throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 8
`Date: July 12, 2021
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`LUPIN, LTD. and LUPIN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`AMGEN, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before ZHENYU YANG, CHRISTOPHER G. PAULRAJ, and
`JOHN E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`SCHNEIDER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Lupin, Ltd. and Lupin Pharamaceuticals, Inc. (collectively
`“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes
`review of claims 1–30 of U.S. Patent No. 9,856,287 B2 (“the ’287 patent,”
`Ex. 1001). Amgen, Inc. and Amgen Manufacturing, Limited (collectively
`“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes
`review. 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the Petition and the
`Preliminary Response, and in light of Board precedent, we conclude
`Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that at
`least one claim is unpatenable
`A. Real Parties-in-Interest
`Petitioner identifies Lupin, Ltd., Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Lupin,
`Inc., and Nanomi BV as the real parties-in-interest for Petitioner. Pet. 2
`Patent Owner identifies Amgen, Inc. and Amgen Manufacturing, Limited as
`the real parties-in-interest for Patent Owner. Paper 4, 1.
`B. Related Matters
`Petitioner states that there is no pending district court action involving
`the ’287 patent and that the ’287 patent was the subject of litigation in three
`district court actions:
`- Amgen Inc. et al. v. Tanvex BioPharma USA, Inc. et al., 19-cv-
`01374, S.D. Cal. (the “Tanvex litigation”), which was dismissed December
`19, 2019.
`- Amgen Inc. et al. v. Adello Biologics, LLC et al., 18-cv-3347, D.N.J.,
`(the “Adello litigation”), which was dismissed November 25, 2019.
`- Amgen Inc. et al. v. Accord BioPharma USA, Inc. et al., 18-cv-
`61828, S.D. Fl., which was dismissed November 15, 2019.
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`
`Petitioner also states that there are no currently pending Patent Trial
`and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) proceedings that address the validity of the
`’287 patent and that the ’287 patent was the subject of three prior PTAB
`proceedings:
`- PGR2019-00001, Adello Biologics, LLC et al. v. Amgen Inc. et al.
`(the “Adello PGR”) was terminated on December 6, 2019. PGR2019-00001,
`Paper 28 (PTAB Dec. 6, 2019).
`- IPR2019-00971, Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC et al. v. Amgen, Inc. et
`al. (the “2019 Fresenius IPR”), was denied institution under § 314(a) as
`duplicative of the then-pending Adello PGR, without evaluation on the
`merits. See 2019 Fresenius IPR, Paper 13 (PTAB Oct. 16, 2019).
`- IPR2020-00314, Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC et al. v. Amgen, Inc. et
`al. (the “2020 Fresenius IPR”) was terminated on June 19, 2020. Fresenius
`IPR, Paper 17 (PTAB. Jun. 19, 2020).
`C. The ’287 Patent
`The ’287 patent relates to a method of refolding proteins expressed in
`non-mammalian cells. Ex. 1001, 2:62–3:4. Such refolding is necessary in
`some non-mammalian expression systems, such as bacteria, because of the
`“inability of a bacterial host cell to fold recombinant proteins properly at
`high levels of expression.” Id. at 1:25–32. As a result, the improperly-folded
`proteins are insoluble and precipitate out of solution to form inclusion
`bodies. Id. According to the ’287 patent, prior art refolding techniques did
`not demonstrate refolding of larger, more complex protein molecules at high
`concentrations, i.e., 2.0g/L or higher, at a scale suitable for industrial
`applications. Id. at 2:8–32.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`
`D. Illustrative Claims
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–30. Claims 1, 10, 16, and 26 are the
`independent claims. Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below:
`1. A method refolding proteins expressed in a
`nonmammalian expression system, the method comprising:
`contacting the proteins with a preparation that supports the
`renaturation of at least one of the proteins to a biologically
`active form, to form a refold mixture, the preparation
`comprising:
`at least one ingredient selected from the group consisting
`of a denaturant, an aggregation suppressor and a protein
`stabilizer;
`an amount of oxidant; and
`an amount of reductant;
`wherein the amounts of the oxidant and the reductant are
`related through a thiol-pair ratio and a thiol-pair buffer strength,
`wherein the thiol-pair ratio is in the range of 0.001-100; and
`wherein the thiol-pair buffer strength maintains the solubility of
`the preparation; and incubating the refold mixture so that at
`least about 25% of the proteins are properly refolded.
`
`
`Ex. 1001, 18:21–41.
`
`E. Evidence
`Petitioner relies on the following evidence:
`Vallejo, et al., EP 1449848 A1, published August 25, 2004. (Ex. 1003
`“Vallejo”).
`Schlegl, US 2007/0238860 A1, published October 11, 2007 (Ex. 1004
`“Schlegl”).
`Hevehan, D. and Clark, E., “Oxidative Renaturation of Lysozyme at
`High Concentrations,” 54:3 BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
`BIOENGINEERING. 221–230 (May 1997) (Ex. 1005 “Hevehan”).
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`Schafer et al., “Redox Environment of the Cell as Viewed Through the
`Redox State of the Glutathione Disulfide/Glutathione Couple,” 30 Free
`Radical Biol. Med. 1191–1212 (2001) (Ex. 1007 “Schafer”).
`Ruddon et al., WO 95/32216, published November 30, 1995. (Ex.
`1006 “Ruddon”).
`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of George Georgiou, Ph.D.
`(Ex. 1002 “Georgiou Decl.”).
`F. Prior Art and Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–30 would have been unpatentable on
`the following grounds:
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–4, 7–19, 22–30
`1–4, 7–19, 22–30
`1–30
`1–6, 8–21, 23–30
`8–9, 14–15, 23–25,
`30
`8–9, 14–15, 23–25,
`30
`
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Legal Standards
`1. Burden of Proof
`At this stage of the proceeding, the burden rests on the petitioner to
`establish a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that at least
`one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).
`
`
`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125
`Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Because the
`’287 patent was filed before March 16, 2013 (the effective date of the
`relevant amendments), the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103 apply.
`
`5
`
`35 U.S.C. §1
`102(b)
`102(b)
`103(a)
`103(a)
`103(a)
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`Vallejo
`Schlegl
`Vallejo, Hevehan
`Schlegl, Hevehan
`Vallejo, Schafer, Ruddon
`
`103(a)
`
`Schlegl, Schafer, Ruddon
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`
`2. Anticipation
`“Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, every limitation of a claim must identically
`appear in a single prior art reference for it to anticipate the claim.” Gechter
`v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “[U]nless a [prior art]
`reference discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of
`the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined
`in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior
`invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. §
`102.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
`2008).
`
`3. Obviousness
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art,
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3)
`the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary
`considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). If the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains,” the claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
`A proper § 103 analysis requires “a searching comparison of the
`claimed invention—including all its limitations—with the teaching[] of the
`prior art.” In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
`“Obviousness requires more than a mere showing that the prior art
`includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim
`under examination.” Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352,
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Rather, obviousness requires the additional showing
`that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have
`selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of
`research and development to yield the claimed invention” with a reasonable
`expectation of success. Id.
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Petitioner proposes that an ordinary artisan “would have had a Ph.D.
`in biochemistry or chemical engineering and several years of experience in
`the fields of biochemical manufacturing, protein purification and/or protein
`refolding” or, alternatively, “would have had an equivalent level of
`education and experience, including a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree with
`more practical work experience in the above field(s).” Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex.
`1002 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not dispute, and we adopt, for purposes of
`this Decision, Petitioner’s proposed definition of level of skill.
`We further note that, in this case, the prior art itself demonstrates the
`level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,
`261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings
`regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself
`reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting
`Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed.
`Cir. 1985))).
`
`C. Claim Construction
`We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that
`would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C.
`282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under this standard, we construe the
`claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such
`claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore we need only construe the
`claims to the extent necessary to determine the patentability of the
`challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean
`Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe
`terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200
`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`The only dispute between the parties with respect to claim
`construction centers on the term “is calculated,” which appears in several
`dependent claims. See Pet. 24–26; Prelim. Resp. 36–38. As seen from the
`analysis below, we find it unnecessary to resolve the meaning of this term.
`D. Grounds Based on Vallejo
`Vallejo discloses “a method of producing a biologically active
`recombinant cystine-knot protein comprising (a) solubilisation of inclusion
`bodies comprising said cystine-knot protein produced in a bacterium . . . ;
`[and] (b) renaturation of the solubilized cystine-knot protein in batch or by
`pulse addition of said solubilized cystine-knot protein to a refolding buffer . .
`. .” Ex. 1003 ¶ 1.
`Petitioner argues that claims 1–4, 7–21, and 30 are anticipated by
`Vallejo; claims 1–6, 7–19, and 30 are unpatentable as obvious over Vallejo
`alone or in combination with Hevehan; and claims 8, 9, 14, 15, 23–25, and
`30 are unpatenable as obvious over Vallejo in combination with Schafer and
`Ruddon. Pet. 28–41, 52–56, and 63–64. Patent Owner disputes these
`contentions. Prelim. Resp. 39–44. Based on the record before us, we find
`Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive.
`All of the challenged claims recite “wherein the thiol-pair ratio is in
`the range of 0.001-100.” Petitioner’s arguments with respect to this
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`limitation are based on calculations performed by its expert Dr. Georgiou,
`who opined that the “standard renaturation buffer” used in Example 6 of
`Vallejo was the buffer disclosed in Example 8. Pet. 32–33; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 101–
`102. Using the solution described in Example 8, which included glutathione,
`Dr. Georgiou calculated a thiol-pair ratio of 3. Pet. 34; Ex. 1002 ¶ 103.
`However, as Patent Owner points out, in Example 4, Vallejo discloses
`a different “standard redox solution.” Prelim. Resp. 42; Ex. 1003 ¶ 47. The
`redox solution of example 4 does not contain glutathione. Ex. 1003 ¶ 49.
`Given that the thiol-pair calculation is based, in part, on the presence of
`glutathione, the absence of glutathione would yield a different “thiol-pair
`ratio” than that calculated by Dr. Georgiou.
`Dr. Georgiou does not point to nor do we discern any disclosure in
`Vallejo that would lead one skilled in the art to conclude that the redox
`solution described in Example 8 was the redox solution used in Example 6.
`In fact, the discussion in Example 6 suggests that the redox solution used
`was that of Example 4. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 47 (Example 6 only references the
`presence of guanidium salt with no mention of glutathione). Thus, we agree
`with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown that Vallejo discloses all of
`the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the
`challenged claims.
`The challenged claims also call for the thiol-pair buffer to maintain
`the solubility of the solution or preparation. See, e.g. Ex. 1001, 8:38–39.
`Petitioner contends that Vallejo inherently discloses this limitation as
`refolding would not be possible unless solubility were maintained. Pet. 36;
`Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–110. However, Vallejo discloses in Example 6 that the
`protein precipitates. Ex. 1003 ¶ 49, Figs. 3 and 8. Thus, we agree with Patent
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`Owner that Petitioner has not shown that Vallejo discloses that the thiol-pair
`buffer maintains the solubility of the solution.
`Grounds 3 and 5 assert that the challenged claims are unpatentable
`over Vallejo alone or in combination with Hevehan, Ruddon, and/or Schafer.
`In its analysis Petitioner again relies on the assumption that the redox
`solution used in Example 6 of Vallejo is that disclosed in Example 8. See
`Pet. 53, 59. Nowhere in its analysis of either ground does Petitioner address
`the issue of Vallejo teaching two different redox solutions or the fact that the
`method of Vallejo results in proteins precipitating out of solution. See id. at
`53–56, 59–63. The additional references do not correct the deficiencies of
`Vallejo.
`Based on the foregoing we conclude that Petitioner has failed to
`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of showing that claims 1–30 are
`unpatentable based on the teachings of Vallejo alone or in combination with
`the secondary references.
`E. Grounds Based on Schlegl
`Schlegl discloses
`a method for obtaining a biologically active recombinant protein
`by reconstituting the protein from a denatured state to its active
`form, said method containing a steps of mixing a feed solution
`containing the protein in its denatured form and/or its
`biologically inactive intermediate forms with a refolding buffer
`under conditions that approximate ideal mixing.
`
`Ex. 1004 ¶ 24.
`Petitioner contends that claims 1–4, 8–19, and 23–30 are anticipated
`by Schlegl. Pet. 41. Petitioner also contends that claims 1–6, 8–21, and 23–
`30 are unpatentable as obvious over Schlegl, alone or in combination with
`Hevehan and that claims 8, 9, 14, 15, 23–25, and 30 are unpatentable as
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`obvious over Schleglor in combination with Schafer and Ruddon. Id. at 56,
`63. Patent Owner disputes these contentions. Prelim. Resp. 44–49. Based on
`the record before us, we find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive.
`As noted above, the challenged claims recite the limitation calling for
`the thiol-pair buffer to maintain the solubility of the solution or preparation.
`Petitioner contends that the method of Schlegl meets this limitation as the
`method results in biologically active proteins and that this result would not
`occur if the protein and other components did not remain in solution. Pet. 48;
`Ex. 1002 ¶ 131. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that one skilled in the art
`would understand that the high refolding yields reported in Schlegl would
`lead one skilled in the art to understand that the solubility of the proteins and
`other components had been maintained. Id. at 57; Ex. 1002 ¶ 152.
`Petitioner supports its contentions with the testimony of Dr. Georgiou.
`Dr. Georgiou, however, offers no support for his conclusions that the results
`achieved in Schlegl would not have been achieved unless the solubility of
`the components were maintained. Ex. 1002 ¶ 65. While not expressed in
`terms of inherency, we interpret Dr. Georgiou’s testimony as stating that the
`maintenance of solubility is inherent in the process of Schlegl in that the
`process produces properly refolded proteins in significant amounts.
`However, inherency requires that the missing element “‘is necessarily
`present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.’ The inherent result
`must inevitably result from the disclosed steps; ‘[i]nherency . . . may not be
`established by probabilities or possibilities.’” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d
`1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). We agree with Patent
`Owner that Petitioner has failed to establish that maintenance of solubility is
`inherent in the method of Schlegl. Prelim. Resp. 48.
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`Schlegl teaches that the thiol containing redox systems such as
`reduced glutathione/oxidized glutathione is optional. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36. Thus,
`the method of Schlegl can be practiced without a thiol-pair. In addition, as
`discussed above, the process of Vallejo, which yields bioactive proteins, also
`results in protein precipitating out of solution. Ex. 1003 ¶ 49, Figs. 3 and 8.
`Thus, the teachings of Schlegl and Vallejo contradict Dr. Georgiou’s opinion
`that the proper refolding of the proteins can only occur if the proteins and
`other components remain in solution. Petitioner does not address this
`discrepancy. Thus, we find that Petitioner has not shown that the system of
`Schlegl would inherently maintain the protein and other components in
`solution.
`Based on the foregoing we find that Petitioner has not demonstrated a
`reasonable likelihood of showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable
`as anticipated by Schlegl or obvious over Schlegl alone or in combination
`with the secondary references.
`III. DISCRETION UNDER 35 U.S.C. §§ 314 AND 325
`Patent Owner has argued that we should exercise our discretion and
`deny the petition under either 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
`Prelim Resp. 6–35. Petitioner argues that we should not. Pet. 5–10.
`As discussed above, we find that Petitioner has not demonstrated a
`reasonable likelihood of showing at least one of the challenged claims to be
`unpatentable. Having denied the Petition on this basis, we do not reach the
`issue of whether we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under
`§ 314(a) or § 325(d).
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Based on the foregoing we conclude that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one of the
`challenged claims is unpatentable.
`V. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition is denied
`and no inter partes review is instituted.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00326
`Patent 9,856,287 B2
`PETITIONER:
`
`Thomas J. Meloro
`Michael W. Johnson
`WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP
`tmeloro@willkie.com
`mjohnson1@willkie.com
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Megan Raymond
`J. Steven Baughman
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
`WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
`mraymond@paulweiss.com
`sbaughman@paulweiss.com
`
`14
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket