INTERDIGITAL - EXHIBIT 2008
`Lenovo Holding Co. Inc. et al. v. InterDigital Technology Corporation
`IPR2020-01413
`
`

`

`The views expressed in this book are those of the authors as legal
`commentators. Nothing in this book prejudges any case that
`might come before the United States Supreme Court.
`
`@2012 Antonin Sealia. &Bryan A. Garner
`
`Published by Thomson/We st
`610 Opperman Drive
`P.O. Box 64526
`St. Paul, MN 55164—0527
`1-800—328-9352
`
`ISBN: 978-0-314-27555—4
`
`Printed in the United States of America
`
`Library ofCongress Cataloguing-in—Publication Data
`Antonin Scalia &Bryan A. Garner
`Reading Law: the interpretation oflegal texts —- 1st ed.
`p.
`cm.
`Includes bibliographical references and index.
`1. Law—interpretation and construction.
`2.]udicial Process—United States.
`3. Law—philosophy.
`4. Statutes—United States.
`
`5. Jurisprudence.
`6. Limb-methodology.
`I. Scalia, Antonin, 1936-
`l. Garner. Bryan A.,1958—
`11. Title
`
`Fin! printing
`
`

`

`Short Table ofContents
`
`a
`
`................................................. xxvn
`Introduction ............................................ 1
`
`I'll.
`
`' .511. Sound Principles of Interpretation ...................... 47
`
` .
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`
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`I
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`A. Principles Applicable to All Texts
`Fundamental Principles ........................ 53
`Semantic Canons .............................. 69
`
`Syntactic Canons .............................. 140
`Contextual Canons ............................ 167
`
`B. Principles Applicable Specifically to
`Governmental Prescriptions
`Expected—Meaning Canons .................... 247
`Government—Structuring Canons .............. 278
`Private—Right Canons ......................... 295
`Stabilizing Canons ............................ 318
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`

`

`
`
`.
`
`Full-Length Table ofContents
`
`OWLEDGMENTS .................................................... XIX
`
`REWORD ................................................................
`
`inn
`
`ChiefJudge Frank H. Easterbrook
`ACE ................................................................. xxvu
`
`RODUCTION ............................................................. l
`
`' A. THE WHY or THIS BOOK
`
`
`
`
`The Flood-Control Case ............................................... 1
`The Need for a Sound Approach ...................................... 3
`The Prevailing Confusion.............................................. 9
`Textualism and Its Challengers ...................................... 15
`B. THE How OFTHIS BOOK
`
`,
`
`Some Fundamental Issues ............................................ 29
`Permissible Meanings ................................................. 31
`The “Fair Reading” Method .......................................... 33
`Scope and Organization ofWhat Follows .......................... 41
`The Flood-Control Case Resolved ................................... 44
`
`UND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION .............................. 47
`
`. Principles Applicable to All Texts .................................... 49
`PREFATORY REMARKS ...................................................... 51
`
`FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
`
`1.
`
`Interpretation Principle. Every application of a text to
`particular circumstances entails interpretation. ................ 53
`
`2. Snpremacy—of-Text Principle. The words of a governing
`text are ofparamount concern, and what they convey,
`in their context, is what the text means......................... 56
`
`‘
`
`3. Principle ofInterrelating Canons. No canon of
`interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome by the
`strength ofdiffering principles that point in other directions.
`
`59
`
`4. Presumption Against Inefl'ectiveness. A textually
`permissible interpretation that furthers rather than
`obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored. ......... 63
`
`xi
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`

`

`5. Presumption ofValidity. An interpretation that validates
`outweighs one that invalidates (at res magi: mien! 9mm
`parent]. ............................................................. 66
`
`SEMANTIC Canons
`6. Ordinary-Mowing Canon. Words are to be understood
`in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context
`indicates that they bear a technical sense. ...................... 69
`7. Fixed-Meaning Canon. Words must be given the
`meaning they had when the text was adopted. ................ 73
`8. Omitted-Case Canon. Nothing is to be added to what
`the text states or reasonably implies (ram omisrurpm amino
`nabendur est). That is, a matter not covered is to be treated
`as not covered. .................................................... 93
`
`9. General-Toms Canon. General terms are to be given
`their general meaning (generafia verbs: suntgenerafiter
`intelligenda). ...................................................... 101
`10. Negative-Implication Canon. The expression of one thing
`implies the exclusion ofothers (expressio Miro est exclude
`ulterior). .......................................................... 107
`11. Mandatory/Pennissive Canon. Mandatory words impose
`a duty; permissive words grant discretion. .................... 112
`12. Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon. Andjoins a conjunctive
`list, or a disjunctive list—but with negatives, plurals, and
`various specific wordings there are nuances. .................. 116
`13. Subordinating/Superordinating Canon. Subordinating
`language (signaled by ruéjert to) or superordinating
`language (signaled by notwithstanding or despite) merely
`shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash—-
`but does not necessarily denote a clash of provisions.
`........ 126
`14. Gender/Number Canon. In the absence of a contrary
`indication, the masculine includes the feminine (and vice
`versa) and the singular includes the plural (and vice versa). .. 129
`15. Presumption ofNonexclusive “Include.” The verb
`to include introduces examples, not an exhaustive list. ........ 132
`16. Unintelligibility Canon. An unintelligible text is
`inoperative. ...................................................... 134
`
`
`
`

`

`acne Canons
`
`
`
`
`‘17. Grammar Canon. Words are to be given the meaning
`that proper grammar and usage would assign them. ......... I40
`‘13. Last-Antecedent Canon. A pronoun, relative pronoun,
`or demonstrative adjective generally refers to the nearest
`
`reasonable antecedent. .......................................... 144
`’19. Series-Qualifier Canon. When there is a straightforward,
`
`parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs
`in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier
`normally applies to the entire series. ........................... 147
`.
`30. Nearest-Reasonable-Referent Canon. When the syntax
`involves something other than a parallel series of nouns or
`verbs, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally
`applies only to the nearest reasonable referent. ................ 152
`
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`
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`
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`31. Proviso Canon. A proviso conditions the principal matter
`that it qualifies—almost always the matter immediately
`
`preceding. ........................................................ 154
`132. Scope-of-Subparts Canon. Material within an indented
`
`subpart relates only to that subpart; material contained in
`unindented text relates to all the following or preceding
`indented subparts................................................ 156
`
`
`
`
`
`
`. Punctuation Canon. Punctuation is a permissible
`Indicator of meaning. ........................................... 161
`
`AL Canons
`
`. Whole-Text Canon. The text must be construed
`II a whole. ....................................................... 167
`
`
`
`i. ' Pumption ofConsistent Usage. A word or phrase is
`presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text;
`
`I. material variation in terms suggests a variation
`In meaning. ...................................................... 170
`
`'Surplusage Canon. Ifpossible, every word and every
`fiwlflion is to be given effect (tier-51a cum firmrumarnpiena'a).
`one should be ignored. None should needlessly be given
`In interpretation that causes it to duplicate another
`iffwlaion or to have no consequence. .......................... 174
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`27.
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`28.
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`29.
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`30.
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`31.
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`32.
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`33.
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`34.
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`35.
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`36.
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`37.
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`Hmonious—Reading Canon. The provisions of a text
`should be interpreted in a way that renders them
`compatible, not contradictory. .................................. 180
`General/Specific Canon. If there is a conflict between
`a general provision and a specific provision, the specific
`provision prevails (genemfia mainline: non deroganz). ......... 183
`Irreconcilability Canon. If a text contains truly
`irreconcilable provisions at the same level of generality,
`and they have been simultaneously adopted,
`neither provision should be given effect.
`...................... 189
`Predicate-Act Canon. Authorization of an act
`also authorizes a necessary predicate act. ...................... 192
`
`Associaned-Words Canon. Associated words bear on
`one another’s meaning (nosrirur a radii). ....................... 195
`flusdm Generis Canon. Where general words follow an
`enumeration of two or more things, they apply only
`to persons or things of the same general kind or class
`specifically mentioned (cynicism generis). ....................... 199
`Dish-ibutive-Phrasing Canon. Distributive phrasing
`applies each expression to its appropriate referent
`(reddenda singtda siagnfir). ....................................... 214
`Prefatory-Materials Canon. A preamble, purpose clause,
`or recital is a permissible indicator of meaning. ............... 217
`Title-and-Headings Canon. The title and headings are
`permissible indicators of meaning. ............................. 221
`Interpretive-Direction Canon. Definition sections and
`interpretation clauses are to be carefully followed. ............ 225
`Absurdity Doctrine. A provision may be either
`disregarded or judicially corrected as an error (when
`the correction is textually simple) if failing to do so
`would result in a disposition that no reasonable person
`could approve..................................................... 234
`
`Principles Applicable Specifically
`to Governmental Prescriptions .................................... 241
`PREFATORY REMARKS ....................................................... 243
`
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`

`- -MI:ANING Canons
`
`' Constitutional-Doubt Canon. A statute should be
`d in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality
`in doubt. ......................................................... 247
`
`7
`
`
`
`-‘Related-Statutes Canon. Statutes 1’an mm: are
`' to be interpreted together, as though they were one law...... 252
`.' " Reenactment Canon. If the legislature amends or reenacts
`-
`‘I provision other than by way of a consolidating statute or
`mryling project, a significant change in language is
`presumed to entail a change in meaning.
`..................... 256
`' Preemption Against Retroacfivity. A statute
`presumptively has no retroactive application. ................. 261
`' " . Pending-Action Canon. When statutory law is altered
`’
`during the pendency of a lawsuit, the courts at every level
`must apply the new law unless doing so would violate
`the presumption against retroactivity........................... 266
`" . Extraterritoriality Canon. A statute presumptively has no
`extraterritorial application (statute rue cfauduntur territoria,
`nee aim: territafium dispersant). ................................. 268
`44. Artificial-Person Canon. The word person includes
`corporations and other entities, but not the sovereign. ....... 273
`
`"
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`i mam-Smocruumo Caucus
`
`. Repealability Canon. 'Ihe legislature cannot derogate
`from its own authority or the authority of its successors...... 278
`:46. Preemption Against Waiver ofSovereign Immunity.
`A statute does not waive sovereign inununity——and a
`federal statute does not eliminate state sovereign immunity—
`unless that disposition is unequivocally clear. ................. 281
`47. Presmnption Against Federal Preemption. A federal
`statute is presumed to supplement rather than displace
`state law. ......................................................... 290
`
`' .
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`-
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`- ~Rlon'r CANONS
`
`‘3. Penalty/Illegality Canon. A statute that penalizes an act
`makes it unlawful................................................ 295
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`

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`
`
`49. Rule ofLenity. Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime
`or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the
`defendant’s favor. ................................................
`50. Men: Rea Canon. A statute creating a criminal offense
`whose elements are similar to those of a common-law
`crime will be presumed to require a culpable state ofmind
`(me: real) in its commission. All statutory offenses
`imposing substantial punishment will be presumed
`to require at least awareness ofcommitting the act. ..........
`51. PresumptionAgainst Implied Right ofAction. A statute’s
`mere prohibition ofa certain act does not imply creation of
`a private right ofaction for its violation. The creation of
`such a right must be either express or clearly implied from
`the text of the statute. ...........................................
`
`296
`
`303
`
`313
`
`STABILIZING Cartons
`52. PresumptionAgainst Change in Common Law.
`A statute will be construed to alter the common law only
`when that disposition is clear. ..................................
`53. Canon ofImputed Common-Law Meaning. A statute
`that uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts
`its common-law meaning. ......................................
`54. Prior-Construction Canon. If a statute uses words or
`phrases that have already received authoritative
`construction by the jurisdiction’s court of last resort, or
`even uniform construction by inferior courts or a
`responsible administrative agency, they are to be
`understood according to that construction. ...................
`55. PresumptionAgainst Implied Repeal. Repeals by
`implication are disfavored—-“very much disfavored.”
`But a provision that flatly contradicts an earlier-enacted
`provision repeals it. ..............................................
`56. Repeal-of-Repealer Canon. The repeal or expiration ofa
`repealing statute does not reinstate the original statute.
`.....
`57. Duuetude Canon. A statute is not repealed by nonuse
`or dcsuctude.
`..... . ..............................................
`
`318
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`320
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`322
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`327
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`334
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`336
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`
`u RTEEN FALSITIES EXPOSED ........................................ 341
`
`
`
`
`5B. The false notion that the Spirit of a statute should prevail
`over its letter. .................................................... 343
`
`.59. The false notion that the quest in statutory interpretation
`is to do justice. ................................................... 347
`
`
`
`50. The false notion that when a situation is not quite
`covered by a statute, the court should reconstruct what the
`legislature would have done had it confronted the issue. ..... 349
`
`61. The half—truth that consequences of a decision provide
`the key to sound interpretation. ................................ 352
`
`.. .. 355
`
`
`' 6.2. The false notion that words should be strictly construed.
`63. The false notion that tax exemptionshor any other
`
`exemptions for that matter—should be strictly construed. ... 359
`
`64. The false notion that remedial statutes should be liberally
`construed. ........................................................ 364
`
`
`
`
`65. The false notion that a statute cannot oust courts of
`jurisdiction unless it does so expressly. ........................ 367
`366. The false notion that committee reports and floor speeches
`are worthwhile aids in statutory construction. ................ 369
`
`67. The false notion that the purpose of interpretation is
`to discover intent. ............................................... 391
`
`:63. IThe false notion that the plain language of a statute is
`the “best evidence” of legislative intent. ....................... 397
`
`.The false notion that lawyers and judges, not being
`historians, are unqualified to do the historical research
`that originalism requires. ....................................... 399
`. The false notion that the Living Constitution is an
`exception to the rule that legal texts must be given the
`meaning they bore when adopted. ............................. 403
`................................................................ 411
`-
`.
`‘.'- I A: A Note on the Use of Dictionaries ......................... 415
`f4 ' IX B: A Glossary of Legal Interpretation......................... 425
`'-
`'OFCAsss ............................................................. 443
`. Mflm Booxs ...................................................... 465
`-
`.
`:ARTICLES ................................................... 480
`'....... ................................................................ 507
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`152
`
`READING Law
`
`20. Nearest-Reasonable-Referent Canon
`
`When the syntax involves something other than
`a parallel series ofnouns or verbs, a prepositive
`ozpostpositive modifier normall applies
`0 y to the nearest reasonable re erent.
`
`Although this principle is often given the misnomer fast—ante—
`cedent canon (see § 18), it is more accurate to consider it separately
`and to call it the nearer?reasonaéle—refirent canon. Strictly speak—
`ing, only pronouns have antecedents, and the canon here under
`consideration also applies to adjectives, adverbs, and adverbial or
`adjectival phrases—and it applies not just to words that precede
`the modifier, but also to words that follow it. Most commonly,
`the syntax at issue involves an adverbial phrase that follows the
`referent.
`
`A Prohibition-era case1 provides a striking example involv-
`ing grammatically unparallel items with a postpositive modifier.
`Section 32 of Virginia’s Prohibition Act of 1924 provided that
`“the provisions of this act shall not be construed to prevent any
`person from manufacturing for his domestic consumption az‘ bit
`borne .
`.
`. wine or cider from fruit of his own raising .
`.
`. 3’2 What
`was modified by at his borne? Did this mean manafizcturing at bis
`bome or consumption at £75: home—or both? What happened is that
`the appellant, LR. Harris, produced wine at his farm in Bruns—
`wick County from berries grown there. He intended to take the
`wine from his farm to his home in Greensville County, where he
`would consume it. While transporting the wine, Harris was de-
`tained and later convicted of unlawfully transporting two gallons
`of wine.
`
`The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The court
`stated that the “rules of grammar will not be permitted to defeat
`the purpose of the act,”3 which was to “prevent the use of ardent
`
`1 Harris a). Commonweafrb, 128 SE. 578 (Va. 1925).
`
`2
`
`3
`
`Prohibition Act, Acts 1924, § 32, p. 593 (as quoted in Harris. 128 S.E. at 57‘”
`(emphasis added).
`128 8.15. at 579.
`
`

`

`SYNTACTIC CANONS
`
`153
`
`Spirits as a beverage.“1 This was a poor, result-oriented decision. In
`the phrase “manufacturing for his domestic consumption” both
`manzg’czctnn'ng and consumption are nouns, but are not nouns in
`parallel; the second is in a prepositional phrase modifying the first.
`Only by a contorted reading of the statute does the prepositional
`phrase at bis [Jame modify mannfnctnring as well as consumption
`(the adjacent noun).
`Another postpositive-modifier case was the Sixth Circuit’s
`decision in In re Sander-5,5 in which the court was called on to de—
`termine the reach of an adverbial dufingeclause. Under the Bank-
`ruptcy Code, a debtor could not receive a discharge of his debts
`under Chapter 13 if he had “received a discharge .
`.
`. in a case filed
`under Chapter 7 .
`.
`. during tbs 4—yenrperiodprercding” the filing of
`a Chapter 13 petition“ Jason Sanders had filed a Chapter 7 peti-
`tion on July 29, 2002, and was granted a discharge in that case on
`February 5, 2003. He then filed a Chapter 13 petition on January
`5, 2007—-which was more than four years after his Chapter 7 fil—
`ing, but less than four years after his Chapter 7 discharge. Did
`the phrase dun’ng we 4—yearperioa’ modify the word discbarge or
`the wordfiled? Not a difl'icult question. Discharge and carefiled are
`not grammatically parallel; the latter is in a prepositional phrase
`modifying the former. The court correctly held that the four—year
`period started to run on the date of thefiiing ofthe Chapter 7 peti-
`tion. Although it invoked the last—antecedent canon (§ 18), in fact
`the court was indulging in the common misnomer we mentioned
`above: The phrasing involved a rg’erent, not an antecedent.
`
`Id.
`
`551 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2008].
`
`11 U.S.C. § 1328(0 (emphasis added).
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`4
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`5
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`6
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