array that
`
`address the “need for enhancing acoustics of a target sound signal received from a target sound
`
`source, while suppressing ambient noise signals,” thereby improving hands-free and handheld
`
`speech acquisition devices. Ex. A, ’049 Patent at 2:5–8. The detailed descriptions of the
`
`inventions and the claims of the ʼ049 Patent draw on a combination of skills from the acoustic
`
`system arts. Vocalife submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) covered by
`
`the ʼ049 Patent would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering with one to two years of
`
`experience in the field of acoustic system implementation and/or design of acoustic systems. See
`
`Ex. B, Declaration of Joseph C. McAlexander III Regarding Proposed Constructions and
`
`Definiteness of the Asserted Claims of U.S. Patent No. RE47,049, ¶ 29. Extensive experience
`
`and technical training may substitute for educational requirements, while advanced education
`
`may substitute for experience. Id.
`
`II.
`
`PATENT BACKGROUND AND TECHNOLOGY
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,861,756 issued on October 14, 2014 from Application No. 13/049,877
`
`filed on March 16, 2011. The ’756 Patent claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No.
`
`1
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 6 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 7 of 37 PageID #: 1252
`
`61/403,952, filed on September 24, 2010. On October 14, 2016, a reissue application was filed
`
`for the ’756 Patent. The United States Patent and Trademark Office duly and legally issued ’049
`
`Patent on September 18, 2018. The ’049 Patent is directed to systems and methods for enhancing
`
`the acoustics of a target sound signal while reducing ambient noise signals. See Ex. A, ’049
`
`Patent at 2:5–8.
`
`III. DISPUTED TERMS
`A.
`“determining a delay . . . wherein said determination of said delay enables
`beamforming” (Claims 1 and 20) (No. 11)
`
`Vocalife’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Excludes identifying the direction exhibiting maximum
`energy among beams pointing in each of a prescribed
`number of directions.
`
`Claim 1 recites:
`
`determining a delay between each of said sound sensors and an origin of said
`array of said sound sensors as a function of distance between each of said sound
`sensors and said origin, a predefined angle between each of said sound sensors
`and a reference axis, and an azimuth angle between said reference axis and said
`target sound signal, when said target sound source that emits said target sound
`signal is in a two dimensional plane, wherein said delay is represented in terms of
`number of samples, and wherein said determination of said delay enables
`beamforming.2
`
`This term does not require construction and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`Defendants seek to impermissibly add a negative limitation—“excludes identifying the
`
`direction exhibiting maximum energy among beams pointing in each of a prescribed number of
`
`directions”—where there has been no disavowal of claim scope. See Profectus Tech. LLC v.
`
`Huawei Techs. Co., No. 6:11-cv-474, 2014 WL 1575719, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2014) (citing
`
`
`1 “No. __” refers to claim term number in Plaintiff’s Proposed Constructions submitted with the
`P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement. See Dkt. 42-2.
`2 Hereinafter referred to as “determining a delay.”
`
`2
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 7 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 8 of 37 PageID #: 1253
`
`Omega Eng’g v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Absent a specific
`
`disavowal, negative limitations are generally disfavored.”)).
`
`Defendants rely on a single statement made during prosecution of the reissue application
`
`in which the patentee discussed the Tashev prior art reference. However, nothing said during
`
`prosecution excludes power or energy from the scope of the claims. Instead, the Applicant
`
`merely indicated that delay is within the scope of the claims where the prior art did not teach any
`
`delay. See Ex. C, ’049 Patent File History, Jan. 29, 2018 Amendment and Response to Office
`
`Action at 26. The Applicant stated that “Tashev does not teach or suggest a method for
`
`determining the delay (τ) as a function of distance (d) between each of the sound sensors 301 and
`
`the origin, a predefined angle (Φ) between each of the sound sensors 301 and a reference axis
`
`(Y) and the target sound.” Id. Applicant further clarified that Tashev “does not teach calculation
`
`of time delay as shown in . . . applicant’s original application.” Id. Nothing in the record
`
`indicates that the use of delay would exclude the use of energy and Applicant’s statements do not
`
`indicate that “determining a delay” must “exclude[] identifying the direction exhibiting
`
`maximum energy among beams pointing in each of a prescribed number of directions.”
`
`The patentee’s statements regarding Tashev do not amount to a “clear and unmistakable”
`
`surrender of scope. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2009). The
`
`’049 Patent’s specification contains no expression of manifest exclusion or restriction as to any
`
`additional measurement of a direction exhibiting a certain amount of energy or power as
`
`Defendants contend. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012). Instead, the intrinsic record includes numerous references to calculations utilizing
`
`power that are within the scope of the claims, including at least the Steered-Response Power
`
`(“SRP”) and the Steered-Response Power Phase Transform (“SRP-PHAT”) algorithms. See,
`
`3
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 8 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 9 of 37 PageID #: 1254
`
`e.g., Ex. A, ’049 Patent at 2:30–33, 6:6–12, 6:54–59, 11:25–12:17. Because there is no basis in
`
`the intrinsic record to insert a negative limitation into Claims 1 and 20, Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction should be rejected.
`
`B.
`
`“digital signal processor”(Claims 1 and 20) (No. 2)
`
`Vocalife’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and Ordinary Meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`A processor that is programmable using an instruction set
`that provides more powerful mathematical computational
`abilities for processing digital signals than standard
`microprocessors like ARM and Intel x86.
`
`
`
`The term “digital signal processor” appears in Claims 1 and 20 of the ʼ049 Patent. For
`
`example, Claim 1 recites “wherein said sound source localization unit, said adaptive
`
`beamforming unit, and said noise reduction unit are integrated in a digital signal processor.” This
`
`term does not require construction and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`Defendants seek a non-infringement position by way of construing the claims with a negative
`
`limitation that would exclude ARM and Intel x86 microprocessors from the scope of the claims.
`
`Nothing in the intrinsic record supports such a construction.
`
`
`
`Defendants rely primarily on their expert, Dr. Richard Stern, and extrinsic evidence. Dr.
`
`Stern admits that he is not “a processor person” (Ex. E, Stern Dep. Tr. at 46:8–11) and “not well
`
`versed in the distinction between ARM SOC’s and ARM processors in general.” Ex. E, Stern
`
`Dep. Tr. at 41:2–7. Instead of relying on the intrinsic record or his own knowledge, Dr. Stern
`
`looks to twelve pieces of extrinsic evidence, including a number of articles that are not
`
`appropriate sources of evidence to support claim construction unless it is shown the claim term is
`
`ambiguous. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[E]xtrinsic
`
`publications may not be written by or for skilled artisans and therefore may not reflect the
`
`understanding of a skilled artisan in the field of the patent.”); Vitronics Corp. v Conceptronic,
`
`4
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 9 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 10 of 37 PageID #: 1255
`
`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584–85 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Defendants cannot demonstrate that this claim
`
`term is ambiguous and, by Dr. Stern’s admission, these articles do not support an absolute
`
`negative limitation excluding ARM processors. See Ex. E, Stern Dep. Tr. at 53:25–54:12 (“Q:
`
`So, there could be counterexamples where a DSP does not have much greater mathematical
`
`computational abilities than a standard microprocessor; correct? A: There could be. And the
`
`sentence that we’re citing includes the word typically.”).
`
`
`
`Furthermore, Defendants’ proposal introduces ambiguity by requiring a comparison of
`
`the “power” of processors by requiring a DSP to be “more powerful” than a microprocessor. Dr.
`
`Stern admitted that ARM processors could perform the functions of DSPs. Id. at 29:10–18; see
`
`id. at 35:15–36:1. The ambiguity introduced by Defendants’ construction is further demonstrated
`
`by Dr. Stern’s testimony that part of the construction of DSP requires an evaluation of the
`
`“design goal” of the architecture. See Ex. E, Stern Dep. Tr. at 44:22–45:7. This construction
`
`would therefore read the “intent” of a third-party chip designer into the construction of DSP. As
`
`yet another example, Dr. Stern testified that Defendants’ construction of DSP “should exclude
`
`ARM processors as of 2010,” but does not exclude any processors after 2010. Id. at 52:7–15.
`
`Accordingly, Defendants’ construction would require not only subjective intent, but a temporal
`
`construction of this claim term, introducing further ambiguity. See Core Wireless Licensing
`
`S.A.R. L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-0911-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 6956722, at *14 (E.D. Tex.
`
`Nov. 9, 2015). Defendants’ temporal construction excluding ARM processors as of 2010 would
`
`likely result in serious juror confusion where the jury would have to evaluate whether modern
`
`ARM processors could meet this DSP limitation. Defendants’ injection of subjective intent and
`
`a temporal limitation not supported by the specification also undermines the notice function of
`
`patents and should therefore be disregarded. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19 (“[U]ndue
`
`5
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 10 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 11 of 37 PageID #: 1256
`
`reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that it will be used to change the meaning of claims
`
`in derogation of the ‘indisputable public records consisting of the claims, the specification and
`
`the prosecution history,’ thereby undermining the public notice function of patents.”) (citations
`
`omitted).
`
`
`
`Defendants have no evidence to support the proposition that ARM processors are not
`
`powerful enough to perform the functions described in the specification, let alone to require the
`
`exclusion of these microprocessors from the claims. Above all, the intrinsic record does not
`
`support Defendants’ narrow construction. The specification discloses that digital sound signals
`
`are transmitted to the DSP “for processing of the digital sound signals.” Ex. A, ’049 Patent at
`
`15:25–27. Further, “[t]he DSP 1403 chip is powerful enough to handle the DSP 1403
`
`computations in the microphone array system 200 disclosed herein.” Id. at 16:27–29. Nothing in
`
`the specification indicates that the DSP was intended to be limited to “a processor that is
`
`programmable using an instruction set that provides more powerful mathematical computational
`
`abilities for processing digital signals than standard microprocessors like ARM and Intel x86” as
`
`proposed by Defendants. The specification does not identify any specific brands of processors or
`
`the comparative strength of such processors as proposed by Defendants’ proposed construction.
`
`Rather, a POSITA would understand the term by its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., a device
`
`that processes digital signals. At his deposition, Dr. Stern was confronted with numerous ARM
`
`technical specifications demonstrating that ARM processors include DSP instruction sets and
`
`functionality. See Ex. E, Stern Dep. Tr. at 41:13–42:3; 46:21–47:4; Exs. H–K, Exhibits 2–5 to
`
`the Deposition of Dr. Richard Stern, ARM Processor Specifications. In fact, Dr. Stern testified
`
`that he did not consider whether ARM processors include digital signal processor instruction
`
`sets. See Ex. E, Stern Dep. Tr. at 30:3–10.
`
`6
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 11 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 12 of 37 PageID #: 1257
`
`
`
`Defendants identify no lexicography or “clear and unmistakable” disavowal of claim
`
`scope to support injecting their narrow limitation excluding certain types of processors from the
`
`scope of the claims. See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014) (“We depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the
`
`specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”) (citations omitted). Had the
`
`patentee intended to limit “digital signal processors” to processors “more powerful than standard
`
`microprocessors,” he could have written this limitation into the claims. However, the claim
`
`language is broader and there is “no persuasive evidence that the claim should be interpreted
`
`other than by its plain language.” See Howemedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.,
`
`540 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Defendants’ construction should be rejected
`
`and “digital signal processor” should carry its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`C.
`
`“for said array of sound sensors in a plurality of configurations” (Claims 1
`and 20) (No. 3)
`
`Vocalife’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`With the sound sensors positioned in multiple physical
`layouts.
`
`“For said array of sound sensors in a plurality of configurations” appears in independent
`
`Claims 1 and 20 of the ʼ049 Patent. This term does not require construction and should be given
`
`its plain and ordinary meaning. Defendants’ construction unnecessarily complicates and adds
`
`ambiguity to the claims by injecting the new phrase “positioned in multiple physical layouts.”
`
`This new limitation increases confusion instead of providing clarity and unduly limits the scope
`
`of Claims 1 and 20.
`
`Defendants contend that the term “configuration” must be limited specifically to a
`
`positioning of the sensors in a physical layout of the sensors. However, Defendants identify no
`
`lexicography or disavowal of scope with respect to the term “configuration.” A POSITA would
`
`7
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 12 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 13 of 37 PageID #: 1258
`
`have understood the meaning of the term “configuration” as recited in the claims and that
`
`meaning would not have been restricted to a physical layout. See e.g., Ex. A, ’049 Patent at
`
`16:29–31. Therefore, there is no basis to substitute Defendants’ term for a new narrowing
`
`limitation, and Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected. Straight Path IP Grp.,
`
`Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O., 806 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[U]nless there is a disclaimer or
`
`redefinition . . . the proper construction of any claim language must . . . ‘stay[] true to the claim
`
`language,’ and . . . avoid giving invention-defining effect to specification language included for
`
`other descriptive and enablement purposes”) (citations omitted).
`
`D.
`
`“origin of said array of said sound sensors”(Claims 1, 19, and 20) (No. 4)
`
`Vocalife’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Location within the array at which no sound sensor is
`located.
`
`The meaning of the claim term “origin of said array of sound sensors” is clear to a
`
`POSITA and Defendants’ attempt to redefine it as a “location within the array at which no sound
`
`sensor is located” should be rejected. First, there is no support in the intrinsic evidence that
`
`lends credence to Defendants’ proposed construction. A POSITA would understand what the
`
`“origin” is and its meaning is readily apparent from the claims and specification. For example,
`
`the ’049 Patent explains:
`
`In an embodiment where the target sound source that emits the target sound signal
`is in a two dimensional plane, a delay between each of the sound sensors and an
`origin of the microphone array is determined as a function of distance between
`each of the sound sensors and the origin, a predefined angle between each of the
`sound sensors and a reference axis, and an azimuth angle between the reference
`axis and the target sound signal.
`
`Ex., A, ’049 Patent at 2:42–49. In addition, the exemplary embodiments shown in Figures 5
`
`through 7C, and their accompanying descriptions, demonstrate how the distance between each
`
`sound sensor in the array and the origin is calculated and how the delay is determined. See id. at
`
`8
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 13 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 14 of 37 PageID #: 1259
`
`8:8–11:22. Defendants’ proposed construction does not provide any clarity to the fact-finder and
`
`instead only adds confusion by improperly inserting a negative limitation wherein the origin can
`
`only be a “location within the array at which no sound sensor is located.” See Omega Eng’g,
`
`334 F.3d at 1322–23. Defendants’ seek this construction in order to manufacture a non-
`
`infringement position since a number of accused products include a sound sensor in the center of
`
`the microphone array. See Ex. F, Depiction of the Locations of the Sound Sensors in the
`
`Amazon Products. In support of their construction, Defendants rely on their expert, Dr. Stern,
`
`who states that a microphone cannot be located at the origin because the resulting predefined
`
`angle would not exist. See Ex. D, Stern Report at ¶ 69. However, at his deposition, Dr. Stern
`
`admitted than an angle can have a 0 degree measurement. See Ex. E, Stern Dep. Tr. at 66:19–24.
`
`
`
`To support Defendants’ construction, Dr. Stern relies on the Applicant’s statements made
`
`during prosecution of the related ’623 application to overcome the Erten reference.3 See Ex. D,
`
`Stern Report at ¶ 71. In distinguishing Erten, the applicant stated “the distance D in Erten is not
`
`the distance between the sensor and the origin as in the applicant’s disclosure. In contrast, the
`
`distance D is the distance between the two sensors.” See Ex. L, File History of Appl. No.
`
`16/052,623, June 17, 2019 Amendment at 16. This statement does not foreclose the possibility
`
`that the claimed origin is at a location within the array where a sound sensor is also located.
`
`Erten is a two-sensor configuration (see id.) and in such a configuration, the origin would be at a
`
`point between the two sensors. This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that in a
`
`configuration including more than two sound sensors, the origin must be at a location within the
`
`array at which no sound sensor is located as Defendants would have the Court believe.
`
`
`3 Notably, the amendment that Dr. Stern cites is dated June 17, 2019, which is subsequent to the
`issuance of the ’049 Patent on Sept. 18, 2018.
`
`9
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 14 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 15 of 37 PageID #: 1260
`
`
`
`Defendants’ construction is also incorrect because it would also exclude an embodiment
`
`explicitly disclosed in the specification. The ’049 Patent states, “For purposes of illustration, the
`
`detailed description refers to a circular microphone array configuration; however, the scope of
`
`the microphone array system 200 disclosed herein is not limited to the circular microphone array
`
`configuration but may be extended to include a linear array configuration, an arbitrarily
`
`distributed coplanar array configuration, or a microphone array configuration with any arbitrary
`
`geometry.” Ex. A, ’049 Patent, at 8:34–40 (emphasis added). In a linear microphone array, for
`
`example, it may not be possible to pinpoint a “location within the array at which no sound sensor
`
`is located.” The result of Defendants’ construction is that only a circular or other geometric
`
`microphone array configuration could fall within the scope of the claims, which is explicitly
`
`contradicted by the specification. Id. Defendants’ expert conceded this point when he testified
`
`that an angle could be 0 degrees, indicating that the sensor can be at the origin and contradicting
`
`his expert report in which he appeared to suggest otherwise. See Ex. E, Stern Dep. Tr. at 66:19–
`
`24. “A claim construction that excludes the preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct . . .
`
`.’” Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). For the
`
`foregoing reasons and because the meaning of this term is readily apparent to a POSITA, “origin
`
`of said array of said sound sensors” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`E.
`
`“steering directivity pattern”(Claims 1 and 20) (No. 5)
`
`Vocalife’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Changing the direction of a directivity pattern to point
`toward a location of the target sound source
`
`
`
`
`The term “steering a directivity pattern” appears in Claims 1 and 20 of the ʼ049 Patent as
`
`part of the method step of “performing adaptive beamforming.” This term does not require
`
`construction and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Defendants propose this claim
`
`10
`
`Amazon Ex. 1025, Page 15 of 41
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 68 Filed 02/12/20 Page 16 of 37 PageID #: 1261
`
`term should be construed as “changing the direction of a directivity pattern to point toward a
`
`location of the target sound source.” In support, Defendants’ expert opines that a POSITA
`
`“would understand that ‘steering a directivity pattern,’ much like steering a car, means changing
`
`its direction.” Ex. D, Stern Report at ¶ 83.
`
`
`
`While there are multiple places in the specification that refer to “steering a directivity
`
`pattern” (see, e.g., Ex. A, ’049 Patent at 2:65–3:4; 6:13–17; 6:60–64; 7:44–50; 12:23–27), these
`
`disclosures do not indicate that this term should be construed differently from its plain and
`
`ordinary meaning. Defendants do not offer any evidence as to why the term “steering” should be
`
`replaced by “changing.” See Cloud Farm Assoc. LP v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 674 Fed.
`
`Appx. 1000, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Cloud Farm is unable to offer any evidence for why the
`
`term ‘controlling’ should be replaced by the term ‘altering.’ . . . As the district court stated,
`
`‘altering’ is materially different from ‘controlling,’ and ‘suspension damping’ is not the same as
`
`‘suspension.’”). Defendants do not submit any evidence aside from their expert report indicating
`
`that the plain and ordinary meaning of “steering” equates to “changing,” but the term “changing”
`
`is not use