UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Metromont Corporation,
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`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`Reigstad & Associates, Inc.,
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`Patent Owner
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`
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`Case: IPR2021-00467
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`U.S. Patent No. 10,337,196
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`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`IPR2021-00467 (USP 10,337,196)
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
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`II. Claim Construction .............................................................................................. 3
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`III. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“POSITA”) ................................................ 3
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`IV. Ground A ............................................................................................................. 4
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`A. Ground A fails because Petitioner did not conduct a proper obviousness
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`analysis in view of the Graham factors .................................................................. 4
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`V. Ground B .............................................................................................................. 9
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`A. Ground B fails because Sika is not a printed publication ............................. 9
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`B. Ground B also fails because Petitioner did not conduct a proper
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`obviousness analysis .............................................................................................15
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`VI. Conclusion .........................................................................................................16
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`Certification of Word Count Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d) .......................................18
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`IPR2021-00467 (USP 10,337,196)
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cases Pages
`Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc.,
`908 F.3d 765 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................................... 10, 13
`Cardiocom, LLC v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00439, Paper 26 (Jan. 16, 2014) ............................................................ 8
`Celltrion, LLC v. Biogen, Inc.,
`IPR2017-01230, Paper 10 (PTAB Oct. 12, 2017) .............................................. 12
`In re Cronyn,
`890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .......................................................................... 14
`Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................... 5
`Floodbarrier, Inc. v. ILC Dover, LP,
`IPR 2019-01543 .................................................................................................... 5
`Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC,
`IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) ....................................... 10, 11
`KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................................ 16
`LG Display Co. Ltd. v. Innovative Display Techs. LLC,
`IPR2015-00487, Paper 36 (July 15, 2016) ........................................................... 8
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
`829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 5
`Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.,
`IPR2016-00680, Paper 8 (Sept. 12, 2016) ............................................................ 9
`Silver Star Capital, LLC v. Power Integrations, Inc.,
`IPR2016-00736, Paper 11 (Aug. 26, 2016) .......................................................... 8
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys.,
`511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 13
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`Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Technologies LLC,
`Case No. CBM2014-00082 (PTAB, Oct. 16, 2014) ......................................... 5, 9
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
`200 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 3
`In re Wyer,
`655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A 1981) ............................................................................. 10
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. §311(b) .................................................................................................... 10
`35 U.S.C. §314(a) ........................................................................................ 3, 5, 9, 11
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) ................................................................................................... 8
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`EXHIBIT LIST
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`Description
`Printout of search interface of New
`York/New Jersey Port Authority for
`“Sika”
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`Exhibit
`Ex-2001
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Petitioner Metromont Corporation (“Metromont” or “Petitioner”), filed a
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`petition (the “Petition”) for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 10,337,196 (“the
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`’196 patent”) challenging claims 1-7, 9, 10, and 13 (the “Challenged Claims”) across
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`three grounds (the “Grounds”). Claim 1 is the only challenged independent claim,
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`with each of the remaining Challenged Claims depending therefrom. The Petition
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`does not and cannot show claim 1 to be invalid. Therefore, the Petition must be
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`rejected.
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`As shown below, Petitioner challenges claim 1 in both Grounds A and B of
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`the Petition, the only difference being a citation to the “Sika Product Sheets”
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`(hereinafter “Sika”):
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`(Petition at 27.) The reason for this is clear: even if combined as Petitioner proposes,
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`Gleich and Tumialan do not disclose limitation 1c and thus do not render obvious
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`claim 1 or any claim depending therefrom. Therefore, Ground A fails. Petitioner
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`does not even attempt to argue otherwise; instead, as shown below, it relies on
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`conclusory expert testimony to fill that gap with respect to Ground A.
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`As highlighted above, Petitioner’s second ground adds Sika to Petitioner’s
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`combination to address Ground A’s deficiency regarding limitation 1c. But
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`Petitioner has not shown that Sika qualifies as a printed publication before the
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`priority date of the ’196 patent. Petitioner’s only attempt to prove up Sika’s prior
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`art status is through citation to the New York/New Jersey Port Authority’s (the “Port
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`Authority”) response to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request. This
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`request was made by a personal injury attorney and is completely unrelated to
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`concrete. No other evidence was provided. The only apparent way a POSITA could
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`find Sika would have required the POSITA knowing the exact FOIA request number
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`(12238), accessing the Port Authority’s website1, entering the FOIA request number
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`at that website, downloading the response, and then sifting through the 700-plus
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`pages of the FOIA request response. (Petition at 53, n.2). Simply searching the Port
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`Authority’s website in an attempt to find Sika would not return Sika or indicate that
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`1 The website is: https://www.panynj.gov/corporate/en/public-record-
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`access/public-record-fulfilled-requests.html
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`2
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`Sika exists. Accordingly, Ground B fares no better than Ground A and the Petition
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`must be rejected.
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`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Petitioner proposes a construction for the term “concrete,” and interprets all
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`other claim limitations according to their purported plain and ordinary meaning.
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`(Petition at 19-27.) Patent Owner currently takes no position on whether Petitioner’s
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`proposed construction of “concrete” is correct because, as explained herein, the
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`Grounds are deficient regardless of Petitioner’s construction. Accordingly, the
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`Board need not address any claim construction disputes at this time. (Vivid Techs.,
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`Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“only those terms
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`need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve
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`the controversy.”).) Patent Owner reserves the right to address any claim
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`construction disputes should they arise.
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`III. PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART (“POSITA”)
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`Petitioner provides the following definition of a POSITA:
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`“[A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
`(“POSA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in Civil
`Engineering, Architectural Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, or
`a related technical field, and at least three years of experience in the
`structural design of reinforced or prestressed concrete strengthening
`alternatives. Ex-1002, ¶¶27-28. Additional work experience in
`relevant work industries could compensate for less education or an
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`education in a different field, and advanced education or degrees may
`similarly compensate for less work experience. Id.” (Petition at 18.)
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`Patent Owner takes no position on whether Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a
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`POSITA is correct, but applies it for purposes of this Patent Owner Preliminary
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`Response. Patent Owner reserves the right to address the appropriate skill level if
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`necessary.
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`IV. GROUND A
`A. Ground A fails because Petitioner did not conduct a proper
`obviousness analysis in view of the Graham factors
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`Ground A purports to rely on two references—Gleich (Ex-1003) and
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`Tumialan (Ex-1004)—to show that claim 1 is obvious. However, Petitioner does
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`not clearly identify or explain which of these two reference discloses each limitation
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`of claim 1. Rather than perform an obviousness analysis in view of the Graham
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`factors, Petitioner simply recites across all limitations of claim 1 that “the
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`combination of Gleich and Tumialan disclose…” without ever specifically
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`identifying which limitations are missing from which prior art references.
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`Petitioner’s treatment of the preamble is representative. For the preamble, Petitioner
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`states “[t]he combination of Gleich and Tumialan discloses the preamble of Claim
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`1.” (Petition at 40.) But Petitioner appears to rely on Gleich alone as disclosing the
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`preamble—Petitioner does not reference Tumialan or some version of a combination
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`of the two references in support of its argument. Thus, it is unclear to Patent Owner
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`whether Petitioner relies on its combination, as stated, or on Gleich alone, as the
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`analysis appears to indicate, or on something else entirely. It is not Patent Owner’s
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`burden to guess Petitioner’s intent. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d
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`1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015).
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`Petitioner repeats the same pattern across the remaining limitations of claim
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`1 and the dependent claims, repeatedly stating that “the combination of Gleich and
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`Tumialan disclose…” the respective limitation(s), without clearly indicating what is
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`lacking in Gleich or Tumialan or which reference is being cited relative to a specific
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`limitation. Again, it is not Patent Owner’s burden to guess which reference
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`Petitioner believes discloses the limitation(s) at issue, and similarly situated Petitions
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`have been denied. Floodbarrier, Inc. v. ILC Dover, LP, IPR 2019-01543, Paper 12,
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`slip p. at 24-25 (Mar. 11, 2020) (denying Petition because Petitioner left the Board
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`to guess which parts of a reference Petitioner relied upon for teaching claimed
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`features); Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Technologies LLC, Case No. CBM2014-
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`00082, Paper 10 (PTAB, Oct. 16, 2014) (finding a Petition deficient when a
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`“Petitioner has not articulated any difference between the recited [apparatus] and
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`method and each of Viescas, Filepp, and Peapod … Without having identified
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`specifically the differences between the recited invention and the prior art, Petitioner
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`has failed to make a meaningful obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and,
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`thus, has failed to establish that it is more likely than not that that independent claim
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`1 or 22 is unpatentable over the asserted combinations of Viescas, Peapod, and the
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`other references.”.) For this reason alone, Petitioner’s Ground A should be rejected.
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`Irrespective of how interpreted, Ground A further fails because Petitioner’s
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`proposed combination does not disclose, teach, or suggest limitation 1c.
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`Specifically, claim 1 is the only challenged independent claim, and each additional
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`Challenged Claim depends from claim 1. Every Challenged Claim, therefore,
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`includes limitation 1c. Because the prior art does not disclose, teach, or suggest at
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`least limitation 1c, Ground A fails.
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`As best Patent Owner can determine, Petitioner purports to rely on Tumialan
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`to disclose limitation 1c. (Petition at 41 (“As discussed further with respect to
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`elements 1[a] to 1[d], Tumialan discloses …”).) Limitation 1c requires “applying a
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`concrete bonding agent to an internal side surface of the trench.” Limitation 1c is a
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`separately-claimed limitation from limitation 1d, which requires “filling the trench
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`with concrete.” (Petition at 17.)
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`Petitioner’s analysis concedes that Tumialan does not disclose limitation 1c.
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`Specifically, and unlike Petitioner’s analysis for other claim limitations, the Petition
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`groups limitations 1c and 1d together in its analysis to hide the fact that its prior art
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`does not disclose limitation 1c. (Compare Petition at 40-42 (1a alone) & 42-44 (1b
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`alone) with id. at 44-47 (1c &1d grouped).) In its combined analysis of limitations
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`1c-1d, the only portion of the Petition that appears to relate at all to limitation 1c
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`states as follows:
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`“When filling NSM grooves with a cement-based paste, such as
`concrete mortar, a POSA would have known that a concrete bonding
`agent should first be applied to the internal side surfaces of the trench
`(prior to filling the trench with concrete mortar). Ex-1002, ¶106. The
`use of concrete bonding agents with cement based paste materials
`was well-known at the time of the invention and would have been
`common knowledge to a POSA. Ex-1002, ¶106; Ex-1020, §§ 8.13.1,
`8.13.3; Ex-1008, 2 (priming).” (Petition at 46.)
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`As shown, Petitioner does not cite to Tumialan (or to Gleich) in support of its
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`argument that Ground A discloses limitation 1c. Instead, Petitioner cites Exhibits
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`1002, 1020, and 1008 to conclude “a POSA would have known that a concrete
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`bonding agent should first be applied to the internal side surfaces of the trench.”
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`Petitioner, therefore, has failed to show that either Gleich or Tumialan disclose
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`limitation 1c. Accordingly, Ground A is deficient on its face.
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`Petitioner’s citation to Exhibit 1002 (Petitioner’s expert’s declaration) does
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`not cure Petitioner’s lack of evidence at least because “Ex-1002, ¶106” simply
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`recites Petitioner’s above conclusory paragraph:
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`“When filling NSM grooves with a cement-based paste, such as
`concrete mortar, a POSA would have known that a concrete bonding
`agent should first be applied to the internal side surfaces of the trench
`(prior to filling the trench with concrete mortar). Indeed, the use of
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`concrete bonding agents with cement-based paste materials was
`well-known at the time of the invention and would have been
`common knowledge to a POSA. Ex-1020, §§ 8.13.1, 8.13.3; Ex-
`1008, 2 (priming).” (Ex.-1002 at ¶ 106.)
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`It is well established that “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying
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`facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.65(a). The Board has also repeatedly accorded no evidentiary weight to
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`copied-and-pasted expert testimony. See, e.g., Silver Star Capital, LLC v. Power
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`Integrations, Inc., IPR2016-00736, Paper 11 at 14 (Aug. 26, 2016) (rejecting
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`petitioner’s conclusory argument and according little weight to expert declaration
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`that parroted the petition without citing underlying facts or data); Cardiocom, LLC
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`v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc., IPR2013-00439, Paper 26 (Jan. 16, 2014) at
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`15-16 (rejecting petitioner’s arguments and giving “little to no credit” to expert’s
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`conclusory declaration); LG Display Co. Ltd. v. Innovative Display Techs. LLC,
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`IPR2015-00487, Paper 36 (July 15, 2016) at 21 (refusing to credit petitioner’s expert
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`and noting that “[m]erely repeating an argument from the Petition in the declaration
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`of a proposed expert does not give that argument probative value.”); Minerva
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`Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., IPR2016-00680, Paper 8 (Sept. 12, 2016) at 27-28
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`(rejecting petition where petitioner’s and expert’s arguments for combining
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`references were merely “conclusory and insufficient”).
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`Petitioner’s citations to Exhibits 1008 and 1020, which are not part of Ground
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`A, are likewise unavailing. Petitioner has not proposed combining those Exhibits
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`with the Ground A references (Gleich and Tumialan), explained how such a
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`combination would work or what it would like, or presented any motivation or
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`rationale to support making such a combination. Such deficiencies further show that
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`Ground A is not viable. Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Technologies LLC, Case
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`No. CBM2014-00082 (PTAB, Oct. 16, 2014).
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`For the above reasons, Ground A fails to establish “a reasonable likelihood
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`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
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`in the petition” and must be rejected. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
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`V. GROUND B
`A. Ground B fails because Sika is not a printed publication
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`Ground B challenges the same claims as Ground A but relies on Sika to
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`disclose limitation 1c. (Petition at 52-61.) A petition is limited to challenges based
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`on prior art patents and printed publications. (35 U.S.C. §311(b).) Ground B fails
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`because Sika is neither.
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`“A reference is proven to be a ‘printed publication’ ‘upon a satisfactory
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`showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to
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`the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art,
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`exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend
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`therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research or
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`experimentation.’” In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A 1981). “Because there
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`are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public,
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`‘public accessibility’ has been called the touch-stone in determining whether a
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`reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’....” Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision
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`Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Jazz Pharm., Inc. v.
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`Amneal Pharm., LLC , 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re
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`Hall , 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
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`A petitioner must make a threshold showing that an alleged prior art reference
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`qualifies as prior art. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039,
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`Paper 29, at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (“[A]t the institution stage, the
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`petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a
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`reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical
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`date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that
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`it qualifies as a printed publication.”); Id. (explaining that this standard requires “far
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`more than is required in typical notice pleading”); 35 U.S.C. §314(a) (an IPR can be
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`instituted based only on “information presented in the petition”).)
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`Petitioner has not met its burden. Petitioner contends that Sika was publicly
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`accessible, but its only evidentiary support is a response from the NY/NJ Port
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`Authority to a FOIA request submitted by a personal injury attorney. (Petition at
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`53-54; Ex-1010 at 1 (“Email Address: tcortelli@lsinjurylaw.com”).) The FOIA
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`request sought:
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`“Any and all records, contracts, plans and work orders pertaining to
`construction, remodeling, lead removal, painting and or related
`projects being carried out at the Port Authority Bus Terminal located
`at 625 8th Avenue, New York, NY 10036 during the months of June
`and July of 2010. Records should include all documentation related
`to work being performed by Fine Painting Decorating Co. Inc. AND
`any additional company or general contractor on the exterior
`staircases located at the Port Authority and identified as follows:
`landing of the staircase between the fifth and sixth floor thereat,
`identified as follows: FHOS610FH09 on metal portion of door above
`glass bar code of BT4296 and SW6L-4 sticker posted on glass.
`Further, if available, please provide a copy of any incident reports
`and or video surveillance for an accident that occurred on said
`premises on the above referenced staircase on July 7, 2010.” (Ex-
`1010, 1.)
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`As shown, the FOIA request was for “construction, remodeling, lead removal,
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`painting and or related projects…[and] all documentation related to work…on the
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`exterior staircases located at the Port Authority and identified as follows: landing of
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`the staircase between the fifth and sixth floor thereat.” The FOIA request provided
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`no indication that a response thereto would be relevant to “structural design of
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`reinforced or prestressed concrete strengthening alternatives,” i.e., the field of the
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`invention as characterized by Petitioner. (Petition at 18.) Moreover, as Petitioner
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`acknowledges, the response to the FOIA request included approximately 700 pages
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`of materials.2 (Petition at 53, n.2.) At most, that response suggests that Sika existed
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`within a 700-page report. No evidence suggests or shows that a POSITA with an
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`interest in the field of the ’196 patent would have been able to locate and access the
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`report using reasonable diligence before the priority date of the ’196 patent. Indeed,
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`while Petitioner identified that the response was downloaded from the Port Authority
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`website, there is no evidence that a POSITA could have done so in the relevant time
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`frame prior.
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`It is well established that the mere existence of a document, such as Sika, is
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`insufficient to establish its public accessibility. (See Celltrion, LLC v. Biogen, Inc.,
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`IPR2017-01230, Paper 10 at 11-14 (PTAB Oct. 12, 2017) (holding that Petitioner
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`failed to establish a newsletter as a printed publication despite evidence that it was
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`available on the MD Anderson website because there was insufficient evidence of
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`public accessibility).) Indeed, the present circumstances are akin to those in
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`Acceleration Bay, where the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that a report
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`uploaded to the CSE Technical Reports Library was not a printed publication
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`2 Petitioner understands the response to the FOIA request to actually include 704
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`pages of materials.
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`because there was “no evidence that [the report] was disseminated to the public” or
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`that “an interested skilled artisan, using reasonable diligence, would have found [the
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`report] on the CSE Technical Reports website.” Acceleration Bay, 908 F.3d at 773.
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`Petitioner provides no evidence regarding whether or when the response to the FOIA
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`request became publicly accessible. Petitioner also provides no evidence or
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`explanation as to whether or how a POSITA could have located the response to the
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`FOIA request using reasonable diligence. Moreover, unlike Acceleration Bay in
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`which the CSE Technical Reports Library website was relevant to the technology at
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`issue, there is no evidence that a POSITA would have looked for art relating to the
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`“structural design of reinforced or prestressed concrete strengthening alternatives”
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`(Petition at 18) at the Port Authority’s website. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys.,
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`511 F.3d 1186, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (describing the public accessibility standard
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`as requiring a showing that a document could be located by “persons interested and
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`ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence”); id. at
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`1196-97 (remanding the district court’s summary judgment involving a public
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`accessibility finding because the record did not show that the paper in question could
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`have been found by an “anonymous user skilled in the art” by accessing an FTP
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`server and freely navigating through its directory structure, i.e., without being
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`provided with the full FTP address for the file by the file’s author); In re Cronyn,
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`890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining that a thesis document in a library
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`indexed by the author’s name was not publicly accessible because “the only research
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`aid in finding the theses was the student’s name, which of course, bears no
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`relationship to the subject of the student’s thesis.”).
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`Petitioner also provides no evidence that Sika was indexed or searchable via
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`the Port Authority website. In fact, even in the year 2021, it appears that it is not.
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`Exhibit 2001, filed herewith, is a printout from the Port Authority’s website in which
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`“Sika” was entered into the website’s search functionality by counsel for Patent
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`Owner. As visible in the printout, the only result is unrelated to the FOIA request
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`relied upon by Petitioner. The only apparent way to locate Sika is by: (1) knowing
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`the FOIA request number; (2) knowing a brief description of the FOIA request
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`(which makes no reference to Sika); or (3) manually clicking through each request
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`under the FOIA that the Port Authority has completed and includes on its website.
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`Only after having such specific knowledge or manually browsing all of these
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`requests could the searcher then download the 700-plus page response.
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`For the above reasons, Petitioner failed to show that Sika is prior art. At most,
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`Petitioner showed that Sika existed within a 700-page response to a FOIA request,
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`with no evidence even suggesting that a POSITA could or would have found Sika
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`before the priority date of the ’196 patent. A document does not qualify as a “printed
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`publication” in such circumstances. Accordingly, Ground B must also be denied.
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`IPR2021-00467 (USP 10,337,196)
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`B. Ground B also fails because Petitioner did not conduct a proper
`obviousness analysis
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`As shown in §IV.A above, Petitioner failed to complete a Graham factor
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`analysis relative to Ground A. Petitioner repeats the same fatal error in Ground B:
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`(Petition at 60.) As shown, Petitioner relies on its improper Ground A analysis for
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`the preamble and limitations 1a-1b of claim 1. For this reason alone, Ground B also
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`fails to present a proper Graham factor analysis.
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`Petitioner’s analysis in Ground B also repeats the same mistakes relative to
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`limitations 1c-1d. For these limitations, Petitioner states that the “combination of
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`Gleich, Tumialan, and the Sika Product Sheets would have rendered it further
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`obvious…,” but Petitioner fails to describe the differences between the prior art and
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`the claims at issue, as required by Graham. KSR, 550 U.S. at 406 (citing Graham
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`(“[T]he scope and content of the prior art are...determined; differences between the
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`prior art and the claims at issue are...ascertained;…”).
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`For this additional reason, Ground B cannot establish “a reasonable likelihood
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`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
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`in the petition” and the Petition must be denied.
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`VI. CONCLUSION
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`Petitioner’s Grounds are fatally deficient -- Petitioner’s Ground A concedes
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`the cited prior art fails to disclose limitation 1c and Petitioner’s Ground B relies on
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`a reference (Sika) that does not qualify as a printed publication. Accordingly,
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`Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to
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`any Challenged Claim of the ’196 patent, and the Board should deny institution of
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`the Petition.
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`Dated: May 10, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/hjb/
`By:
`Heath J. Briggs, Reg. No. 54,919
`Greenberg Traurig, LLP
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`Reigstad & Associates, Inc.
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`CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
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`In accordance with § 42.6(e)(1), the undersigned certifies that on the 10th day
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`of May, 2021, the above PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`was served, via electronic mail upon the following counsel for Petitioner,
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`Christopher B. Kelly – chris.kelly@alston.com
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`Jason P. Cooper – jason.cooper@alston.com
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`Metromont-196IPR@alston.com
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`Dated: May 10, 2021
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` /hjb/
`Heath J. Briggs
`Reg. No. 54,919
`Greenberg Traurig LLP
`1144 15th Street, Suite 3300
`Denver, CO 80202
`Telephone: (303) 685-7418
`Facsimile: (720) 904-6118
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`CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d)
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`Petitioner certifies that the word count in this Petition is 3,442 words, as
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`counted by the word-processing program (Microsoft Word for Office 365) used to
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`generate this Petition, where such word count excludes the table of contents, table
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`of authorities, mandatory notices, certificate of service, appendix of exhibits, and
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`this certificate of word count. This Petition is in compliance with the 14,000 word
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`limit set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1)(i).
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