throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 30
`Date: November 8, 2021
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`TARGET CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PROXICOM WIRELESS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`
`Before BRIAN J. McNAMARA, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, and
`SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`
`
`
`
`Google Exhibit 1021
`Google v. SecCommTech
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`A. Background
`
`Target Corporation (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for inter partes
`review of claims 9, 22, 28, 35, 38–41, and 51 (“the challenged claims”) of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,090,359 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’359 patent”). Paper 2
`(“Pet.”), 1. Proxicom Wireless, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
`Response. Paper 9. On November 10, 2020, we instituted an inter partes
`review of the challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.
`Paper 10 (“Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”), 30.
`
`Subsequent to institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner
`Response (Paper 18, “PO Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply to the Patent
`Owner Response (Paper 21, “Pet. Reply”), and Patent Owner filed a
`Sur-reply to Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 22, “PO Sur-reply”). An oral hearing
`was held on August 19, 2021. A transcript of the hearing has been entered
`into the record. Paper 28 (“Tr.”).
`
`In our Scheduling Order, we notified the parties that “any arguments
`for patentability not raised in the [Patent Owner] response may be deemed
`waived.” See Paper 11, 10; see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 66 (Nov. 2019) (“The patent owner
`response . . . should identify all the involved claims that are believed to be
`patentable and state the basis for that belief.”).1
`
`For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Petitioner has proven by
`a preponderance of the evidence that claims 9, 22, 28, 35, 38–41, and 51 of
`the ’359 patent are unpatentable.
`
`
`1 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated.
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`B. Real Parties in Interest
`
`Petitioner identifies itself as the sole real party in interest. Pet. 5.
`
`Patent Owner identifies itself as the sole real party in interest.
`Paper 4, 2.
`
`C. Related Matters
`
`The parties indicate that the ’359 patent is the subject of the following
`district court proceedings:
`Proxicom Wireless, LLC v. Target Corporation, No. 6:19-cv-
`1886 (M.D. Fla. filed Oct. 2, 2019)2 and
`Proxicom Wireless, LLC v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-00064
`(M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 12, 2018).
`Pet. 6; Paper 4, 2. The parties further note that the ’359 patent is the subject
`of a petition for inter partes review filed by Petitioner and challenging
`different claims in IPR2020-00931 (“the ’931 IPR”). Pet. 6; Paper 4, 2.
`
`D. The Challenged Patent
`
`The ’359 patent disclosure “is generally concerned with facilitating
`the exchange of information and transactions between two entities associated
`with two wireless devices when the devices are in close proximity to each
`other utilizing both a short range and a long range wireless capability.”
`Ex. 1001, 2:53–57. The devices use a short range communication protocol,
`such as Bluetooth, only to detect the presence of other devices and use a
`long range communication protocol, such as Wi-Max, to communicate with
`
`
`2 Stayed on June 17, 2020 pending resolution of ten petitions for inter partes
`review filed by Petitioner. See Paper 6.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`a central server and to perform the actual substantive communications with
`other devices. Id. at 6:33–46. Each device transmits identifier information
`via short range communication as a proximity detection process. Id.
`at 6:49–53. This use of peer-to-peer short range communication beneficially
`allows proximity between devices to be determined without the need of a
`global positioning system (GPS), which may not always be present or
`available for use. Id. at 3:55–62. Use of a central server to mediate
`communications between the devices beneficially provides security to the
`transaction, allows for anonymity between the parties, and implements
`policy enforcement. Id. at 4:12–60.
`
`In one application, only a user’s device is capable of long range
`communication and the second device is only capable of broadcasting its
`identifier information. Ex. 1001, 7:20–29. This application is illustrated in
`Figure 2, which is reproduced below:
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`Figure 2 shows a block diagram of fixed broadcast device 204 and mobile
`device 202. Id. at 5:6–7. The user’s mobile device detects the broadcast
`device and transmits the broadcast device’s identifier information, along
`with a request for information regarding the broadcast device, to central
`server 100. Id. at 14:48–60. The server determines what information
`regarding the broadcast device is available and transmits a description of the
`information to the user’s device. Id. at 14:61–63. The user then has the
`option to download the information. Id. at 14:63–15:3. The server may also
`coordinate the several steps of an electronic commerce transaction between
`the user’s device and the broadcast device. Id. at 17:36–18:64.
`
`E. The Challenged Claims
`
`Petitioner challenges claims 9, 22, 28, 35, 38–41, and 51 of the
`’359 patent. Pet. 1, 10. All of these claims are dependent claims, with each
`of claims 9, 28, 35, 38–41, and 51 depending directly from independent
`claim 1 and claim 22 depending directly from independent claim 14.
`Claims 1 and 9 are reproduced below:
`1.
`A method for a central server to exchange information
`between one or more wireless devices comprising the steps of:
`
`the central server receiving second device identifier
`information from a first wireless device, the second device
`identifier information having been collected by the first wireless
`device from a second device and wherein said second device
`provides the second device identifier information to the first
`wireless device using short range communication without the
`use of wires from the second device to the first wireless device;
`
`said central server using the second device identifier
`information to determine one or more of an identity or related
`information concerning an entity or object located in proximity
`to the second device; and
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`
`subsequent to the step of the central server receiving the
`
`second device identifier information from the first wireless
`device, the central server taking further action to deliver
`information or a service to the first wireless device based at
`least in part upon (a) the second device identifier and (b) at least
`one of the following:
`
`(i) feedback ratings relevant to an entity associated with
`either the first wireless device or the second device identifier
`information;
`
`(ii) information representing a reward for an entity
`associated with the first device’s participation in a loyalty
`program; or
`
`(iii) a current step in a multiple step process for an
`ongoing electronic commerce transaction.
`9.
`The method of claim 1 wherein the steps performed by
`the central server further comprise:
`
`facilitating a purchase of the goods or services from a
`merchant account associated with the second wireless device
`and a customer account associated with the first wireless
`device;
`
`providing confirmation to each account; and/or
`
`receiving customer confirmation of receipt of a good or
`service via the first wireless device, thereby completing a
`transaction.3
`Ex. 1001, 23:35–63, 24:47–56.
`
`F. Instituted Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`The Petition relies on the following prior art references:
`Name
`Reference
`Perttila
`US 2004/0243519 A1, published Dec. 2, 2004
`Swartz
`US 6,837,436 B2, issued Jan. 4, 2005
`
`Exhibit
`1006
`1007
`
`
`3 We note that claim 9 has been modified by a Certificate of Correction.
`Ex. 1001, 32.
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`We instituted trial based on all asserted claims and grounds of
`
`unpatentability as follows:
`Claims Challenged
`35 U.S.C. §
`9, 22, 51
`102(b)4
`9, 22, 51
`103(a)
`9, 22, 28, 35, 38–41
`103(a)
`
`Perttila
`Perttila
`Perttila, Swartz
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Pet. 10. Petitioner submits a declaration of Mr. David Hilliard Williams
`(Ex. 1003, “Williams Declaration”) in support of its contentions. Patent
`Owner submits a declaration of Michael Foley, Ph.D. (Ex. 2010, “Foley
`Declaration”) in support of its contentions.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Principles of Law
`
`To prevail in its challenge to Patent Owner’s claims, Petitioner must
`demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims challenged
`in the Petition are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.1(d) (2019). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner.
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378
`(Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`“Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 a claim is anticipated ‘if each and every
`limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art
`reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed.
`
`
`4 The application resulting in the ’359 patent was filed prior to the date when
`the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125
`Stat. 284 (2011), took effect. Thus, we refer to the pre-AIA version of
`sections 102 and 103.
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d
`1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “Anticipation requires the presence in a single
`prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the
`claim.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542,
`1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
`
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject
`matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time of the invention to a
`person having ordinary skill in the art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
`U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis
`of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of
`the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the
`prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) when in evidence, any
`objective evidence of nonobviousness.5 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
`U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the
`time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in
`Electrical Engineering, or a related field, and approximately 3-5 years of
`professional experience in the field of wireless communications.” Pet. 14.
`Petitioner acknowledges that “graduate education could substitute for
`
`
`5 The parties have not directed us to any such objective evidence.
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`professional experience” and “significant experience in the field could
`substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–38).
`
`Patent Owner concedes that the level of skill as defined by Petitioner
`“is generally sufficient for the Board to evaluate the Petition Grounds.” PO
`Resp. 15–16. However, Patent Owner also notes that “Petitioner’s proposed
`level of skill in the art does not include any reference to electronic
`commerce” and contends that “a POSITA should also have 1-2 years of
`experience designing or implementing systems for electronic commerce
`including the use of wireless communications.”6 Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 2010
`¶¶ 6–9, 22–24).
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the
`references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355
`(Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In
`re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The level of ordinary skill
`proposed by Petitioner appears to be consistent with that of the references,
`and we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for purposes of
`this Decision. We note that we would reach the same conclusions herein
`using Patent Owner’s alternate definition.
`
`C. Claim Construction
`
`In an inter partes review, claims are construed using the same claim
`construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil
`action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claims in
`accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as
`
`
`6 We note that Patent Owner does not assert that this additional proposed
`requirement has any bearing on any disputed issue in this case.
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history
`pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Thus, we apply the claim
`construction standard as set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
`
`Claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary
`meaning as would be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art in the
`context of the specification, the prosecution history, other claims, and even
`extrinsic evidence including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
`learned treatises, although extrinsic evidence is less significant than the
`intrinsic record. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17. Usually, the specification is
`dispositive, and it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.
`Id. at 1315.
`
`Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only
`to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v.
`Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
`(citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed.
`Cir. 1999)).
`
`Petitioner contends that it “interprets the claim terms according to
`their plain and ordinary meaning consistent with the specification.” Pet. 15.
`Petitioner asserts that the challenged claims use “terms of degree (e.g., ‘short
`range’ communication/link, ‘wide area’ link/network/technology, ‘local
`[area/wireless] link’),” but does not explain how this assertion affects claim
`construction. Id. (alteration in original). Petitioner acknowledges that “[a]
`district court in another proceeding has construed terms of this patent,” but
`argues that those “constructions do not impact the outcome of this IPR as the
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`prior art . . . meets the limitations under these constructions.” Id. at 15
`(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1021).
`
`Patent Owner argues that we should interpret two claim terms: “an
`entity or object located in proximity to the second device” and “wireless
`device.” PO Resp. 18–26. We address each of these terms below.
`
`1. “an entity or object located in proximity to the second device”
`Patent Owner argues that “an entity or object located in proximity to
`
`the second device,” as used in independent claims 1 and 14, should be
`construed “to require that the claimed ‘entity or object’ must have a physical
`presence.” PO Resp. 18. According to Patent Owner, “the reference to the
`object being ‘located in proximity to the second device’ makes clear that the
`claimed ‘object’ of that phrase must be physically present.” Id. at 19. Patent
`Owner argues similarly that “located in proximity to the second device” also
`applies to the recited “entity,” thus requiring “that the ‘entity’ referred to in
`this claim element must be physically present.” Id. at 19–20. Patent Owner
`argues that “proximity” is used in accordance with its ordinary and
`customary meaning and refers to physical placement. Id. at 21–24.
`
`Petitioner argues that we need not construe “entity or object” to
`require a physical presence as proposed by Patent Owner because “a device
`can be ‘in proximity’ to intangible objects.” Pet. Reply 2. Petitioner argues
`that Patent Owner’s citations to the ’359 patent’s use of “proximity” are not
`relevant to how the term is used in the claims. Id. at 3–4 (citing PO
`Resp. 21–23). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s declarant did not base
`his interpretation of “proximity” on how the term is used in the specification
`of the ’359 patent. Id. at 4–5.
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`Patent Owner replies that “object” must be construed to have a
`
`physical presence because “the claimed ‘object’ is limited by the
`requirement that it be ‘located in proximity to the second device.’” PO Sur-
`reply 1; see also id. at 2–4 (presenting similar arguments). Patent Owner
`contends that Petitioner’s assertions regarding Patent Owner’s declarant take
`the testimony out of context. Id. at 5–9. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he
`crucial question about ‘an entity or object located in proximity to the second
`device’ is whether the claimed ‘entity or object’ can be ‘located in proximity
`to the second device’ if the ‘entity or object’ is not physically present.” Id.
`at 5.
`Notwithstanding the arguments in its briefing, Petitioner’s counsel
`
`acknowledged during the hearing that the claims require the entity or object
`to have a physical presence. See, e.g., Tr. 8:17–19 (“[T]here’s no debate . . .
`that physical presence is connoted by the word ‘proximity’ and by
`‘located.’”). There is, accordingly, no controversy regarding whether “an
`entity or object located in proximity to the second device” requires the entity
`or object to have a physical presence. Moreover, as explained below our
`decision does not depend on an express construction of this term. We
`conclude, therefore, that there is no need for us to construe this term.
`
`2. “wireless device”
`Patent Owner argues that, as recited in the challenged claims,
`
`“wireless device” “refer[s] to wireless communication capabilities, not that a
`wireless device would be precluded from having any external wires
`whatsoever.” PO Resp. 25–26. However, Patent Owner concedes that
`construction of “wireless device” is “not necessary to resolve the dispute
`here.” Id. at 25.
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`Petitioner argues that “‘wireless device’ should be construed to
`
`require a device without external wires,” noting that the claims of the
`’359 patent recite a “wireless device” rather than a “wireless communication
`device.” Pet. Reply 5–6. However, Petitioner also concedes that “no
`construction of this term is necessary.” Id. at 5.
`
`No construction of this term is necessary. The parties both agree that
`no construction is needed, and as explained below our decision does not
`depend on a construction of this term.
`
`D. Overview of the Asserted Prior Art
`
`1. Perttila
`Perttila discloses “a system, apparatus, and method for sending
`
`service data in response to electronic communications between a user
`communications device and a merchant-media arrangement.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 8.
`Figure 1a shows such a system and is reproduced below:
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`Figure 1a shows coupon-retrieval system 20 for the communication of an
`electronic coupon to user 28 via link 42 established with source server 24 by
`mobile communications device 28a. Id. ¶¶ 19, 36. When the user’s mobile
`device is within proximity of merchant-media arrangement 36, which may
`be a poster or the like, the arrangement transmits to the mobile device a
`merchant ID code and, optionally, link information for connecting to the
`server. Id. ¶ 37. This transmission may be via radio frequency identification
`(RFID) or Bluetooth. Id. The mobile device establishes a communication
`link with the server through a mobile network or the Internet and transmits a
`merchant-information-request signal to the server. Id. ¶ 38. The server first
`extracts the mobile device ID and the merchant ID code from the request.
`Id. The server then generates an electronic coupon based on the merchant
`ID code and provides the user with an option to download the coupon. Id.
`¶¶ 28, 37–39.
`
`2. Swartz
`Swartz discloses a marketing and shopping system. Ex. 1007,
`
`1:20–25. Figure 1 shows the system and is reproduced below:
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`
`
`Figure 1 shows a block diagram of a preferred embodiment of the system,
`which includes portable terminals 12A–12F and central host 14. Id.
`at 3:62–63, 4:58–5:23, 9:8–11. In use, customers identify themselves to the
`system, such as by inserting a loyalty card into a card reader. Id.
`at 18:29–33. The system then assigns a portable terminal to the user. Id.
`at 18:58–62. Alternatively, customers can use their own portable terminals.
`Id. at 19:48–49. The customer then proceeds through the store and uses the
`portable terminal to record items the customer wishes to purchase. Id.
`at 20:18–19. This can be done by, for example, using the portable terminal
`to scan a bar code on each item. Id. at 20:19–27. After the customer has
`selected all of the items to be purchased, the customer returns the portable
`terminal to the dispenser unit, and information collected with the portable
`terminal regarding the purchased items is processed by a central processing
`unit. Id. at 22:1–8. The customer then pays for the selected products, with
`the system accounting for any discounts or coupons to be applied. Id.
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`at 23:8–11, 23:37–45. By allowing the customers, rather than store
`employees, to scan and bag their selected items as they shop, the store saves
`money and the customer saves time. Id. at 22:48–60.
`
`E. Asserted Anticipation by or Obviousness in View of Perttila
`
`Petitioner argues that claims 9, 22, and 51 would have been
`unpatentable as being anticipated by or obvious in view of Perttila.
`Pet. 18–45. In support of its showing, Petitioner relies upon the Williams
`Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the Petition, Patent
`Owner Response, Petitioner Reply, Patent Owner Sur-reply, and evidence of
`record and determine that, for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has
`shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 9, 22, and 51 would
`have been unpatentable in view of Perttila.
`
`Claims 9 and 51 depend directly from independent claim 1, and
`claim 22 depends directly from independent claim 14. Ex. 1001, 24:47–56,
`26:38–47, 28:63–65. Although Petitioner does not challenge the
`independent claims, the recitations of the independent claims are
`incorporated into the challenged claims, all of which are dependent claims.
`Thus, the Petition addresses the recitations of the independent claims.
`Pet. 25–34, 38–43. Accordingly, we analyze these claims, as well as the
`challenged claims, below.
`
`1. Independent Claim 1
`Claim 1 recites a method for a central server to exchange information
`
`between one or more wireless devices and includes steps performed by a
`central server, a first wireless device, and a second device. Ex. 1001,
`23:35–63. Of particular relevance, claim 1 recites “said central server using
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`the second device identifier information to determine one or more of an
`identity or related information concerning an entity or object located in
`proximity to the second device.” Id. at 23:46–49. Petitioner maps Perttila’s
`electronic coupon to the recited identity or related information and “the
`content promoted by [Perttila’s] billboard” to the recited entity or object and
`argues that the “‘remote source server’ generates ‘an electronic coupon’ ‘in
`the form of an electronic data set corresponding to the merchant-media’s ID
`code,’ [an] ‘electronic coupon that corresponds to the content promoted by
`the billboard.’” Pet. 30; see also id. at 30–32 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 15, 27–29,
`37, 39).
`
`Patent Owner makes several arguments regarding this recitation.
`First, Patent Owner interprets the Petition to map Perttila’s billboard to the
`recited second device and argues that Perttila does not disclose using its
`merchant-media arrangement’s ID code “to determine information about ‘an
`entity or object located in proximity to’ [the] billboard.” PO Resp. 36; see
`also id. at 41 (“Petitioner has identified the merchant media
`arrangement/billboard itself as the ‘second device’ of the challenged
`claims.”). Rather, Patent Owner argues, Perttila’s electronic coupon is
`associated with the billboard itself. Id. at 42 (“The Perttila server merely
`uses the merchant media ID to determine the billboard to which the ID
`relates . . . . [T]he Perttila server simply provides the coupon that it has been
`told to provide based on the merchant media ID.”). “Perttila does not teach
`that the entity or object being promoted by the billboard of the ‘merchant-
`media arrangement’ is located in proximity to the disclosed ‘merchant-media
`arrangement’ . . . .” Id. at 40.
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`Petitioner replies that Perttila’s electronic coupon is related
`
`information concerning an object in proximity to the “short-range
`communicator” (that is, the RFID tag or Bluetooth link). Pet. Reply 7.
`Petitioner argues that such objects include the billboard and content
`promoted by the billboard. Id.; see also id. at 12 (“Because the billboard
`(and thus the content it is promoting) is, in fact, in proximity to (‘co-located’
`with) the merchant-media arrangement’s tag/beacon, . . . the billboard and
`separately its promotional content each meet the requirement of the claimed
`object.” (citing Pet. 30–32; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83, 117–118)).
`
`Patent Owner replies that Petitioner’s mapping of the short-range
`transmitter to the recited second device is inconsistent with Petitioner’s
`mapping of Perttila’s merchant ID code to the recited second device
`identifier information because the merchant ID code identifies the billboard
`(or its content), but does not identify the RFID tag or Bluetooth link. PO
`Sur-reply 16–18. Patent Owner argues that mapping the content promoted
`by Perttila’s billboard to the recited object does not satisfy the claim
`requirements because this mapping “results in reading the claim language to
`mean ‘[second device] in proximity to the second device.’” Id. at 18–22
`(alteration in original).
`
`As we noted in the Institution Decision, Perttila’s merchant-media
`arrangement includes RFID tag 38 (or, alternatively, a Bluetooth link). See
`Inst. Dec. 19. Petitioner maps the short-range transmitter to the recited
`second device (see Pet. 28; Inst. Dec. 19) and maps the electronic coupon to
`the recited identity or related information (see Pet. 30; Inst. Dec. 19).
`Petitioner maps the billboard and, separately, its contents to the recited entity
`or object, which is in proximity to the short-range transmitter. See Pet. 30;
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`Pet. Reply 7–8; Inst. Dec. 19. Perttila’s server uses the merchant ID code to
`generate an “electronic coupon that corresponds to the content promoted by
`the billboard.” E.g., Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 27, 33. Thus, Perttila supports Petitioner’s
`contentions.
`
`Patent Owner equates “merchant-media arrangement” as a billboard;
`that is, a single entity. In the Institution Decision, we noted that the
`merchant-media arrangement includes a billboard and the RFID tag or
`Bluetooth link is “co-located” at the merchant-media arrangement. Inst.
`Dec. 19–20. Petitioner maps the “short-range communicator,” which it
`defines as the RFID tag or Bluetooth link, to the recited second device. Pet.
`Reply 7; see also Pet. 30–31. Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner’s
`assertion that the Petition maps the merchant media arrangement, as a
`singular entity, to both the recited second device and the recited entity or
`object.
`
`We further disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that the electronic
`coupon does not correspond to the content promoted by the billboard. See
`PO Resp. 40–41. Perttila discloses that the “downloadable electronic
`coupon . . . corresponds to the content promoted by the billboard.” Ex. 1006
`¶ 27 (emphasis added). Perttila’s remote server uses the merchant-media ID
`code “to associate the promotional information with an e-coupon to be
`provided to the user visiting this billboard location.” Id. ¶ 28.
`
`In its Reply, Petitioner further maps the “store in which the merchant-
`media arrangement is located” and “product offerings in the store” to the
`recited entity or object. Pet. Reply 7–8 (citations omitted). We disagree
`with these mappings. As noted above, Perttila’s e-coupon corresponds to the
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`content of the billboard. Petitioner has cited no disclosure that Perttila’s
`e-coupon corresponds to the store or an item in the store.
`
`Regarding Petitioner’s “store in which the merchant-media
`arrangement is located” mapping, Petitioner does not explain adequately
`how Perttila’s e-coupon, which Petitioner maps to the recited identity or
`related information, concerns the store itself. Rather, Petitioner relies only
`on products offered for sale within the store. See Pet. Reply 13;
`Tr. 22:25–23:24.
`
`Regarding Petitioner’s “product offerings in the store” mapping, at
`best, Petitioner appears to present an inherency argument that if the billboard
`is placed in a store, the advertised products must be in the store. See Pet.
`Reply 13 (“Perttila expressly discloses the merchant-media arrangement
`may be placed ‘at the store itself’ such that the location where product
`offerings corresponding to the e-coupons are redeemed is the ‘same
`location’ as that where the e-coupons are provided.” (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 28,
`39; Pet. 22, 30–32; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 87, 117–118)). However, while it may be
`likely that the advertised products are in the store, this is not necessarily the
`case. For example, the products may be out of stock, in which case
`Petitioner acknowledges that the claim language is not satisfied. Tr. 24:7–12
`(“[T]he limitations are met when the e-coupon is distributed for a product,
`and that product is in the store with the merchant media arrangement. If
`there are times, for example, when the store is sold out of that particular
`product, that wouldn’t be met during those times.”). Petitioner’s assertions
`regarding the recited entity or object corresponding to product offerings
`within the store are based on speculation, which is insufficient to satisfy the
`requirements for an inherency argument. In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743,
`
`20
`
`

`

`IPR2020-00932
`Patent 8,090,359 B2
`
`745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Inherency, however, may not be established by
`probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result
`from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” (citations omitted)).
`
`Additionally, Patent Owner argues that Perttila’s server does not make
`a determination that any object is in proximity to the second wireless device.
`PO Resp. 38–39; see also PO Sur-reply 12–13.
`
`Petitioner argues that claim 1 does not require the central server to
`make a determination that an object is in proximity to the second device.
`Pet. Reply 8–9.
`
`Claim 1 requires the central server to make a single determination—
`the “identity or related information concerning an entity or object located in
`proximity to the second device”—but does not require the server to also
`determine that the object (or entity) is in proximity to the second device.
`Moreover, Patent Owner’s arguments are inconsistent with the ’359 patent,
`which indicates that the first device is positioned in proximity to an object
`about which information is delivered rather than the server making a
`determination that an object is in proximity to the second device. See, e.g.,
`Ex. 1001, 8:43–52 (discussing the first device being “tied to a location or
`product”). Even if we were to interpret the claims as containing such a
`requirement, as noted above Pert

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket