`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`Paper 31
`Entered: September 3, 2019
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`SUPERCELL OY,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`GREE, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before MICHAEL W. KIM, LYNNE H. BROWNE, and
`CARL M. DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`GREE, Inc. (“GREE”) is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 9,662,580 B2
`(“the ’580 patent”). Supercell Oy (“Supercell”) filed a petition for post-
`grant review of claims 1–10 of the ’580 patent. Paper 1 (“Pet.”). We
`instituted post-grant review of all the claims as challenged in the petition.
`Paper 7 (“Inst. Dec.”). GREE filed a response. Paper 9 (“PO Resp.”).
`Supercell replied. Paper 17 (“Pet. Reply”). And GREE had the last word in
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`a sur-reply. Paper 19 (“PO Sur-Reply”). In addition, GREE moved to
`exclude certain of Supercell’s evidence, namely, Exhibits 1010–1012. Paper
`21 (“PO Mot. Exclude”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. An oral hearing was
`conducted on June 20, 2019. Paper 30 (“Tr.”). After considering the
`parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we determine that Supercell has
`proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–10 of the ’580
`patent are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). We also deny GREE’s motion
`to exclude as moot.
`
`I. BACKGROUND
`
`A. The ’580 Patent
`The ’580 patent, titled “Video Game in Which Groups of Players Earn
`Reward Boxes,” issued May 30, 2017, and claims priority to a foreign
`application filed August 21, 2013.1 Ex. 1001, cover [30]. The ’580 patent
`begins by describing a conventional “social game” in which players operate
`player characters and attack one or more enemy characters. Id. at 1:9–27.
`Notably, in these conventional games, each player is “a member of a specific
`group.” Id. at 1:27–28. If a player within the group defeats the enemy
`characters, “various rewards such as points or items . . . can be given to each
`individual player or the group to which these players belong.” Id. at 1:28–
`31. According to the ’580 patent, however, the rewards available in these
`
`
`1 Because Supercell’s petition was filed within nine months of the
`’580 patent’s issue date and the earliest possible priority date for the ’580
`patent is after March 16, 2013 (the effective date for the first inventor to file
`provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act), the ’580 patent is
`eligible for post-grant review. See 35 U.S.C. § 321. GREE does not contest
`that the ’580 patent qualifies for post-grant review.
`
`2
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`conventional social games “are fixed to some extent.” Id. at 1:35–37. These
`fixed rewards, the ’580 patent reports, “cause a reduction in the player’s
`motivation to participate in the game or continue the game,” such as “in
`come-from-behind victory in relation to the other players.” Id. at 1:38–44.
`To address this problem, the ’580 patent provides a method and
`system of “improving unexpectedness, dramatic impact, and taste when
`medals, game items, or the like as a reward are provided to a player.” Id. at
`1:45–53 (emphasis added). As described, this purported improvement is
`achieved by an “information storage unit” that stores information relating to
`“a reward providing condition, rewards, and [a] reward box” and a control
`unit that accesses the stored information and “allocates at least one reward”
`to a “reward box.” Id. at 1:62–66 (emphasis added). As part of allocating
`the reward, the reward box is “displayed on the terminal device . . . to let the
`player know that the reward can be acquired by defeating [an] enemy
`character.” Id. at 7:21–26, Fig. 5. The control unit then “determines
`whether the reward providing condition is met based on match-up situations
`or match-up results between the players and first game characters [i.e.,
`enemy game characters] in the game.” Id. at 1:65–2:2 (emphasis added); see
`also id. at Fig. 3. If the condition is met, then the allocated reward is
`provided to the player. Id. at 2:2–5.
`GREE’s expert illustrates Figure 3 of the ’580 patent, reproduced
`below, to illustrate the operation of the game. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 63–64.
`
`3
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`
`
`As explained by GREE’s expert in annotated Figure 3 above, the
`reward is “displayed” in allocating step S3 “before match . . . begins,” and
`then reward is “provided to player” in determining steps S6–S9 as a result of
`the player “meeting reward providing condition.” Id.
`
`B. The Challenged Claims
`Of the challenged claims, five are independent—claims 1 and 7–10.
`Claim 1 is directed to a “control method,” claim 7 is directed to a “non-
`transitory computer-readable recording medium recording process,” claims 8
`
`4
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`and 10 are directed to a “control apparatus,” and claim 9 is directed to a
`“game system.” Common across these claims are the following steps for
`execution by a computer:
`“storing” game information that defines “a plurality of
`groups to which . . . players belong,” “rewards,” “a reward
`providing condition,” and a “reward box
`. . . associated
`exclusively with a respective one of said groups,”
`“allocating” a reward into a reward box,
`“determining” if a reward providing condition is met
`based on match-ups between players and game characters,
`“displaying” the reward in the reward box, and
`“providing” the reward from the reward box to a player
`who meets the reward providing condition.
`
`See Ex. 1001, claims 1, 7, 8, 9, 10.
`
`Supercell asserts that claim 1 is “representative” of the independent
`claims. Pet. 19. Although GREE disputes that assertion (PO Resp. 13–14),
`it nonetheless limits its arguments to claim 1 without arguing the other
`independent claims separately (id. at 18–61).2 Given the significant overlap
`in the steps recited by the independent claims, we agree with Petitioner that
`claim 1 is representative. Claim 1 recites:
`1. A control method for a computer network, comprising:
`storing, by a memory for storing information related to a
`game in which a plurality of players can participate, information
`defining a plurality of groups to which said players belong, a
`reward providing condition, rewards, and reward box
`information for a plurality of reward boxes each associated
`exclusively with a respective one of said groups, as part of the
`information related to the game; and
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2 GREE does argue the dependent claims separately. See Pet. 50–53; PO
`Resp. 22–23, 61–65.
`
`5
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`
`
`
`by an arithmetic processor, performing computation on the
`game, and
`displaying images of the game on terminal devices
`operated by the players[,]
`allocating at least one reward out of the rewards to at least
`one of the reward boxes,
`determining whether the reward providing condition is
`met based on match-up situations or match-up results between
`the players and first game characters in the game, and
`displaying, on the terminal devices, a screen for providing
`the reward allocated to at least part of one of the reward boxes
`to at least one player in the group associated with the one of the
`reward boxes based on the determination results.
`
`Ex. 1001, 11:12–35 (emphases added).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`C. The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`In its petition, Supercell asserts that claims 1–10 of the ’580 patent are
`unpatentable, first, as being directed to non-statutory subject matter under 35
`U.S.C. § 101 (Pet. 26–53), and, second, as being indefinite under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112(b) (id. at 54–58).
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`Neither Supercell nor GREE proposes a construction for any
`particular claim term. See Pet. 17–26; PO Resp. 13–14, 20–23, 31–35. With
`one exception, we confirm that no express constructions are necessary. The
`exception relates to the terms “allocating” and “allocates” recited throughout
`the claims. The ’580 patent does not ascribe any special meaning to those
`terms. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:65–66, 3:10–11, 8:30–53, 11:25–26. As such,
`we construe the terms “allocating” and “allocates” in accordance with their
`
`6
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`plain and ordinary meaning3—“to place,” “to apportion for a specific
`purpose or to particular persons or things : distribute,” “to set apart or
`earmark : designate.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 30 (10th
`ed. 2000) (Ex. 3001).
`During the hearing, however, GREE argued for a narrower
`construction of “allocating rewards” in the context of claim 1. See Tr.
`92:15–25. Pointing to the specification of the ’580 patent (Ex. 1001, 8:41–
`53), GREE proposed that “allocating rewards” includes consideration of
`“multiple factors,” such as “the game elapsed time, number of enemy
`characters, state [of] the player, progress of the game, kind of treasure box,
`items possessed by the player, and the kind of predetermined event.” Id.
`But those factors are recited in dependent claim 3 of the ’580 patent. Ex.
`1001, 11:48–55. In that regard, GREE conceded during the hearing that it is
`“not asking for the limitations to be read into [claim 1].” Tr. 93:6–17. Thus,
`to the extent GREE maintains a narrower construction of the term
`“allocating rewards,” we reject it, first, as improperly reading limitations
`from the specification into the claim, and, second, as contrary to the doctrine
`of claim differentiation.
`Moreover, GREE’s argument for a narrower construction is distinctly
`at odds with the understanding of its own expert that “allocating” means not
`only placing the reward in, or designating the reward to, a rewards box but
`also “displaying” the reward to inform players of the reward before the
`
`
`3 We apply the “broadest reasonable construction” standard per 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b) (2017), which was in effect at the time of filing the instant
`petition. A recent amendment to that rule does not apply here. See 83 Fed.
`Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), effective
`November 13, 2018).
`
`7
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`match begins. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 63–64. We agree with that understanding of
`GREE’s expert, as it is consistent with the ’580 patent specification, which
`explains that, as part of allocating the reward, the reward box is “displayed
`on the terminal device . . . to let the player know that the reward can be
`acquired by defeating [an] enemy character.” Id. at 7:21–26, Fig. 5. As
`such, in addition to construing the term “allocating” in accordance with its
`plain and ordinary meaning as “placing” or “designating,” as reflected by the
`above dictionary definition, we construe it as also encompassing
`“displaying” the reward.4
`
`B. Supercell’s Challenge Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
`Supercell asserts that claims 1–10 do not recite patent eligible subject
`matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Pet. 26–53. GREE disagrees. PO Resp. 13–
`65. The United States Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101
`to exclude from patenting “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomenon, and
`abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014)
`(“Alice”) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
`U.S. 66, 77–78 (2012) (“Mayo”)). Here, we are concerned with the judicial
`exception of abstract ideas. In evaluating whether the challenged claims are
`
`
`4 To avoid any confusion, we note that the “displaying” step at the end of
`claim 1 is not part of the allocating step. Rather, the final “displaying” step
`speaks to “a screen” for “providing” the “allocated” reward to the player at
`the end of the match. Ex. 1001, 11:31–35. It is not the “introduction
`screen” that “let[s] the player know” of the reward before the match begins,
`but rather it is a “providing screen” for rewarding the player with the
`allocated reward after the match ends. Compare id. at 7:21–26, Fig. 5, with
`id. at 9:28–35, Fig. 8.
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`“directed to” a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we are guided by the
`framework set out by the Supreme Court in Alice and Mayo. Alice, 573 U.S.
`at 217–227 (citing and quoting Mayo throughout).5
`In accordance with the Alice/Mayo framework, we determine first
`whether the claim is directed to an abstract idea.6 Id. If so, we then consider
`whether “additional features” beyond the abstract idea itself transform the
`claim into a “practical application” of the idea.7 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–78,
`84–85 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)); see also
`Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (evaluating whether computer implementation of a
`mathematical formula is “the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any
`‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed
`to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself’”) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77);
`Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“It is now commonplace that
`an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
`structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). As a final
`safeguard, we analyze whether the additional features, either individually or
`
`
`5 We are also guided by Office’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
`Eligibility Guidance (“Office Guidance”), which frames the Alice/Mayo test
`in terms of a three-part inquiry. 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 53–56 (Jan. 7, 2019)
`(outlining “Step2A,” which includes “Prong One” and “Prong Two,”
`followed by “Step 2B”).
`6 This step of the Alice/Mayo inquiry is recounted in the Office Guidance as
`“Revised Step 2A . . . Prong One: Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a
`Judicial Exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
`7 This step of the Alice/Mayo framework is recounted in the Office Guidance
`as “Revised Step 2A . . . Prong Two: If the Claim Recites a Judicial
`Exception, Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception is Integrated Into a
`Practical Application.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
`
`9
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`in combination, amount to an “inventive concept,” in other words,
`something “significantly more” than “well-understood, routine, conventional
`activities previously known to the industry.”8 Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–222,
`225 (internal quotations, brackets, and citations omitted).
`
`1. Whether the Claims Recite an Abstract Idea
`Supercell asserts that the claims of the ’580 patent are directed to the
`abstract idea of a “method of organizing human activity,” which it
`characterizes as “the idea of providing a reward to a video game player from
`a player group reward box if a reward condition is met.” Pet. 26, 42,
`respectively. In conforming to the “groupings” of abstract ideas provided in
`the Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52), which issued after the filing of
`the petition here, Supercell further argues that the claims “broadly recite[]
`rules governing a game (i.e., allocating rewards to a reward box,
`determining [if] a condition is satisfied, [and then] providing the allocated
`reward to the player).” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added); see also id. at 5
`(further contending that the claims “are directed to providing a simple ‘game
`mechanic’ . . . which is nothing more than a way of managing a video
`game.”). As such, Supercell surmises that such rules for playing a game fall
`squarely within the excepted group of abstract ideas that the U.S. Court of
`Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held to be methods of organizing human
`activity. Id. at 5; see also Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.13.
`
`
`8 This aspect of the Alice/Mayo framework is recounted in the Office
`Guidance as “Step 2B: If the Claim is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
`Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.” 84 Fed. Reg.
`at 56.
`
`10
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`
`In support, Supercell compares the claims of the ’508 patent to claims
`held to be abstract in In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016),9 and In re
`Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Pet. Reply
`4–5. In each case, the Federal Circuit explained that the claims recite a
`patent-ineligible abstract idea because they are directed to nothing more than
`“a set of rules for a game,” Smith, 815 F.3d at 819, or “rules for playing a
`dice game,” Guldenaar, 911 F.3d at 1160–61. The Guldenaar court further
`observed that rules for a game are a “method of organizing human activity,”
`which is a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Id. at 1160. Supercell takes a
`similar position here. Pet. 26–27; Pet. Reply 5.
`In response, GREE argues that Supercell’s articulation of the abstract
`idea “indicate[s] a fundamental misunderstanding of what is claimed and
`how the claimed subject matter improves the computational flexibility of
`multiplayer online battle games.” PO Sur-Reply 3. In particular, GREE
`contends that Supercell “improperly oversimplifies the challenged claims by
`cherry-picking elements” to summarily conclude that the claims are directed
`to an abstract idea. Id. at 5. According to GREE, the claims do not recite
`simply rules for playing a game, but rather “recite a specific storage
`archetype with paired computer processing functionality that enables more
`flexible and nuanced reward-giving.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). GREE
`points to the claimed “storing,” “allocating,” and “determining” steps as
`capturing this increased flexibility. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 11:13–30.
`
`
`9 The Office Guidance cites In re Smith as an example of “[c]ertain methods
`of organizing human activity.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.13 (quoting In re
`Smith’s conclusion that “[a]pplicants’ claims, directed to rules for
`conducting a wagering game’ are abstract).”).
`
`11
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`
`We disagree that the above-recited limitations remove the challenged
`claims from the realm of an abstract idea. Instead, we determine that these
`limitations are typical of a rule for competitive gameplay—namely, if a
`player meets a certain condition of gameplay, then the player receives a pre-
`defined reward. More specifically, as claimed in the ’580 patent, a reward is
`allocated to a “box” so as to inform a group of players in advance of the
`reward to be received if they meet a condition of gameplay. Whichever
`player meets that condition is then presented with that reward. Virtually any
`game in which players compete against each other for a designated prize
`incorporates that “if-then” rule. The ’580 patent itself recognizes as much in
`the “Background” section—“there is known, for example, a system” in
`which “if the player defeats the enemy characters, various rewards such as
`points or items available in the game can be given to each individual player
`or the group to which these players belong.” Ex. 1001, 1:22–31.
`Furthermore, merely reciting the “if-then” rule of gameplay in terms
`of “allocating” a reward to a display box, “determining” whether a reward
`providing condition is met, and “providing” the displayed reward to the
`player meeting that condition, does not save the claims from being a rule for
`playing a game. That is because those claimed steps compare substantively
`to the steps of “placing at least one wager” and “paying a payout amount if
`the at least one wager occurs” found to be abstract “rules for playing a dice
`game” in Guldenaar, 911 F.3d at 1160–61, and the steps of “accepting at
`least one first wager” and “resolving any player versus dealer wagers” found
`to be an abstract “set of rules for a game” in Smith, 815 F.3d at 819.
`
`12
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`
`Moreover, in describing how the video game is played, the
`specification of the ’580 patent underscores the abstract nature of the idea
`embodied in the claims:
`[A]n image indicating what kind of event is taking place is
`displayed in a lower part of Fig. 4. For example, as shown in the
`lower part of Fig. 4, the player knows that a winner-take-all
`reward event is taking place, and that 300 medals are potentially
`acquired as the reward the winner can take . . .
`As the event introduction screen displayed on the terminal device
`2, for example, a string of characters such as “Winner-take-all
`chance against enemy character A” is displayed on the terminal
`device 2 . . . to let the player know that the reward can be
`acquired by defeating enemy character A. . . .
`As shown in Fig. 6, a group A to which at least one player
`character belongs, a treasure box A, and an enemy character A
`are associated with one another. . . . [W]hen a player (player
`character Ca) belonging to the group A defeats the enemy
`character A associated with the group A, the player can acquire
`a reward stored in the treasure box A.
`Ex. 1001, 7:8–49 (emphases added).
`Those descriptions support that the idea underlying the claims is
`nothing more than an “if-then” rule or instruction for playing the game,
`namely, if a player from a group of players defeats an enemy character, then
`that player receives a reward from a “box.” As described and claimed, the
`“box” is nothing more than a display “to let the player know” what the
`reward is before the game begins. Id. at 7:21–26. GREE’s expert admits as
`much. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 63–64 (explaining that “allocation of the rewards
`happens before the actual match starts . . . in which event S3 [in flowchart in
`Fig. 3 of the ’580 patent] displays the reward boxes on the ‘introduction
`screen,’ before the match [and game screen in Fig. 4] shows ‘an image
`indicating what kind of event is taking place’ and what the reward for the
`
`13
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`winner is (e.g., ‘300 medals’).”) (emphasis added). That the allocating step
`may include the selection and display of the reward does not, without more,
`take the claims outside the realm of the abstract idea of one of certain
`methods of organizing human activity (i.e. “allocating” a reward to a reward
`box, “determining” if a condition of game play is met, and then “providing”
`the allocated reward to the player). See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
`F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a process of “selecting an ad”
`and “facilitating display of the ad” on the Internet is a “combination of steps
`[that] recites an abstraction—an idea.”).
`GREE’s expert likewise acknowledges that the claims are directed
`simply to “the mechanics of the game.” See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 44–52. In
`explaining his use of that phrase, GREE’s expert testifies that the step of
`“allocating” a reward to a box is a game mechanic and that game mechanics
`include rules for playing a game—
`Q [by Supercell’s Counsel]: Mr. Crane, will you turn to
`paragraph 48 of your declaration, please. The first sentence there
`says, “The ’580 Patent explains that the arithmetic processing
`unit of the server allocates rewards to respective boxes . . . This
`mechanic is different from conventional social games . . . .”
`What are you referring to when you say “this mechanic”?
` [by GREE’s Expert]: I’m referring to the way in which the
`’580 Patent allocates rewards to what they call reward boxes.
`Q: And . . . you’ve used that term, in your declaration in various
`places, “game mechanic,” so is the allocation of rewards to a
`reward box a game mechanic?
`A: Game mechanic is a term of the art in the video games
`referring to the way in which the player interacts with a game.
`Q: Can anything else be a game mechanic? [Objection by
`GREE’s Counsel].
`
` A
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`
`A [by GREE’s Expert]: It’s actually pretty much all inclusive of
`how a game operates, how it operates, and accessed by a game
`player. It covers just about everything. . . .
`Q: Does it include the rules of the game?
`A: It does.
`
`Ex. 1009, 77:20–79:2 (emphasis added).
`That testimony, as well as the ’580 patent’s own description, support
`that the steps of simply displaying a reward for players to know what they
`will get if they win the match, and then giving the displayed reward to the
`player upon winning the match, are nothing more than basic rules or
`instructions for playing a game. See Smith, 815 F.3d at 818–819;
`Guldenaar, 911 F.3d at 1160–61; see also Planet Bingo LLC v. VKGS LLC,
`576 F. App’x 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The district court correctly
`concluded that managing the game of bingo consists solely of mental steps
`which can be carried out by a human using pen and paper.”) (quotation
`omitted). That being the case, we determine that the independent claims
`here recite the abstract idea of one of certain methods of organizing human
`activity (i.e., following the rules or instructions for playing a video game).10
`In reaching this determination, we have considered GREE’s
`arguments that Guldenaar and Smith are distinguishable, but remain
`persuaded Supercell is correct. See PO Sur-Reply 8. For instance, GREE
`attempts to distinguish Smith and Guldenaar by arguing that the claims in
`
`
`10 Our determination is consistent with the Office Guidance’s identification
`of “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
`people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
`instructions)” among the types of “certain methods of organizing human
`activity” that are abstract ideas. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.13 (citing Smith).
`
`15
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`those cases are drawn to “a wagering game—a fundamental economic
`practice.” PO Sur-Reply 8. But to the extent GREE relies on the claimed
`“wager” in Smith and Guldenaar as being monetary in nature, nothing
`precludes the claimed “reward” here from being monetary or otherwise.
`Moreover, similar to the “resolving the wagers” based on winning a hand of
`cards in Smith or the “paying a payout amount” based on winning a roll of
`dice in Guldenaar, the claimed “providing the reward” here depends on
`winning a match of game characters. They all recite rules for winning a
`game—if you meet this condition of gameplay, then you win this reward.
`As such, we are not persuaded that the claims found to be abstract in Smith
`and Guldenaar are meaningfully distinguishable from the claims here. Like
`the claims in those cases, the claims here recite an abstract idea because they
`amount to rules or instructions for playing a game—display a reward in a
`box for a group of players to see before the match begins, determine if any
`player meets a reward-providing condition (such as winning the match), and
`then give the reward to the player who wins the match.
`
`2. Whether the Claims Integrate the Abstract Idea Into a Practical
`Application
`Having determined that the claims recite an abstract idea, we now
`decide whether any “additional features” of the claims integrate the abstract
`idea into a “practical application.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–78, 84–85 (quoting
`Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)). Additional features may
`give rise to a practical application if they reflect a “specific improvement to
`the way computers operate” or otherwise apply the abstract idea in a
`meaningful way beyond invoking a computer “merely as a tool.” Enfish,
`LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`16
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`
`Here, GREE contends that additional features transforming the claims
`into a practical application include the “storing” and “processor” steps
`because they “establish[] reward distribution specific to individual players
`and battles.” PO Sur-Reply 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002, 71; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 45–49);
`see also PO Resp. 24–27. According to GREE, “[t]he ’580 patent improved
`the way that data objects associated with a multiplayer online battle game
`were stored in computer memory by providing flexibility regarding rewards
`that other multiplayer online battle games did not provide.” PO Resp. 24
`(citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 31, 45) (emphasis added). That increased flexibility in
`allocating rewards, GREE contends, is achieved “in part, by using a control
`method to perform computation on data structures stored in an information
`storage unit.” Id. at 25. In support of these assertions, GREE analogizes the
`’580 patent to the claims found not to be abstract in Core Wireless Licensing
`S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and Data Engine
`Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`We disagree that the storing and processing limitations represent a
`technological improvement in computer capability or a meaningful
`application of the abstract idea beyond generic computer hardware. See
`Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (“[I]neligible claims generally lack steps or limitations specific to [a]
`solution of a problem, or improvement in the functioning of technology.”);
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016) (“The patent in this case is not directed to the solution of a
`‘technological problem’ . . . nor is it directed to an improvement in computer
`or network functionality. Instead, it claims the general concept of out-of-
`region delivery of broadcast content through the use of conventional devices,
`
`17
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`without offering any technological means of effecting that concept.”). If
`anything, the Core Wireless and Data Engine cases relied on by GREE
`highlight the abstract nature of the claims of the ’580 patent.
`For instance, in Core Wireless, the claims recited an improved user
`interface for small-screen computing devices. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at
`1362. As held by the Federal Circuit, the claimed invention improved the
`“efficient functioning of a computer” by increasing the speed at which a user
`could navigate through images on a display screen by reciting specific
`implementation details of the GUI including specific graphical
`characteristics, a limited set of displayed data, and specific requirements for
`the state of the device applications. Id. at 1359. Likewise, in Data Engine,
`the Federal Circuit found the claims not abstract because they recited a
`specific, user interface solution to known problems with computerized
`spreadsheets, in particular, “a specific structure (i.e., notebook tabs) within a
`particular spreadsheet display that performs a specific function (i.e.,
`navigating within a three-dimensional spreadsheet).” Data Engine, 906 F.3d
`at 1010–11.
`In contrast, the claims here are not directed to specific implementation
`details of user interface technology despite their recitation of “displaying”
`steps. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363,
`1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that, rather than reciting “the ‘interactive
`interface’ is a specific application of the abstract idea, . . . the interactive
`interface limitation is a generic computer element.”); Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d
`at 1261 (holding that “graphical user interface [] used to display a menu of
`options to the user” was “conventional” and “used in conventional ways”).
`Nor are the claims directed to specific implementation details of any
`
`18
`
`
`
`PGR2018-00036
`Patent 9,662,580 B2
`
`computer functionality. Although the ’580 patent purports to improve the
`“unexpectedness, dramatic impact, and taste” of the game, the claims are
`devoid of any specific means or technological detail for achieving that
`desired result. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:35–53. Instead, the claims merely
`employ result-oriented functional language, in which the recited functions
`are executed on general purpose computer components such as “a memory,”
`“an arithmetic processor,” and “terminal devices.”
`More specifically, the claimed “storing” step, which GREE argues is a
`technological improvement, recites nothing more than “a memory for storing
`information” that includes “groups to which [] players belong,” “a reward
`providing condition,” “rewards,” and a “reward box” for each group. Id. at
`11:14–24. And the “arithmetic processor