`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`GREE, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SUPERCELL OY,
`
`Defendant.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00413-JRG-RSP
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`GREE, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT SUPERCELL OY’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 1
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 2 of 34 PageID #: 185
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`RESPONSE TO SUPERCELL’S STATEMENT OF ISSUES ...........................................1
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Standard for Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ............................................2
`
`Standard for Patent Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Alice.............................2
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE SUZUKI PATENTS AND CHALLENGED CLAIMS ..................4
`
`SUPERCELL FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CLAIMS RECITE AN
`ABSTRACT IDEA UNDER ALICE STEP 1 ......................................................................6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`Supercell Improperly Describes the Claims at a High Level of Abstraction
`that Ignores Nearly Every Claim Element. ..............................................................6
`
`The Claims Are Drafted Such that there is No Risk of Pre-Emption. .....................9
`
`Supercell’s Reliance on the Federal Circuit’s Non-Precedential Decision
`in Planet Bingo and other Cases is Misplaced. ......................................................10
`
`Supercell’s Motion Fails to Address the Examiner’s Prior Finding that the
`Claims do not Recite an Abstract Idea. ..................................................................14
`
`Supercell Fails to Address GREE’s Pleadings which are Presumed True at
`the 12(b)(6) Stage. .................................................................................................15
`
`VI.
`
`SUPERCELL FAILS TO CARRY ITS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THE
`CLAIMS FAIL ALICE STEP 2 .........................................................................................16
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Supercell Fails to Address GREE’s Well-Pled Allegations, which are
`Presumed to be True at the 12(b)(6) Stage. ...........................................................16
`
`Supercell Fails to Shoulder its Burden of Establishing the Claims Fail
`Alice Step 2 by Clear and Convincing Evidence. ..................................................19
`
`VII.
`
`SUPERCELL FAILS TO CARRY ITS BURDEN WITH RESPECT TO THE
`DEPENDENT CLAIMS ....................................................................................................21
`
`VIII. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ISSUES RENDER SUPERCELL’S MOTION
`PREMATURE ...................................................................................................................23
`
`- i -
`
`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 2
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 3 of 34 PageID #: 186
`
`IF THE COURT IS INCLINED TO GRANT ANY PART OF SUPERCELL’S
`MOTION, GREE SHOULD BE GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND ................................25
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................26
`
`IX.
`
`X.
`
`
`- ii -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 3
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 4 of 34 PageID #: 187
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,
`882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .................................................................................... 18, 24, 25
`
`Alarm.com Inc. v. ipDatatel, LLC,
`383 F. Supp. 3d 719 (S.D. Tex. 2019) ...................................................................................... 25
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ........................................................................................................... passim
`
`Ancora Techs. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................ 7, 13
`
`Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................... 3, 17, 19
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ......................................................................................... passim
`
`Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen,
`681 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................... 2
`
`Carroll v. Fort James Corp.,
`470 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................. 25
`
`Cave Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp.,
`No. 6-17-CV-00344-RWS, 2018 WL 703247 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2018) .................................. 20
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
`927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................... 1, 17, 18
`
`Coleman v. Dretke,
`409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................... 14
`
`Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
`880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018 .................................................................................................... 7
`
`Courtesy Prods. L.L.C. v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc.,
`No. 13-2012-SLR-SRF, 2015 WL 6159113, at *6 n.7 ............................................................. 14
`
`Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................. 7, 13
`
`- iii -
`
`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 4
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 5 of 34 PageID #: 188
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................ 7, 13
`
`Doe v. United States,
`831 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 2
`
`Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co.,
`192 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. 15
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................ 3, 6, 19
`
`FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
`No. 8:14-CV-2685-T-23MAP, 2015 WL 3883958 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2015) ........................ 20
`
`Foman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178 (1962) .................................................................................................................. 25
`
`Garmin USA, Inc. v. Cellspin Soft, Inc.,
`140 S. Ct. 907 (2020) .................................................................................................................. 1
`
`GREE, Inc. v. Supercell OY,
` Civ. No. 2:19-cv-00161, Dkt. 58, at 4 ............................................................................... 11, 16
`
`In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V.,
`911 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................... 11, 24
`
`In re Smith,
`815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................... 11, 19, 24
`
`In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .............................................................................................. 9, 17
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
`838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................ 12
`
`Masel v. Villarreal,
`924 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................... 25
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) ...................................................................................................................... 3
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
`837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................... 9, 10, 18
`
`MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC,
`934 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .................................................................................. 2, 3, 15, 23
`
`- iv -
`
`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 5
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 6 of 34 PageID #: 189
`
`NexusCard, Inc. v. Kroger Co.,
`173 F. Supp. 3d 462 (E.D. Tex. 2016) ........................................................................................ 2
`
`Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC,
`576 F. App’x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 10
`
`Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States,
`850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................ 6, 24
`
`Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc.,
`675 Fed. Appx. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................... 22
`
`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................. 2, 23
`
`ZitoVault, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
`No. 3:16-cv-0962-M, 2018 WL 2971131, at n.5 ...................................................................... 14
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ............................................................................................................... 1, 2, 23, 25
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ............................................................................................................................. 20
`
`Rules and Regulations
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................. 2, 25
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ................................................................................................................. 25
`
`- v -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 6
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 7 of 34 PageID #: 190
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendant Supercell Oy (“Supercell”) asks this Court to ignore nearly every element in
`
`the claims, consider only their “gist,” and find them abstract. To do so is to allow 35 U.S.C. §
`
`101 to “swallow all of patent law,” as the Supreme Court warned against. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.
`
`v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014).
`
`Supercell further argues, ignoring GREE’s specifically pleaded allegations to the
`
`contrary, that everything in the claims was well-known, routine, and conventional. Supercell’s
`
`approach ignores the Federal Circuit’s holding that “whether a claim element or combination of
`
`elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is
`
`a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
`
`140 S. Ct. 911 (2020). As such this question of fact requires not just evidence, but clear and
`
`convincing evidence for Supercell to prevail. Yet, Supercell comes forward with no evidence,
`
`nor can it at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. See Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1317-
`
`18 (Fed. Cir. 2019) cert. denied sub nom. Garmin USA, Inc. v. Cellspin Soft, Inc., 140 S. Ct.
`
`907 (2020) (holding that when plaintiff “made specific, plausible factual allegations about why
`
`aspects of its claimed inventions were not conventional, . . . [t]he district court erred by not
`
`accepting those allegations as true”).
`
`Those errors aside, this motion can be denied based on the well-pled allegations in
`
`GREE’s Amended Complaint. The pleading explains exactly why the asserted claims recite
`
`patent-eligible subject matter. At this stage, those pleadings must be accepted as true,
`
`compelling denial of this motion to dismiss.
`
`II.
`
`RESPONSE TO SUPERCELL’S STATEMENT OF ISSUES
`
`The issue to be decided by this Court is whether to confirm that the asserted patents claim
`
`eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`- 1 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 7
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 8 of 34 PageID #: 191
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`A.
`
`Standard for Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
`
`A party may move to dismiss for a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
`
`granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At the 12(b)(6) stage, “[a]ll well-pleaded facts are accepted
`
`as true and ‘view[ed] . . . in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Doe v. United States,
`
`831 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2016) (second and third alternations in original) (quoting Bowlby v.
`
`City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012)); see also NexusCard, Inc. v. Kroger Co.,
`
`173 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (E.D. Tex. 2016). “Patent eligibility [under 35 U.S.C. § 101] may be
`
`determined on a Rule 12(c) motion, but only when there are no factual allegations that, if taken
`
`as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.” MyMail, 934 F.3d at
`
`1379.
`
`B.
`
`Standard for Patent Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Alice
`
`One may obtain a patent for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
`
`composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
`
`Supreme Court has held that it is implicit in the statute that “[l]aws of nature, natural
`
`phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216 (citation omitted).
`
`The “concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i]s one of pre-emption,” and the Supreme
`
`Court thus admonished that courts should “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary
`
`principle lest it swallow all of patent law.” Id. at 216-17.
`
`Under the framework set forth in Alice, the Court must first “determine whether the
`
`claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. at 218. “If not, the claims pass
`
`muster under § 101.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In
`
`addressing the Step 1 analysis the Federal Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that “describing
`
`the claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims all
`
`- 2 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 8
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`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 9 of 34 PageID #: 192
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`but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822
`
`F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`Only if the claims fail Step 1, does the test proceed to Step 2 where one must next
`
`“consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to
`
`determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
`
`eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
`
`Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78 (2012)). The Step 2 inquiry determines whether the claims add an
`
`inventive concept that is sufficient to ensure the patent amounts to more than a patent upon the
`
`abstract idea itself rather than merely a well-understood, routine and conventional combination
`
`of elements. Id. Importantly, while individual elements of a claim may not be patentable,
`
`those elements in ordered combination may amount to something more than an abstract idea.
`
`Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350, 1352 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2016). “The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-
`
`understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of
`
`fact.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
`
`Thus, to prevail on its Motion to Dismiss, Supercell must, with all of GREE’s
`
`allegations taken as true, demonstrate both that: (1) the claims, as an ordered combination, are
`
`directed to an abstract concept; and (2) this ordered combination of claim elements is well-
`
`understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan. See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1367-
`
`68; Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1318. Finally, in addressing a Section 101 motion to dismiss at the
`
`Rule 12 stage, “failure to address the parties’ claim construction dispute is error.” MyMail, Ltd.
`
`v. ooVoo, LLC, 934 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that “if the parties raise a claim
`
`construction dispute at the Rule 12(c) stage, the district court must either adopt the non-moving
`
`- 3 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 9
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`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 10 of 34 PageID #: 193
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`party’s constructions or resolve the dispute to whatever extent is needed to conduct the § 101
`
`analysis”). Supercell’s Motion fails on all accounts, and thus should be denied.
`
`IV.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE SUZUKI PATENTS AND CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`
`United States Patent No. 10,518,177 (the “’177 Patent”) is entitled “Game control
`
`method, system, and non-transitory computer-readable recording medium,” and United States
`
`Patent No. 10,583,362 (the “’362 Patent”)1 is entitled “Changing battle card game conditions
`
`during different terms.” The ’362 Patent is a continuation of the ʼ177 Patent (collectively, the
`
`“Suzuki Patents”), and they share a common specification. 2
`
`The Suzuki Patents describe and claim different aspects of innovative systems and
`
`methods for controlling and presenting games to users on a computer or mobile device, divide a
`
`battle game into time slots, sets battle conditions for the time slots, and provides “functionality
`
`[that] was not common or conventional at the time of the invention of the [Suzuki Patents].”
`
`(Dkt. No. 25, at ¶¶12-16; Dkt. No. 25-1, at 2:35-42.)
`
`Before the innovations described and claimed in the Suzuki Patents, conventional card-
`
`based computer battle videogames did not include two terms with two distinct battle conditions
`
`in the manner described and claimed in the Suzuki Patents. (See Dkt. No. 25, at ¶18.)
`
`Specifically, the Suzuki Patents explain that in conventional videogames, “players intentionally
`
`concentrate their attacks near the end of the time slot[,]” and that “[t]his strategy does not
`
`provide the opponent time to counterattack and allows for an effective attack by augmenting the
`
`attack strength through consecutive attacks.” (Dkt. No. 25-1, at 2:1-5.) Further, “subduing the
`
`boss in the last half earns a high number of points, whereas even if players actively participate in
`
`
`1 Attached hereto as Exhibit A.
`2 The references herein to the specification of the ’177 Patent, submitted at Dkt. No. 25-1, thus
`equally apply to the ’362 Patent.
`
`- 4 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 10
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`
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`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 11 of 34 PageID #: 194
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`the battle and attack the enemy in the first half, they may easily suffer a reverse in the last half.”
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`(Id. at 2:7-10.) The specification of the Suzuki Patents further explains that in these
`
`conventional games, “a battle may be fought with opponents having vastly dissimilar attack
`
`strengths” and that “beginners may therefore be unsuccessful” and thus “may end up passively
`
`participating in a group battle.” (Dkt. No. 25, at ¶13 (citing Dkt. No. 25-1, at 2:19-34).)
`
`The Suzuki Patents describe an innovative user interface for displaying “a virtual field on
`
`which the battle game progresses” (Dkt, No. 25-1, at 6:61-62) and game play that “divid[es] the
`
`battle into a plurality of time slots” and “set[s] a battle condition of at least one of the time slots .
`
`. . to differ from a battle condition of a second time slot . . . .” ( Dkt. No. 25, at ¶14 (citing Dkt.
`
`No. 25-1, at 2:35-60).) The specification of the Suzuki Patents further explains that “[b]y
`
`dividing the time slot of the battle game into a plurality of time slots and setting the battle
`
`condition for each time slot, a battle game that has conventionally been played under certain
`
`rules can be changed . . . .” (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 25-1, at 2:65-3:2).) The example is given of
`
`“setting a battle condition that is advantageous for a certain target and by changing the battle
`
`condition in the time slot for the first half, for example, when the participation rate in the time
`
`slot battle game is not high, an increase in the participation rate of characters throughout the time
`
`slots can be expected.” (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 25-1, at 3:2-7).)
`
`The Suzuki Patents also describe a client device with a game screen that can display a
`
`“stack of virtual cards,” and can display selected cards on a palette on the screen. (Id. at ¶16
`
`(citing Dkt. 25-1, at Figs. 1, 3, 4; 6:58-7:21).) Providing such a user interface and functionality
`
`was not common or conventional at the time of the invention of the Suzuki Patents. (Id.)
`
`The claims of the Suzuki Patents are rooted in computer technology and cannot be
`
`performed without a computer. (Id. at ¶17.) The claims are directed to specific improved
`
`- 5 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 11
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 12 of 34 PageID #: 195
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`graphical user interfaces and functionality on computers and mobile devices, and are inextricably
`
`tied to computer technology. (Id.)
`
`Each claim of the Suzuki Patents recites a distinct and particular invention. (Id. at ¶20.)
`
`No single claim of the Suzuki Patents is representative for purposes of determining subject
`
`matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Id. at ¶20.)
`
`V.
`
`SUPERCELL FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CLAIMS RECITE AN
`ABSTRACT IDEA UNDER ALICE STEP 1
`
`Supercell urges that the claims “are directed [to] the abstract idea of organizing a game
`
`with different rules for different phases of the game.” (Mot. at 1.) As explained below,
`
`Supercell’s argument ignores controlling Federal Circuit law that prevents defining the claims
`
`at such a high level of abstraction. It also ignores that there is no risk of pre-emption, the
`
`Examiner’s prior finding that this is not an abstract idea, and the Amended Complaint’s well-
`
`pled facts that must be accepted as true at this stage. Any one of these is fatal to Supercell’s
`
`motion.
`
`A.
`
`Supercell Improperly Describes the Claims at a High Level of Abstraction
`that Ignores Nearly Every Claim Element.
`
`
`Supercell attempts to boil the claims down to an abstract idea that ignores nearly every
`
`word in the claims. It urges that the claims are simply directed to “managing a game” and
`
`“organizing a game with different rules for different phases of the game” and ignores the bulk
`
`of the claim elements. (Mot. at 1.) This conclusory assertion runs afoul of the Federal
`
`Circuit’s admonition that “[w]e must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what the
`
`claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful.”
`
`Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added);
`
`see also Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337.
`
`The challenged claims recite innovative systems and methods that improve the utility of
`
`- 6 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 12
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 13 of 34 PageID #: 196
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`computerized games that cannot be played outside of the claimed computer and mobile
`
`components on which the game runs. As pled throughout the Amended Complaint, these
`
`claims provide an improvement over the prior art. (See Dkt. 25 at ¶¶ 13-19.) Further, the
`
`Federal Circuit repeatedly has held that inventions directed at improving the functioning of a
`
`computer are eligible under Alice step one, especially when the claims also disclose a novel
`
`user interface. For example, in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the
`
`Federal Circuit held that claims “directed to an improved user interface for computing devices”
`
`are not abstract. 880 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Other Federal Circuit cases have held
`
`that similar improvements likewise pass muster under Alice step one. See, e.g., Ancora Techs.
`
`v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that software improvements
`
`“can be a non-abstract computer-functionality improvement if done by a specific technique that
`
`departs from earlier approaches to solve a specific computer problem”); Data Engine Techs.
`
`LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The method provides a specific
`
`solution to then-existing technological problems in computers and prior art electronic
`
`spreadsheets. The specification teaches that prior art computer spreadsheets were not user
`
`friendly.”); see also DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014) (“[T]hese claims stand apart because they do not merely recite the performance of some
`
`business practice known from the pre-Internet world along with the requirement to perform it
`
`on the Internet. Instead, the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in
`
`order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”).
`
`The claimed systems and methods of the Suzuki Patents improve computer
`
`functionality by increasing the utility of computerized battle games that cannot be played
`
`outside of the context of the claimed computer components on which they run. (Dkt. 25 at
`
`- 7 -
`
`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 13
`
`
`
`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 14 of 34 PageID #: 197
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`¶¶14-16.) In Enfish, the Federal Circuit held that “[w]e do not read Alice to broadly hold that
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`all improvements in computer-related technology are inherently abstract and, therefore, must be
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`considered at step two. Indeed, some improvements in computer-related technology when
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`appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract.” 882 F.3d at 1335. “Software can make
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`non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements can.” Id.
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`In that case, “the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality
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`itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity,”
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`and thus the court found the claims at issue “not directed to an abstract idea” but rather
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`“directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate.” Id. at 1336.
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`As in Enfish and the other decisions cited above, the claimed systems and methods of
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`the Suzuki Patents provide specific and concrete improvements in the operation of a computer.
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`The claims are rooted in computer technology and are directed to the functioning of a
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`computer. (Dkt. 25 at ¶¶14, 17.) Every independent claim requires a “battle game,” “a stack of
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`virtual cards,” and “conducting a battle,” “parameter[s], and “first” and “second battle
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`condition[s].”
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`Further, every independent claim of the ’177 Patent requires “automatically initiating a
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`second term of the battle game” “at the conclusion of the first term of the battle game” and
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`“conducting the battle . . . based on the parameter set on the card selected by the player's
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`operation under a second battle condition, wherein the second battle condition is different from
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`the first battle condition and is predetermined independent from a battle result of the first term.”
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`(See, e.g., Dkt. 25-1, at 12:65-13:32.) And every independent claim of the ’362 Patent requires
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`“a predefined end timing based on a start timing of the battle game” a second predefined end
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`timing based on the start timing of the battle game.” (See, e.g., Exhibit A, at 13:11-34.) Claim
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 14
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`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 15 of 34 PageID #: 198
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`12 of the ’362 Patent also includes a “rendition processing module,” “a game screen,” and a
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`“battle processing unit.” (Id. at 14:23-55.)
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`Put another way, the claims require a virtual battle game under which certain rules can
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`be changed and battle conditions vary based on the time slot of the battle game. As explained
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`in the Amended Complaint, the Suzuki Patents “describe a client device with a game screen
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`that can display a ‘stack of virtual cards,’ and can display selected cards on a palette on the
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`screen” for the battle event in which certain rules and conditions vary. (See id. at ¶¶15-16
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`(citation omitted).) Providing such a user interface and functionality . . . cannot be performed
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`without a computer. (See id. at ¶¶16-17.) As in Enfish, this is a non-abstract improvement in
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`the operation of a computer-based battle game.
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`B.
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`The Claims Are Drafted Such that there is No Risk of Pre-Emption.
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`Supercell commits the error that the Federal Circuit warned against: “that courts ‘must
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`be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them generally and failing to
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`account for the specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.
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`Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823
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`F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In McRO, the Federal Circuit considered whether claims
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`directed to using a set of rules and weights to produce accurate and realistic lip
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`synchronizations for animations recited patent eligible subject matter. Id. at 1309-11. The
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`Federal Circuit confirmed the claims were patent eligible because they “[were] limited to rules
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`with certain common characteristics, i.e., a genus.” Id. at 1313. “Claims to the genus of an
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`invention, rather than a particular species, have long been acknowledged as patentable.” Id.
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`“The pre[-]emption3 concern arises when the claims are not directed to a specific invention and
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`3 The McRO Court addressed pre-emption as part of the Step 1 analysis. See McRO, 837 F.3d at
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`- 9 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 15
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`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 16 of 34 PageID #: 199
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`instead improperly monopolize ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work.’” Id. at
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`1314 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 216).
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`Similarly here, the claimed systems and methods of the Suzuki Patents do not attempt to
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`pre-empt the entire field of online games, let alone computerized battle games. To the contrary,
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`the claims are directed to specific technical improvements and include claim elements that
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`require conducting a battle with multiple terms during which the parameters and conditions
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`vary. The claims go further and specify information that the system must set these parameters
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`and conditions. As one example, claim 1 of the ’177 Patent requires “conducting the battle to a
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`second opponent character based on the parameter set on the card selected by the player’s
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`operation under a second battle condition, wherein the second battle condition is different from
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`the first battle condition and is predetermined independent from a battle result of the first term.”
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`(Dkt. No. 25-1, at 13:13-19.) Similarly, claim 1 of the ’362 Patent requires “conducting a
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`battle against a second-term opponent character appearing in the second term using a second-
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`term parameter based on a second-term card selected by the player.” (Dkt. No. 25, at ¶42
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`(quoting ’362 Patent, at 13:28-31).) Neither of these concepts is addressed by Supercell’s
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`proposed abstract idea. Moreover, the rules applied in the Suzuki Patents are tailored to avoid
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`the concerns of pre-emption, as with the claims found patent eligible in McRO. Thus, the
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`claims recite patent eligible subject matter.
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`C.
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`Supercell’s Reliance on the Federal Circuit’s Non-Precedential Decision in
`Planet Bingo and other Cases is Misplaced.
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`Supercell’s motion heavily relies on the non-precedential decision in Planet Bingo, LLC
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`v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Unlike the claims of the Suzuki
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`1316.
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`- 10 -
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`Supercell
`Exhibit 1020
`Page 16
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`Case 2:19-cv-00413-JRG Document 34 Filed 04/08/20 Page 17 of 34 PageID #: 200
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`Patents, the claims at issue