`_______________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________________
`
`TELEBRANDS CORP.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`TINNUS ENTERPRISES, LLC,
`Patent Owner
`_______________________
`
`Case PGR2016-00030
`U.S. Patent 9,242,749
`_______________________
`
`DECLARATION OF BARRY M. KUDROWITZ
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`1 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`1.
`
`I, Barry M. Kudrowitz, have been retained as an expert in this
`
`proceeding by counsel for Patent Owner Tinnus Enterprises, LLC and ZURU Ltd.
`
`(collectively “Patent Owner” or “Tinnus”).
`
`2.
`
`I have been asked to provide this declaration in rebuttal of arguments
`
`made by Petitioner Telebrands Corp. in its Petition for Post-Grant Review Pursuant
`
`to 35 U.S.C. §§ 312-328 and C.F.R. §42.200 et seq., (Paper 1, “Pet.”). I have been
`
`asked to offer my opinion regarding the validity of certain claims of United States
`
`Patent No. 9,242,749 (the “’749 patent”), entitled “System and Method for Filling
`
`Containers with Fluids.”
`
`3.
`
`In connection with preparing this declaration, I have reviewed the
`
`materials listed in Exhibit A, attached hereto.
`
`QUALIFICATIONS
`
`4.
`
`I have a Ph.D. of Mechanical Engineering from the Massachusetts
`
`Institute of Technology (MIT). Prior to that I received a Masters of Mechanical
`
`Engineering from MIT and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from
`
`the University of Central Florida, graduating Summa Cum Laude. My Masters
`
`Thesis, entitled An Exploration of Concepts for Projectile Toys, was specifically
`
`on the process of designing conceptual foam and water projectile toys. I worked
`
`closely with Hasbro Inc. for two years developing new technologies for Nerf brand
`
`and Super Soaker brand products. I am listed as an inventor on US Patent Number
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`2 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`7,673,625 Toy Projectile Launching Device as a result of this work with Hasbro.
`
`This technology was implemented in the Nerf Atom Blaster toy, which was on the
`
`market in 2006. I am also a listed inventor on an unrelated patent application for
`
`an Endoscopic Biopsy Needle Design. I have developed a course called Toy
`
`Product Design, which I have taught for twelve years at both the Massachusetts
`
`Institute of Technology and the University of Minnesota. In this class, I teach a
`
`toy design process to students in engineering, design and business disciplines. I
`
`regularly speak nationally and internationally about creative product design and
`
`designing for play. I am currently an Assistant Professor and the Director of
`
`Product Design at the University of Minnesota in the College of Design. A copy
`
`of my curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit B.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`5.
`
`I have been informed that a validity analysis of patent claims must be
`
`undertaken from the perspective of what would have been known or understood by
`
`someone of ordinary skill in the art at the time the application for the patent-in-suit
`
`was filed.
`
`6.
`
`I have also been informed that factors that may be considered in
`
`determining level of ordinary skill in the art include the education level of the
`
`inventor, the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`3 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the
`
`technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field.
`
`7.
`
`Petitioner has suggested that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`(“POSA”) would have been “a person having a general knowledge about and
`
`experience with expandable containers, including without limitation balloons, and
`
`at least an associate’s degree in a technical science or engineering.” (Pet., Paper 1,
`
`at 12; Ex. 1027 at ¶¶ 13-14.) I disagree with Petitioner’s assessment of a person
`
`having ordinary skill in this field of art because the minimum level of skill is too
`
`low, and it sets forth no maximum level of skill.
`
`8.
`
`The ’749 patent describes several possible fields of application
`
`including toy and medical applications. It is my opinion that in each of these fields
`
`a POSA would have some experience designing mechanical devices rather than
`
`merely “general knowledge about and experience with expandable containers.”
`
`Under Petitioner’s proposed definition, anyone who has interacted with a balloon
`
`would have a “general knowledge about and experience with expandable
`
`containers.” Thus any layman (children included) would be considered a POSA,
`
`given this component of Petitioner’s definition.
`
`9.
`
`I have taught interdisciplinary university classes, specifically in toy
`
`product design, for 12 years. The students in this course are typically
`
`upperclassmen representing dozens of different 4-year bachelor degree programs.
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`4 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`Developing an invention of this nature would not come easily to the students who
`
`are not in the mechanical engineering degree program. Students in other science
`
`and engineering disciplines outside of mechanical engineering such as electrical
`
`engineering or chemistry typically have difficulty understanding and designing
`
`mechanical product concepts. This invention involves an understanding of fluids,
`
`forces, and mechanical design. A POSA with regards to this invention would
`
`require a 4-year Bachelor’s Degree or equivalent industrial experience in
`
`mechanical engineering, physics, or a similar engineering discipline.
`
`10. While I have heard of designers of medical device technology being
`
`inspired by design elements from past experience with toys, I have never heard of a
`
`toy designer without medical device design experience, in either academia or
`
`elsewhere, using medical technology design elements to develop toys.
`
`11. Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill is unreasonable for the additional
`
`reason that it does not limit the level to that of ordinary skill. Petitioner’s proposed
`
`level of ordinary skill would include individuals with Ph.Ds in the sciences,
`
`geniuses, and Nobel laureates. These individuals would not have ordinary skill but,
`
`rather, extraordinary skill in the art, thus Petitioner’s definition requires limitation.
`
`It should be understood that the level of skill I define in the preceding paragraphs,
`
`and apply throughout this declaration, falls within the broad definition provided by
`
`Petitioner.
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`5 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`A. Obviousness
`
`12.
`
`I have been informed by counsel that a patent claim is invalid for
`
`obviousness only if each and every element of the claimed invention is found in a
`
`combination of prior art references and the differences between the claimed
`
`invention and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
`
`been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
`
`13.
`
`I have been informed by counsel that a combination of prior art
`
`references may be obvious if, in the combination, the prior art references merely
`
`perform their established functions. However, I have also been informed by
`
`counsel that if a combination of prior art references would result in a prior art
`
`device being unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, there is no motivation to
`
`combine the references. I have also been informed that if prior art teaches away
`
`from a combination, then such teaching away shows that the combination is
`
`nonobvious.
`
`B.
`
`Inherency in an Obviousness Analysis
`
`14.
`
`I have been informed by counsel that, to rely on inherency to establish
`
`the existence of a claim limitation in the prior art in an obviousness analysis, the
`
`limitation must necessarily be present or the natural result of the combination of
`
`elements explicitly disclosed by the prior art. I have also been informed that the
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`6 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`mere possibility that the limitation could be met by the proposed combination of
`
`teachings in the prior art is insufficient to establish a limitation via inherency.
`
`C.
`
`Indefiniteness and Enablement
`
`15.
`
`I am informed that a patent may be found invalid for indefiniteness
`
`only if its claims, read in light of the rest of the specification of the patent, and the
`
`prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
`
`about the scope of the invention.
`
`16.
`
`I am also informed that a patent meets the enablement requirement
`
`when one skilled in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the
`
`claimed invention without undue experimentation.
`
`D.
`
`Prior Art
`
`17.
`
`I am informed that “prior art” refers to information that was known
`
`before the effective filing date of the patent application and that therefore can
`
`establish that the claimed inventions were obvious. Prior art information
`
`encompasses any printed publication in this or a foreign country as well as any
`
`public use or sale in the U.S. of the claimed subject matter. I am also informed
`
`that a patent application may, in certain circumstances claim priority to an earlier
`
`filed provisional or non-provisional application and have as its effective filing date
`
`the filing date of the earlier filed application. Accordingly, it is my understanding
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`7 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`that any reference that is not dated before the effective filing date of the patent
`
`cannot be prior art to the patent for purposes of invalidating the patent.
`
`18.
`
`It is my understanding that the effective filing date of the ’749 Patent
`
`is February 7, 2014.
`
`19.
`
`I am informed that if Petitioner did not rely on any prior art or issue
`
`other than that which was considered by the USPTO examiner, Petitioner has the
`
`added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government
`
`agency presumed to have properly done its job. In the present case, I understand
`
`that each prior art reference serving as a basis for trial institution except the Air
`
`Force 4 Inflator reference was previously considered by the examiner. (Ex. 1001,
`
`p. 2.)
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`A.
`
`“Common Face”
`
`Claim Term
`common face
`
`Petitioner Construction
`“a planar portion of an object
`bounded by an edge or other
`geometric transition”
`
`
`
`Patent Owner Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`without any planar limitation, but
`if the Board believes a
`construction is necessary, it
`should be “a shared outer surface
`of the housing”
`
`20. A POSA would have readily discerned the meaning of “common
`
`face,” and the language of the claim itself most accurately conveys the meaning the
`
`term would have had to such a person. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, “a
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`8 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`shared outer surface of the housing,” correctly captures the meaning “common
`
`face” would have had to a POSA. The scope, though broad, is not unlimited,
`
`however. “Common face” conveys the idea that the holes extend through a shared
`
`outer surface of the housing and that the hollow tubes extend from the housing in
`
`the same general direction. If the Board deems a construction of this term to be
`
`necessary, Patent Owner’s proposed construction accurately reflects the plain and
`
`ordinary meaning of the term as it would have been understood by a POSA. Patent
`
`Owner’s proposed construction is also consistent with the specification, which
`
`expressly discloses non-planar (conical, etc.) embodiments of a common face of
`
`the housing. (Ex. 1001 at 6:17-22.)
`
`21. There are several problems with Petitioner’s proposed construction.
`
`First, a POSA would not have understood “common face” to require that it be
`
`planar or that it be bounded by an edge or other geometric transition. Petitioner’s
`
`construction is overly geometrical/mathematical, in the context of the ’749 Patent.
`
`In everyday usage, “face” is often used to mean something other than a planar
`
`surface bounded by an edge or other geometric transition. For example, a mountain
`
`is often referred to as having a “face” (e.g., the North Face of Mt. Everest).
`
`Second, Petitioner’s construction is inconsistent with the specification and
`
`represents an attempt to read into claim 1 a specific embodiment shown in FIGS. 1
`
`and 2 that happens to have a planar common face. As discussed above, the
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`9 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`specification discloses other embodiments in which the housing has a non-planar
`
`(conical, etc.) common face.
`
`22.
`
`I also disagree with Petitioner’s interpretation of the prosecution
`
`history of the ’066 Patent relative to the Boise reference. The holes in Boise do not
`
`lie in the horizontal plane that Telebrands indicates in its annotated drawing (Pet.
`
`at 18). Rather, the holes actually lie in a vertical plane, as shown in the following
`
`annotated reproduction of Boise, FIG. 5 (the holes at the ends of the tubes on the
`
`opposite sides of the cylindrical housing lie in a similar vertical plane):
`
`In that vertical plane, there is not a plurality of holes extending through a common
`
`face of the cylindrical housing at a second end of the housing. Therefore, Patent
`
`Owner’s proposed construction of “common face” is, in my opinion, consistent
`
`
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`10 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`with the Examiner’s comments in connection with the Examiner’s amendment that
`
`distinguished Boise. (See Ex. 1019 at 111-12.)
`
`B.
`
`“Second End”
`
`Claim Term
`second end
`
`Petitioner Construction
`none
`
`
`
`Patent Owner Construction
`“an outer surface of the housing
`distinct from the first end”
`
`23. Claim 1 recites, “a housing comprising an opening at a first end and a
`
`plurality of holes extending through a common face of the housing at a second
`
`end.” Thus, claim 1 recites a “first end” that has “an opening” and a separate
`
`“second end”—a portion of the housing that includes the recited “common face”
`
`(shared outer surface of the housing) and the “holes” that extend through it. The
`
`specification consistently identifies the “second end” as being an outer surface of
`
`the housing that is distinct from the “first end” (the end having an opening for
`
`connection with a hose or other filling apparatus). (See Ex. 1001 at 2:5-15, 31-35,
`
`39-41; Id. at 4:28-31, FIGS. 1-2.)
`
`24.
`
`In the context of the ’749 Patent’s claims and specification, a POSA
`
`would have understood “second end” in accordance with Patent Owner’s proposed
`
`construction: “an outer surface of the housing distinct from the first end.”
`
`C.
`
`“Elastic Fastener”
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`11 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`Claim Term
`elastic fastener
`
`
`
`Petitioner Construction
`its ordinary and customary
`meaning, i.e., an elastic
`element for attaching
`things together
`
`Patent Owner Construction
`“an elastic element for attaching
`things together”
`
`25.
`
`It is my opinion that a POSA would have readily understood the
`
`meaning of “elastic fastener,” and Patent Owner’s proposed construction captures
`
`that meaning. Patent Owner’s proposed construction is also consistent with how
`
`the term “elastic fastener” is used in the specification: “. . . each elastic fastener
`
`clamping each container to a corresponding hollow tube.” (Ex. 1001, Abstract.) I
`
`understand that Petitioner has proposed a similar construction.
`
`D.
`
`“At Least Partially Filling”
`
`Claim Term
`at least
`partially filling
`
`Petitioner Construction
`none
`
`
`
`Patent Owner Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning, but
`if the Board decides that a
`construction is necessary, it
`should be “adding an amount of
`fluid”
`
`26.
`
`It is my opinion that a POSA would have readily understood “at least
`
`partially filling” a container to mean “adding at least some fluid” to the container,
`
`and that meaning is reflected in Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Patent
`
`Owner’s proposed construction is also consistent with passages in the specification
`
`discussing containers that, though they contain an amount of fluid, are not
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`12 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`necessarily filled to their maximum capacity (i.e., they are not “full”). (See Ex.
`
`1001 at 3:39-42, 3:63-65, 4:21-22, and 4:52-57.)
`
`E.
`
`“Sufficiently Limited”
`
`Claim Term
`sufficiently
`limited
`
`Petitioner Construction
`none
`
`
`
`Patent Owner Construction
`“the restriction of the elastic
`fastener is such that the container
`detaches upon at least partially
`filling, shaking, or both”
`
`27.
`
`It is my opinion that a POSA would have interpreted “sufficiently
`
`limited” as reflected in Patent Owner’s proposed construction because of the
`
`express claim language that immediately follows it: “to permit its respective
`
`container to detach from its respective tube upon one or more of (1) at least
`
`partially filling the container with a fluid and (2) shaking the housing.” In my
`
`opinion, that meaning would have been clear to a POSA. Patent Owner’s
`
`construction is also consistent with the specification’s discussion of different ways
`
`in which the containers detach, depending on the particular embodiment. (See Ex.
`
`1001 at 3:50-65.)
`
`28.
`
`In the limitation “the restriction of each elastic fastener being
`
`sufficiently limited to permit its respective container to detach from its respective
`
`tube upon one or more of (1) at least partially filling the container with fluid and
`
`(2) shaking the housing,” the word “upon” is important because it would have
`
`indicated to a POSA that detachment occurs in response to and at the instant that
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`13 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`one or both of the recited conditions are satisfied. Therefore, in my opinion, a
`
`restriction of the elastic fastener that requires something in addition to partially
`
`filling and/or shaking would not fall within the scope of claim 1 because
`
`detachment would, in that case, not occur “upon” partially filling and/or shaking,
`
`as the claim requires.
`
`F.
`
`All Other Claim Terms
`
`29.
`
`It is my opinion that all other terms in claim 1 of the ’749 Patent
`
`should be given their respective plain and ordinary meanings as they would have
`
`been understood by a POSA.
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim 1 Is Not Indefinite (Ground 1)
`
`
`
`
`1.
`
`“Sufficiently Limited”
`
`30.
`
`I understand Petitioner argues that the following language in claim 1
`
`(the “Sufficiently Limited Limitation”) is indefinite: “each elastic fastener
`
`configured to restrict detachment of its respective container from its respective
`
`tube . . ., the restriction of each elastic fastener being sufficiently limited to permit
`
`its respective container to detach from its respective tube upon one or more of (1)
`
`at least partially filling the container with a fluid and (2) shaking the housing.”
`
`(Pet. at 23.) I disagree. In my opinion, the above limitation is sufficiently bounded
`
`to inform a POSA about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`14 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`31. First, regarding “at least partially filling,” that phrase is sufficiently
`
`bounded. A POSA—a layperson, even—would readily have understood that “at
`
`least partially filling” means adding at least some fluid to the container up to and
`
`including its maximum capacity. In the case of an expandable container like a
`
`balloon, that maximum capacity is the point just prior to the container bursting.
`
`That meaning is captured in Patent Owner’s proposed construction, “adding an
`
`amount of fluid.”
`
`32. The recited conditions for detachment are also sufficiently bounded to
`
`inform a POSA which apparatuses would infringe and which would not. Below, I
`
`consider some specific scenarios.
`
`33. First, if a container detaches from its tube upon being at least partially
`
`filled, the limitation is met. As I mentioned above, the word “upon” is important,
`
`in this context, because it conveys that detachment occurs in response to and at the
`
`instant the condition is met.
`
`34. Second, if a container detaches from its tube in response to the
`
`housing being shaken (i.e., an acceleration is applied to the housing), regardless of
`
`whether the container has had any fluid added to it or not, the limitation is met.
`
`35. Third, if a container detaches from its tube in response to the housing
`
`being shaken while it is in a condition of being at least partially filled (refer to
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`15 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s construction of “at least partially filling” above), the limitation is
`
`met.
`
`36. On the other hand, the limitation would not be met where a container
`
`detaches from its tube without being at least partially filled and without the
`
`housing being shaken. In other words, if neither the “at least partially filling”
`
`condition nor the “shaking the housing” condition is met, yet the container
`
`detaches anyway, there would be no infringement. In this situation, the
`
`“restriction” provided by the elastic fasteners is less than the lower bound for
`
`infringement.
`
`37. The limitation also would not be met where the container does not
`
`detach from its tube despite being filled with fluid up to and including its
`
`maximum capacity (a point just prior to bursting, for an expandable container) and
`
`the maximally filled container still does not detach in response to the housing
`
`being shaken. In such a scenario, the container may cling to its tube in spite of the
`
`shaking, or one of the components (for example the container, the fastener, or the
`
`tube) may be destroyed, thereby preventing the container from detaching from its
`
`tube. Under this scenario, the “restriction” provided by the elastic fasteners is
`
`greater than the upper bound for infringement.
`
`38. For at least the above reasons, it is my opinion that the Sufficiently
`
`Limited Limitation does not render claim 1 indefinite.
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`16 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`2.
`
`“Shaking”
`
`39.
`
`I understand that Petitioner also argues that the recited “shaking”
`
`renders claim 1 indefinite. (Pet. at 24-28.) “Shaking” has a clear meaning
`
`(“applying an acceleration”) that would have been well understood by a POSA.
`
`This term is also discussed in the specification, and Patent Owner’s proposed
`
`construction is consistent with how the term is used there. (See Ex. 1001 at 3:50-
`
`53.)
`
`40. Petitioner’s arguments appear to boil down to the idea that, since the
`
`claim does not specify the exact measure of acceleration (sometimes called g-
`
`force) to be applied, Petitioner cannot tell whether or not a hypothetical elastic
`
`fastener is strong enough. In my opinion, the question is really whether the
`
`containers can be detached by shaking, consistent with the other recited limitations.
`
`Elastic fasteners configured to hold their containers onto their tubes in spite of
`
`extreme shaking would not meet the limitation. Elastic fasteners that break as a
`
`result of extreme shaking would not meet the limitation. An apparatus employing
`
`containers or tubes that break due to extreme shaking also would not meet the
`
`limitation.
`
`41.
`
`It is my opinion that the recited “shaking” does not render claim 1
`
`indefinite.
`
`B. Claim 1 Is Not Obvious Over the Cited Prior Art (Grounds 2-6)
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`17 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1.
`
`Cooper in View of Saggio and Lee or Donaldson (Grounds 2 and
`3)
`
`42.
`
`It is my opinion that neither proposed combination (Cooper in view of
`
`Saggio and Lee nor Cooper in view of Saggio and Donaldson) renders claim 1
`
`obvious because neither combination teaches or suggests all of the limitations
`
`recited in claim 1.
`
`43. The proposed combinations do not meet the following limitation
`
`recited in claim 1 (the “Sufficiently Limited Limitation”): “the restriction of each
`
`elastic fastener being sufficiently limited to permit its respective container to
`
`detach from its respective tube upon one or more of (1) at least partially filling the
`
`container with a fluid and (2) shaking the housing.”
`
`44.
`
`I disagree with Petitioner that Saggio’s internal membrane 18 is
`
`equivalent to Lee’s rubber band or Donaldson’s O-ring because Saggio’s internal
`
`membrane 18 is not an “elastic fastener.” It does not “attach things together.”
`
`Saggio also does not disclose that the containers detach upon being at least
`
`partially filled (in response to and at the instant that condition is met) and does not
`
`disclose detachment of the balloons by shaking Saggio’s filling apparatus (the
`
`alleged “housing”).
`
`45. Lee does not teach detachment of the containers upon at least partially
`
`filling or shaking. Instead, Lee teaches that an additional force different from
`
`“shaking the housing” is applied via mechanical actuation. Specifically, Lee
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`18 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`teaches that an outer guide pipe 4 is used to push an air-filled balloon and rubber
`
`band off of inner guide pipe 3, detaching and sealing the balloon. (Ex. 1010 at ¶
`
`[0033].) I disagree with Petitioner that the application of this mechanically
`
`actuated force is equivalent to the recited “shaking” because claim 1 requires that
`
`the housing be shaken. The force applied via outer guide pipe 4 acts on the balloon
`
`and rubber band, not the housing (the structure to which the balloon and rubber
`
`band are attached). Therefore, the force applied in Lee and the recited “shaking”
`
`are not equivalent.
`
`46. Donaldson teaches that an air-filled balloon is forced off of its tube
`
`through mechanical actuation (the movement of two housing portions relative to
`
`one another). (Ex. 1011 at 4:53-5:6.) Donaldson does not teach or suggest
`
`detachment upon at least partial filling, nor does it teach or suggest detachment
`
`upon the housing being shaken. In fact, shaking would be unlikely to succeed with
`
`an air-filled balloon due to the low mass of the fluid.
`
`47.
`
`I have been informed by counsel that, to rely on inherency to establish
`
`the existence of a claim limitation in the prior art in an obviousness analysis, the
`
`limitation must necessarily be present or the natural result of the combination of
`
`elements explicitly disclosed by the prior art. I have also been informed that the
`
`mere possibility that the limitation could be met by the proposed combination of
`
`teachings in the prior art is insufficient to establish a limitation via inherency.
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`19 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`48. Based on my understanding of the standard for establishing the
`
`presence of a limitation via inherency, Petitioner’s arguments regarding Lee and
`
`Donaldson relative to the Sufficiently Limited Limitation fail to meet that standard.
`
`49. Combining the teachings in Cooper, Saggio, and Lee would not
`
`naturally result in the Sufficiently Limited Limitation being met. Lee discloses a
`
`rubber band that is intended to be difficult to dislodge without the deliberate
`
`application of a force to push the balloon and rubber band free of inner guide pipe
`
`3: “A rubber band 2 having a high elastic force is provided in the pipe for fixing a
`
`balloon thereto.” (Ex. 1010 at ¶ [0031] (emphasis added).) Since Lee is directed to
`
`an endoscopic surgical apparatus, there are potentially grave consequences if the
`
`rubber band securing the balloon to inner guide pipe 3 is inadvertently detached.
`
`Accordingly, the rubber band is specifically disclosed as having a “high elastic
`
`force” that can only be detached by mechanical actuation of a pushing mechanism.
`
`For Lee’s rubber band to meet the Sufficiently Limited Limitation, it would have
`
`to be specifically engineered to supply the correct amount of restriction—at least
`
`within an acceptable range, as discussed above. Such engineering would not
`
`naturally result from combining the teachings in Cooper, Saggio, and Lee.
`
`50. Similarly, combining the teachings in Cooper, Saggio, and Donaldson
`
`would not naturally result in the Sufficiently Limited Limitation being met. Like
`
`Lee’s rubber band, Donaldson’s O-ring would have to be specifically engineered to
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`20 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`supply the correct amount of restriction—at least within an acceptable range—to
`
`meet the Sufficiently Limited Limitation. Such engineering would not naturally
`
`result from the proposed combination.
`
`51.
`
`In my opinion, a POSA would not have been motivated to combine
`
`the teachings in Cooper, Saggio, and Lee or Donaldson. Cooper teaches a lawn
`
`sprinkler whose purpose is to spray water over an area of ground. There is no
`
`disclosure in Cooper regarding containers. Combining Saggio’s balloons with
`
`Cooper’s sprinkler would involve both covering Cooper’s tubes with balloons and
`
`inverting Cooper’s sprinkler. Those modifications would render Cooper’s sprinkler
`
`unsatisfactory for its intended purpose; therefore, there would have been no
`
`motivation for a POSA to make the proposed combination.
`
`52. Even if a POSA had somehow been motivated to combine Cooper and
`
`Saggio, such a person would not have been motivated to add a rubber band (Lee)
`
`or O-ring (Donaldson) to the combination. Saggio teaches a purportedly self-
`
`sealing balloon. A POSA in possession of such self-sealing balloons would not
`
`have been motivated to add an external elastic fastener because it would be
`
`redundant (unnecessary) and would actually increase the parts count and possibly
`
`require additional labor and/or manufacturing processes to install the elastics.
`
`53.
`
`In my opinion, based on my experience with toy design and the toy
`
`industry, it is also unlikely that a POSA seeking to solve a problem concerning
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`21 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`how to attach water balloons to a filling apparatus would have looked to a
`
`reference from the field of medicine like Lee.
`
`2.
`
`Saggio (Ground 4)
`
`54.
`
`It is my opinion that Saggio does not render claim 1 obvious because
`
`Saggio does not teach or suggest all of the limitations recited in claim 1. In the
`
`analysis that follows, I will refer to the following reproduction of Saggio’s FIGS. 2
`
`and 7:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`55.
`
`I understand that Petitioner argues that inner membrane 18 in Saggio’s
`
`purportedly self-sealing balloon meets the recited “elastic fasteners.” (Pet. at 53,
`
`58-60.) I disagree that inner membrane 18 is an “elastic fastener.”
`
`56. Saggio discloses a self-sealing balloon 10 that, based on Saggio’s
`
`prosecution history, I understand is not enabled. That purportedly self-sealing
`
`balloon includes an inner membrane 18. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of
`
`
`
`Tinnus Exhibit 2010
`Telebrands v. Tinnus
`PGR2016-00030
`22 of 67
`
`
`
`
`
`“elastic fastener” is “an elastic element for attaching things together.” I understand
`
`that the Board applied a similar construction in the PGR of related U.S. Patent No.
`
`9,051,066 (PGR2015-00018). The inner membrane 18 in Saggio does not “attach[]
`
`things together.” Instead, according to Saggio’s description, a distal portion of it
`
`referred to as “closure member 24” presses against the inside of the wall 12 of
`
`balloon 10 to seal the balloon after it has been filled with water. (Ex. 1009 at ¶
`
`[0019].) Saggio thus teaches that the inner membrane 18, under certain conditions,
`
`presses against the wall 12 of balloon 10, but there is no teaching or suggestion in
`
`Saggio that inner membrane 18 “attach[es] things together,” as required by claim
`
`1.
`
`57.
`
`I also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that the inner membrane 18
`
`in Saggio acts as an “elastic fastener” because it allegedly exerts a clamping force
`
`to help hold the neck of a balloon 10 onto the tip 37 of its lateral conduit 36 while
`
`the balloon is being filled. (Pet. at 58-60.) Referring once again to FIGS. 2 and 7
`
`from Saggio above, if one imagines the neck of balloon 10 being stretched over a
`
`tip 37 of a lateral conduit 36, the tip 37 would then be inside the neck of the
`
`balloon and occupy that space. That means the portion of inner membrane 18
`
`within the neck of the balloon 10 would be pressed flush against the inside wall of
`
`the neck of the balloon by the tip 37, preventing wa