throbber
Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 1 of 22 PageID 4128
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`DALLAS DIVISION
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-1263-B
`
`§§
`
`§§
`
`§§
`
`§§§
`

`
`DDC TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC and ORORA
`PACKAGING SOLUTIONS,
`
` Defendants.
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`Before the Court is Defendant Google LLC’s Motion to Transfer Venue and Sever (Doc.
`
`94). Because the Court finds that convenience and justice favor transfer and otherwise outweigh
`
`concerns of judicial efficiency, the Court GRANTS the Motion, SEVERS Plaintiff DDC
`
`Technology, LLC (“DDC”)’s claims against Google, and TRANSFERS the claims against
`
`Google to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. DDC’s claims
`
`against Defendant Orora Packaging Solutions (“OPS”) remain before this Court.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`This is a patent infringement case. DDC originally sued six different entities for direct
`
`and indirect infringement of patents (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”)1 relating to a
`
` 1 The patents include United States Patent No. 9,420,075, entitled “Virtual Reality Viewer and Input
`Mechanism,” which issued on August 16, 2016 (“the ‘075 Patent”); United States Patent No. 9,811,184,
`entitled “Virtual Reality Viewer and Input Mechanism,” which issued on November 7, 2017 (“the ‘184
`Patent”); United States Patent No. 10,528,199, entitled “Virtual Reality Viewer and Input Mechanism,”
`which issued on January 7, 2020 (“the ‘199 Patent”); United States Patent No. 11,093,000, entitled “Virtual
`Reality Viewer and Input Mechanism,” which issued on August 17, 2021 (“the ‘000 Patent”); and United
`States Patent No. 11,093,001, entitled “Virtual Reality Viewer and Input Mechanism,” which issued on
`August 17, 2021 (“the ‘001 Patent”). Doc. 123, Am. Compl., ¶ 3.
`
`-1-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 001
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 2 of 22 PageID 4129
`
`cardboard virtual reality viewer. See generally Doc. 1, Orig. Compl. In short, in lieu of an
`
`expensive virtual reality headset, a user equipped with the cardboard viewer can insert their
`
`smartphone into the viewer to create a makeshift virtual reality headset:
`
`Doc. 1-1, Ex. A, 5 (depicting the ‘075 Patent).
`
` In June 2014, Google presented its first version of a cardboard viewer at an annual
`
`conference. Doc. 123, Am. Compl., ¶ 24. Around that time, a separate company, DODOcase,
`
`Inc., owned in part by Patrick Buckley, contacted Google regarding a potential business
`
`relationship. See id. ¶¶ 4, 27. Specifically, Buckley emailed several Google employees—Andrew
`
`Nartker, Alex Kauffman, and Clay Bavor—regarding a “conductive tap button” for the virtual
`
`viewer that could improve its functionality. See id. ¶¶ 27–29. DODOcase shortly thereafter filed
`
`its first provisional application to which the Asserted Patents are related. Id. ¶ 30.
`
`Around March 2015, Google created the “Works With Google Cardboard” Program
`
`(“WWGC Program”). Id. ¶ 38. The idea underlying the WWGC Program was that Google would
`
`disseminate manufacturing and marketing guidelines to third parties to create their own
`
`cardboard viewers. See id. ¶¶ 43–45. See generally Doc. 123-15, Ex. O. Google also provided
`
`-2-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 002
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 3 of 22 PageID 4130
`
`software development guidelines for developers to create compatible applications. Doc. 123-15,
`
`Ex. O, 2. Together, the WWGC Program would function as an ecosystem where users could
`
`utilize the cardboard viewers on a host of compatible applications. Doc. 123, Am. Compl., ¶ 43
`
`For manufacturers to be a part of the WWGC Program, they had to submit samples of
`
`their cardboard viewers for Google’s approval and evaluation. See id. ¶¶ 41, 43–44. Once Google
`
`approved, the manufacturers could then indicate their viewer worked with the WWGC Program
`
`by printing a WWGC badge and QR code on the viewer. Id.; see also Doc. 123-15, Ex. O, 2.
`
`DODOcase’s virtual viewer was a part of the WWGC Program. Doc. 123, Am. Compl., ¶ 40.
`
`In May 2015, Google launched a second version of its viewer, the Google Cardboard V2 Viewer.
`
`Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. Around this time, DODOcase filed a second provisional application relating to the
`
`Asserted Patents now at issue. Id. ¶ 47.
`
`In 2016, however, after several years of selling its products, DODOcase suffered “price
`
`pressures resulting from infringers importing competitive products” and was forced stop sales and
`
`production. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. In 2018, weary of litigation, DODOcase assigned the Asserted Patents to
`
`DDC under an agreement that DODOcase would “retain[] a financial interest [in] recoveries
`
`from enforcement of the Asserted Patents.” Id. ¶ 8.
`
`As the successor in interest, DDC filed suit in June 2022 against six different entities who
`
`allegedly violated the Asserted Patents. Doc. 1, Orig. Compl. DDC sued Google for direct
`
`infringement of the Asserted Patents based on the Google Cardboard V2 Viewer or other
`
`“substantively similar” products. Id. ¶¶ 21, 74. DDC also sued several third-party manufacturers
`
`for their virtual viewers. See id. ¶¶ 16–20. And finally, DDC sued Google for indirect patent
`
`infringement by inducing third-party manufacturers—including the other defendants—to
`
`-3-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 003
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 4 of 22 PageID 4131
`
`infringe the Asserted Patents through the WWGC Program and by advertising the viewer as
`
`“open source.” E.g., id. ¶¶ 251–52.
`
`DDC however, eventually dismissed most of the defendants from suit. That is, within
`
`seven months of filing suit, DDC had filed notices or stipulations of dismissal on four of the six
`
`defendants.2 A fifth defendant—Landsberg Orora—was dismissed by Court order on December
`
`19, 2022, for lack of personal jurisdiction after the Court determined, in short, that DDC had
`
`seemingly “sued the wrong entity within the broader corporate family.” Doc. 103, Mem. Op. &
`
`Order, 4. Google was the single remaining defendant in the suit, with a pending motion to sever
`
`and transfer venue. See Doc. 94, Mot. Transfer.
`
`In February 2023, however, DDC filed an amended complaint. Doc. 123, Am. Compl.
`
`DDC added a new Landsberg entity—OPS—in Landsberg Orora’s place. See id. The allegations
`
`in the new complaint are similar. DDC sues Google for direct infringement for the Google
`
`Cardboard V2 Viewer, but it also includes direct infringement claims for other WWGC Program
`
`viewers that Google advertised and linked on its site. E.g., id. ¶¶ 76, 116. DDC also maintains its
`
`indirect infringement suits against Google for inducing the other—now former—defendants to
`
`directly infringe the Asserted Patents. E.g., id. ¶ 159.
`
`DDC sues OPS for direct infringement for (1) allegedly manufacturing the Google
`
`Cardboard V2 Viewer on Google’s behalf and (2) manufacturing its own OPS cardboard viewer,
`
`which directly infringes the Asserted Patents. E.g., id. ¶¶ 20, 138.
`
` 2 Defendant HMD TECH SARL (d/b/a Homido) was dismissed on October 6, 2022. Doc. 73, Not.
`Dismissal. Emerge Technologies, Inc. (d/b/a Utopia 360) was dismissed on October 24, 2022. Doc. 82, Joint
`Stip. Dismissal. Pyrite VR LTD (d/b/a Maxbox VR) and DDC reached a confidential settlement agreement
`on December 21, 2022. Doc 107, Stip. Final Consent J. & Perm. Inj. And Structural Graphics, LLC (d/b/a Red
`Paper Plane) was dismissed on January 6, 2023. Doc 109, Joint Stip. Dismissal.
`
`-4-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 004
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 5 of 22 PageID 4132
`
`In its Motion to Transfer Venue and Sever the Case (Doc. 94), Google argues that
`
`joinder of the (now dismissed) defendants was improper and, in any event, DDC’s case against it
`
`should be severed and transferred to the Northern District of California. Doc. 94, Mot. Transfer.
`
`Though Google’s Motion preceded the dismissal of several defendants and the amended
`
`complaint, Google’s arguments still apply, and the Motion is ripe before the Court.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A.
`
`Transfer of Venue
`
`Even when venue is proper, a district court may transfer a civil action to another district
`
`or division if (1) the plaintiff could have brought that action there originally and (2) the transfer
`
`would be for “the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1404(a). The movant must clearly establish both elements to “show good cause” for transfer.
`
`See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314–15, 314 n.10 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
`
`[hereinafter Volkswagen II].
`
`As to the first prong, a plaintiff may initially bring “any civil action for patent
`
`infringement . . . in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
`
`committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 28 U.S.C. §
`
`1400(b).
`
`For the second prong, to determine if transfer would be for “the convenience of parties
`
`and witnesses, in the interest of justice,” courts balance eight private- and public-interest factors.
`
`See Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 433 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation omitted).
`
`“The private[-]interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
`
`availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of
`
`-5-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 005
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 6 of 22 PageID 4133
`
`attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case
`
`easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. at 433–34 (internal quotations omitted). “The public[-]
`
`interest factors bearing on transfer are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
`
`congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity
`
`of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
`
`problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Id. at 435 (internal quotations
`
`omitted). No one factor is dispositive, although cost of attendance to witnesses is generally
`
`regarded as the most important. BNSF Ry. Co. v. OOCL (USA), Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 703, 707,
`
`711 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (Means, J.).
`
`A plaintiff’s choice of venue is not a “distinct factor” in the transfer analysis. Volkswagen
`
`II, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10. Instead, it is “treated as a burden of proof question,” and deference to
`
`this choice is reflected in the movant’s burden to show good cause for the transfer. See id.
`
`(internal quotation omitted). Thus, the balance of factors must clearly weigh in favor of transfer
`
`to the new venue. Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 433. “When the transferee venue is not clearly
`
`more convenient than the venue chosen by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s choice should be
`
`respected.” Id.
`
`B.
`
`A Party’s Joint Motion to Sever and Transfer
`
`When a party seeks to both transfer and sever its claims, the Court’s inquiry is different
`
`than traditional severance motions. See id. at 427. Both the Federal Circuit and the Fifth Circuit
`
`direct courts to consider and weigh the “comparative inconvenience of splitting the suit versus
`
`the advantages to be gained from partial transfer.” In re Amazon.com, Inc., 2022 WL 17688072, at
`
`*2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2022) (quoting Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 428); see also Def. Distributed,
`
`30 F.4th at 429 (“[S]everance and transfer makes sense only where the administration of justice
`
`-6-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 006
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 7 of 22 PageID 4134
`
`would be materially advanced and a defendant in one district is not so involved in the transferred
`
`controversy that the same issues would have to be litigated twice.”) (internal quotation omitted).
`
`III.
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`The Court begins by applying the traditional transfer analysis to determine the
`
`advantages, if any, of transferring DDC’s claims against Google to the Northern District of
`
`California. Because the Court finds the factors favor transfer, it next analyzes whether the
`
`benefits of transfer outweigh any judicial inefficiencies resulting from severing Google’s claims.
`
`See KY Home & Garden, LLC v. AMI Ventures, Inc., 2021 WL 8533033, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
`
`30, 2021) (looking first to whether transfer of the claims against the moving defendants was
`
`appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and then considering judicial efficiency).
`
`A.
`
`Transfer of Venue
`
`The Court finds that this case should be transferred pursuant to § 1404(a). In analyzing
`
`transfer of venue, the Court applies Fifth Circuit law because the issue is not unique to patent.
`
`See, e.g., In re Amazon.com, 2022 WL 17688072, at *2. To obtain transfer, Google must show
`
`that (1) this suit could have properly been filed in the Northern District of California and (2) the
`
`Northern District of California is “clearly more convenient” when considering the private- and
`
`public-interest factors. See Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 433.
`
`DDC concedes that this suit could have been properly filed in the District Court for the
`
`Northern District of California if Google was the sole defendant, Doc. 95, Resp., 5, as Google is
`
`headquartered in Mountain View, California, Doc. 94, Mot. Transfer, 8. The Court therefore
`
`considers the private- and public-interest factors enumerated above and finds that Google has
`
`shown good cause for transfer to the Northern District of California.
`
`-7-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 007
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 8 of 22 PageID 4135
`
`1.
`
`The Private-Interest Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer
`
`Three factors—relative access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process, and
`
`cost of attendance for willing witnesses—favor transfer. The remaining factor, which considers
`
`practical problems and judicial economy, is neutral. Thus, the Court finds that, collectively, the
`
`private-interest factors strongly support transfer.
`
`i.
`
`Relative ease of access to sources of proof
`
`The first private-interest factor favors transfer. This factor considers the ease of access to
`
`sources of documentary and other physical, non-witness evidence. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at
`
`316 (considering only documents and physical evidence); Netlist, Inc. v. SK Hynix Inc., 2021 WL
`
`2954095, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2021) (noting the first factor does not include witnesses). The
`
`movant must provide “an actual showing of the existence of relevant sources of proof, not merely
`
`an expression that some sources likely exist in the prospective forum.” Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th
`
`at 434. “In patent infringement cases, the bulk of the relevant evidence usually comes from the
`
`accused infringer. Consequently, the place where the defendant’s documents are kept weighs in
`
`favor of transfer to that location.” In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
`
`(analyzing transfer under Fifth Circuit law).
`
`Here, Google has indicated that “documents in Google’s possession about its products
`
`and services are normally created and maintained by the employees working on those products
`
`and services.” Doc. 94-1, Ex. A, App. at 7. And the employees that worked on “the Google
`
`Cardboard V2 Viewer, Google’s viewer guidelines for third parties, the WWGC [P]rogram, and
`
`the development of Google Cardboard viewers are based primarily in the San Francisco Bay
`
`Area,” with “no such employees . . . in Texas.” Id.; see also Doc. 94, Mot. Transfer, 3–4
`
`-8-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 008
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 9 of 22 PageID 4136
`
`(providing a list of nine employees and details of their involvement with the Google products and
`
`program). As such, Google claims “[a]ll technical, financial, and marketing documents related
`
`to Google Cardboard and the WWGC Program are created and maintained in California.” Doc.
`
`94, Mot. Transfer, 4.
`
`DDC, by contrast, relies in part on the presence of potential witnesses, a consideration
`
`beyond the scope of this factor. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. DDC also points to former
`
`defendants Emerge, Structural Graphics, and Landsberg,3 which all have locations in this district,
`
`as evidence that documents relevant to induced infringement are likely located here. See Doc.
`
`95, Resp., 8–11. But DDC’s claims regarding the presence of evidence and documents are based
`
`solely on the LinkedIn profiles of the entities’ purported employees. See id. For example, DDC
`
`says that, because Emerge’s “Computer Programmer” and “Sales & Marketing Manager” work in
`
`this district, relevant documents regarding the cardboard viewers must be here too. See id. at 9.
`
`But the logical jump from the location of Emerge’s “Computer Programmer” to documents
`
`relating to cardboard virtual reality viewers is significant and highly speculative. See Parus
`
`Holdings, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2022 WL 17420391, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2022) (noting
`
`that the relevance of witnesses based on their LinkedIn profiles was “far too speculative” and
`
`worth “little to no weight”); Doc. 95-1, Ex. 8, App. at 73 (showing Structural Graphics’ Dallas
`
`office is one of six national sales offices). Accordingly, comparing access to evidence in this
`
` 3 Although DDC is now suing OPS, the Court still considers the Landsberg witnesses identified in
`DDC’s response because most, if not all, of those witnesses presumably work for OPS instead of Landsberg.
`See Doc. 95, Resp., 13 (listing witnesses with LinkedIn profiles indicating they are located in Dallas and work
`for a Landsberg entity); see also Doc. 103, Mem. Op. & Order, 8–9 (“Landsberg has no physical presence or
`employees in Texas. Rather, a separate entity within the corporate family—[OPS]—is the reason for the office
`buildings and employees in Texas.”) (internal citation omitted).
`
`-9-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 009
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 10 of 22 PageID 4137
`
`district with the Northern District of California, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of
`
`transfer.
`
`ii.
`
`Availability of compulsory process to secure the presence of witnesses
`
`The Court finds the second private-interest factor weighs in favor of transfer. A subpoena
`
`may command a person’s attendance at a trial, hearing, or deposition
`
`(A) within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly
`transacts business in person; or (B) within the state where the person resides, is
`employed, or regularly transacts business in person, if the person (i) is a party or a
`party’s officer; or (ii) is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur
`substantial expense.
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1). As the party seeking transfer, Google “has the burden to establish that
`
`[the District Court for the Northern District of California] has subpoena power over more
`
`unwilling witnesses than this Court.” See R2 Sols. LLC v. Target Corp., 2021 WL 2550908, at *3
`
`(E.D. Tex. June 22, 2021).
`
`Google has identified several potential third-party witnesses. For example, Google points
`
`to three former DODOcase employees—Patrick Buckley, Craig Dalton, and Gene Daly. Doc. 94,
`
`Mot. Transfer, 13. Buckley is the named inventor on the Asserted Patents. Id. at 9. And Dalton
`
`and Daly were involved in “pre-suit communications [with Google] . . . when both companies
`
`were developing and selling their cardboard viewers.” Doc. 98, Reply, 7. Dalton and Daly were
`
`also “named as inventors on the provisional application to which the [A]sserted [P]atents claim
`
`priority.” Id. Google additionally highlights MerchSource, a company previously involved in
`
`litigation with DODOcase and DDC that may be relevant to licensing or damages issues. Doc.
`
`94, Mot. Transfer, 13. And finally, Google identifies Dontae Rayford, who was a former Google
`
`employee named in the original complaint as the “business development manager” that accepted
`
`-10-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 010
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 11 of 22 PageID 4138
`
`DODOcase’s cardboard viewer into the WWGC Program. Id.; see also Doc. 1, Orig. Compl., ¶¶
`
`40, 46.
`
`Buckley currently lives in Idaho—outside of both the transferor and transferee
`
`forums—and has indicated he is willing to travel to testify if needed. See Doc. 95-1, Ex. B, App.
`
`at 10–11. According to their LinkedIn profiles,4 Dalton and Daly live in the Northern District of
`
`California, and Rayford lives in Los Angeles, California. See Doc. 94-1, Exs. 6, 8, 10, App. at 49,
`
`67, 75. Similarly, MerchSource is located Irvine, California. Id., Ex. 11, App. at 88. Though
`
`Google is unsure whether these witnesses are unwilling to testify, it argues that their location
`
`favors transfer. Doc. 94, Mot. Transfer, 13.
`
`Conversely, DDC points again to the employees of former defendants Emerge, Structural
`
`Graphics, and Landsberg as presumably unwilling witnesses located in the Northern District of
`
`Texas. Doc. 95, Resp., 14. But for similar reasons as discussed above, their relevance as witnesses,
`
`based only on their company-affiliations and job titles, is highly speculative and worth little
`
`weight. Whereas Google has identified third-party witnesses and explained their relevant
`
`knowledge, DCC’s witnesses lack any direct connection to the cardboard viewers. Accordingly,
`
`the Court declines to simply tally the witnesses and instead finds that, taking into consideration
`
`the demonstrated relevance of the purported witnesses, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
`
`iii.
`
`Cost of attendance for willing witnesses
`
`The Court finds that the third private-interest factor also favors transfer. This factor
`
`considers witness convenience and cost, which usually depend on the distance a witness must
`
`4 The Court’s prior discussion on LinkedIn should not be taken as a categorical statement about the
`use of LinkedIn profiles as evidence. Rather, the Court sees a fundamental difference between using someone’s
`LinkedIn profile as evidence of the person’s probable location and using someone’s LinkedIn profile as
`evidence that, based on a generalized job title, the person likely has relevant knowledge to the case at hand.
`
`-11-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 011
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 12 of 22 PageID 4139
`
`travel to the prospective forums. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 317. “When the distance
`
`between an existing venue for trial of a matter and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more
`
`than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the
`
`additional distance to be traveled.” Id. Indeed, “[a]dditional distance means additional travel
`
`time[,] . . . meal and lodging expenses[,] and . . . overnight stays.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d
`
`201, 205 (5th Cir. 2004).
`
`“[T]he moving party must identify specific witnesses and outline the substance of their
`
`testimony.” BNSF Ry. Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d at 711. This factor is often regarded as the most
`
`important, though courts typically give greater weight to the convenience of non-party witnesses
`
`than party witnesses. Ternium Int’l U.S.A. Corp. v. Consol. Sys., Inc., 2009 WL 464953, *4 (N.D.
`
`Tex. Feb. 24, 2009) (Fish, J.).
`
`Google has identified several willing witnesses for both itself and DDC that are located in
`
`California. Doc. 94, Mot. Transfer, 9–10. First, Google points to nine relevant employees that
`
`developed the cardboard viewers or worked on the WWGC Program. Id. at 9. Google also
`
`highlights the potential DODOcase VR employees—Buckley, Dalton, and Daly—should they be
`
`willing witnesses for DDC. Id. at 9–10. As discussed above, Buckley lives in Idaho, and Dalton
`
`and Daly live in Northern District of California. See Doc. 94-1, Exs. 6, 8, 10, App. at 49, 67, 75.
`
`In response, DDC argues that Google has simply “hand-picked several employees with
`
`ties to California to create the illusion of inconvenience.” Doc. 95, Resp., 7. In particular, DDC
`
`points to Google’s omission of Damien Henry from the list of potential witnesses. Id. at 15. Henry
`
`lives in France and, according to DDC, played a role in developing the Google viewers. See id.
`
`DDC also notes that it is located in Austin, Texas and again references the various employees
`
`-12-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 012
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 13 of 22 PageID 4140
`
`from former defendants Emerge, Structural Graphics, and Landsberg that are purportedly located
`
`in this district. Id. at 15–16.
`
`The Court finds that this factor favors Google. The Northern District of California is a
`
`more convenient forum for the non-party DODOcase employees than the Northern District of
`
`Texas, as Daly and Dalton live there, and Buckley is closer by plane.5 Google’s party
`
`witnesses—nine employees—are also located almost exclusively in California, with several
`
`directly mentioned in DDC’s complaint. See Doc. 123, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 32–34 (discussing Alex
`
`Kauffmann, Andrew Nartker, and Clay Bavor). And even if Henry is a relevant witness—a
`
`notion Google contests—the burden of international travel from France to California or Texas is
`
`comparable. Doc. 95, Resp., 15; see also In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2009) (noting that travel for European witnesses to California versus Texas was comparable and
`
`collecting similar cases).
`
` While the Court acknowledges that DDC is located in Austin, Texas, DDC itself only
`
`acquired the Asserted Patents for purposes of litigation and is unlikely to have many substantive
`
`witnesses. See Doc. 94, Mot. Transfer, 12. Moreover, the employees of the former defendants
`
`DDC has identified are unlikely to be willing witnesses and, in any event, are speculative as to
`
`both their location and relevance. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor favors transfer.
`
`iv.
`
`Practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive
`
`The Court finds that the fourth private-interest factor is neutral. “This factor
`
`encompasses concerns rationally based on judicial economy.” Seagen Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Co.,
`
`546 F. Supp. 3d 515, 532 (E.D. Tex. 2021). The Court “may properly consider any judicial
`
`5 Idaho is an hour closer by plane to the Northern District of California than the Northern District
`of Texas. Doc. 98-1, Exs. 1–2, App. at 4–9.
`
`-13-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 013
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 14 of 22 PageID 4141
`
`economy benefits which would have been apparent at the time the suit was filed” but should not
`
`consider benefits arising after the filing of the suit. In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App’x 973, 976 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2013) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960)). Google emphasizes a prior
`
`litigation that took place in the Northern District of California involving some of the Asserted
`
`Patents. Specifically, DODOcase VR filed suit against MerchSource in the Northern District of
`
`California, and DDC was later added as a plaintiff. See DODOcase VR, Inc. v. MerchSource, LLC,
`
`No. 3:17-CV-07088 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 13, 2017). The lawsuit involved the asserted ‘075 and
`
`‘184 patents, but the bulk of the litigation involved a temporary restraining order and preliminary
`
`injunction. See Doc. 94-1, Ex. 17, App. at 120–31. The court thus did not reach more
`
`substantive issues such as claim construction. See id. Nevertheless, the Northern District of
`
`California has some familiarity with these patents and the issues at hand.
`
`On the other hand, if the action stayed in this district, even if the claims against Google
`
`were severed,6 efficiencies are gained because of the overlap in claims against OPS and Google
`
`regarding the Google Cardboard V2 Viewer and Google’s induced infringement. See Doc. 123,
`
`Am. Compl., ¶ 20. The claims involve the same Asserted Patents and similar issues.
`
`On balance, therefore, the Court finds that the Northern District of California’s
`
`familiarity with the Asserted Patents roughly matches any efficiencies gained by keeping the
`
`claims against both parties in the Northern District of Texas.
`
`2.
`
`The Public-Interest Factors Are Neutral
`
`Turning to the public-interest factors, the first factor—court congestion—weighs against
`
`transfer, while the second factor—localized interests—favors transfer. The third and fourth
`
`6 Any judicial efficiency concerns arising from the severance itself—as opposed to the
`transfer—are considered in the severance analysis. See infra Section B.
`
`-14-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 014
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 15 of 22 PageID 4142
`
`factors, which consider the courts’ familiarity with governing law and avoidance of conflict of law
`
`issues, are neutral. Accordingly, the Court finds that, as a whole, the public-interest factors are
`
`neutral.
`
`i.
`
`Administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion
`
`The Court finds that the first public-interest factor weighs against transfer. “This factor
`
`takes into consideration the speed with which a case may be resolved in the plaintiff’s chosen
`
`venue and in the proposed transferee venue.” BNSF Ry. Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (citing In re
`
`Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d at 1347). Nevertheless, “this factor alone should not outweigh other
`
`factors,” as it is the “most speculative.” Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. Medallion Foods, Inc., 867 F.
`
`Supp. 2d 859, 871 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (citing In re Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1347).
`
`DDC states this factor weighs against transfer because in the twelve-month period ending
`
`on June 30, 2022, the Northern District of California had 9,837 case filings and 12,453 cases
`
`pending with a time from filing to trial of 34.7 months. Doc. 95, Resp., 18; Doc. 95-1, Ex. 20,
`
`App. at 140. DDC also notes in the same twelve-month period, the Northern District of Texas
`
`had 7,386 case filings and 6,836 cases pending with a time from filing to trial of 25.1 months.
`
`Doc. 95, Resp., 18; Doc. 95-1, Ex. 20, App. at 139. Google argues this factor is neutral because
`
`patent cases in both forums have an equal rate of disposition over the past ten years. Doc. 94,
`
`Mot. Transfer, 17. The Court finds that the twelve-month period is a better indicator of court
`
`congestion and therefore concludes that this factor weighs against transfer.
`
`ii.
`
`Local interest in having localized interests decided at home
`
`The Court finds that the second public-interest factor favors transfer. This factor focuses
`
`on deciding localized interests at home and “most notably regards not merely the parties’
`
`significant connections to each forum writ large, but rather the significant connections between a
`
`-15-
`
`Google Ex. 1012, p. 015
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-01263-B Document 139 Filed 03/14/23 Page 16 of 22 PageID 4143
`
`particular venue and the events that gave rise to a suit.” Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 434
`
`(quoting In re Apple, 979 F.3d at 1345). “Important considerations include the location of the
`
`injury, witnesses, and the plaintiff’s residence.” Id.
`
`The Northern District of California’s interests in deciding this case are clear, as the suit
`
`largely arises out of events in Northern California. Specifically, the Google Cardboard viewers,
`
`along with the WWGC Program, were designed and operated in the Northern District of
`
`California. See In re Apple, 979 F.3d at 1345 (finding significant the location where the “accused
`
`products were designed, developed, and tested”). And the alleged injury primarily arose in
`
`Northern California with DODOcase VR as the operating company and patent holder. That
`
`DDC now resides in Austin, Texas and retains the patents solely for purposes of litigation is
`
`therefore less compelling.
`
`The Northern District of Texas has a limited interest. While some of the infringing
`
`activity by the former defendants may have taken place in this district, those defendants have
`
`been dismissed. Thus, as to the case against Google, the connection to this district only exists
`
`indirectly through the alleged infringing acts of now-dismissed third parties. Additionally, as
`
`previously discussed, DDC’s evidence regarding the actual presence of the former defendants and
`
`their witnesses here is somewhat speculative. Similarly, even if DDC has “taken affirmative steps
`
`to acquire and sell products covered by the Asserted Patents in Texas and this Judicial District,”
`
`Doc. 95, Resp., 19, the sale of products alone is not enough to negate transfer. See In re TOA
`
`Techs., Inc., 543 F. App’x 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that the “sale of a product in the
`
`plaintiff’s preferred forum” did “not negate the significant interest in trying this case in a venue in
`
`which the accused product

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket