throbber
1/17/2021
`
`http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure_hashing.html
`
`267 captures
`11 Oct 2007 - 27 Oct 2020
`
`NIST.gov - Computer Security Division - Computer Security Resource Center
`Go MAY JUN JUL
`25
`2010 2011 2012
`
`👤 ⍰ ❎
`
`
`f 🐦
`▾ About this capture
`
`SEARCH CSRC:
`
` GO
`
`ABOUT MISSION CONTACT STAFF SITE MAP
`
`CSRC HOME
`
`GROUPS
`
`PUBLICATIONS
`
`DRIVERS
`
`NEWS & EVENTS
`
`ARCHIVE
`
`CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLKIT
`Block Ciphers
`Block Cipher Modes
`Digital Signatures
`Entity Authentication
`Implementation Guideline
`Key Derivation Functions
`Key Management
`Message Authentication
`Password Usage and Generation
`Random Number Generation
`Secure Hashing
`Approved Algorithms
`Testing / Products
`Additional Information
`
`Algorithm Examples
`
`CSRC HOME > GROUPS > ST > CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLKIT
`SECURE HASHING
`Approved Algorithms
`There are five (5) Approved algorithms for generating a condensed
`representation of a message (message digest): SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
`SHA-384, and SHA-512.
`February 11, 2011: NIST announces the release of draft Federal Information
`Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS). Draft FIPS
`180-4 is a proposed revision of FIPS 180-3. Draft FIPS 180-4 adds a general
`procedure for creating an initialization hash value and two additional secure
`hash algorithms: SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256, and removes a requirement
`that padding must be done before hash computation begins. SHA-512/224 and
`SHA-512/256 may be more efficient alternatives to SHA-224 and SHA-256,
`respectively, on platforms that are optimized for 64-bit operations. Removing the
`restriction on the padding operation in the secure hash algorithms will potentially
`create more flexibility and efficiency in implementing the secure hash algorithms
`in many computer network applications. The Federal Register Notice (FRN) of
`this publication is located here. Examples of the implementation of the secure
`hash algorithms SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224
`and SHA-512/256, can be found at http://www.nist.gov/CryptoToolkitExamples.
`March 15, 2006: The SHA-2 family of hash functions (i.e., SHA-224, SHA-256,
`SHA-384 and SHA-512) may be used by Federal agencies for all applications
`using secure hash algorithms. Federal agencies should stop using SHA-1 for
`digital signatures, digital time stamping and other applications that require
`collision resistance as soon as practical, and must use the SHA-2 family of hash
`functions for these applications after 2010. After 2010, Federal agencies may
`use SHA-1 only for the following applications: hash-based message
`authentication codes (HMACs); key derivation functions (KDFs); and random
`number generators (RNGs). Regardless of use, NIST encourages application
`and protocol designers to use the SHA-2 family of hash functions for all new
`applications and protocols.
`SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
`FIPS 180-3, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), October 2008
`FIPS 180-3 is a revision of FIPS 180-2. The FIPS specifies five secure hash
`algorithms for use in computing a condensed representation, called a message
`digest, of electronic data. The technical information about the security provided
`by the secure hash algorithms, and the length limits and security implications of
`truncated hash outputs is provided in Special Publication 800-107,
`Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms.
`In August, 2004, researchers announced that they discovered a new way to
`break a number of cryptographic hash algorithms. Those initial attacks did not
`break any of the SHA family algorithms, as is reflected in NIST's comments at
`that time.
`In February, 2005, however, researchers announced an attack on the full SHA-1
`algorithm. Click here for NIST's brief comments on these latest attacks.
`(Statement revised April 25, 2006.)
`NIST announces the release of Special Publication 800-106, Randomized
`Hashing for Digital Signatures. This Recommendation provides a technique to
`randomize the input messages to hash functions prior to the generation of digital
`signatures to strengthen security of the digital signatures.
`NIST announces the release of the Special Publication 800-107,
`Recommendation for Using Approved Hash Algorithms. This Recommendation
`provides guidance on using the Approved hash algorithms in digital signatures
`applications, Keyed-hash Message Authentication Codes (HMACs), key
`derivation functions (KDFs) and random number generators.
`
`Testing Products
`Testing requirements and validation lists are available from the Cryptographic
`Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP).
`
`Back to Top
`
`Back to Top
`
`Additional Information
`NIST is currently conducting a competition to develop a new cryptographic hash
`algorithm. For more infomation on this competition and other hash related issues
`please see the Cryptographic Hash Project page.
`April 12, 2011: NIST requested comments for Draft Special Publication (SP)
`800-131B, Transitions: Validation of Transitioning Cryptographic Algorithm and
`Key Lengths. on February 10, 2001. SP 800-131B provides details about the
`validation of the cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic modules in
`transition, as specified in SP 800-131A. These are the comments received.
`April 12, 2011: NIST requested comments for Draft Special Publication (SP)
`800-131C, Transitions: Validating the Transition from FIPS 186-2 to FIPS 186-3
`on February 10, 2011. SP 800-131C addresses both the cryptographic algorithm
`validations and the cryptographic module validations that are conducted by
`
`https://web.archive.org/web/20110625054822/http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure_hashing.html
`
`1/2
`
`Patent Owner, Bot M8 LLC - Ex. 2036, p. 1
`
`

`

`1/17/2021
`
`http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure_hashing.html
`
`267 captures
`11 Oct 2007 - 27 Oct 2020
`
`NIST.gov - Computer Security Division - Computer Security Resource Center
`NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the
`Go MAY JUN JUL
`25
`Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), respectively. These are the
`comments received.
`2010 2011 2012
`January 13, 2011: NIST announces the completion of Special Publication (SP)
`800-131A, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of
`Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths. This Recommendation provides the
`approach for transitioning from the use of one algorithm or key length to another,
`as initially addressed in Part 1 of SP 800-57. SP 800-131B, Transitions:
`Validation of Transitioning Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, is under
`development and will address the validation of cryptographic modules during the
`transition period.
`
`Note: An algorithm or technique that is either specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation.
`
`👤 ⍰ ❎
`
`
`f 🐦
`▾ About this capture
`
`CryptoToolkit Webmaster, Disclaimer Notice & Privacy Policy
`NIST is an Agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce
`
`Last updated: April 12, 2011
`Page created: December 21, 2000
`
`https://web.archive.org/web/20110625054822/http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure_hashing.html
`
`2/2
`
`Patent Owner, Bot M8 LLC - Ex. 2036, p. 2
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket