throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 9
`Date: October 12, 2021
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`CHEWY, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before KEN B. BARRETT, KEVIN W. CHERRY, and
`ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314, 37 C.F.R. § 42.4
`Granting Motion for Joinder- Paper 3
`35 U.S.C. § 315, 37 C.F.R. § 42.122
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
`
`
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Chewy, Inc. (“Petitioner” or “Chewy”) filed a Petition (Paper 2,
`“Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20
`(‘the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent 7,076,443 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’443
`patent”). Petitioner concurrently filed a Motion for Joinder of this
`proceeding with IPR2020-01655 (the “1655 IPR” or “the Zillow IPR”).
`Paper 3 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). International Business Machines Corporation
`(“Patent Owner” or “IBM”) filed an Opposition to the Motion.1 Paper 7
`(“Opposition” or “Opp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply to the Opposition. Paper
`8 (“Reply”).
`We have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to
`determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314(a). See also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2019) (“The Board institutes the trial
`on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes
`review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition
`shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
`respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons
`discussed below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims
`of the ’443 patent on all grounds stated in the Petition. We also grant the
`Motion.
`A. Related Matters
`The ’443 patent is currently at issue in Chewy, Inc. v. International
`Business Machines Corp., No. 1:21-cv-01319 (S.D.N.Y.) (the “New York
`litigation”) and International Business Machines Corp. v. Zillow Group,
`
`
`1 Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response to the Petition.
`
`2
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`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
`
`Case No. 2:20-cv-00851-TSZ (W.D. Wash.) (the “Washington litigation”).
`Pet. 1, Paper 5, 1. The ’443 patent is at issue in IPR2020-01655. Paper 5, 1.
`B. Real Parties in Interest
`Petitioner and Patent Owner state that the named entities are the only
`real parties in interest. Pet. 1; Paper 5, 1.
`C. The ’443 Patent
`The ’443 patent “relates to e-commerce solutions that include target
`advertising.” Ex. 1001, 1:10–13. The patent explains that advertising to
`Internet users has typically involved the use of “banner ads,” which have
`drawbacks:
`First, advertisements are made available to the users whether or
`not these ads have been specifically solicited. Second, banner
`ads rely on user profiling, which is burdensome to employ.
`Third, web site owners who are not technically savvy, or without
`available resources, can not easily acquire user profiling
`information.
`Id. at 1:18–28. Additionally, shortcomings in the use of user profiles for
`targeted advertising include that collecting and building profiles is
`“cumbersome work,” that the information changes, and that it is “difficult to
`identify a specific user, i.e., a user interested in purchasing automobiles, and
`associate the correct advertisement profile to the user.” Id. at 1:46–56. The
`patent provides a method for use with search engine services that does not
`rely on user profiling, and is “uniquely different from the e-commerce
`method of user profiling.” Id. at 1:65–2:4; 4:54–56.
`The patent relies on the idea that “if a user is interested in a specific
`piece of information, he or she may be interested in related or similar
`advertisements,” presented in banner advertisements, based on the results of
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`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
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`searches. Id. at 5:11–19. “[F]or each search result item 30, the method
`requires a match search 40 of related products.” Id. at 5:33–35.
`The method of the ’443 patent includes the use of a “product database
`110,” which “provides storage for a list of potential product advertisements.”
`Id. at 6:13–14. “The type of information pertaining to these products may be
`in the form of images, such as hyperlinks or full HTML pages, and the like.
`It is not necessary to dictate the details of this database, provided accessible
`images can be acquired.” Id. at 6:14–18. According to the ’443 patent:
`product matching manager 140 takes the search engine results set
`and attempts to match at least one product to each of the search
`result
`items. This
`is accomplished,
`in part,
`through
`communication with the product database 110. For example, if
`the search had yielded twenty five (25) in the results set, the
`product matching manager 140 would, for each of those twenty
`five search result items, try to match at least one of the products
`found in the product database 110 to the individual search result
`item.
`Id. at 6:35–43. The patent describes “using the URL of the search result
`item as a unique key identifier.” Id. at 6:47–49.
`D. Prior Art and Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 would have been
`unpatentable on the following grounds (Pet. 3–4)2:
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`Linden3
`
`35 U.S.C. §
`102
`
`
`2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
`Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Because the
`’443 patent was filed before the effective date of the relevant amendment,
`the pre-AIA version of § 102 applies.
`3 US 6,266,649 B1, issued July 24, 2001 (Ex. 1003, “Linden”).
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`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
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`
`35 U.S.C. §
`102
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`Bull4
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20
`
`E. The Challenged Claims
`Claims 1 and 15 are independent and are reproduced below:
`1. A method of
`targeting at
`least one associated
`advertisement from an Internet search having access to an
`information repository by a user, comprising:
`identifying at least one search result item from a search result
`of said Internet search by said user;
`searching for said at least one associated advertisement
`within said repository using said at least one search result
`item;
`identifying said at least one associated advertisement from
`said repository having at least one word that matches said
`at least one search result item; and
`correlating said at least one associated advertisement with
`said at least one search result item.
`
`
`
`result
`
`items
`
`to said
`
`related
`
`15. A method for providing related advertisements for search
`result items from a search of an information repository,
`comprising:
`matching said search
`advertisements;
`designating each of said search result items that have said
`related advertisements matched therewith;
`providing a corresponding graphical user interface for each
`of said search result items so designated for subsequent
`user selection;
`searching and retrieving said related advertisement for one of
`said search result items when said corresponding
`graphical user interface is selected by a user; and
`formatting and displaying said related advertisements upon
`selection.
`Ex. 1001, 8:5–17, 8:61–9:8.
`
`4 US 5,995,943, issued Nov. 30, 1999 (Ex. 1004, “Bull”).
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`IPR2021-00757
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`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Institution of Inter Partes Review
`We instituted an inter partes review of the challenged claims in the
`1655 IPR. Zillow Group, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.,
`IPR2020-01655, Paper 8, 2 (PTAB Mar. 15, 2021). Petitioner here
`challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability
`as those on which we instituted the 1655 IPR. Mot. 1 (Petition is “narrowly
`tailored to the same claims, prior art, and grounds for unpatentability that are
`the subject of” the 1655 IPR). Petitioner also relies on the same declarant
`testimony as did the petitioner in the 1655 IPR. Id. at 4. Because the
`grounds of unpatentability in the Petition are identical to those in the 1655
`IPR, and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the 1655
`IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on all grounds
`presented in the Petition.
`B. Motion for Joinder
`The statutory provision governing the joinder of a party to a pending
`inter partes review is 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) which provides:
`(c) JOINDER. If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the
`Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter
`partes review any person who properly files a petition under section
`311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under
`section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response,
`determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under
`section 314.
`To join Petitioner to the 1655 IPR, we must first determine whether the
`Petition warrants institution under § 314. See Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City
`Innovations, LLC, 973 F. 3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020). As discussed
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`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
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`above, we have so determined. We now turn to whether or not we should
`exercise our discretion to join Petitioner as a party to the 1655 IPR.
`
`Our rules require that the Motion be filed “no later than one month
`after the institution date of” the 1655 IPR. 37 C.F.R. § 42.122 (b). We
`instituted review in the 1655 IPR on March 15, 2021. See Zillow Group,
`IPR2021-01655, Paper 9. The Motion was timely filed on April 15, 2021.
`Paper 3.
`
`Petitioner analyzes the factors set forth in Kycocera Corp. v. Softview,
`LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB April 24, 2013) and contends the
`factors weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to join Petitioner as a
`party to the 1655 IPR. Mot. 3. Under Kyocera, we consider the reasons
`why joinder may be appropriate, whether the Petition presents any new
`grounds of patentability, the impact, if any, joinder would have on the trial
`schedule in the 1655 IPR, and how briefing and discovery may be
`simplified. Id.
`
`Petitioner contends that joinder is appropriate because the “Petition is
`substantively identical to the Zillow Petition, containing only minor
`differences related to the formalities of a different party filing the petition”
`and “there are no changes to the facts, citations, evidence, or arguments
`presented in the Zillow Petition.” Mot. 5; see also id. at 7 (The Petition
`“does not present any new grounds or arguments of unpatentability.”).
`Petitioner notes that because the “Petition relies on the same expert and a
`substantively identical declaration, only a single deposition is needed for the
`proposed joint proceeding.” Id. at 8. Petitioner further contends that joinder
`“will not unduly burden or negatively affect the Zillow IPR trial schedule,”
`we “will receive consolidated filings instead of redundant submissions in
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`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
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`separate IPR’s, and Patent Owner will not be burdened with presenting any
`additional responses or arguments.” Id. at 6. Petitioner represents that it
`“explicitly consents to the existing trial schedule and agrees to take an
`‘understudy’ role” in the Zillow IPR . . . so long as Zillow remains an active
`party in the joined proceeding.” Id. at 9; see also id. at 10–11 (Petitioner
`stipulating to certain procedures if the Motion is granted.).
`
`Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s showing but argues we
`“should consider factors for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`when evaluating whether to institute and join this proceeding with the Zillow
`IPR.” Opp. 4 (citing Consolidate Trial Practice Guide, 77 (Nov. 2019)).
`According to Patent Owner “[t]he mere fact that Chewy seeks to join an
`already-instituted IPR on the same invalidity grounds ‘does not obligate [the
`Board] to institute this proceeding without first considering whether to
`exercise discretion under § 314(a).” Id. (citing Apple v. Uniloc 2017 LLC,
`IPR2020-00854, Paper 9, 4–5 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2020) (precedential)). In
`particular, Patent Owner contends that we should consider “the state of
`parallel district court litigation in which the same patent and claims are at
`issue.” Id. (citing Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11, 5–6
`(PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)).
`The precedential order in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc. identifies factors to
`consider when a patent owner raises an argument for discretionary denial
`due to the advanced state of a parallel proceeding:
`1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one
`may be granted if a proceeding is instituted;
`2.
`proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected
`statutory deadline for a final written decision;
`3.
`investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the
`parties;
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`IPR2021-00757
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`
`overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the
`4.
`parallel proceeding;
`5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel
`proceeding are the same party; and
`6.
`other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of
`discretion, including the merits.
`Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5‒6. “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness,
`and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of
`an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. There is some
`overlap among these factors and some facts may be relevant to more than
`one factor. Id. In evaluating the factors, the Board takes a holistic view of
`whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or
`instituting review. Id.
`i.
`Analysis
`We reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and evidence in light of the
`factors stated in Kyocera. We find that the evidence supports joining
`Petitioner as a party to the 1655 IPR. We now analyze the Fintiv factors to
`determine whether those factors, considered holistically, support exercising
`our discretion to deny institution/joinder.
`a. Whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one
`may be granted
`Patent Owner contends that this factor weighs in favor of denial of
`institution because Petitioner filed a stay request in the New York litigation
`and argues that the District Court is unlikely to grant a stay. Opp. 5–6.
`Petitioner counters that the Washington litigation concerning the ’443 patent
`is stayed pending resolution of the 1655 IPR. Reply 2.
`After the briefing in this case was complete, the District Court denied
`Petitioner’s motion to stay the New York litigation. Ex. 3001, 35.
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`Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny
`institution.
`
`b. The proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s
`projected statutory deadline for a final written decision
`Patent Owner contends that this factor favors denial of institution
`because the District Court ordered that the New York litigation “be ready for
`trial on November 27, 2021.” Opp. 6 (citing Ex. 2005, 1). According to
`Patent Owner, that date “is over three and a half months earlier than the
`March 15, 2022 due date for a final written decision in the” 1655 IPR. Id.
`(citing Ex. 2002).
`Petitioner contends that “the District Court agreed to extend the ‘ready
`for trial’ date to January 11, 2022.” Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1014). Petitioner
`further contends that “the District Court’s rules explain that the ‘ready for
`trial’ date is not the actual trial date; instead, it is simply the date by ‘which
`the parties will not be heard to complain that they are not ready for trial.’”
`Id. (citing Ex. 1015, 5).
`The current record reflects that the District Court in the New York
`litigation will “set a firm trial date” on December 30, 2021. Ex. 1014, 3.
`Because the District Court has not set a firm trial date, we find this factor
`weighs in favor of not exercising our discretion to deny institution.
`c. Investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the
`parties
`Patent Owner contends this factor favors denial of institution because
`the New York litigation “will be far along before the Board’s institution
`decision is due in this case, and will likely be complete before the final
`written decision is expected” in the 1655 IPR. Opp. 7. In support of this
`contention, Patent Owner directs us to a schedule indicating that the District
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`Court will conduct “a Markman hearing as early as July 23, 2021, exchange
`expert reports by August 16, 2021, complete fact and expert discovery by
`September 29, 2021, and be ready for trial by November 27, 2021.” Id.
`(citing Ex. 2005).
`Petitioner contends “the progress of the litigation at the time of the
`institution decision is speculative at best in light of Petitioner’s pending
`motion to dismiss or stay IBM’s infringement counterclaim.” Reply 3–4.
`Petitioner further contends “if the motion is denied, the Board will issue its
`institution decision before the deadlines to serve rebuttal expert reports . . .
`complete depositions . . . complete discovery . . . and file dispositive
`motions.” Id. at 4.
`Petitioner further contends that under this factor, “the Board considers
`the ‘facts relevant to timing,’ including whether ‘the evidence shows that the
`petitioner filed the petition expeditiously, such as promptly after becoming
`aware of the claims being asserted.’” Id. at 3 (citing Apple v. Fintiv, Paper
`11 at 11–12). In that regard, Petitioner contends it filed the Petition and
`Motion for Joinder on April 15, 2021 which is “over one month before
`Patent Owner served its infringement contentions on May 21 2021.” Id.
`We agree with Petitioner that there is some uncertainty in the District
`Court schedule at this point. From the record evidence, it appears that the
`District Court has twice revised the earliest date on which it will hold a
`Markman hearing. See Ex. 1014, 2; Ex. 2005, 2. Nonetheless, the record
`evidence also reveals that a not insignificant amount of work has been
`invested by the parties in preparing for the Markman hearing as of the date
`of this decision. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ D.2.2–D.2.3. It also appears that a not
`insignificant amount of work remains to be done. Id. ¶¶ D.3–D.6, E.
`
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`
`Given Petitioner’s timely filing of the Petition and Motion and the
`amount of work left to be done in the New York litigation post institution,
`we find that this factor is neutral in our analysis.
`d. Overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the
`parallel proceeding
`Patent Owner contends that this factor favors denial of institution
`because “all claims challenged in Chewy’s Petition are also at issue in the
`Chewy Litigation.” Opp. 8 (citing Ex. 2004, 25 n.8).
`Petitioner counters “if this proceeding is instituted and its Motion is
`granted, then it will not pursue the same grounds in the District Court.”
`Reply 4. Petitioner contends that based on this stipulation, “this factor
`‘weighs marginally in favor’ of institution.” Id. (citing Sand Revolution II,
`LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393,
`Paper 24, 11–12 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative).
`Based on Petitioner’s representation that it will not pursue the same
`grounds in the New York litigation, this factor weighs marginally in favor of
`not exercising our discretion to deny institution.
`e. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel
`proceeding are the same party
`Patent Owner contends that this factor favors denial of institution
`because Chewy is the Petitioner here and a party to the parallel litigation.
`Opp. 9 (citing Ex. 2006, 1).
`Petitioner contends that this factor “could weigh either in favor of, or
`against, exercising discretion to deny institution, depending on which
`tribunal was likely to address the challenged patent first.” Reply 4 (citing
`Apple v. Koss Corp., IPR2021-00305, Paper 14, 20-21 (PTAB June 3, 2021).
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`
`Although the reasoning in the Apple v. Koss decision is not binding on
`us, it is, nonetheless, informative on this point. We note that we will hold
`the oral hearing in the 1655 IPR on December 15, 2021 which is two weeks
`prior to the date that the District Court in the New York litigation will set a
`firm trial date. IPR2020-01655, Paper 9, 12. These facts indicate it is
`highly likely that we will address the patentability of the challenged claims
`of the ’443 patent prior to the District Court. Consequently, we treat this
`factor as weighing in favor of not exercising our discretion to deny
`institution.
`
`f. Other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of
`discretion, including the merits.
`Patent Owner contends that this factor favors denial of institution.
`According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s decision to seek joinder to the 1655
`IPR rather than filing its own stand-alone Petition “appears to be a strategic
`attempt to participate in an instituted IPR without being subject to the full
`petitioner estoppel that typically attaches with a final written decision.”
`Opp. 10 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)). Patent Owner contends that “the
`Federal Circuit has suggested that petitioners joined to an IPR are estopped
`only from later raising the grounds that were actually advanced in the IPR,
`rather than the broader statutory estoppel.” Id. (citing Network-1 Techs.,
`Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 981 F. 3d 1015, 1027–28 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
`Patent Owner notes that the petitioner in Newtork-1, unlike Petitioner here,
`was time-barred at the time of joinder and “thus it is unclear whether the
`same narrower estoppel would apply to Chewy.” Id. Patent Owner further
`contends that Petitioner faces no prejudice if we deny institution of the
`Petition and the Motion, because it will not be time barred from filing its
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`own Petition until April 19, 2022 “which is also one month after the due
`date for a final written decision” in the 1655 IPR. Id. at 12.
`Petitioner counters that because it will only play an understudy role in
`the 1655 IPR, this factor weighs strongly against denying institution because
`the 1655 IPR will still go forward and denial “would not avoid potential
`duplicative efforts.” Reply 4–5 (citing Garmin Int’l v. Phillips North
`America LLC, IPR2020-00910, Paper 8, 26 (PTAB Nov. 19, 2020)).
`Petitioner contends that it sought joinder for efficiency reasons alone and
`Patent Owner’s estoppel allegations are “unsupported and simply not true.”
`Id. at 5. Petitioner also contends that it would suffer prejudice if it were
`required to refile the Petition because “a final written decision would not
`issue until April 2023––15 months after the ‘ready for trial date’ entered by
`the District Court” which, according to Petitioner “would lead to duplicative
`proceedings and prejudice to Petitioner.” Id.
`Patent Owner’s argument concerning the scope of estoppel is, as
`Patent Owner concedes, unsupported by Network-1, and thus, speculative
`because Petitioner is not time barred. We agree with our colleagues in
`Garmin that because the 1655 IPR is still ongoing, denial of institution and
`joinder will not avoid potential duplicative efforts by the Board. See
`Garmin, Paper 8 at 26. Our colleagues in Garmin found that this factor
`weighed strongly against denying institution because of this and the fact that
`the merits of the petition in that case were strong. In this case, the merits of
`the Petition with respect to challenged claim 1 are strong and more than
`sufficient for institution.
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine that this factor weighs
`against exercising our discretion to deny institution.
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`g. Weighing Factors Holistically
`Because our analysis of the Fintiv factors is fact driven, no single
`factor is determinative of whether we exercise our discretion. After
`weighing all factors holistically, we determine not to exercise our discretion
`to deny institution or the motion for joinder because the District Court has
`not yet set a trial date for the New York litigation, the oral hearing in the
`1655 IPR will be held in approximately two months, and our final written
`decision in the 1655 IPR will be issued no later than March 15, 2022. Due
`to the speculative nature of Patent Owner’s estoppel argument, we are not
`persuaded that the integrity of the system would be negatively impacted by
`our decision to institute and grant the Motion.
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the reasons discussed above, we institute inter partes review of
`the challenged claims of the ’443 patent based on the grounds set forth in the
`Petition. We also grant the Motion and join Petitioner to IPR2020-01655 in
`the understudy role described by Petitioner in the Motion so long as the
`petitioner in IPR2020-01655 continues to participate in that proceeding.
`IV. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of an inter
`partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds presented in the
`Petition is granted;
`FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial, which
`commences on the entry date of this decision;
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`FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37
`C.F.R. § 42.122, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder (Paper 3) is granted, and
`Petitioner is joined as a petitioner in IPR2020-01655, subject to the
`following limitations on Petitioner’s participation in that proceeding;
`FURTHER ORDERED that the asserted grounds of unpatentability on
`which the Board instituted inter partes review in IPR2020-01655 are
`unchanged and remain the only instituted grounds;
`FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling Order, Paper 9 in
`IPR2020-01655, and any modifications thereto, shall govern the schedule of
`the proceeding;
`FURTHER ORDERED that all further filings by Petitioner are to be
`made in IPR2020-01655;
`FURTHER ORDERED that all filings by Petitioner in IPR2020-
`01655 be consolidated with the filings of the petitioner in IPR2020-01655;
`FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall be bound by any past or
`future agreement between Patent Owner and the petitioner in IPR2020-
`01655 concerning discovery and/or depositions;
`FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall not seek any discovery
`from Patent Owner separate from the petitioner in IPR2020-01655;
`FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner, at deposition, shall not receive
`any direct, cross examination, or redirect time beyond that permitted for the
`petitioner in IPR2020-01655 alone under either 37 C.F.R. § 42.53 or any
`agreement between Patent Owner and the petitioner in IPR2020-01655;
`FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall not separately request nor
`receive any time at the oral hearing in this matter;
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`
`FURTHER ORDERED that the case caption in IPR2020-01655, for
`all further submissions, shall be modified to add Chewy, Inc. as a named
`Petitioner, and to indicate by footnote the joinder of Petitioner to that
`proceeding;
`FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner may seek relief from the
`conditions on its participation in IPR2020-01655 set forth in this Order only
`if the petitioner in IPR2020-01655 ceases to participate as a party in
`IPR2020-01655;
`FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Decision shall be entered
`into the record in IPR2020-01655.
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2021-00757
`Patent 7,076,443 B1
`
`For PETITIONER:
`
`Joshua Raskin
`Heath Briggs
`Vimal Kapadia
`GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
`raskinj@gtlaw.com
`briggsh@gtlaw.com
`kapadiav@gtlaw.com
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Yung-Hoon Ha
`Theodoros Konstantakopolous
`DESMARAIS LLP
`yha@desmaraisllp.com
`tkonstantakopolous@desmaraisllp.com
`
`
`
`18
`
`

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