throbber
Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 1 of 36 PageID #: 2252
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`VOCALIFE LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and
`AMAZON.COM LLC
`
`Defendants.
`
`Civil Action No. 2:19-CV-00123-JRG
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`AMAZON’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026
`IPR Petition - US RE47,049
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 1 of 36
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 2 of 36 PageID #: 2253
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ------------------------------------------------ 2
`
`III.
`
`DISPUTED CLAIM LIMITATIONS ------------------------------------------------------------ 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`“adaptive beamforming” (Claims 1, 3, 6, 8 and 20) ----------------------------------- 2
`
`“auditory transform based noise reduction algorithm” (Claim 7) ------------------- 5
`
`“digital signal processor” (Claims 1 and 20) ------------------------------------------- 6
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`DSPs Are Programmable --------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`DSPs Are Fundamentally Different From Standard
`Microprocessors ------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
`
`DSPs Use Instruction Sets That Differ From Standard
`Microprocessors ------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
`
`ARM and x86 Processors Were the Most Common Examples of
`Standard Microprocessors ------------------------------------------------------- 10
`
`Vocalife Provides No Justification for Disregarding Amazon’s
`Expert Testimony, Technical Dictionaries, Textbooks, and
`Industry Publications ------------------------------------------------------------ 12
`
`“determining a delay … wherein said determination of delay enables
`beamforming” (Claims 1 and 20) ------------------------------------------------------- 14
`
`“for said array of sound sensors in a plurality of configurations” (Claims 1
`and 20) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
`
`F.
`
`“origin of said array of said sound sensors” (Claims 1, 19 and 20) ---------------- 17
`
`1.
`
`The Predefined Angle is Measured Between a Reference Axis and a
`Line Joining a Sound Sensor to the Origin ----------------------------------- 17
`
`2.
`
`The Origin is a Point Where No Sound Sensor is Located ----------------- 18
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`J.
`
`K.
`
`“sound source localization unit” (Claims 1 and 20) ---------------------------------- 21
`
`“steering a directivity pattern” (Claims 1 and 20) ------------------------------------ 24
`
`“target sound signal” (Claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 19 and 20) ------------------------------- 25
`
`“target sound source” (Claims 1, 2, 3 and 20) ----------------------------------------- 26
`
`“when said target sound source that emits said target sound signal is in a
`two dimensional plane” / “three dimensional plane” (Claim 1 / 20) --------------- 26
`
`L.
`
`Order of Steps (Claims 1 and 20) ------------------------------------------------------- 29
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30
`
`i
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 2 of 36
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 3 of 36 PageID #: 2254
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`Page(s):
`
`AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,
`239 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..........................................................................................13, 14
`
`Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). (Br. .) ....................................................................................22
`
`Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`2015 WL 6746910 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2015) ..........................................................................24
`
`Cypress Lake Software, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
`382 F. Supp. 3d 586 (E.D. Tex. 2019) .....................................................................................10
`
`Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................21
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Springs Networks, Inc.,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)......................................................................................1, 26, 28
`
`GoDaddy.com, Inc. v. RPost Comms. Ltd.,
`2016 WL 212676 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2016), aff’d, 685 F. App’x 992
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................................................23
`
`Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,
`939 F.2d 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................................24
`
`Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
`800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................22
`
`Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd.,
`764 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..........................................................................................29, 30
`
`Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. TiVo, Inc.,
`2012 WL 6087792 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2012) ...........................................................................10
`
`MTD Prod. Inc. v. Iancu,
`933 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................21, 23
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ...................................................................................................................6
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................ passim
`
`ii
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 3 of 36
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 4 of 36 PageID #: 2255
`
`Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................5
`
`Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc.,
`413 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................20
`
`Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc.,
`174 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................24
`
`Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp.,
`164 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..........................................................................................15, 16
`
`Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`743 F.3d 849 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................................7
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................20
`
`Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................4
`
`Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
`505 U.S. 763 (1992) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Virginia Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`2019 WL 4259020 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2019) ....................................................................21, 22
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). (Br. .) ......................................................................................14
`
`Whirlpool Corp. v. TST Water, LLC,
`2016 WL 3959811 (E.D. Tex. July 22, 2016) ...........................................................................3
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)....................................................................................21, 23, 24
`
`Statutes and Rules:
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ............................................................................................................21, 22, 23, 24
`
`10 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................................................................................4
`
`21 U.S.C. § 802 ................................................................................................................................4
`
`22 U.S.C. § 6023 ..............................................................................................................................4
`
`50 U.S.C. § 4801 ..............................................................................................................................4
`
`Patent Local Rule 4-3.....................................................................................................................11
`
`iii
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 4 of 36
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 5 of 36 PageID #: 2256
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`U.S. Reissue Patent RE47049 (the “’049 patent”) describes mathematical methods for
`
`enhancing digital signals received by a collection of microphones. The asserted claims recite
`
`technical phrases that would be completely foreign to lay jurors, such as “adaptive beamforming”
`
`and “steering a directivity pattern.” For this reason alone, the claim limitations should be
`
`construed. Vocalife argues that the Court should not help the jury to understand the meaning of
`
`any of the disputed claim limitations. Vocalife contends that the “plain and ordinary meaning”
`
`controls, but never offers a construction that articulates that meaning.
`
`For many of the disputed claim limitations, Vocalife’s brief reveals that it intends to present
`
`an incorrect meaning at trial. Vocalife’s meanings are often unsupported by any evidence at all.
`
`They are also contrary to the specification and prosecution history. Amazon therefore disputes
`
`Vocalife’s meanings and proposes claim constructions that are supported by the intrinsic and
`
`extrinsic evidence. The Court should resolve the parties’ disputes by selecting an actual claim
`
`construction for each limitation to help the jury properly understand the scope of the claims.
`
`Vocalife argues that Amazon’s constructions depart from the plain and ordinary meaning
`
`of all disputed claim limitations. For many of the disputed limitations, however, Amazon’s
`
`proposed construction is the plain meaning. The dispute for such limitations is not whether the
`
`plain meaning applies, but what the plain meaning is. Adopting the generic label of “plain and
`
`ordinary meaning” as Vocalife proposes would not resolve this dispute and is therefore improper.
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Springs Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`
`(“[A] district court’s duty at the claim construction stage is, simply, the one that we described in
`
`O2 Micro … to resolve a dispute about claim scope … raised by the parties.”). Amazon has offered
`
`the correct meanings for the disputed claim limitations, as explained below.
`
`1
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 5 of 36
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 6 of 36 PageID #: 2257
`
`II.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`The ’049 patent claims a priority date of September 24, 2010. (Ex. A (“’049 pat.”).)1 One
`
`of ordinary skill in the relevant art at that time would have had a graduate degree in electrical
`
`engineering, computer science, or a similar field, with courses in digital signal processing. (Ex. X
`
`(“Stern Decl.”) at ¶ 22.) Alternatively, the skilled artisan would have had a bachelor’s degree in
`
`such a field with 3 to 4 years of industry experience in digital signal processing. (Id.) Experience
`
`in digital signal processing is important because the patent focuses on mathematical manipulation
`
`of digital sound signals. For example, the patent extensively discusses “beamforming,” which is
`
`“a signal processing technique … for directional signal reception.” (’049 pat. at 6:17-20; see also
`
`id. at 7:6-11:20 (describing mathematical formulas (1)-(8), used for beamforming).)
`
`Vocalife argues that one of ordinary skill would need only “one to two years of experience”
`
`in “acoustic system implementation and/or design of acoustic systems”—with no experience in
`
`digital signal processing. (Br. at 1.) An “acoustic system” is simply a “system that’s capable of
`
`generating or processing or receiving sound.” (Dkt. 68-8 at 28:5-7.) Thus, acoustic system
`
`implementation would include activities as basic as deciding where in a room to place a set of off-
`
`the-shelf speakers. (Id. at 29:8-18.) Such basic activities bear no resemblance to the digital signal
`
`processing described in the ’049 patent, so the level of skill that Vocalife proposes is incorrect.
`
`III. DISPUTED CLAIM LIMITATIONS
`
`A.
`
`“adaptive beamforming” (Claims 1, 3, 6, 8 and 20)
`
`Amazon
`
`“a beamforming process in which the directivity pattern of the microphone
`array is adaptively steered in the direction of a target sound signal emitted by a
`target sound source in motion, and which includes adaptively performing
`beam steering and null steering”
`
`
`
`Vocalife
`
`Plain and
`ordinary
`meaning
`
`
`1 Exhibits A through X are attached to the Declaration of Jeremy A. Anapol, filed herewith.
`
`2
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 6 of 36
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`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 7 of 36 PageID #: 2258
`
`The specification of the ’049 patent expressly defines the phrase “adaptive beamforming.”
`
`Adaptive beamforming refers to a beamforming process where the directivity
`pattern of the microphone array 201 is adaptively steered in the direction of a
`target sound signal emitted by a target sound source in motion. Adaptive
`beamforming achieves better ambient noise suppression than fixed beamforming.
`This is because the target direction of arrival, which is assumed to be stable in fixed
`beamforming, changes with the movement of the target sound source. Moreover,
`the gains of the sound sensors 301 which are assumed uniform in fixed
`beamforming, exhibit significant distribution. All these factors reduce speech
`quality. On the other hand, adaptive beamforming adaptively performs beam
`steering and null steering; therefore, the adaptive beamforming method is more
`robust against steering error caused by the array imperfection mentioned above.
`
`(’049 pat. at 12:23-38;2 Stern Decl. at ¶ 36.) Amazon’s construction simply adopts the patent’s
`
`express definition. Where a specification defines a claim limitation, that definition governs the
`
`claim construction inquiry. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`
`
`Vocalife’s expert provides testimony in his declaration that supports Amazon’s
`
`construction. He states: “adaptive beamforming adaptively steers the directivity pattern of the
`
`microphone array towards the direction of … the target sound signal which enhances the target
`
`sound signal while the target sound source is in motion.” (Dkt. 68-3 at ¶ 34.) He reiterated this in
`
`his deposition. (Dkt. 68-8 at 49:3-13.) Although his declaration does not mention the “beam
`
`steering and null steering” requirement of Amazon’s construction, he agreed at his deposition that
`
`the specification includes that requirement and he had no reason to doubt it. (Id. at 50:1-12.)
`
`Vocalife suggests that “adaptive beamforming” need not be construed and that the jury
`
`should apply their plain understanding of it. But this is not a common phrase that lay jurors would
`
`understand. See Whirlpool Corp. v. TST Water, LLC, 2016 WL 3959811, at *11, *14 (E.D. Tex.
`
`July 22, 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s arguments that “technical” claim terms should not be
`
`construed). In fact, the patent does not even presume that skilled artisans would understand it, and
`
`
`2 Emphasis in quotations is added unless otherwise noted.
`
`3
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 7 of 36
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`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 8 of 36 PageID #: 2259
`
`therefore provides an explicit definition. (’049 pat. at 12:23-38.) Even Vocalife’s expert felt he
`
`needed to explain what “adaptive beamforming” is in his declaration. (Dkt. 68-3 at ¶ 34.) Thus,
`
`the Court should not leave the jury to its own understanding of this technical term.
`
`
`
`Vocalife argues that the part of the specification Amazon cites merely describes advantages
`
`of adaptive beamforming, without providing a definition. (Dkt. 68 (“Br.”) at 30.) However, the
`
`specification’s statement that “adaptive beamforming refers to” a certain type of process is clear
`
`definitional language. The phrasing “[Term X] refers to [Meaning Y]” is widely used for express
`
`definitions. For example, Congress uses this phrasing in “Definitions” sections of many statutes.
`
`E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 101(b)(10), 21 U.S.C. § 802(2), 22 U.S.C. § 6023(4), 50 U.S.C. § 4801(1). The
`
`Supreme Court uses this phrasing for definitions. E.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
`
`U.S. 763, 777 (1992) (“[T]he word ‘origin’ refers to the geographic location in which the goods
`
`originated….”). The Federal Circuit does too. E.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`
`649 F.3d 1276, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“‘Live blood’ refers to blood within a body.”).
`
`Vocalife argues that Amazon’s construction “fail[s] to provide any clarity to the fact
`
`finder.” (Br. at 26.) But Amazon’s construction specifies that adaptive beamforming requires
`
`(1) steering toward a sound source in motion, and (2) both beam steering and null steering. Neither
`
`of these features would be apparent to the jury without Amazon’s clarifying construction.
`
`
`
`Vocalife also argues that portions of Amazon’s construction are redundant. (Br. at 26-27.)
`
`But the phrasing comes directly from the specification, and the two aspects of the construction
`
`enumerated above are undisputedly not redundant to the explicit claim language.
`
`
`
`Vocalife also mistakenly asserts that Amazon’s construction requires the microphone array
`
`to be adaptively steered. (Br. at 27.) But Amazon’s construction—like the patent—states that the
`
`array’s “directivity pattern” is steered, not the array itself. (’049 pat. at 12:23-38.)
`
`4
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 8 of 36
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`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 9 of 36 PageID #: 2260
`
`Vocalife contends that Amazon’s construction is presumptively improper under the
`
`doctrine of claim differentiation because it includes a requirement that is explicit in dependent
`
`claim 3—i.e., that the “target sound source is in motion.” (Br. at 28.) But an express definition,
`
`like the one quoted above, easily overcomes that presumption. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton,
`
`Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`Vocalife also accuses Amazon of trying to “insert a non-limiting embodiment into the
`
`claims.” (Br. at 30.) But the description Amazon adopts from the specification explains what
`
`adaptive beamforming “refers to.” (’049 pat. at 12:23-38.) In contrast, the specification also
`
`describes that “the adaptive beamforming unit 203 disclosed herein comprises” certain
`
`components. (Id. at 12:39-42.) The description of what adaptive beamforming unit 203
`
`“comprises” is an embodiment; the description of what adaptive beamforming “refers to” is a
`
`definition. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315-16.
`
`B.
`
`“auditory transform based noise reduction algorithm” (Claim 7)
`
`Amazon
`
`Vocalife
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Indefinite.
`
`
`
`Claim 7 recites the phrase “auditory transform based noise reduction algorithm.” However,
`
`the specification and file history never explain what that algorithm is or how to implement it; nor
`
`does it have a known meaning in the art. (Stern Decl. at ¶¶ 37-40.) Even Vocalife’s expert, Mr.
`
`McAlexander, could not clearly explain it at his deposition. (Dkt. 68-8 at 124:5-125:2 (admitting
`
`he could not identify all the factors that determine whether a transform is “auditory”).)
`
`McAlexander identifies two references that allegedly describe the claimed algorithm. (Dkt.
`
`68-3 at ¶ 38.) But neither reference uses the phrase “auditory transform based noise reduction
`
`algorithm.” (See Dkt. 68-3 at 61-64 (“Li”), 65-90 (“Quatieri”).) McAlexander defines an “auditory
`
`transform” as “a wavelet transform in which the mother wavelet is chosen by filters that emulate
`
`5
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 9 of 36
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`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 10 of 36 PageID #: 2261
`
`the cochlear filters present in cochlea of the human ear ….” (Dkt. 68-3 at ¶ 38.) But Vocalife
`
`does not offer this construction. And McAlexander provides no support for his definition. (Id.)
`
`In fact, the references he cites distinguish auditory transforms from wavelet transforms—
`
`contradicting his definition. (Li at 1; Quatieri at 10:53-56.) Neither reference shows that the
`
`phrase “auditory transform based noise reduction algorithm” would “inform those skilled in the
`
`art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
`
`Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). Because the phrase has no common meaning in the
`
`art and the patent offers no clue as to its meaning, it is indefinite. (Stern Decl. at ¶¶ 37-40.)
`
`C.
`
`“digital signal processor” (Claims 1 and 20)
`
`Amazon
`
`“a processor that is programmable using an instruction set that provides
`more powerful mathematical computational abilities for processing
`digital signals than standard microprocessors like ARM and Intel x86.”
`
`
`
`Vocalife
`
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
`
`A “digital signal processor” (or “DSP”) is a type of microprocessor that is optimized in
`
`specific ways for digital signal processing, and was commercially available for decades before the
`
`patent’s 2010 priority date. (Stern Decl. at ¶ 52; Ex. H at 308; Ex. K at 55 (describing DSPs
`
`available in the 1980s).) Amazon’s construction identifies the key features that distinguish DSPs
`
`from other types of processors, which will help the trier of fact understand this limitation.
`
`Amazon’s expert explains how Amazon’s construction reflects the plain meaning of DSP
`
`from the perspective of a skilled artisan. (Stern Decl. at ¶¶ 41-52.) In contrast, Vocalife’s expert
`
`admitted that he performed no analysis of the DSP limitation. (Dkt. 68-8 at 137:3-6.)
`
`Vocalife argues that a DSP is any “device that processes digital signals.” (Br. at 6.) But
`
`Vocalife identifies no evidence that a skilled artisan would understand a DSP to have this overly
`
`broad and purely functional meaning. Nor could it, because Vocalife’s intended meaning would
`
`6
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 10 of 36
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`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 11 of 36 PageID #: 2262
`
`capture all general-purpose computers, as well as digital watches, teletype machines, pocket
`
`calculators, and countless other devices that one of ordinary skill would never call a DSP.
`
`The parties’ competing positions present four questions for the Court to resolve. First, are
`
`DSPs programmable? Second, are they different from standard microprocessors? Third, how are
`
`DSPs different from standard microprocessors? Fourth, are ARM and x86 examples of standard
`
`microprocessors? Vocalife’s opening brief largely ignores the first three questions and attempts
`
`to shift the focus to the fourth one—particularly the “ARM” example—where it relies on untimely
`
`evidence that contradicts its own intended meaning. All four questions are addressed below.
`
`1.
`
`DSPs Are Programmable.
`
`Both asserted independent claims recite a DSP comprising three functional units—a “sound
`
`source localization unit,” an “adaptive beamforming unit,” and a “noise reduction unit.” (’049
`
`pat., claims 1 & 20).) The patent explains that these functional units are implemented with
`
`“software instructions programmed on the DSP.” (’049 pat. at 15:45-49, 16:29-38.)
`
`The patent’s disclosure of a programmable DSP is consistent with the conventional
`
`understanding of DSPs as programmable microprocessors. (Stern Decl. at ¶¶ 42-43, 48-51.) For
`
`example, the definition of “digital signal processor” in the 2008 edition of Newton’s Telecom
`
`Dictionary identifies “programmability” as one of the “two main advantages of DSPs.”3 (Ex. H at
`
`308; see also Ex. G at 66 (defining DSP as a specific type of “programmable microprocessor”).)
`
`Vocalife’s intended meaning does not require the DSP to be programmable. It would cover
`
`any circuit that processes digital signals, even if the circuit’s functionality is hard-wired rather than
`
`programmed. Vocalife simply assumes that the plain meaning of DSP includes non-programmable
`
`devices, but never explains why. No evidence supports Vocalife’s broad view.
`
`
`3 See Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (relying on
`Newton’s Telecom Dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of a technical claim limitation).
`
`7
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 11 of 36
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`

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`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 12 of 36 PageID #: 2263
`
`2.
`
`DSPs Are Fundamentally Different From Standard
`Microprocessors.
`
`Vocalife’s interpretation of DSP would cover standard microprocessors, because they are
`
`devices that “process digital signals.” (Br. at 6.) But a skilled artisan would know that DSPs are
`
`fundamentally different from standard microprocessors. (Stern Decl. at ¶¶ 41, 44, 46, 47.) Indeed,
`
`the prosecution history distinguishes DSPs from standard microprocessors.
`
`During prosecution, the applicant amended the claims to recite a DSP and argued that it
`
`distinguished the prior art. (Ex. R at 2, 9, 27.) This amendment was responsive to a rejection in
`
`which the examiner found that a prior art reference called Tashev disclosed the claimed sound
`
`source localization unit, adaptive beamforming unit, and noise reduction unit. (Ex. Q at 7.) The
`
`amendment added a requirement that these three units, which Tashev disclosed, are “integrated in
`
`a digital signal processor.” (Ex. R at 2, 7.) The applicant argued that “no reference or combination
`
`of references,” including Tashev, taught or suggested the DSP limitation. (Ex. R at 27.)
`
`Instead of a DSP, Tashev’s invention runs on “personal computers, server computers, hand-
`
`held or laptop devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set top boxes,
`
`programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers … and
`
`the like.” (Ex. W at ¶¶ 26-29.) All of these devices process digital signals. Most notably, Tashev’s
`
`invention runs on “microprocessor-based systems,” but the applicant treated this microprocessor
`
`disclosure as not disclosing a DSP. (Ex. R at 27.) Thus, the applicant’s argument distinguishing
`
`Tashev shows that a standard microprocessor, although it processes digital signals, is not a DSP.
`
`The prosecution history accords with the plain meaning of DSP, as reflected in widespread
`
`industry usage. The fundamental difference between DSPs and standard microprocessors was
`
`well-established in the literature before 2010. (Stern Decl. at ¶¶ 41, 44, 46.) For example, a 2001
`
`ComputerWorld article, entitled “Digital Signal Processor,” explains that “[e]very modern
`
`8
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 12 of 36
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 13 of 36 PageID #: 2264
`
`computer has a microprocessor in it, but not many have a digital signal processor (DSP).” (Ex. G
`
`at 66; see also Ex. H at 308 (distinguishing “DSP” from “standard microprocessor”).) Dr. Stern
`
`also identified a 1999 textbook, The Scientist and Engineer’s Guide to Digital Signal Processing,
`
`with a section on “How DSPs are Different from Other Microprocessors.” (Ex. J at 503-506.)
`
`Vocalife provides no evidence to support its position that standard microprocessors are
`
`DSPs. The prosecution history, technical dictionary, ComputerWorld article, and textbook cited
`
`above all contradict Vocalife’s position. Standard microprocessors are not DSPs.
`
`3.
`
`DSPs Use Instruction Sets That Differ From Standard
`Microprocessors.
`
`DSPs, unlike standard microprocessors, are optimized for processing “very efficiently and
`
`in real time a stream of digital data that is sampled from analog signals,” such as “voice, audio,
`
`and video.” (Ex. H at 308.) DSPs support such processing with instruction sets that provide more
`
`powerful mathematical abilities than the instruction sets of standard microprocessors.4 (Stern
`
`Decl. at ¶¶ 41, 47; Ex. G at 66 (DSPs use a streamlined “instruction set” with hardware “geared
`
`toward high-performance arithmetic operations”); Ex. H at 308 (DSPs “have powerful
`
`mathematical computational abilities, more than normal computer microprocessors”).)
`
`A 2001 technical dictionary, The Computer Glossary, explains that a DSP “provides extra
`
`fast instruction sequences,” including “multiply and add,” which are “commonly used in math-
`
`intensive signal processing applications.” (Ex. M at 121.) A 2003 textbook, Practical Digital
`
`Signal Processing for Engineers and Technicians, explains that the “multiply-add or multiply-
`
`accumulate (MAC) operation is encountered in all major DSP functions,” so “all DSP chips are
`
`designed to perform the MAC operation very efficiently.” (Ex. O at 204-205.) Texas Instruments,
`
`the pioneer of the first DSP chips, published an article explaining that “DSPs were born” when
`
`
`4 An instruction set defines the fundamental operations a processor supports. (See Ex. G at 66.)
`
`9
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 13 of 36
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`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 Filed 02/26/20 Page 14 of 36 PageID #: 2265
`
`“certain microprocessor architects designed their processors around hardware dedicated to
`
`performing multiply-accumulate functions.” (Ex. K at 52-53.) In contrast to DSPs, standard
`
`microprocessors are less optimized for complex math and more optimized for moving and
`
`comparing data. (Ex. J at 503-504 (contrasting DSPs from “traditional microprocessors”).)
`
`Vocalife argues that DSPs need not be “more powerful than standard microprocessors.”
`
`(Br. at 7.) This argument misses the point.5 Instead of simply requiring that DSPs are “more
`
`powerful,” as Vocalife suggests, Amazon’s construction specifies how DSPs provide an advantage
`
`over standard microprocessors—i.e., by using a mathematically powerful instruction set. That is
`
`what makes a DSP a DSP and differentiates it from other types of processors.
`
`4.
`
`ARM and x86 Processors Were the Most Common
`Examples of Standard Microprocessors.
`
`Amazon’s construction also helps the layperson trier of fact by providing two examples of
`
`standard microprocessors—“ARM and x86.” Including these examples in the construction will
`
`“help clarify the disputed term for the jury.” Cypress Lake Software, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
`
`Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 586, 606 (E.D. Tex. 2019); Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. TiVo, Inc., 2012 WL
`
`6087792, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2012). As Dr. Stern explained, “Intel x86 and ARM processors”
`
`were “the most common examples of standard microprocessors” in 2010. (Stern Decl. at ¶¶ 22,
`
`45.) Dr. Stern’s testimony is supported by a 2010 computer architecture textbook. (Ex. L at xiv.)
`
`Vocalife argues that the court should not adopt “an absolute negative limitation excluding
`
`ARM processors.” (Br. at 5.) To be clear, however, Amazon’s construction does not exclude any
`
`device from the scope of the claims simply because it includes an ARM processor. Amazon
`
`
`5 A DSP ordinarily can complete more calculations than a standard microprocessor in the same
`time period because its mathematical instructions are more efficient, as explained above. But even
`though a standard microprocessor uses less efficient instructions, this inefficiency can be offset
`(and the processor can therefore be made more “powerful”) by increasing the number of
`instructions executed per second. Amazon’s construction does not exclude this possibility.
`
`10
`
`Amazon Ex. 1026, Page 14 of 36
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00123-JRG Document 69 F

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