throbber

`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________
`
`
`SLAYBACK PHARMA LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`EYE THERAPIES, LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`__________________
`
`Case IPR2022-00142
`U.S. Patent No. 8,293,742
`__________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REPLY BRIEF ADDRESSING THE BOARD’S
`QUESTIONS
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`
`Table of Contents
`
`b.
`
`
`
`
`
`Question 1: The Preamble and Inherent Anticipation ..................................... 1
`The preamble requires redness reduction .............................................. 1
`Even if the Preamble Only Requires an Intent to Reduce
`Redness, Petitioner Cannot Establish Anticipation ............................... 2
`a.
`The patient population in Example 1 of the ’553 patent
`does not mandate redness ......................................................... 3
`The steps of Example 1 of the ’553 patent are not
`identical to the claimed method ................................................ 5
`GlaxoSmithKline cannot save Petitioner’s position ................. 6
`c.
`Question 2: “Consisting Essentially of” .......................................................... 7
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,
`569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 8
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH,
`8 F.4th 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................................... 1
`GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Glenmark Pharms. Inc., USA,
`No. CV 14-877-LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 2290141 (D. Del. May 25,
`2017) ............................................................................................................. 3, 6, 7
`Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,
`342 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................ 1, 2
`Kingston Tech. Co. v. SPEX Techs., Inc.,
`798 F. App’x 629 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..................................................................... 10
`Millennium Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.,
`862 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 4
`Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc.,
`No. IPR2021-00881, 2022 WL 16842073 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2022) .................... 2
`Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp.,
`432 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 5
`Rapoport v. Dement,
`254 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ........................................................................ 6, 7
`Sanofi Mature IP v. Mylan Lab’ys Ltd.,
`757 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................... 1-2
`TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc.,
`529 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 8
`Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Lab’ys, Inc.,
`473 F.3d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................ 8
`
`ii
`
`

`

`I.
`
`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`
`Question 1: The Preamble and Inherent Anticipation
` The preamble requires redness reduction
`There is no dispute that the preamble—a method for reducing eye redness—
`
`is limiting. Instead, the parties dispute whether the preamble requires reduction of
`
`ocular hyperemia as Patent Owner contends (Paper 71 at § II.A), or merely mens rea
`
`regarding reducing redness without any effectiveness as Petitioner contends (Paper
`
`70 at § I.A). Petitioner’s position is inconsistent with the claims themselves, intrinsic
`
`record, and Federal Circuit precedent.
`
`It is undisputed that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva
`
`Pharms. Int’l GmbH, 8 F.4th 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2021) is instructive. Paper 70 at 2-3.
`
`The Federal Circuit’s guidance in Eli Lilly and Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342
`
`F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) support construing the preamble to require redness
`
`reduction. See Paper 71 at § II.A. Indeed, as in Eli Lilly and Jansen, the intrinsic
`
`record of the ’742 patent emphasizes the essence of the invention—use of low dose
`
`brimonidine to reduce redness. See e.g., EX-1001 at 2:38-41, 4:26-30. Moreover,
`
`despite Petitioner’s suggestion to the contrary (Paper 70 at 2-3, n.1), the language in
`
`the ’742 patent claims nearly parallels the language central to the court’s decision in
`
`Jansen. Like Jansen where the claims recited “treating or preventing” a condition
`
`“to a human in need thereof,” here, the claims recite “reducing eye redness” “to a
`
`patient having an ocular condition.” 342 F.3d at 1332-34; see Sanofi Mature IP v.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`Mylan Lab’ys Ltd., 757 F. App’x 988, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (akin to Jansen, the
`
`preamble “[a] method of increasing survival” requires increasing survival).
`
`Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc., No. IPR2021-00881, 2022
`
`WL 16842073 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2022) is inapposite. The Board’s conclusion in
`
`Mylan turned on facts not present here. See id. at *9. For context, the claims in Mylan
`
`were directed to a sequential dosage regimen (i.e., timing of doses), where it was
`
`undisputed that the method of using the compounds at issue (VEGF antagonists) for
`
`the claimed use (treating angiogenic eye disorders) was known. Id. at *3. The claims
`
`did not recite any concentrations of the VEGF antagonists, but rather focused only
`
`on timing of dosing. Id. at *9. Additionally, the preamble recited “treating a patient
`
`with an angiogenic eye disorder,” akin to administering the compound, without
`
`requiring (or even describing) a specific result in the claims. Id. The facts here are
`
`materially different from those in Mylan. As an example, there is no such concession
`
`about the method of use being known in the art. In fact, the inventors surprisingly
`
`discovered that low-dose brimonidine could work to reduce redness, and therefore
`
`claimed use of specific doses of brimonidine—“between about 0.001% . . . and
`
`about 0.05%” and “between about 0.001% to about 0.025%”—for reducing eye
`
`redness. EX-1001 at claims 1-3. Because the facts and claim language central to the
`
`decision in Mylan are not present here, Petitioner’s reliance on this case is misplaced.
`
`
`
`Even if the Preamble Only Requires an Intent to Reduce
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`
`Redness, Petitioner Cannot Establish Anticipation
`Petitioner fails to address the implications of the Board adopting Patent
`
`Owner’s construction and finding that the preamble requires redness reduction, not
`
`merely intent. The reason for that is clear. Petitioner has not and cannot prove
`
`inherency if redness reduction is required. Petitioner effectively conceded as much
`
`when it shifted its position in its reply to argue that the claims require only intent to
`
`reduce redness. Compare e.g., Paper 2 at § IV.A.2.a with Paper 43 at 7-8.
`
`Importantly, even if the Board adopts Petitioner’s construction, Petitioner still
`
`cannot meet its burden. See, e.g., Paper 71 at § II.B. Petitioner’s inherency argument
`
`hinges on the Board finding that both the physical steps and patient population in
`
`Example 1 of the ’553 patent are identical to the claimed method. See Paper 70 at
`
`§ I.B (citing GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Glenmark Pharms. Inc., USA, No. CV 14-877-
`
`LPS-CJB, 2017 WL 2290141 (D. Del. May 25, 2017)). Neither the patient
`
`population nor physical steps are the same.
`
`a.
`
`The patient population in Example 1 of the ’553
`patent does not mandate redness
`With respect to the patient population, Petitioner must establish that the
`
`patients after radial keratotomy (“RK”) surgery (the population in Example 1) would
`
`necessarily have eye redness to prove inherent anticipation. Petitioner relies entirely
`
`on the testimony of Dr. Sher on this point. Paper 43 at 8; Paper 70 at 6. But what
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`Petitioner conveniently fails to mention is that Dr. Sher has never performed the
`
`RK surgery in Example 1. See EX-2213 at 12:25-13:7 (“Q: Have you done RK
`
`surgery other than the astigmatic RK surgery that you mentioned just a moment ago?
`
`A: No. I don’t believe in it. . . .”). Because Dr. Sher has not performed RK surgery,
`
`his unsupported testimony that all RK patients would have redness should be
`
`rejected. See Millennium Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2017) (reversing a finding of invalidity where, inter alia, the petitioner’s expert
`
`had “never worked with any boronic acid compound and has not performed or
`
`supervised any lyophilization experiments since 1983.”)
`
`Petitioner contends that Dr. Sher’s testimony is “unrebutted.” Paper 70 at 13.
`
`That is incorrect. Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Noecker, the only expert in this case
`
`who actually has performed RK surgery (EX-1053 at 95:1-3 (“Q: In your -- have
`
`you ever performed radial keratotomy? A: Yes.”)), also addressed this issue. And
`
`Dr. Noecker explained, from his own experience, redness does not always (i.e.,
`
`necessarily and inevitably) result from radial keratotomy surgery.1 See, e.g., EX-
`
`2020, ¶¶ 105, 149. This is logical, for it is important to realize that RK surgery
`
`
`1 Tellingly, Petitioner’s counsel did not ask about Dr. Noecker’s patient outcomes
`
`with respect to redness. This makes sense, because he had already given his position
`
`in writing. See, e.g., EX-2020, ¶¶ 105, 149.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`involves making microscopic cuts in the cornea, which is avascular—meaning there
`
`are no blood vessels, as Dr. Sher acknowledged. EX-2162 at 113:12-17; EX-2020,
`
`¶¶ 35, 104. Thus, unlike vascular parts of the body (including vascular parts of the
`
`eye), where cuts result in blood (and redness (see EX-2020 at ¶ 38)), the situation in
`
`the avascular cornea is different. Dr. Noecker’s clinical experience is thus
`
`unsurprising and consistent with logic and science.2
`
`Because Petitioner cannot establish that all of the patients in Example 1 of the
`
`’553 patent would have had redness to reduce, its inherency argument must fail. See
`
`Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1376-79 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (if
`
`providing the claimed treatment may have different results based upon the specific
`
`patient (with or without sunburn) treated, the results are not inherent).3
`
`b.
`
`The steps of Example 1 of the ’553 patent are not
`
`
`2 Dr. Sher’s testimony to the contrary was likely based on his experience with
`
`astigmatism keratotomy, a different procedure (EX-2213 at 12:20-24), performed on
`
`the edge of the cornea closer to the vascular part of the eye (EX-2020 at ¶¶ 33, 38).
`
`3 Patent Owner and Petitioner both cite to Perricone, but Petitioner tellingly fails to
`
`address the Court’s ultimate finding in Perricone that the claims were not anticipated
`
`because the method in the prior art was not identical to the claimed methods because
`
`of differences in the patient population. 432 F.3d at 1376-79
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`
`identical to the claimed method
`Petitioner additionally has not and cannot prove that the steps of Example 1
`
`of the ’553 patent are identical to the steps in the claimed methods. The reason for
`
`this is simple: Example 1 is incomplete as written and a POSA would have
`
`recognized that other drugs would be ocularly administered, as Dr. Sher
`
`acknowledged. EX-2213 at 18:10-23:13. Performing the method of Example 1 of
`
`the ’553 patent thus includes steps involving administration of other drugs whereas
`
`the claimed methods exclude steps involving administration of drugs other than
`
`brimonidine. See, e.g., Paper 71 at §§ II.B, III. The methods thus are not identical,
`
`and Petitioner’s inherent anticipation argument must fail for this additional reason.
`
`GlaxoSmithKline cannot save Petitioner’s position
`c.
`Petitioner argues that this case is square with GlaxoSmithKline, but
`
`GlaxoSmithKline is inapposite and involved what amounts to an opposite factual
`
`situation. In GlaxoSmithKline, the court explained that a patentee may not
`
`circumvent inherency by adding an intent limitation to claims. 2017 WL 2290141,
`
`at *2. Here, it is Petitioner, not Patent Owner, who now attempts to insert an “intent”
`
`element to circumvent the language of the claims (which require “redness
`
`reduction”) and resurrect its maligned inherency position. The District of Delaware
`
`in GlaxoSmithKline, moreover, cited Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2001), which found no inherency, “where intent for administering buspirone as part
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`of asserted claims—to treat sleep apnea—resulted in manipulative difference from
`
`method disclosed in prior art—which was to treat anxiety; dosing regime for anxiety
`
`was three times daily while regime for sleep apnea was larger dose once a day at
`
`time of sleep.” GlaxoSmithKline, 2017 WL 2290141, at *2. Here, even if the Board
`
`finds that the claims merely require “intent” as opposed to actual redness reduction,
`
`Petitioner’s inherency position still fails because, similar to Rapoport, the claimed
`
`methods and Example 1 of the ’553 patent have manipulative differences beyond
`
`just the intent to treat pain versus the intent to treat redness. Namely, the dosing
`
`protocol and dose (about 0.025% brimonidine without other drugs (e.g., claim 2)
`
`versus 0.03% brimonidine with other drugs) are different and these differences
`
`impact the patient population, i.e., whether the patients even have eye redness to
`
`reduce and if 0.03% brimonidine alone would inevitably reduce redness if present.
`
`II. Question 2: “Consisting Essentially of”
`The parties agree that “consisting essentially of” excludes steps that materially
`
`affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed invention. See Paper 70 at
`
`8-9; Paper 71 at 10. The parties dispute, however, what the basic and novel
`
`characteristic of the invention is and what steps would materially affect it.
`
`Petitioner contends that the basic and novel characteristic of the invention is
`
`“brimonidine’s ability to reduce eye redness at low doses,” which “does not exclude
`
`administration of other drugs.” Paper 70 at 9-10. But in making this argument,
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`Petitioner ignores key aspects of the prosecution history. See id. The “consisting
`
`essentially of” phrase was added during prosecution to overcome Dean, EX-1007,
`
`which administered brinzolamide (not a vasoconstrictor) with brimonidine. In
`
`replacing “comprising” with “consisting essentially of” (EX-1024 at 111), the
`
`patentee made it clear that the claimed methods “do not include administering other
`
`active agents” with low-dose brimonidine (Id. at 124, 116-117, 120).
`
`Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s position regarding administration of
`
`other drugs “cannot be squared with the ’742 patent itself.” See Paper 70 at 9-10, 13-
`
`14. But as is often the case, the ’742 patent’s specification contains subject matter
`
`that is not claimed, and claims need not be construed to encompass all disclosed
`
`embodiments, particularly when narrowed during prosecution. See TIP Sys., LLC v.
`
`Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (declining
`
`“to construe the claim term to encompass the alternative embodiment” where doing
`
`so “would contradict the language of the claims”); see also Ventana Med. Sys., Inc.
`
`v. Biogenex Lab’ys, Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Notably, this patent
`
`family contains other patents with different claims that use the “comprising”
`
`transitional term (see, e.g., Slayback Pharma LLC v. Eye Therapies, LLC, IPR2022-
`
`00146, EX-1001 at claims 1, 3, 5) and cover co-administration with other drugs. As
`
`such, Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) is inapposite.
`
`Petitioner also cites claim 4, directed to administering brimonidine “within
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`about 24 hours after a Lasik surgery,” to argue the claims include dosing with other
`
`drugs. See Paper 70 at 15. That is a red herring, for claim 4 is controlled and limited
`
`by “consisting essentially of” and what the patentee argued it included (brimonidine
`
`alone) and excluded (other drugs) during prosecution. Yet claim 4 still has scope. It
`
`includes dosing with brimonidine alone in the claimed timeframe (within about 24
`
`hours of surgery), and the postoperative use of other drugs (e.g., steroids or NSAIDs)
`
`may only extend a few hours post-surgery, leaving ample room for brimonidine
`
`alone to be administered well after those drugs wear off. Petitioner cites to EX-2213
`
`at 23:11-13, but this testimony explains only that during surgery an anesthetic would
`
`be given, providing no information on what happens postoperatively at, e.g., 24
`
`hours. And although the record is undeveloped on this new argument, the reality is
`
`that not all patients require other active ingredient drops post-surgery. See e.g., EX-
`
`1102 and EX-1104 (describing no post-operative medication).
`
`Conceding that other drugs would be administered if a POSA were to practice
`
`Example 1 of the ’553 patent, Petitioner now must argue that those other drugs do
`
`not impact brimonidine’s ability to reduce redness. Paper 70 at § II.B. But that
`
`cannot be reconciled with Dr. Sher’s clear admission that steroids could be
`
`administered as part of RK surgery and would reduce redness, thus impacting
`
`brimonidine’s ability to do so. EX-2213 at 18:23-19:25. The same is true for
`
`NSAIDs and antibiotics, which, despite Petitioner’s suggestion, is not speculative
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`given Dr. Sher’s testimony clearly admitting that anti-inflammatories and antibiotics
`
`are administered and they would impact redness. Id. at 18:10-21:8.
`
`In an attempt to salvage its inherency argument, Petitioner asserts yet another
`
`new, speculative argument. This time, Petitioner argues the ’553 patent and Norden
`
`were designed with “controls,” and the results show that the other drugs
`
`administered do not impact brimonidine’s ability to reduce redness. See Paper 70 at
`
`12-13. But these drugs not only would potentially prevent the formation of redness
`
`in the first instance, but they also might reduce redness or cause some other
`
`synergistic (or dys-synergistic) effect. EX-2213 at 18:23-21:8, 41:21-42:4.
`
`Additionally, Petitioner ignores that Norden administered 0.2% brimonidine, a
`
`concentration well above the claimed ranges and known to cause hyperemia rather
`
`than reducing it. See, e.g., Paper 30 at §§ VI.C.1.d.ii; Paper 59 at § III.C.1.a.i.
`
`Petitioner’s endless position shifting establishes only one thing: There are a
`
`multitude of unknowns in its references. With this untenable foundation, Petitioner
`
`cannot satisfy its heavy burden of proving inherent anticipation. Kingston Tech. Co.
`
`v. SPEX Techs., Inc., 798 F. App’x 629, 634 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (affirming no inherent
`
`anticipation on theory that relied on multiple inferential steps).
`
`Date: March 27, 2023
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`By: /Bryan C. Diner/
`Bryan C. Diner, Reg. No. 32,409
`Justin J. Hasford, Reg. No. 62,180
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`
`Caitlin E. O’Connell, Reg. No. 73,934
`Christina Ji-Hye Yang, Reg. No. 79,103
`
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, LLP
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case IPR2022-00142
`Patent Owner’s Reply Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing Patent Owner’s Reply
`
`
`
`Brief Addressing the Board’s Questions was served electronically via email on
`
`March 27, 2023, in its entirety on the following:
`
`Linnea P. Cipriano
`Goodwin Proctor LLP
`620 Eight Avenue
`New York, NY 10018
`lcipriano@goodwinlaw.com
`
`Louis H. Weinstein
`Patrick G. Pollard
`Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLC
`1 Giralda Farms
`Madison, NJ 07940
`lweinstein@windelsmarx.com
`ppollard@windelsmarx.com
`
`Robert Frederickson III
`Goodwin Proctor LLP
`100 Northern Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`rfrederickson@goodwinlaw.com
`
`Petitioner has consented to service by electronic mail.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /Geneva Eaddy/
`Geneva Eaddy
`Case Manager
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
` GARRETT & DUNNER LLP
`
`Dated: March 27, 2023
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket